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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation advances and tests an explanation for the spread of violent civil conflict 
from one state to another. The fear of such “substate conflict contagion” is frequently invoked by 
American policymakers as a justification for military intervention in ongoing substate conflicts 
— the argument these policymakers often make is that conflicts left uncontained now will spread 
and become a more pertinent security threat later. My State Action Explanation is that substate 
conflict contagion is not the sole product of nonstate factors such as transnational rebel networks 
and arms flows, nor of the structural factors such as poverty that make internal conflict more 
likely in general. Rather, at least one of three deliberate state government actions is generally 
required for a conflict to spread, making substate conflict contagion both less common and more 
state-driven — and hence more preventable — than is often believed. These state actions include 
Evangelization, the deliberate encouragement of conflict abroad by former rebel groups that have 
taken over their home government; Expulsion, the deliberate movement of combatants across 
borders by state governments in conflict; and Meddling with Overt Partiality, the deliberate 
interference in another state’s conflict by a state government that subsequently leads to conflict 
in the interfering state. 
After introducing this State Action Explanation, I probe its empirical plausibility by 
identifying 84 cases of substate conflict contagion between 1946 and 2007, and showing that at 
least one of these three state actions was present and involved in most of these 84 cases. I then 
conduct two regional tests of the explanation, in Central America (1978-1996) and Southeast 
Asia (1959-1980). I argue that state actions appear to have been necessary for most of the 
contagion cases in both of these regions, and that the absence of state actions appears to best 
explain the cases in which conflicts did not spread. 
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Chapter 1: The Puzzle of Substate Conflict Contagion 
 The 2011 U.S. intervention in Libya was unusual in a number of respects. It was, for 
instance, one of the few American military interventions in which humanitarian factors played a 
major role in policymakers’ decision-making. In one respect, though, the intervention was part of 
a strikingly typical pattern in American foreign policy. The Libyan civil war was the latest in a 
long line of violent civil conflicts in which Washington intervened, in part, out of the fear that 
the conflict might soon spread to other states, destabilizing the entire region and leaving an even 
bigger mess for the international community to clean up later. In his March 28 address to the 
nation justifying the intervention, President Barack Obama said, “A massacre [in Benghazi] 
would have driven thousands of additional refugees across Libya’s borders, putting enormous 
strains on the peaceful — yet fragile — transitions in Egypt and Tunisia.” In other words, if the 
killing in Libya had not been contained, it might have spilled over into two neighboring countries 
that were themselves in the throes of (mostly nonviolent) political instability. 
 This particular justification for the Libya intervention has echoes in American military 
adventures dating back at least to the early Cold War. President George W. Bush advocated 
“staying the course” in Iraq in 2007 in part because of fears that if U.S. forces withdrew, radical 
nonstate actors in the country would be able to use it as a foothold to sow instability elsewhere in 
the region.1 Twelve years earlier, President Bill Clinton reasoned that if the U.S. did not take 
action in Bosnia, “The conflict that already has claimed so many people could spread like poison 
throughout the entire region.”2 Nine years before that, President Ronald Reagan said that if the 
U.S. “ignore[d] the malignancy in Managua,” it would “spread and become a mortal threat to the 
                                                 
1
 President George W. Bush’s address to the nation, January 10, 2007. 
2
 President Bill Clinton, November 22, 1995. Quoted in Michael E. Brown, “Introduction,” in Michael E. Brown, 
ed., The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 23-24. 
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entire world.”3 And, of course, the “Domino Theory” upon which American involvement in 
Vietnam was built began with a similar underlying assumption: that violent anti-regime conflict 
in one state might spread to another state, creating catastrophic security consequences for the 
U.S. if it was not contained quickly. 
If we took these policymaker rationalizations for American military intervention at their 
word, we would be forced to conclude that violent civil conflicts spread constantly and 
uncontrollably. Further, we would conclude that in order to prevent massive “outbreaks” of 
contagious civil war from enveloping entire regions, large-scale great power military 
intervention would frequently be necessary. But the truth behind these assumptions is murky. 
Despite excellent early academic work, the scholarly community still knows little about the 
frequency of substate conflict contagion or the conditions under which it occurs. 
On the one hand, we know that this policymaker fear of substate conflict contagion 
sometimes comes true. Figure 1.1 illustrates one of the most infamous recent cases, the spread of 
insurgency from Afghanistan to Pakistan. Each dot on the map in the figure represents a battle in 
a substate conflict.4 Between 2007 and 2009, the density of battles in the northwestern Pakistani 
border region progressively increased, as the Afghan civil war spilled over the border with 
greater frequency (as discussed in Chapter 3). Figure 1.2 provides a similar illustration of another 
infamous case of substate conflict contagion, this one from Croatia to Bosnia during  
 
                                                 
3
 President Ronald Reagan, March 17, 1986. Quoted in Jerome Slater, “Dominoes in Central America: Will They 
Fall? Does It Matter?” International Security 12, No. 2 (1987): 105-134, p. 106. 
4
 Data are plotted in ArcMap and come from the Afghanistan and Pakistan datasets of the Armed Conflict Location 
and Event Data (ACLED) project (http://www.acleddata.com/index.php/data, accessed March 22 and April 10, 
2012). See Clionadh Raleigh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre, and Joakim Karlsen, “Introducing ACLED: Armed 
Conflict Location and Event Data,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 47, No. 5 (2010): 1-10. Only events labeled as 
“battles” are shown. “Violence against civilians,” along with events from the dataset that were not necessarily 
violent — including “headquarters or base establishment,” “rioting/protesting,” and any event labeled “nonviolent” 
— are excluded. 
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Figure 1.1 (continues on next two pages). Geo-referenced battles in Afghan and Pakistani 
substate conflicts, 2007-2009. 
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Figure 1.2. Geo-referenced battles in Bosnian and Croatian substate conflicts, 1991-1992. 
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the early 1990s.5 In 1991 we see 216 battles in Croatia and only 2 in Bosnia.6 But in 1992 
Bosnia’s civil war began, in part because of the civil war in Croatia and the broader struggle for 
nationhood in the Balkans (as discussed in Chapter 3). In 1992, Bosnia saw 211 battles. The 
Croatian data show only two battles in 1992, which may be an incomplete accounting.7 
Regardless, it is clear that the conflict zone expanded in 1992 to include Bosnia. 
 And yet we also know that contrary to the frequent invocation of the fear of substate 
conflict contagion as a justification for great power military intervention, substate conflicts do 
not spread in all places or at all times. Figure 1.3 shows a map of most of Africa, this time 
showing all battles in substate conflicts between 1997 and 2010.8 I have been assured by the 
director of the project that collected these data, Clionadh Raleigh, that they are comparable 
cross-nationally.9 The distribution of these battles in Africa is discussed in more detail below, but 
at a quick glance we can see that in spite of the high frequency of substate conflict on the 
continent, dots have not covered the entire map. Some states, such as Namibia, seem to have 
escaped the scourge of substate conflict almost entirely. That is to say, conflict has spread in 
some cases and to some places but not others. 
If substate conflict contagion is neither imaginary nor ubiquitous, the relevant question 
becomes under what conditions violent civil conflict will spread from one state to another. Some 
quantitative and qualitative empirical work has begun to shed light on this question, but a 
complete explanation of the phenomenon remains elusive. Without a better understanding of  
                                                 
5
 Ibid, Bosnia and Croatia datasets. Again, only battles are shown. 
6
 The second of Bosnia’s two battles in 1991 lay along the northern border with Croatia, and is thus obscured in the 
figure by a Croatian battle. 
7
 The ACLED project includes a note on the Balkan data that states they are less complete than the data used here in 
Figures 1.1 and 1.3 (http://www.acleddata.com/templates/modernviewblue/documents/Balkans_note.pdf). 
8
 ACLED, “All Africa” data. Again, non-battle events are excluded, although the substantive story is similar if these 
events are included. 
9
 Clionadh Raleigh, personal communication, March 20, 2012. 
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Figure 1.3. Geo-referenced battles in African substate conflicts, 1997-2010. 
— 
what causes substate conflict contagion, academics and the policymakers they advise risk 
missing the warning signs of contagion. Or, perhaps worse, we risk committing valuable 
military, financial, and diplomatic resources to a far-off civil conflict that is not at risk of 
spreading and does not need to be contained, thereby reducing our ability to advance real 
security interests elsewhere. 
In this dissertation, I hope to start rectifying this status quo by exploring the conditions 
under which a “substate conflict” — an armed conflict between a state and militarized rebels10 
that has caused at least 25 cumulative battle-related deaths — makes a causal contribution to 
                                                 
10
 “One-sided violence” by a state against non-militarized dissidents, i.e. firing into a crowd of unarmed protesters, 
is not included in this definition. 
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the onset of a “civil war” in another state. This is my definition of substate conflict contagion. A 
“civil war” is defined here as an armed conflict between a state and militarized rebels that has 
caused at least 1,000 cumulative battle-related deaths. Thus all civil wars are substate conflicts, 
but the converse does not hold. A note on scope conditions: Since I am trying to unpack the 
policymaker assumption that uncontained civil conflicts will lead to regional catastrophes, I 
focus my study on civil war outcomes rather than low-intensity conflict outcomes. Were I to 
include low-intensity conflict outcomes within the scope of my dependent variable, my 
explanation of contagion would be different. This finding is discussed further in the empirical 
chapters. However, because there are some cases of low-intensity conflicts contributing to the 
onset of high-intensity conflicts in other states, I do include such “low-to-high” cases under the 
scope of my dependent variable. 
I advance and empirically test the explanation that substate conflicts are highly unlikely 
to spread unless a sovereign state government takes one of three specific, deliberate actions. 
These state actions — elaborated in more detail below — are Evangelization, the deliberate 
sponsorship of nascent rebel groups abroad by a state that has experienced a violent regime 
change; Expulsion, the deliberate transfer of combatants across borders by a state in conflict; 
and Meddling with Overt Partiality, the deliberate interference in another state’s substate 
conflict that subsequently leads to conflict in the interfering state. 
In the absence of at least one of these three state actions, substate conflict in one state will 
generally not spread to another state. Contagion faces significant natural obstacles, and it usually 
takes evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality to overcome those obstacles. 
One such obstacle is that substate conflicts and their accompanying brutality have a tendency to 
horrify rather than inspire potential rebels around the region, making potential rebels less rather 
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than more likely to rebel themselves.11 Other obstacles, discussed more fully below, include the 
ability of states to “fortify” themselves against contagion, the rarity of substate conflict in 
general, and the rarity of high-intensity conflict. The presence of these obstacles means that 
contrary to the current consensus in the small extant academic literature on the spread of violent 
civil conflict, nonstate actors such as rebel networks and arms dealers generally cannot create the 
conditions for successful substate conflict contagion on their own. State action of the kinds 
described above is usually also required. 
This is good news for great power policymakers. First, substate conflict is much more 
difficult to spread than they currently believe, meaning many conflicts do not require any 
intervention at all. Second, because substate conflict contagion is also significantly more state-
driven than the academic conventional wisdom suggests, it is also significantly more 
preventable. Great power governments, the U.S. included, can use their coercive leverage over 
other states to dissuade them from evangelizing, expelling, or meddling. Such coercion may not 
be easy, but it is certainly easier than trying to stop the nonstate causes of substate conflict 
contagion — trying to keep rebel groups from talking to each other, or trying to interdict illicit 
economies. And I argue that this state-to-state coercion, when successful, can prevent the vast 
majority of potential contagion cases, even with important nonstate factors still in operation. 
That being said, the means of coercion are important. Using military force in the name of 
preventing contagion may end up constituting meddling with overt partiality, and thereby 
increasing the risk of the spread of violent civil conflict. Thus coercive diplomacy seems to be 
the most prudent course for policymakers interested in preventing substate conflict contagion. 
                                                 
11
 James Fearon, “Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict,” in David Lake and Donald Rothchild, 
eds., The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1998), pp. 112-113. 
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 In the remainder of this introductory chapter, I first briefly discuss whether the spread of 
substate conflict across borders is analytically distinct from the spread of substate conflict within 
borders (I argue that it is). I then provide an overview of the political science literature on 
“contagion” in general and substate conflict contagion in particular. I also consider whether 
likening the spread of conflict to the spread of disease might help us explain substate conflict 
contagion — it does, to a limited extent. Next, I discuss in more detail the contributions I hope to 
make to the existing literature. Finally, I discuss the methodology of my study and lay out the 
plan for the rest of the dissertation. 
The Relevance of Borders to the Spread of Substate Conflict 
 Before launching into a dissertation seeking to explain the spread of violent civil conflict 
across borders, it is first worth asking whether borders matter to the spread of violent civil 
conflict at all. In other words, is the spread of substate conflict from one state to another a 
distinct phenomenon from the spread of substate conflict within states? Or can we explain all the 
variation in the interstate spread of substate conflict by invoking the causes of the intrastate 
spread of substate conflict? 
 Perhaps unsurprisingly, I believe borders do matter to the phenomenon of substate 
conflict contagion. Theoretically, the “natural obstacles” foundation for my State Action 
Explanation, which I elaborate in Chapter 2, gives us some reason to expect the spread of 
conflict across borders to be more difficult than the spread of conflict within states. Several of 
these natural obstacles, such as the tendency for conflict to horrify rather than inspire potential 
rebels and the ability of state governments to fortify themselves against the potential for substate 
conflict onset, are likely magnified when an international border is involved. For example, the 
“reverse demonstration effect” (the first obstacle mentioned) is likely compounded when 
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potential rebels realize: “Not only did the original rebellion not go well, but any lessons we try to 
translate to our own rebellion will have to be adapted to a fighting a different state actor in a 
different political, institutional, geographic, and (potentially) cultural context.” As for 
fortification (the second obstacle mentioned), it is also a more formidable obstacle to contagion 
when a border is involved. If we are only talking about contagion within a state, then the sole 
state government involved probably has a limited capacity to fortify itself against further conflict 
— after all, a conflict has already started in that state. But contagion across borders involves, by 
definition, a second state — which, on average, we should expect to be more willing and able to 
fortify itself (because it is not currently in conflict, and because a proximate conflict abroad has 
made it pay more attention to the danger of internal strife at home). In short, interstate substate 
conflict contagion should be more difficult than its intrastate counterpart, and because it is 
harder, its causes should be different. 
 I also have preliminary empirical evidence that shows the relevance of borders to the 
spread of substate conflict. Recall the map shown in Figure 1.3 above, and recall that each dot 
represents a battle in a substate conflict. The map shows some states with many densely clustered 
dots — Burundi seems to be the most extreme example — and other states, such as Congo-
Brazzaville, with few dots. Contiguity to a state with many dots does not seem to ensure that a 
given state will have many dots itself. See, for instance, the sparsely dotted Tanzania (contiguous 
neighbor of dot-heavy Burundi, Uganda, Kenya, and Congo-Kinshasa), or the sparsely dotted 
Cameroon (contiguous neighbor of dot-heavy Nigeria and, to a lesser extent, the Central African 
Republic). Only in the Horn of Africa (Somalia, Ethiopia, and present-day South Sudan) do we 
see something approaching a similar density of dots cross-nationally. These data suggest that 
violence does not spread across geographic space with reckless abandon. Rather, in many cases 
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violence appears to be stopped, at least partially, by international borders. Therefore, the spread 
of violence across international borders is an analytically distinct phenomenon from the spread 
of violence within states, and worth better understanding on its own. 
 Additionally, the academic literature that we might harness to understand the spread of 
substate conflict within states is even less developed than the literature on the spread of conflict 
between states (the latter of which is reviewed below). The major published works I found on 
intrastate contagion only began appearing around 2008, and many of these preliminary works are 
understandably more focused on describing the spread of conflict within borders than explaining 
it.12 As one the most comprehensive studies to date acknowledges, “We can show that our subset 
of civil wars exhibits characteristic diffusion patterns [within borders], but we do not know 
precisely what actors and conditions generate them.”13 Many of the explanatory variables that 
are advanced are accounted for elsewhere in my research design — availability of arms,14 ethnic 
linkages,15 and inspiration of rebellion in one locality by rebellion in another locality16 are 
                                                 
12
 The literature on intrastate conflict contagion includes: Michael Townsley, Shane D. Johnson, and Jerry H. 
Ratcliffe, “Space Time Dynamics of Insurgent Activity in Iraq,” Security Journal, Vol. 21 (2008): 139-146; Nils B. 
Weidmann and Michael D. Ward, “Predicting Conflict in Space and Time,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 54, 
No. 6 (2010): 883-901; John O’Loughlin and Frank D.W. Witmer, “The Localized Geographies of Violence in the 
North Caucasus of Russia, 1999-2007,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 101, No. 1 
(2011): 178-201; Sebastian Schutte and Nils B. Weidmann, “Diffusion Patterns of Violence in Civil Wars,” Political 
Geography, Vol. 30 (2011): 143-152; Jesse Hammond, “Cartography of Crisis: Diffusion of Insurgent Violence as a 
Strategic Process,” Paper Presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Diego, April 1-
4, 2012; Erika Forsberg, “Do Ethnic Dominoes Fall? Evaluating Domino Effects of Granting Territorial 
Concessions to Separatist Groups,” International Studies Quarterly, forthcoming; and Yuri M. Zhukov, “Roads and 
the Diffusion of Insurgent Violence: The Logistics of Conflict in Russia’s North Caucasus,” Political Geography, 
forthcoming. 
13
 Schutte and Weidman, “Diffusion Patterns,” p. 152. 
14
 Townsley et al., “Space Time Dynamics,” p. 141. 
15
 O’Loughlin and Witmer, “The Localized Geographies of Violence,” p. 178. 
16
 Forsberg, “Do Ethnic Dominoes Fall?” Forsberg tests the theoretical arguments of Monica Duffy Toft, The 
Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2003); Barbara F. Walter, “Building Reputation: Why Governments Fight Some Separatists but Not Others,” 
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 50, No. 2 (2006): 313-330; and Barbara F. Walter, “Information, 
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included below as “nonstate factors” that may link two potential rebel actors in separate states. 
Yuri M. Zhukov’s work on road networks as vectors of conflict is an exception in which a 
unique cause of contagion is advanced, although Zhukov cautions that roads may cause conflicts 
to “relocate” rather than expand.17 Road networks are discussed below as a structural factor that 
helps enable contagion across borders. On the whole, though, it is clear that the nascent literature 
on intrastate substate conflict contagion cannot fully explain interstate substate conflict 
contagion. With this clarified, I seek to advance my own explanation for the latter phenomenon, 
starting with a review of the most pertinent literature. 
Progress and Shortcomings of Past Literature 
 International relations scholars have been interested in the general phenomenon of 
“contagion” for decades, and work on the contagion of interstate war has comprised a significant 
part of this literature (see below). By contrast, work on contagion of intrastate conflict has been 
limited. Furthermore, much of the past work has not focused on the conditions under which 
substate conflict contagion might occur, and has instead focused on the question of whether such 
contagion exists at all (to which the answer is unequivocally “yes”). 
In the early 1990s, Jerome Slater and Douglas Macdonald debated the empirical veracity 
of the Domino Theory — which basically asserts that leftist insurgencies are contagious. This 
debate did not progress in part because the specific definition of the Domino Theory kept 
shifting. First, Slater tried to exclude 1970s Indochina as a case of the theory operating as 
expected, by arguing that the theory predicts contagion across entire regions, not to individual 
                                                                                                                                                             
Uncertainty, and the Decision to Secede,” International Organization, Vol. 60, No. 1 (2006): 105-135 vis-à-vis the 
interdependence of secessionist movements, ultimately finding little empirical support for these arguments. 
17
 O’Loughlin and Witmer also note that road networks are correlated with density of violence (“The Localized 
Geographies of Violence,” p. 178), as does Hammond (“Cartography of Crisis”). Hammond also finds that conflict 
spreads more quickly to more populated localities; population is included in the statistical models of civil war onset 
that I use to proxy for structural factors. 
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states.18 Then, when Macdonald pointed out that China and Cuba may only have failed to inspire 
regional contagion because “the United States and the West intervened to contain revolutions,”19 
Slater redefined the theory’s predictions to emphasize the inevitability of contagion — thus, 
whenever cascading revolutions did not occur, the theory was invalidated without regard to 
great-power actions.20 So the exchange was problematic because it centered around whether 
contagion ever happened, resulting in circular definitional debates. 
Quantitative literature on substate conflict contagion in general — moving beyond the 
narrow scope of leftist contagion that concerned Slater and Macdonald — was similarly focused 
on contagion’s very existence for most of the 2000s. While R. William Ayres and Stephen 
Saideman argued in 2000 that both domestic and external factors appeared to influence separatist 
conflict, two prominent statistical studies of the causes of civil war, from Håvard Hegre et al. in 
2001 and James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin in 2003, found no significant association between 
the involvement of a state in civil war and the likelihood of civil war onset in an adjacent state.21 
Seeming cases of contagion, in other words, appeared to be artifacts of the spatial clustering of 
other variables causing conflict, such as poverty and non-democracy.22 
Subsequent work came to opposing findings. First, in 2006 Idean Salehyan and Kristian 
Skrede Gleditsch demonstrated an independent association between a “neighbor at war” dummy 
                                                 
18
 Slater, “Dominoes in Central America,” p. 112. 
19
 Douglas J. Macdonald, “America and Democratic Reform in the Third World: A Reply to Jerome Slater,” 
Security Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1993): 163-173, p. 167. 
20
 Jerome Slater, “Response to Douglas J. Macdonald,” Security Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1993): 174-180, p. 176. 
21
 R. William Ayres and Stephen Saideman, “Is Separatism as Contagious as the Common Cold or as Cancer? 
Testing International and Domestic Explanations,” Nationalism & Ethnic Politics, Vol. 6, No. 3 (2000): 91-113; 
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variable and civil war onset.23 Hegre and Nicholas Sambanis found the same result later that 
year.24 The following year, Gleditsch found a similar link between neighboring substate conflicts 
(which, as above, are less bloody and more frequent than civil wars).25 Finally, in 2008, Halvard 
Buhaug and Gleditsch replicated that finding, while explicitly controlling for prominent spatially 
clustered explanatory variables.26 As in the Domino Theory exchange, we learned from this 
debate that contagion of substate conflict sometimes happens, but one is left wondering how 
frequently it happens and, more importantly, why it happens in some cases but not others. 
 Although a few methodologically rudimentary studies exploring the conditions under 
which substate conflict contagion occurs were published in the late Cold War,27 interest in the 
“conditions” question did not coalesce until after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the most 
sophisticated studies have only been published in the last four years. The occurrence of at least 
one undisputed case of contagion (Great Lakes) in the 1990s doubtlessly helped to move the 
debate beyond existence to conditions, although the quantitative literature lagged behind this 
empirical shock considerably. The conditions literature has gotten off to a promising start, but it 
faces two challenges that this dissertation aims to overcome. 
 The first challenge, which applies primarily to the quantitative conditions literature, 
concerns the definition of the dependent variable. Large-N contagion conditions scholars have 
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generally defined contagion as the occurrence of a conflict onset in a state which is adjacent to a 
state in conflict.28 This definition is problematic in two ways. First, only focusing on adjacent 
states underestimates the frequency of contagion in many situations. Although the means by 
which substate conflict spreads is at least partially geographic in nature, non-geographic factors 
play a role as well. For example, if it is foreign support that causes some rebellions, there is no 
strong reason to expect that support to spread only across land borders. So by limiting the scope 
to contiguous states, some important cases of contagion are omitted. 
A second problem with the dependent variable definition used by large-N scholars is that 
the definition also overestimates contagion. The danger for overestimation stems from the fact 
that any onset in a state adjacent to a state in conflict is included in the definition. Large-N 
scholars have not required that the two conflicts in question be causally linked to each other — 
yet we could observe spatially clustered conflicts because of actual contagion (one conflict 
contributing to the onset of another), spatial clustering of other explanatory variables (discussed 
above), or pure coincidence. Hence Forsberg identifies 185 cases of ethnic conflict contagion 
between 1989 and 2004,29 many of which would probably not be identified by regional experts 
as actual instances of one conflict influencing the onset of another. Future research should aim to 
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define contagion in a way that better distinguishes actual cases of the phenomenon from 
illusionary ones. 
 The other major challenge applies to all of the extant conditions literature: This literature 
is in search of a unified explanation of contagion. Numerous possible causes have been advanced 
in prior scholarship, but they largely cumulate to a list of variables. Snyder suggests four 
possible causes of falling dominoes: “when (1) target states are weak domestically, small in size, 
geographically contiguous, or bereft of strong allies; (2) the initial fallen domino is similar in its 
main characteristics to a number of subsequent targets; (3) the initial domino is major country; 
… and (4) military technology facilitates the offensive.”30 Macdonald makes a list that is similar 
but not identical: 
“The causes of revolutionary contagion are several: regional economic crises; a set of weak or 
demoralized elites in target nations; the psychological and physical aftermath of general war; the 
rise in popularity of a transcendent ideology with region-wide adherents; domestic political 
crises; and offensive political strategies.”31 
 
Brown identifies four possible “mechanisms that transmit instability from one place to another”: 
refugees, economic problems, “rebel activities in neighboring states,” and “when ethnic groups 
straddle formal international frontiers.”32 Lake and Rothchild, whose work on ethnic conflict 
“diffusion” is among the best known in the field, propose four diffusion mechanisms — one 
concerns “events abroad … chang[ing] directly the ethnic balance of power at home,” and the 
other three involve information revealed by another state’s conflict about an ethnic group’s 
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political safety or “costs of protest.”33 To this list, Kirstin Hasler adds the possibility that states 
play a role in conflict’s spread, ironically as they seek to prevent contagion through repression of 
their own people and interference in the conflicts of others.34 
 The quantitative conditions literature has produced a similarly diverse list of independent 
variables. Potential causes of contagion identified in this literature include: transnational ethnic 
or religious ties between states,35 refugee flows,36 separatist conflicts (as opposed to conflicts 
over control of the central state),37 limited “state capacity” of the potential receiving state 
(measured various ways),38 the intensity of the original conflict,39 the absence of international 
peacekeeper involvement in the original conflict,40 and, relatedly, “the flow of arms across 
borders.”41 Setting aside the fact that these scholars do not agree among each other about the 
statistical significance of individual variables, there is little conceptual unity to this list, apart 
from a general focus on nonstate actors to the exclusion of sovereign state governments (a 
tendency discussed further in Chapter 2).  
 Without a unified explanation of contagion, which both the qualitative and quantitative 
contagion conditions literatures lack, scholars and policymakers are left with little sense of which 
of these numerous variables are most important, how they interact, which conditions are 
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necessary or sufficient, or what causal mechanisms underlie the various correlations that have 
been found. Put simply, without a unified explanation, it is hard to know where even to begin in 
order to try to explain and predict the occurrence of substate conflict contagion. 
 What of the international relations literature on contagion in general — can it provide the 
framework we need to make sense of this question? Unfortunately, this larger literature does not 
help in this regard. There is some interesting theoretical work on what interstate contagion is and 
what different subtypes of it exist. But many of these theories are too specific to travel well 
across issue areas. Beth Simmons and Zachary Elkins, for instance, define “diffusion” as a 
process, not an outcome — precisely the opposite of what is meant by “contagion” here — and 
specify that diffusion cannot include coordinated action.42 The latter stipulation is problematic 
because governments or fighters may indeed coordinate violent action across borders. 
Conversely, Benjamin Most and Harvey Starr require conscious imitation by “local 
policymakers” of “other polities,” excluding inadvertent “diffusion” from their definition.43 
Ironically, another of Starr’s theories — he published extensively on the contagion of interstate 
conflict in the 1980s — is too vague to be useful. He defended a causal framework based on a 
state’s “opportunity” to receive a diffusion of war (proxied by physical proximity) and its 
“willingness” (proxied by alliances) to do so.44 Opportunity and willingness could be proxied in 
countless ways in the domain of substate conflict, so as before it is difficult to know what 
variables to include. Furthermore, civil war scholars are already all too familiar with a parallel 
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framework for explaining individual substate conflict onsets — greed and grievance45 — so the 
opportunity/willingness construct adds little. 
 Finally, what about the epidemiology literature, which seeks to explain the spread of 
disease? Many policymakers have likened the spread of substate conflict to the spread of disease; 
for example, President Obama told CNN in November 2009, “We have a vital interest in making 
sure that Afghanistan is sufficiently stable, that it can’t infect the entire region with violent 
extremism.”46 If we take the conflict-as-disease analogy seriously, can we leverage the 
epidemiology literature to generate a simple explanation of substate conflict contagion? 
 Generally, scholars have looked on this analogy with skepticism, if not outright scorn, 
calling the comparison “simplistic” and “deterministic.” One of these scholars’ chief complaints 
is that likening substate conflict contagion to the spread of a disease takes human agency out of 
the equation; it implies that political actors have no more culpability than might a child for 
catching the flu.47 I think this critique is unfair, because the causes of the spread of disease are 
neither simplistic nor deterministic. Many diseases, such as cancer, have a wide array of causes, 
as discussed further below. And many diseases are caused in large part by human behavior. So 
saying that a phenomenon “spreads like a disease” does not imply that the spread of the 
phenomenon is simple — that it only has one or two underlying causes — or that human agency 
is not involved in its spread. 
 In reality, there is explanatory leverage to be had from making an analogy between the 
spread of disease and the spread of conflict, although this analogy alone cannot generate a full 
explanation of substate conflict contagion. Such an analogy is limited in its inferential power 
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because it is not specific about what type of disease a substate conflict is. The world has 
countless diseases that spread for countless reasons; modeling the spread of just one of these 
diseases can be the work of a lifetime for an epidemiologist.48 Without any analytic priors about 
where in this maze of analogues violent civil conflict fits, we can only make general statements 
linking epidemics and spreading conflicts. More specifically, we can only use general theoretical 
frameworks of how diseases spread. 
The most promising of these theoretical frameworks is the “Epidemiologic Triangle,” 
shown in Figure 1.4.49 The triangle has three vertices, each representing a class of causes of the 
spread of disease: host, agent, and environment. The host, or potential target of the infection, 
may have characteristics that make him particularly susceptible or non-susceptible to infection. 
He may lack immunity to the pathogen, or have poor nutrition, or have an unusually high number 
of social contacts that increase his odds of exposure. The infecting agent (a pathogen, e.g. a 
bacterium or virus) may also have characteristics that make it more or less likely to spread. For 
example, airborne agents are more easily transmitted than sexually transmitted diseases. Finally, 
the environment — “the sum total of influences that are not part of the host [or agent]”50 — can 
have characteristics that are more or less conducive to the spread of disease; we expect high-
density urban areas or toxic waste dumps to be more spread-prone than a pristine country  
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Figure 1.4. The Epidemiologic Triangle. 
— 
meadow. 
The Epidemiologic Triangle is an intriguing theoretical framework, because we can also 
imagine causes of the spread of substate conflict that look like “host” factors (i.e., the potential 
receiving state’s wealth or population density) or “agent” factors (i.e., the intensity of the 
potentially contagious substate conflict) or “environment” factors (i.e., the involvement of great 
powers in the region). In particular, we will find this framework useful later in the dissertation as 
we consider the interaction between the state actions that form the cornerstone of my explanation 
and the structural factors that cause civil war in general, such as poverty and ethnic 
fractionalization. Structural factors are analogous to “host” factors in the Epidemiologic Triangle 
framework, because they are characteristics of the potential target of the “infection.” As 
elaborated in Chapter 2 and throughout the empirical chapters, my State Action Explanation 
argues that evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality are usually necessary 
Host 
Environment Agent 
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for contagion, but that such actions cannot produce contagion outcomes in a “healthy host.” In 
other words, a state lacking the structural conditions for civil war will most likely not see a 
substate conflict spread to it, even if one of its neighbors evangelizes or expels, or even if it 
meddles.  
 Overall, the past literature on substate conflict contagion, as well as the broader literature 
on contagion as a phenomenon in international relations, do not yet help scholars and 
policymakers understand the causes of substate conflict contagion in a unified, readily applicable 
way. The literature on infectious disease epidemiology does provide us with a useful theoretical 
framework, although its generality prevents us from developing a full understanding of substate 
conflict contagion on the basis of the conflict-as-disease analogy alone. From all of this 
literature, we are missing a more accurate dependent variable and, more importantly, a unified 
explanation. The aim of this dissertation is to overcome both of these challenges. 
Contributions of this Dissertation 
 This dissertation makes two main contributions to the existing academic literature on and 
policymaker understanding of substate conflict contagion. First, by conceiving of the dependent 
variable differently than many of the works described above, I generate a more comprehensive 
and accurate universe of cases of substate conflict contagion between 1946 and 2007. Recall that 
under my definition of substate conflict contagion, the phenomenon occurs when a substate 
conflict makes a causal contribution to the onset of a civil war in another state. Notably, my 
definition allows contagion to occur between non-contiguous states; instead of only considering 
pairs of states which border each other, I consider pairs of states in the same “neighborhood,” 
where each neighborhood is a region of geographically and historically similar states that 
influence one another’s internal politics. (The list of neighborhoods and the states belonging to 
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them can be found in Chapter 3.) This broader conception of contagion prevents us from missing 
key cases. 
 My definition of the dependent variable also avoids the overestimation problem described 
above, by requiring that two spatially and temporally clustered substate conflicts also share a 
causal relationship with one another. So instead of looking for clusters of conflicts in space and 
time and deeming any two clustered conflicts to be a case of contagion, I started with those 
clusters and then researched the secondary source literature on each one to determine whether the 
original conflict in one state was considered by area experts to be clearly linked to the 
subsequent civil war in the other state. This is a fairly low causal threshold — the original 
conflict does not have to be the sole cause of the subsequent civil war, or a necessary condition 
for the subsequent civil war, just a contributing factor — yet it is a substantially higher threshold 
than the definition used by many previous scholarly works. My initial search for clusters of 
substate conflicts turned up 665 pairs between 1946 and 2007, yet I found causal links between 
clustered conflicts alleged by experts in only 162 of those pairs. Of those 162 cases, 78 were then 
excluded because the second conflict in the cluster was not a full-scale civil war (in other words, 
the conflict did not result in 1,000 cumulative battle-related deaths). This extensive coding 
process thus left me with 84 genuine cases of substate conflict contagion, which are discussed in 
detail in Chapter 3. 
 The second major contribution of this dissertation is a unified explanation of substate 
conflict contagion, which is missing from the existing literature. My State Action Explanation 
seeks to account for the occurrence of the 84 identified cases of substate conflict contagion, as 
well as the tens of thousands of cases during the same timeframe in which contagion did not 
occur. The logic behind the explanation is elaborated in Chapter 2, but in brief, I start from the 
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premise that substate conflict contagion is hard. It is hard because there are significant natural 
obstacles to the spread of violent civil conflict across borders, particularly if we require in our 
definition that the second conflict in a pair escalates to full-scale civil war. These obstacles, 
discussed more fully in the next chapter, include the propensity for conflicts to horrify rather 
than inspire potential imitators,51 the ability of states to “fortify” themselves against contagion, 
the rarity of substate conflict in general, and the rarity of high-intensity conflict. 
 So to spread a conflict, an actor needs to be able to overcome these obstacles. 
Empirically, I have found that the natural obstacles to substate conflict contagion can be 
overcome — at least sometimes — by combinations of 10 distinct causal mechanisms. The first 
six involve only nonstate actors, and I collectively refer to them as nonstate factors in this 
dissertation. Many nonstate factors have already been mentioned in some form in the previous 
academic literature described above. They are: (1) the inspiration of potential rebels in one state 
by active rebels in another state, (2) the assistance of potential rebels in one state by active rebels 
in another state, (3) the movement of weapons from a state in conflict to potential rebels in 
another state, (4) the movement of illicit drugs from a state in conflict to potential rebels in 
another state (who exploit the drug trade to build up resources they need to start their rebellion), 
(5) the return of foreign fighters in one conflict to their home state, after which those fighters stir 
up conflict at home, and (6) the movement of refugees from a state in conflict to a state at peace, 
the latter of which is destabilized by the refugee flows. However, while these nonstate causal 
mechanisms are doubtlessly important and perhaps sometimes necessary for the spread of 
substate conflict, in most cases they are insufficient to cause substate conflict contagion on their 
own. The natural obstacles to contagion are generally too great for nonstate actors to overcome 
alone. 
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 The seventh causal mechanism is the set of structural factors that cause civil war in 
general; we discussed these factors above as those which make “host” states “susceptible” to 
“infection.” Structural factors, such as underdevelopment and mountainous terrain in a potential 
host state, render the natural obstacles to substate conflict contagion less formidable. For 
example, they may increase the general level of grievance among potential rebels in a given 
state, making it easier for potential rebel elites to mobilize fighters. We could also consider the 
road network between two states — roads being a potentially important cause of intrastate 
contagion, as discussed above — to be a structural factor, since road links ease the occurrence of 
many of the nonstate factors discussed above. Like nonstate factors, structural factors are very 
difficult to change. Great power policymakers are hard-pressed to make a given state less poor 
over even the medium term, and they certainly cannot make a state less mountainous! We should 
not expect substate conflict to spread to states where the baseline conditions for conflict do not 
exist, so these structural factors are usually necessary for contagion. But, like the nonstate 
factors, these structural factors are insufficient to cause substate conflict contagion on their own. 
There are many potential contagion cases — a small subset of which I manage to identify in the 
empirical chapters — in which the structural conditions for civil war undeniably exist, but where 
the obstacles to contagion still prevail. 
 Rather, it appears that in order for substate conflict contagion to happen, the natural 
obstacles usually must be overcome by at least one of three deliberate state actions (more 
precisely, state government actions), which constitute the remaining three causal mechanisms. 
Under the first state-driven mechanism, Evangelization, a rebel group fighting a substate conflict 
in one state unseats the government, takes the reins of the state itself, and then sponsors nascent 
rebel groups in nearby states. Examples include Communist China’s support for the Naga rebels 
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in India in the 1950s and Liberia’s support for the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone in 
the 1990s. The second state action, Expulsion, involves the movement of combatants from a state 
in conflict to another state, by the government of the state in conflict (which is more able to expel 
combatants thoroughly and permanently than a nonstate actor). The expelled actors then 
contribute to the onset of a civil war in the state to which they were driven. Examples include the 
Ugandan expulsion of Rwandan combatants prior to the start of the bloody Rwandan civil war, 
and the Afghan/American expulsion of jihadist elites into Iraq prior to 2004. The final state 
action, Meddling with Overt Partiality, occurs when a state government interferes in a nearby 
substate conflict abroad, usually by supporting the rebels.52 (The caveats of “overt” and “partial” 
will be explained in Chapter 2.) This meddling can boomerang back to the meddling state in one 
of three ways (detailed in Chapter 2), the most obvious of which is that the state being meddled 
with may retaliate against the meddling state by sponsoring a rebel movement there. Examples 
include the infamous Rwandan retaliation for Zairean meddling, and the boomeranging of the 
Taliban conflict from Afghanistan to meddlesome Pakistan. 
 I argue that because it usually takes the considerable resources of a state government to 
overcome the natural obstacles to substate conflict contagion, the presence of at least one of 
these three state actions is usually a necessary condition for contagion. They are not sufficient 
conditions either. Indeed, we will see empirical cases in which state actions occurred but 
contagion did not. Such cases suggest that state actions must combine with nonstate factors, and 
even more commonly with the structural factors that cause civil war in general, in order to 
produce contagion outcomes. Nevertheless, without the occurrence of these state actions, most 
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cases of contagion could not happen. Therefore, while recognizing the complexity of the 
phenomenon I am studying, my explanation leads to a simple conclusion: If evangelization, 
expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality could be prevented — which ought to be a good 
deal easier than preventing nonstate or structural factors — so too could most potential cases of 
substate conflict contagion. 
 As discussed above, the chief policy implications of this State Action Explanation are (1) 
because of the inherent difficulty of contagion, the containment of many violent civil conflicts in 
the developing world requires no intervention at all, and (2) when the empirically rare presence 
of state action creates a risk of contagion, great powers should try to prevent the spread of 
substate conflict by coercing other state governments to refrain from these actions — while 
remaining mindful of the means of coercion and avoiding meddling with overt partiality. 
Meanwhile, there are significant scholarly implications of this research project as well. Not only 
does this dissertation represent an ambitious empirical exploration of substate conflict contagion, 
but it is also one of the first to emphasize the role of the state so heavily. Clearly the academic 
literature to date has emphasized nonstate factors as spreaders of substate conflict; my work 
acknowledges the importance of these factors, but focuses on a different and more preventable 
set of causes. By virtue of my key independent variables, my work is also distinct in that while 
acknowledging the important role of structural causes of contagion — which include the 
structural causes of civil war in general, as well as factors such as the intensity of the original 
conflict, about which potential receiving state governments can usually do little — I combine 
these variables with agent-driven or policy-driven causes of substate conflict contagion, which 
can be changed more easily. 
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 I should note that this is not the first scholarly work on substate conflict contagion to 
hypothesize that states matter more than the received wisdom lets on. Hasler’s excellent 2011 
conference paper, cited above, also makes this claim. However, her conception of the state-
driven causes of substate conflict contagion is less developed than the one advanced in this 
dissertation. She posits two basic causal mechanisms: states repressing their populations and 
states intervening in neighboring conflicts, both ironically in the name of preventing contagion. 
But there is little explanation of how the mechanisms actually work — why, for instance, does 
repression cause rebellion in some cases but civil peace in others? Meanwhile, the evangelization 
and expulsion mechanisms of my State Action Explanation are not discussed. While a certain 
variant of meddling is explored, her work only considers meddling conducted to prevent 
contagion, which is not the only reason states meddle in each other’s conflicts (as discussed 
further in Chapter 2). Finally, from an empirical standpoint, Hasler only looks at cases involving 
Kurdish minorities, while this dissertation draws from the results of a global study of substate 
conflict contagion across six decades.53 
 In its current form, my dissertation is intended to advance a unified but not fully complete 
explanation of substate conflict contagion. I focus on identifying necessary conditions, rather 
than on the even more difficult task of identifying the combinations of state actions, nonstate 
factors, and structural factors that are sufficient for contagion. Sufficiency will be a question for 
future research. In the meantime, though, I hope this dissertation will allow scholars and 
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policymakers to read about all identified cases of substate conflict contagion between 1946 and 
2007, according to a rigorous definition of the dependent variable, and see the application of a 
relatively simple but powerful explanation that identifies a set of necessary and preventable 
conditions for those cases. This dissertation is intended to be a jumping-off point for future 
research and for more informed policy debates about the merits of intervention in the name of 
preventing substate conflict contagion. 
Methodology and Plan for the Dissertation 
 Given the complexity of the phenomenon of interest and the relative dearth of existing 
academic literature, it was difficult to discern the best way forward methodologically. Ultimately 
I decided the most prudent approach had to be multi-method. Hence I use two basic 
methodologies in this dissertation in order to both (1) probe the plausibility of and (2) 
empirically test my State Action Explanation. For the plausibility probe I engage in medium-N 
descriptive work, cataloging all known cases of substate conflict contagion between 1946 and 
2007 and coding each case for the presence and causal weight of the state actions described 
above. This effort is similar in scope and approach to the effort by Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey 
J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott, and Barbara Oegg to identify all cases of economic sanctions 
levied against other states and to assess their degree of success.54 Neither their study nor mine 
can perfectly define and identify the universe of cases or elucidate the full history of each case, 
but both studies have the virtue of giving us a rich, arguably complete universe of cases on which 
to conduct further study with a reasonable claim to external validity. The other methodology, 
which I use for testing the explanation, is the detailed case study at the regional level. Two such 
case studies are meant to dive deeper into the causes of specific cases of substate conflict 
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contagion. In addition, the focus on an entire region of states over a discrete period of time 
allows me to consider cases (more specifically, directed dyads) in which contagion did not occur, 
and assess whether or not my explanation accounts for those cases as well. These two case 
studies thus provide useful tests of the State Action Explanation, albeit with more limited 
external validity than the medium-N cataloging exercise. 
 In all three empirical chapters, I try to measure the occurrence and causal contributions of 
three broad sets of independent variables. The first set contains the specific state actions of 
evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality. The definitions of these terms, as 
given in Chapter 2, are fairly strict. Furthermore, because the actions are taken by sovereign 
states, evidence for their occurrence (and, to a lesser extent, their non-occurrence) is generally 
well-documented. Measurement therefore involved a relatively straightforward process of culling 
secondary (and in some cases primary) sources for evidence of these actions in individual 
directed dyads. The second set contains the structural factors for civil war onset. Defining these 
variables precisely is more difficult, since the list of possible causes of civil war is virtually 
limitless, and since the enormous question of what causes civil wars in general is outside this 
dissertation’s scope. Ultimately I decided to use one of the most prominent statistical models of 
civil war onset in the discipline to date as a proxy for “structural factors.”55 This model, its 
component variables, and my use of it are described in Chapter 3. (Road networks are not 
included in this model, and will be measured in future research.) The final set contains the six 
nonstate factors described above. I was able to measure the occurrence of these factors dyad-by-
dyad in my regional case studies, but not across all 84 cases of contagion in Chapter 3. Thus my 
two regional tests take account of all three sets of causal factors, but the empirical probability 
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probe takes account of only two sets. Nonstate factors will be added to the empirical plausibility 
probe in future work. 
 I should note that I also considered a statistical approach to my research question — in 
fact, it was for this reason that I undertook the painstaking process of generating a 
comprehensive universe of cases — but ultimately I set this approach aside, with the exception 
of a few basic regressions in Chapter 3. I did so as my explanation congealed, and as it became 
clear that phenomena such as evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality 
would be quite difficult to measure quantitatively across a dataset with more than 20,000 
directed dyad-year observations. (The dataset is described in full in Chapter 3.) In principle, 
however, if accurate and consistent measurements for these independent variables could be 
assembled, I would expect to find positive and statistically significant associations between them 
and the dependent variable of substate conflict contagion. Such work should certainly be 
undertaken in the future. 
 With these methodological guidelines in mind, the dissertation proceeds as follows. 
Chapter 2 outlines the State Action Explanation in more detail, beginning with an extended 
discussion of where the explanation fits into the academic literature on civil war as well as the 
disciplines of international relations and security studies in general. Chapter 3 describes the 
process by which I arrived at the 84 cases of substate conflict contagion, and lists those cases. 
The chapter then summarizes the causes of each of those 84 cases, ultimately reporting that at 
least one of the three state actions was present in about three-quarters of the contagion cases and 
was demonstrably necessary for the spread of conflict in at least two-thirds of them. (In the 
chapter, I make a critical distinction between “necessary for the spread of conflict between the 
sending and receiving state” and “necessary for the onset of civil war in the receiving state” that 
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is worth briefly noting here, so the reader can watch for it later. I primarily make the former 
claim, as the latter claim is quite difficult to make given the complexity of civil war onset.) From 
these descriptive statistics, I conclude that the presence of at least one of the three state actions 
appears to be a necessary but insufficient condition for most cases of substate conflict contagion, 
just as the State Action Explanation predicts. I also introduce my rough proxy for the presence of 
structural factors, and suggest that these structural factors, like the state actions themselves, 
appear to be necessary but insufficient for most cases of contagion. 
 On their own, however, these empirical results do not provide a convincing test of the 
State Action Explanation, because they do not consider the cases in which contagion did not 
occur. In other words, the data in Chapter 3 are selected on the dependent variable. Chapters 4 
and 5, the regional case studies mentioned above, are designed to overcome this methodological 
challenge and actually test the explanation. In Chapter 4, I look at Central America between 
1978 and 1996 — a region selected because of the puzzle that despite the presence of five 
different substate conflicts, there was only one case of substate conflict contagion (the 
evangelization of the Nicaraguan conflict to El Salvador in 1981). Contagion was particularly 
rare in the region despite the pervasive presence of many of the nonstate factors, including 
refugee flows, arms flows, and a significant drug trade. Based in part on archival research and 
interviews with former government officials in the region, I conclude that evangelization, 
expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality were quite rare in the region as well — and argue 
that given the frequent presence of the nonstate factors, this relative lack of state actions was a 
significant factor in the relative lack of contagion. The case study thus serves as strong evidence 
for the proposition that state actions are necessary conditions for contagion, and that nonstate 
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factors alone are insufficient to spread violent conflict across borders. (The story on structural 
factors is more complicated, as discussed in the chapter.) 
In Chapter 5, I look at Southeast Asia between 1959 and 1980 — a time and a place 
selected in large part for its substantial policy relevance, given that the Domino Theory was 
originally generated by American policymakers with respect to Cold War Southeast Asia. This 
region saw six cases of contagion rather than one; I find state action both present and necessary 
for roughly five of these cases, leaving only one case (the spread of conflict from Malaysia to 
Thailand in 1976) that does not fit the State Action Explanation. As in Central America, I again 
find state action to be relatively rare among the cases in which contagion did not occur, and I 
find nonstate and this time also structural factors to be fairly common, by contrast. After noting 
the congruence of these findings with the State Action Explanation, I then briefly evaluate the 
Domino Theory in light of the same empirics. 
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation. I briefly summarize the argument and the 
empirical evidence supporting it, and then discuss the policy implications of the State Action 
Explanation in more detail. I discuss the recent U.S. military intervention in Libya — undertaken 
in part to prevent substate conflict contagion — and assess whether that mission accomplished its 
objectives at the lowest possible cost in light of what this dissertation tells us. In short, the 
answer is “no,” because the Libyan conflict was not at great risk of spreading according to the 
State Action Explanation — and military intervention has probably made contagion more likely. 
On the basis of this discussion, I recommend a more restrained approach to the prevention of 
substate conflict contagion, including (1) the realization that most substate conflicts, lacking state 
action, will contain themselves without great power involvement and (2) the use of coercive 
diplomacy (such as sanctions) rather than military action to discourage state actions in the rare 
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instances where they are likely to occur. Finally, I discuss the numerous avenues for future 
research that could follow from this dissertation project. 
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Chapter 2: The State Action Explanation 
 
 In the previous chapter, I introduced the puzzle of substate conflict contagion, which 
occurs when a “substate conflict” — an armed conflict between a state and militarized rebels 
that has caused at least 25 cumulative battle-related deaths — makes a causal contribution to 
the onset of a “civil war” — an armed conflict between a state and militarized rebels that has 
caused at least 1,000 cumulative battle-related deaths — in another state. I discussed the present 
academic literature that engages the question, and suggested that one of the major shortcomings 
of that literature was the lack of a unified explanation of contagion. This chapter attempts to 
provide such an explanation. 
 In short, my explanation is that substate conflict contagion is unlikely to occur without 
deliberate action by the government of a sovereign state. Three specific state government actions 
seem particularly conducive to contagion: (1) a state being taken over by rebel forces which, now 
at the reins of the state, try to export their revolution abroad; (2) a state government expelling 
combatants from their borders, driving the fighters into another state which they proceed to 
destabilize; and (3) a state government meddling — e.g., supporting rebels — in another state’s 
conflict, resulting in the “boomeranging” of conflict back to the meddling state. Each of these 
actions will be discussed in more detail below. 
 The key takeaway of my explanation, henceforth the State Action Explanation, is that 
substate conflict contagion is not the sole product of commonplace and largely uncontrollable 
forces. Links between conflicts involving nonstate actors and nonstate factors — namely, the six 
nonstate mechanisms described in Chapter 1 — are frequent in the international system and may 
sometimes be necessary for substate conflict contagion. And the slow-changing structural causes 
44 
 
of civil war in general, such as poverty and ethnic fractionalization, are almost always necessary 
catalysts for the spread of substate conflict. However, nonstate and structural factors are usually 
insufficient to spread substate conflict on their own. In addition, state governments generally 
must take at least one of the three specific actions listed above, making them usually necessary 
— though themselves insufficient — conditions for contagion. 
This should come as good news to great power policymakers, because it means that the 
horrific phenomenon of substate conflict contagion is both rarer and more preventable than they 
might think. A state like the U.S., if it has an interest in keeping a particular conflict from 
spreading, should first realize that the conflict is highly unlikely to spread in the absence of these 
relatively uncommon state actions. Even if state actions are present, the U.S. does not have to try 
to alter the decision calculus of shadowy nonstate actors, wipe out illicit economies, or bring the 
region out of poverty in order to prevent contagion. It is likely sufficient to use the leverage of 
the U.S. to dissuade the government of the state in conflict, and the governments of any potential 
receiver states of contagion, from taking these three detrimental actions — while also refraining 
from these actions (namely meddling) ourselves. State-to-state coercion is not easy, but it is 
easier than coercing nonstate actors or changing structural factors. 
 My State Action Explanation should not be viewed as pitting state actions against the 
nonstate and structural causes of substate conflict contagion. I am certainly not arguing that 
nonstate factors such as rebel networks and structural factors such as poverty are unimportant to 
the spread of substate conflict. Quite the contrary, I advance an explanation that combines state 
actions, nonstate factors, and structural factors, arguing that some combination of the latter two 
factors is also necessary, in conjunction with the state actions discussed below, for the spread of 
substate conflict. I am simply trying to tell a part of the story of substate conflict contagion — 
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the pivotal role of state governments — that to date has generally been underemphasized. 
Furthermore, this particular part of the story has some uniquely relevant policy implications, 
because the necessary but insufficient state actions emphasized in this dissertation are more 
uncommon and more easily prevented by great powers than the necessary but insufficient 
nonstate and structural factors emphasized elsewhere. 
 In the remainder of this chapter, I (1) situate my State Action Explanation in the context 
of the existing academic literature on substate conflict contagion and substate conflict in general, 
(2) define key terms, (3) explain the basic premise and the three specific mechanisms of the 
explanation in more detail, (4) discuss the interaction between state actions, nonstate factors, and 
structural causes of contagion, and (5) consider the implications of the explanation for both 
scholarship and policy. 
The Role of States in Substate Conflict 
 To a great extent, the end of the Cold War shifted scholarly focus in security studies 
away from interstate relations to the politics and violence occurring within states. Accompanying 
this change in focus was a significant shift in the actors of interest to scholars. Whereas most pre-
1991 security scholarship attempted to explain and predict the actions of sovereign state 
governments, post-Cold-War work has taken a great deal more interest in nonstate actors, such as 
insurgent groups, terrorist groups, private militias, and so forth. 
 This trend toward studying nonstate actors is more prevalent in some areas of security 
studies than others, but it is quite evident in civil war scholarship. Numerous recent works have 
attempted to understand the “micro-dynamics” of substate conflict — why individuals join 
insurgent groups, the motivations of the groups themselves, and the relationships between 
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groups.1 Still others have applied international relations theory to substate conflicts, treating 
states as miniature “international systems” with anarchic, rather than hierarchic, environments 
within them.2 Following this analogy, the state government is only one actor among many, and 
the environment is usually dominated by nonstate players. Finally, Idean Salehyan has 
constructed an entire theory of civil war around “transnational rebels,” arguing that they are one 
of the critical actors behind civil conflict onset and termination (and some interstate conflict 
onsets as well).3 
 In the small academic literature on substate conflict contagion, rather than substate 
conflict in general, we also see a strong emphasis on nonstate actors. For example, many of the 
works discussed in the previous chapter have claimed that transnational ethnic ties facilitate 
contagion, either by encouraging copycat behavior on the part of ethnically linked elites or by 
creating rebel support networks that span across borders.4 Håvard Hegre and Nicholas Sambanis 
tell a similar story about rebel group ties more generally: “There could be different … 
mechanisms that explain how one country’s civil war risk spreads around the region. There could 
be demonstration or diffusion effects, as rebels learn by observing others, or there could be 
contagion effects, as rebels spill over borders to incite rebellion by their coethnics in neighboring 
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countries.”5 This view of substate conflict contagion is notably devoid of state action — conflicts 
are spreading because rebel groups, whether ethnically linked or not, are taking cues from or 
supporting each other. Other variables believed to contribute to substate conflict contagion are 
also generally focused on the behavior of nonstate actors. For example, refugees — though 
sometimes the product of state expulsion policies — can allegedly spread conflict by “facilitating 
the transnational spread of arms, combatants, and ideologies conducive to conflict, altering the 
ethnic composition of the state, and … exacerbating economic competition.”6 
 There are some dissenting voices to this limited view of the role of state actors in civil 
conflicts. Chief among them is Michael Brown, who argues that “bad neighbors” are worse for 
regional stability than “bad neighborhoods.” By this he means that when civil war breaks out in a 
state due to forces external to that state (whether or not those external forces include a nearby 
conflict), it is more likely the result of a malicious state government’s action than the result of 
uncontrollable forces such as refugee and arms flows.7 However, Brown is not focused 
specifically on the phenomenon of one conflict contributing to the onset of another, as I am in 
this dissertation.8 A more recent paper by Kirstin Hasler does focus on conflicts causing other 
conflicts, and does argue that the state plays a greater role in contagion than the existing 
literature suggests, although she focuses on different specific state actions than this dissertation 
(including a hybrid of the “meddling” mechanism that I describe below). Her cogent exploration 
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of the Kurdish conflicts in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey provide a useful complement to this 
dissertation.9 Sarah Kenyon Lischer’s theory of refugee-based conflict contagion also involves a 
key role for both sending and receiving state governments — why the refugees are on the run 
and the way in which they are received abroad matters — although her work is focused on 
contagion as it emanates from refugee flows alone.10 Additionally, David Lake and Donald 
Rothchild emphasize state actions in their discussion of the mechanisms by which substate 
conflicts “escalate,” although generally by “escalation” they are referring to the onset of 
interstate conflict rather than intrastate conflict.11 Finally, recent work by Stathis Kalyvas and 
Laia Balcells identifies the importance of the international system-level variable of polarity to 
the conduct of civil war — a variable that is a level of analysis above where my state-centric 
study is focused.12 These limited exceptions aside, on the whole it would be fair to characterize 
the contagion literature, as well as the substate conflict literature in general, as focused on 
nonstate actors to the exclusion of state governments. My explanation takes these nonstate actor-
centric mechanisms into account, and then adds additional mechanisms that have largely been 
overlooked. 
 The focus on nonstate actors in the civil war literature is part of a much broader trend in 
international relations and security studies scholarship which deemphasizes the role of state 
governments. The standard-bearer for this trend is the globalization literature within international 
political economy, where a sizable group of scholars has argued for two decades that the state is 
slowly obsolescing as a meaningful institution in the contemporary world. For example, Philip 
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Cerny has argued that globalization has eroded the basic functions of sovereign states, and that 
we are moving toward a “neo-feudal” world in which “overlapping and democratically 
unaccountable private regimes, regional arrangements, transnational market structures, ‘global 
cities,’ [NGOs], quasi-autonomous NGOs, and international quasi-autonomous NGOs, with 
rump governments … attempt to free ride on global/local trends for short-term competitive 
interests.”13 Other scholars and commentators have taken similar, if less dramatic, views, while 
often focused on particular issue areas such as state monetary policy.14 
 The “neo-medievalist” perspective on the fading prominence of states in the international 
system is certainly intoxicating, and may well be correct in some of the domains about which 
international relations and security scholars are concerned.15 However, I do not think states are 
obsolescing with respect to the spread of substate conflict, a perspective which sets this 
dissertation apart from most of the other literature on the phenomenon. Quite the contrary, my 
State Action Explanation seeks to “bring the state back in”16 to the study of substate conflict 
contagion, and perhaps more indirectly to the study of substate conflict in general. Nonstate 
actors and nonstate factors play important roles in substate conflict contagion — for example, 
rebels in one state may inspire potential rebels in another state to consider armed insurrection, 
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while refugee flows across borders can significantly heighten sociopolitical tensions. But 
nonstate actors are not the only actors relevant to this phenomenon. Without taking the role of 
sovereign state governments seriously, we miss a key part of the story of how these conflicts 
spread, as well as a much more effective pathway by which concerned great powers can stop 
them from spreading. The explanation I advance in this dissertation, and the empirical 
plausibility probes and tests of the explanation that follow, attempt to tell that part of the story. 
Thus my work speaks not only to the civil war literature, but also to other works within 
international relations and security studies scholarship that seek to remind us of the importance 
of the state in many arenas. Such works include the argument that states still have policy 
autonomy despite increasing international capital flows,17 and the argument that states still 
control the Internet despite the increasingly popular view that they do not.18 And, of course, my 
perspective is consistent with the structural realist’s view of the international system — that 
states are the actors of greatest importance. (As discussed below, however, I do take issue with 
the “billiard ball” view of states.) Kenneth Waltz argued passionately against an overemphasis 
on nonstate actors, although the bogeyman of his time was the multinational corporation rather 
than the insurgent group.19 Again, I do not believe nonstate actors are irrelevant; far from it. But 
I have constructed an explanation of substate conflict contagion in which state governments play 
the pivotal — and most preventable — roles. 
Defining Key Terms 
 A state action is an action undertaken deliberately by the government of a sovereign 
state. Theoretically, a sovereign state is a geopolitical entity that possesses a monopoly on the 
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legitimate use of violence within a given territory;20 the government is the institution within the 
state that controls the monopoly. Practically, in this dissertation I count as sovereign states those 
entities that are recognized as such by the international community, and likewise for 
governments. Hence the governments of Timor-Leste (from 2002), Kosovo (from 2008), and the 
Republic of China qualify as state actors; the government of Somaliland does not. 
 Just because a state is sovereign does not necessarily mean its government is capable of 
the three deliberate actions emphasized in the State Action Explanation. For example, it is 
difficult to imagine the government of Somalia, which controls a few city blocks in Mogadishu, 
exporting violence to a neighboring state, managing to expel fighters to any meaningful degree, 
or meddling in another state’s conflict to a noticeable extent. Capability of fomenting substate 
conflict contagion does not follow from statehood alone. That being said, most sovereign state 
governments are capable of at least some of the actions in focus here. The government of Zaire, 
despite existing in an environment nearly as anarchic as present-day Somalia, managed to 
deliberately harbor rebels from Angola, Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda in the 1990s — meddling 
that ultimately boomeranged back into Zaire with disastrous consequences. 
 By “deliberate,” I do not mean to imply that a given state government intended for a 
conflict to spread. That is sometimes the case, but it is often just the opposite. (Zaire’s Mobutu 
Sese Seko, for example, surely did not intend to have his government wiped out by his 
neighbors.) I mean only that the original action, one of the three discussed in more detail below, 
was intended by the government. In an ideal world, we would find records of such a decision 
being made by that government’s executive. 
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 State A will henceforth be used to refer to the state originally in conflict — the state from 
which conflict might spread. State A will also be referred to as the potential sender state. 
Likewise, State B will refer to a state in the rough geographic vicinity of State A (more on 
“rough geographic vicinity” in the next chapter). This is the state to which State A’s conflict 
might or might not spread, and will also be known as the potential receiver state or, if the 
Epidemiologic Triangle from Chapter 1 is being used, the potential host state.21 
 Below I will refer to three causal mechanisms of substate conflict contagion. By “causal 
mechanism,” I simply mean an event or sequence of events connecting an independent variable 
to a dependent variable. 
When I postulate below that a given causal mechanism is usually necessary but 
insufficient for substate conflict contagion, I mean that in the absence of that mechanism, 
contagion is highly unlikely. In the presence of the mechanism, contagion is considerably more 
likely, but it is not certain. Other mechanisms may be required to bring about the outcome of 
contagion. Thus, in the cases where we see the mechanism but not contagion, the State Action 
Explanation may still account for the outcome — contagion was enabled by the mechanism in 
those cases, but did not happen because some other required mechanism was not present. In the 
cases where we see contagion without the mechanism, the State Action Explanation falls short. 
Empirically, we do observe such cases, as discussed in the next chapter. These exceptions to the 
explanation do not suggest that the explanation is false, only that it does not account for all cases. 
We are engaged here in probabilistic social science, meaning we want to know what factors 
make the spread of substate conflict more likely or less likely; there is no one factor that makes 
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contagion certain or impossible.22 The empirical value of the State Action Explanation is that it 
appears to pertain to most cases of potential and actual substate conflict contagion, making it 
generalizeable albeit imperfect. 
Basic Premise of the State Action Explanation 
 The State Action Explanation derives its predictions from a single initial premise: 
Spreading substate conflict is hard. Specifically, the contagion of substate conflict from one state 
to another is rare because it faces four natural obstacles. First, substate conflict is rare to begin 
with. According to the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, which identifies every substate 
conflict in the world between 1946 and 2007, of 8,406 “country-years” (i.e., “United States, 
1946,” “United States, 1947,” etc.), at most 268, or just above 3 percent, saw the onset of a 
conflict.23 Many of the 8,138 country-years in which no conflict onset occurred were in poor, 
weak, undemocratic, and ethnically divided states. It remains a mystery in the civil war literature 
writ large why substate conflict occurs so rarely, when the background conditions for it seem 
ever-present in many states. Surely one reason, discussed further below, is that it is intrinsically 
more difficult for a potential rebel group to mobilize an insurrection than it is for a state 
government to repress one. In any event, the rarity of conflict onset means that the spread of 
conflict must be at least as rare. 
Second, when substate conflicts do break out, they do not automatically inspire potential 
rebels in neighboring states to take up arms as well. In fact, violent intrastate conflicts seem just 
as likely, if not more so, to horrify people around the region with their brutality and futility — a 
“reverse demonstration effect.” As often as potential rebel elites in places like Guatemala look to 
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events like the Cuban Revolution and draw inspiration for their own revolts,24 it may be more 
common empirically for potential rebel elites in places like Mozambique to look at horrendous 
conflicts in places like Angola and say, “No thanks.”25 Most substate conflicts do not end in 
rebel victory, and most kill thousands of people while destroying national and local economies. 
A conflict in State A can provide a timely refresher of that lesson of history for those thinking of 
undertaking insurrectionary action, and thus can reduce the likelihood of a conflict in State B 
rather than increase it. 
Third, once a substate conflict starts in one state in a region, the governments of the other 
states in that region are no longer naïve to the possibility of such a conflict (if they ever were to 
begin with). Hence the government of State B can take specific actions to “fortify” itself against 
the spread of conflict from State A.26 For example, if a leftist insurgency breaks out in State A, 
the rightist government of State B can round up its own leftist activists and ensure, through 
promises kept or fingers broken, that its own political system stays stable. Again, then, in some 
ways the onset of substate conflict in State B becomes more difficult in the wake of a State A 
conflict onset, rather than less. (This insight is consistent with Alex Braithwaite’s argument that 
a greater State B capacity lessens the risk of contagion, in that more capable states are more able 
to fortify themselves in these ways.27) 
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Finally, even when a conflict does start in State B as the result of a prior or ongoing 
conflict in State A, the State B conflict may just simmer rather than burn. High-casualty substate 
conflicts — which kill 1,000 people or more in battle — are even rarer than substate conflicts in 
general. There are often technological and logistical limitations to the deadliness of a given rebel 
group or counterinsurgency strategy, particularly when combatants have outdated weaponry and 
are fighting in difficult terrain. This dissertation is concerned with the outbreak of high-casualty 
conflict as the result of a conflict (high-casualty or low-casualty) in State A; the imposition of the 
high-casualty requirement makes the dependent variable of interest even less common. 
In principle, these four natural obstacles to substate conflict contagion — the rarity of 
substate conflict in general, the tendency for conflicts to horrify rather than inspire, the ability of 
states to fortify themselves against contagion, and the rarity of high-intensity conflict — can be 
overcome through a variety of means and by a variety of actors. First, certain structural factors in 
State B may make civil war more likely in general, and thereby make these obstacles less 
formidable than they are in states without these factors. The short-list of relevant structural 
factors is well-known in the civil war literature: Impoverished states are more likely to see civil 
war than wealthy states; autocratic states are more likely to see civil war than democratic states; 
ethnically fractionalized states are more likely to see civil war than ethnically homogenous 
states; states with rough terrain are more likely to see civil war than states with even terrain; and 
so forth.28 Second, I have found empirically that nonstate actors and nonstate factors often 
contribute to the spread of substate conflict in the following six ways: (1) the inspiration of 
potential rebels in one state by active rebels in another state, (2) the assistance of potential rebels 
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in one state by active rebels in another state, (3) the movement of weapons from a state in 
conflict to potential rebels in another state, (4) the movement of illicit drugs from a state in 
conflict to potential rebels in another state (who exploit the drug trade to build up resources they 
need to start their rebellion), (5) the return of foreign fighters in one conflict to their home state, 
after which those fighters stir up conflict at home, and (6) the movement of refugees from a state 
in conflict to a state at peace, the latter of which is destabilized by the refugee flows. In general, 
though, nonstate and structural factors alone cannot cause substate conflict contagion, because 
the obstacles to its occurrence are too great. Instead, the most effective means to overcoming 
these formidable obstacles lie within the exclusive power of state governments. 
In general, sovereign state governments have military and economic resources that far 
outstrip the resources available to nonstate actors. This is usually true even in parts of the world 
where states are considered “weak.” For example, the governments of Algeria, Angola, Burundi, 
Cambodia, Colombia, the Republic of the Congo, Côte D’Ivoire, Guatemala, Iraq, Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka, and Zimbabwe all outstripped the rebel groups they fought against in terms of manpower, 
even though these states were embroiled in chaotic, multi-party civil wars.29 In addition, state 
governments operate on a different timescale than the various structural factors that contribute to 
the spread of substate conflict; poverty and ethnic fractionalization may be decades in the 
making, but a state government can act in one of the contagion-inducing manners described 
below in a matter of days or weeks. The relative strength and speed of state governments better 
equips them to overcome the natural obstacles to substate conflict contagion, when they so desire 
— and, sometimes, even when they do not. Specifically, state governments have enhanced 
capability to take three deliberate actions that facilitate the spread of substate conflict from one 
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state to another. These three causal mechanisms lie at the heart of the State Action Explanation, 
and are now discussed in detail. 
First Mechanism: Evangelization 
The first specific means by which state governments facilitate the spread of substate 
conflict is “evangelization.” This mechanism can only operate when the rebels in State A’s 
conflict have won the conflict, unseated the hostile government, and taken the reins of the state 
themselves.30 Once they have achieved victory at home, the former rebels now controlling State 
A’s government decide to spread their revolution abroad. They get in contact with nascent rebel 
movements in nearby states and provide them with arms, military training, and other forms of 
support. This mechanism essentially reflects the Domino Theory’s view of revolution (see 
Chapter 1): that malevolent governments comprised of former insurgents willfully spread 
conflict as far as they can beyond their borders.31 
How does the mechanism work? First, State A’s government’s support for a potential 
rebel movement in State B endows the rebel group with substantially greater capability than it 
would otherwise have. One of the reasons that substate conflict is rare is that mobilizing a 
rebellion is exceedingly difficult — consider, for example, Ché Guevara’s miserable failure to 
start a major peasant insurgency in Bolivia in the late 1960s32 — and, meanwhile, state 
repression is rather easy. Hence Saudi Arabia, despite being the socially stratified, resource-
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dependent33 sort of place where we might expect a substate conflict, has for the most part 
avoided instability within its own borders by repressing or buying off potential rebel leaders.34 
Mobilization becomes much easier, and State B repression much more difficult, when State A 
lends its substantial resources and provides the potential rebels in State B with the military and 
organizational wherewithal to get its movement off the ground. Furthermore, State A’s support 
for rebels makes the conflict in State B more likely to reach the 1,000-death threshold that is 
otherwise out of reach for many small rebel groups. Second, as Alan Kuperman has noted, 
rational rebel leaders are more likely to start conflicts they think they can win than those about 
which they are pessimistic. Foreign support (or, as Kuperman notes, even the prospect of foreign 
support) can be a key source of optimism that convinces uncertain rebel leaders to start conflicts 
against superior government adversaries.35 Thus, by increasing capability and optimism among 
potential rebel leaders in State B, the evangelizing government of State A can make conflict in 
State B both more likely and more intense. 
 What are some examples? Following the victory of the Communist Chinese over the 
Nationalist Chinese in 1949 and the end of the decades-long Chinese Civil War, the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) began supporting rebel movements in a number of nearby states. For 
instance, in the 1950s the PRC provided the Naga National Council in Northeast India with 
“sophisticated weapons” and China-based military training.36 Another example of evangelization 
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is the Liberian sponsorship of the 1991 rebellion in Sierra Leone, following Charles Taylor’s 
usurpation of the government in Monrovia.37 
Why do states take this action? Of the three state actions, evangelization is the most 
explicitly and deliberately geared toward spreading substate conflict. Usually the new 
government of State A decides to evangelize its conflict because it is motivated by an 
expansionist ideology. The ideology might be global in scope, such as international communism, 
or it might be more regional, like Charles Taylor’s vision of a “Greater Liberia.”38 
Note that with this mechanism I depart somewhat from the orthodox “billiard ball” view 
of states found within structural realism. Evangelizing state governments are clearly not 
defensively motivated if they are trying to foment civil war in another state; rather, they should 
be considered “revisionist” within the status quo-revisionist dichotomy proposed by more recent 
realist scholars.39 
Are some targets of this action more attractive than others? Even a state with a global 
vision of expansionism cannot actually evangelize everywhere; government leaders in State A 
must choose which nascent rebellions in other states they will attempt to fan into civil wars and 
which they will leave to smolder. To some extent, the considerations driving these strategic 
choices are idiosyncratic to the particular State A in question. The PRC, for example, primarily 
chose the foreign rebellions it would support in the 1960s according to the perceived hostility of 
the State B government to the PRC’s existence — as measured by diplomatic recognition of the 
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Republic of China or votes against PRC admission to the United Nations, among other actions.40 
Other considerations are probably common to all State As. For instance, it seems intuitive that a 
given nascent State B rebel movement will be more likely to receive support from State A if the 
movement is relatively evenly matched in power with the State B government — or, put another 
way, if the State B government is weak. By contrast, potential rebels who appear to have no hope 
of winning a substate conflict will probably not receive much external support.41 The political 
interests represented by the potential rebel groups — their ideological orientations, or their ethnic 
ties to the leaders of State A42 — may play a role in State A’s decision-making as well, although 
this appears not to have been the case for the PRC (one of the most prolific evangelizers, as 
discussed in Chapter 3).43 
Many of these variables cannot be observed directly by State A governments — potential 
rebel capability in State B is the most obvious example. Therefore, perception and misperception 
undoubtedly play a role in State A’s evangelization choices. These (mis)perceptions may be the 
product of bureaucratic practices or pathologies within State A’s military and intelligence 
apparatus; they may also be the product of potential State B rebel efforts to convince the State A 
government to intervene on their behalf. Thus, while an evangelizing State A may provide 
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potential rebel elites in State B with optimism, the reverse may also be true — potential rebel 
elites in State B may manage to convince State A officials that the rebel cause in State B is worth 
supporting, and this dialogue may lead to evangelization decisions that State A would not have 
come to on its own.44 Importantly, then, State A decision-making vis-à-vis evangelization 
choices does not conform to a strictly rationalist model with perfect information. 
Second Mechanism: Expulsion 
 The second action state governments can take to facilitate substate conflict contagion is 
“expulsion.” Under this causal mechanism, State A (or another state involved in State A’s 
conflict) forces combatants in their country outside their borders, rather than pacifying, killing, 
capturing, or co-opting those combatants. (“Combatants” can be either pro- or anti-State A 
actors; in practice, they are usually anti-State A rebels.) These expelled State A combatants end 
up in State B, where they either foment or intensify a substate conflict there. 
 How does the mechanism work? Combatants move across international borders for a 
variety of reasons, often of their own free will. For example, rebels in State A might decide to 
rely on bases in the border regions of State B as safe havens, much as the Nicaraguan contras did 
in Costa Rica and Honduras (see Chapter 4). In most cases, combatants who move across borders 
of their own accord do not foment a separate conflict in State B, but rather involve outlying 
geographic regions of State B in the original conflict to a limited degree. By contrast, when a 
state government puts its considerable resources behind the forcible expulsion of combatants, 
they leave in larger numbers and are driven more permanently and more deeply into State B’s 
territory. “There to stay,” this critical mass of combatants begins to undertake major political 
violence. They may join up with a nascent rebel group in State B, increasing that group’s 
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capability and optimism as above, or they may start their own conflict against the government of 
State B, in order to carve out their own niche of power in their newfound home country. 
 It is important to note the distinction between “combatants” and “refugees.” Both move 
across borders during substate conflicts, voluntarily and involuntarily. However, I consider 
refugees to be noncombatants, who are not at the moment of their flight involved as fighters in 
State A’s internal conflict. (Some such refugees may turn to fighting after leaving State A, as 
often happens in squalid refugee camps.) Sometimes refugees contribute to the spread of substate 
conflict, but generally a demographic shift on its own cannot set off contagion. As a nonstate 
actor-centric mechanism, refugee flows are usually overcome, as above, by the natural obstacles 
to contagion. By contrast, combatants from State A are indoctrinated, trained, and usually armed 
when they are forcibly ejected deep into State B under the expulsion mechanism. They have 
already overcome the obstacles to substate conflict onset in one country, and hence are better 
positioned to overcome the obstacles to contagion in State B. Thus, although Sarah Kenyon 
Lischer and I hold similar views about the dangers of politically engaged violent actors moving 
across borders, she considers both combatants and noncombatants to be “refugees” while I do 
not.45 
 What are some examples? The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which attacked the 
government of Rwanda in 1990, had its origins in Uganda. About 4,000 “second-generation 
Rwandan refugees” (meaning their parents were non-combatants when they left Rwanda) joined 
up with the National Resistance Movement (NRM), one of the many rebel groups in Uganda’s 
bloody 1980s civil war — and, following the successful 1986 takeover of Kampala, the 
government of Uganda. In the late 1980s, the NRM government fired a prominent Rwandan 
general from its army and rescinded the land ownership rights of Rwandan refugees. These 
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discriminatory measures effectively constituted expulsion. With nowhere else to go, the 
Rwandan NRM combatants formed the RPF, surged back into Rwanda, and challenged the 
government in Kigali.46 A more recent example of the expulsion mechanism is the link between 
the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. When the Northern Alliance, backed by the United States, 
took over the Afghan government in late 2001, military attacks forced many violent jihadists 
who for decades had been based in Afghanistan to flee elsewhere. A significant number of these 
jihadists, including Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, ended up in Iraq, where they recruited and trained 
men to fight the government in Baghdad and significantly elevated the intensity of the civil war 
there.47 
 Why do states take this action? Expulsion, unlike evangelization, is generally not 
undertaken with the intention of spreading conflict from State A to State B. Rather, substate 
conflict contagion becomes an unintended consequence of the State A government’s desire to 
look after its own security — or, as in the case of Uganda, to achieve ethnopolitical objectives. 
However unanticipated the consequences might be, though, the expulsion itself is deliberate. 
 Are some targets of this action more attractive than others? A number of variables could 
impact State A’s decision to expel combatants to one State B and not another — the strength of 
State B’s border controls, for instance — but the most important determinant is probably 
proximity. Expelled combatants generally end up in states adjacent to the state where they 
originated; the State B abutting whichever corner of State A the combatants have been pushed 
into will probably be the State B they are subsequently forced to enter. There are some 
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exceptions to this tendency (the expulsion of jihadists from Afghanistan to Iraq is one), but in 
general we should expect expulsion to be more geographically bounded than evangelization. 
Third Mechanism: Meddling with Overt Partiality 
 The final state action that facilitates contagion comes from the government of State B, 
rather than State A. Under this causal mechanism, State B’s government “meddles with overt 
partiality” in the conflict ongoing in State A, ultimately resulting in the boomeranging onset of 
conflict in State B. Meddling by state governments in the substate conflicts of others is varied 
and quite common; the meddling of most interest here is that which is “overtly partial.” By 
“partial,” I mean that State B’s government picks a side of the State A conflict — whether the 
rebels or the government — that it supports to the exclusion of the other side. (In practice, 
usually when this mechanism is at work, State B’s government has chosen to support the State A 
rebels.) By “overt,” I mean that State B’s government is providing its chosen partner with 
tangible support, such as military equipment, training, or basing rights. Exclusively diplomatic 
involvement of State B’s government in State A’s conflict — statements of support for one side 
or the other, or attempts to mediate between them — is insufficiently overt to constitute 
“meddling with overt partiality.” 
 How does the mechanism work? Meddling with overt partiality can cause the spread of 
substate conflict from State A to State B in three ways. First, the government of State A often 
retaliates against State B’s meddling by fomenting a conflict in State B.48 When discussing the 
first mechanism above, I argued that State A’s government has substantial abilities to touch off 
conflicts in State B, by providing capability and optimism to emerging rebel groups that they 
might not otherwise have. Under this meddling mechanism, State A’s government provides the 
same advantages to State B rebel groups, but for different reasons. The leaders of State A are not 
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interested in evangelizing a revolutionary ideology so much as they are in fighting back against a 
perceived external threat: State B’s meddling government. 
Second, even if the State B government’s meddling does not prompt retaliation from 
State A, the meddling may “blow back” into State B. In other words, something about State B’s 
meddling may cause the violence in State A to spill over into State B, even though State A’s 
government does not directly foment that spillover of violence. Pakistan’s support for the Afghan 
Taliban has blown back in this fashion; Islamabad’s support enabled the formation of a Pashtun 
nationalist network in northwestern Pakistan that later began an armed rebellion against the 
Pakistani state.49 
Third, meddling in the conflict of another state may embitter the population of the 
meddling state, who would rather see their government’s attention turned inward. Particularly if 
the State B government embarrasses itself abroad — as did the government of Somalia when it 
invaded war-torn Ethiopia and was trounced50 — meddling may undermine the legitimacy of the 
government, spurring insurrectionary activities by disaffected elites. 
 What are some examples? Besides the two examples mentioned above — Pakistan and 
Somalia — the prime example of meddling with overt partiality leading to substate conflict 
contagion is the 1996 conflict in the former Zaire. Zaire’s leader, Mobutu Sese Seko, had a long 
history of antagonizing his neighbors, and in the 1990s harbored rebels fighting the Angolan, 
Burundian, Rwandan, and Ugandan governments within his borders. Eventually these four state 
governments, led by Rwanda, sponsored an insurgency against Mobutu in Zaire, leading to his 
                                                 
49
 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, Second Edition (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2010), pp. 187, 237-239. 
50
 Ioan M. Lewis, Understanding Somalia and Somaliland: Culture, History, Society (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2008), p. 67. 
66 
 
ouster and to a horrific civil war that persists to this day.51 This retaliation is an example of the 
first potential consequence of meddling with overt partiality. 
 Why do states take this action? Given the potentially catastrophic consequences of 
meddling with overt partiality in another state’s conflict, it is well worth asking why states do it 
— and why some states, such as Sudan, make a habit of it. One possibility is that providing 
material aid to armed groups is a cheap form of balancing against or weakening a state 
adversary.52 Many habitual meddlers are weak states with limited traditional military resources 
(though, as noted above, these state governments are still stronger militarily than most nonstate 
actors). Sponsoring an insurgency in a neighbor, or a counterinsurgency, may appear to such 
states as a low-cost and effective means to shape matters in the target state to one’s liking, 
building up allies and mitigating potential threats without risking precious resources at home. 
Another, more ironic possibility is that states meddle in nearby conflicts to prevent conflicts 
from spreading to them.53 For example, Hasler argues that the Iranian intervention in the Iraqi 
Kurd conflict was undertaken to prevent violent Kurdish separatism from spreading to Iran.54 But 
in reality, violent Kurdish separatism spread to Iran in large part because of the Iranian 
intervention (see Chapter 3 for more detail). Although there is some evidence to suggest that 
military intervention can help prevent contagion in some cases — Kyle Beardsley, for instance, 
argues that peacekeeping operations help prevent the spread of substate conflict55 — such 
interventions have a clear risk of backfiring when they constitute meddling with overt partiality. 
                                                 
51
 Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War 
(Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), pp. 2, 122. 
52
 I am indebted to Barry Posen for this suggestion. 
53
 This argument is cogently made in Jacob D. Kathman, “Civil War Contagion and Neighboring Interventions,” 
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 54, No. 4 (2010): 989-1012. 
54
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 Beardsley, “Peacekeeping and the Contagion of Armed Conflict.” I am skeptical of this finding because the 
dependent variable in this article has the two common problems discussed in Chapter 1: restriction to contiguous 
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The fact that these seemingly prudent actions are in truth a likely road to ruin is a key lesson of 
this dissertation. 
 Are some targets of this action more attractive than others? As with evangelization, state 
governments may have more ambitions to meddle with overt partiality than they can actually 
achieve. When the strategic choice of which combatant group of several to support must be 
made, we should continue to expect these decisions to hinge on (1) the hostility of State A to 
State B — How badly does State B want to disrupt State A’s domestic tranquility? — (2) the 
strength of the potential rebel movement in State A,56 and (3) the political interests represented 
by the potential rebel movement in State A, as discussed above. As was the case under the 
evangelization mechanism, these variables must be perceived by the State B government rather 
than observed directly, and we should expect these perceptions to be shaped by domestic politics 
in State B as well as lobbying efforts by potential aid recipients (whether governments or rebels) 
in State A. In addition, if meddling is undertaken to prevent contagion, State B’s assessment of 
the risk of contagion from State A should affect its calculations as well. Of course, the State Bs 
of the world are not currently equipped with my State Action Explanation, and discerning their 
own folk explanations of substate conflict contagion would be a difficult undertaking. 
The Interaction of State, Nonstate, and Structural Factors 
 These three state actions overcome the natural obstacles to substate conflict contagion. 
Through evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality, state governments may 
intentionally empower rebel groups abroad to jump over the hurdles, or they may set off a chain 
of unintended consequences that knock over the hurdles. Either way, state government action of 
at least one of these three specific types appears to be a usually necessary condition for substate 
conflict contagion to occur. Nonstate actors are involved in each of the causal mechanisms 
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described above — such actors overthrow the State A government in the first mechanism, 
foment conflict in State B after their expulsion in the second mechanism, and may have 
predatory designs on State A in the third mechanism — but the main actors in each case are 
states. Without these state government actions, contagion can only happen if it is facilitated by 
nonstate and structural factors alone, which is an unlikely albeit not impossible outcome given 
the significant roadblocks in their way. 
However, though usually necessary, state government action is not sufficient for substate 
conflict contagion. Much like the nonstate and structural factors, evangelization, expulsion, and 
meddling with overt partiality cannot spread conflict on their own. Rather, to draw on the 
Epidemiologic Triangle discussed in Chapter 1, successful contagion also requires a “host” state 
(State B) that is “susceptible” or has a “low immunity” to “infection” by the “agent” of conflict 
from State A. Put another way, the structural conditions for civil war onset must exist in State B 
in order for a state action to result in contagion, and nonstate factors may often be required as 
well. Evangelization, for example, will not succeed in starting a civil war unless there are already 
nascent rebels in State B to support; efforts by evangelizing states to export a completely foreign 
rebel movement into a nearby state are likely to meet with disaster, as they did in Bolivia when 
Guevara tried it (see above). Therefore, evangelization requires a pool of grievance in State B — 
something for political elites to be unhappy about, such as poverty, inequality, or social tensions 
(perhaps caused by refugee flows from State A). It also requires a political environment 
conducive to the mobilization of anti-regime dissidents. Usually states with this environment are 
not so repressive that they squelch all dissent (Saudi Arabia), but nor are they so permissive that 
virtually all dissent is incorporated into the legitimate political process (the U.S.).57 Finally, 
nascent rebel groups are more likely to arise in State B if the rebellion in State A inspires copycat 
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movements in State B, or if State B dissidents receive assistance from rebel movements abroad. 
If this inspiration or assistance occurs without the State A government’s direction, then it 
constitutes the nonstate causal mechanism of rebels inspiring rebels or rebels helping rebels. 
Likewise, substate conflict contagion cannot occur solely because combatants have been 
expelled by State A’s government into State B’s territory. In order for these combatants to 
successfully augment the capabilities of a nascent rebel group in State B and start a civil war, 
there has to be a nascent rebel group in State B — in other words, some lack of immunity on the 
part of the host state is again required. Even if the combatants from State A try to start a civil war 
without the assistance of indigenous dissident groups, this will not be possible unless the 
combatants remain militarily capable of violently challenging State B and causing at least 1,000 
battle-related deaths to occur (between the opposing side and their own). Such military capability 
often requires arms from outside State B, making the nonstate mechanism of cross-border small 
arms diffusion a key element in many contagion cases involving expulsion. 
Finally, the various ways in which meddling with overt partiality can boomerang back to 
State B also require a combination of nonstate and structural factors to cause a full-scale civil 
war. In order for State A to retaliate for meddling by supporting nascent rebels in State B, there 
yet again have to be nascent rebels in State B, a condition requiring grievance and made more 
likely by rebel-to-rebel inspiration or assistance. In order for State A rebels to create instability in 
State B (one common manifestation of “blowback”), State B’s support for them is not enough; 
the State A rebels also need a support network in State B that will provide safe havens and 
potentially additional supplies. Such support can be enabled by cross-border dissident 
communications and assistance and by cross-border arms flows, all nonstate mechanisms. In 
order for the population of State B to revolt against the government of State B in response to its 
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meddling in State A’s conflict, rebel mobilization inside State B must be possible. As above, this 
requires a State B polity of moderate repressiveness, and potentially the inspiring example and 
support of other rebel groups in the region. 
As we will see in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5, state actions that occur in the absence 
of these accompanying nonstate and structural factors can easily lead to a non-occurrence of 
contagion, usually because they involve potential host states that are more or less “immune” to 
the onset of civil war in general. So the best way of thinking of the relationship between state, 
nonstate, and structural factors is that they must combine to produce contagion outcomes, as 
shown in Figure 2.1. Many of these factors may be necessary — and at least one state action is 
necessary for the majority of substate conflict contagion cases — but no one factor is sufficient. 
 That being said, the necessity of the state actions has a special meaning that the necessity 
of the nonstate or structural factors does not have. This is because evangelization, expulsion, and 
meddling with overt partiality are both substantially less common and substantially more 
preventable than the six nonstate factors listed above, and are certainly rarer and more 
preventable than long-abiding structural factors such as poverty and ethnic fractionalization in 
potential State Bs around the world. By recognizing the rarity of these three state actions and 
attempting to curtail them when they do occur, great power policymakers have the best possible 
chance to throw the brakes on this disturbing phenomenon. 
Implications for Scholarship and Policy 
 If my State Action Explanation is valid, as the rest of this dissertation will seek to 
demonstrate, then there are significant implications for both scholars and policymakers. For the 
international relations literature, the explanation’s greatest implication is that deliberate state 
government actions matter in what might appear to be the most unlikely of arenas: substate  
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Figure 2.1. Causal pathway of substate conflict contagion (two scenarios shown). For simplicity, 
I do not show the variables that may cause one state to be selected as the target of 
evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality over other states (i.e., potential rebel 
strength, proximity, border controls, etc.). See the discussion above for other such variables; 
some could be included under “Structural Conditions for Civil War,” but others, such as hostile 
State A-State B international relations, are distinct. 
— 
conflict. The salience of state action in a substate context, in regions of the world where at least 
one state government has at least partially broken down, suggests that in other contexts and 
regions, states are stronger still. In order words, the fact that state governments play a major role 
in determining whether or not substate conflicts spread suggests that those same governments 
can probably play a major role in determining the terms on which their national economies 
operate, control flows of people, goods, and information across their borders, and have a 
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meaningful say in the future of the international system. The State Action Explanation thus 
contributes to the evidence against the neo-medievalist view of the future global political order.58 
 The explanation also speaks to the scholarly literature on civil war, which to this point 
has emphasized nonstate actors over sovereign ones as discussed above. International contagion 
may not be the only facet of substate conflict that involves far more deliberate state choice than 
is currently acknowledged. For example, a number of scholars have argued against the view that 
climate change in and of itself is sufficient to cause substate conflict, pointing to the role that 
state governments play in exploiting and exacerbating the resource scarcities caused by 
“uncontrollable” weather changes (“uncontrollable” in the sense that the countries feeling the 
negative consequences of climate change most intensely are usually not the ones emitting the 
most greenhouse gases).59 My State Action Explanation concurs with this statist argument, and 
suggests that a greater role for state actors in all aspects of substate conflict, including 
environmentally triggered resource deprivation, should be considered. 
 A related implication of this explanation, relevant to both the civil war literature and the 
broader IR literature, stems from its focus on deliberate policy choices over and above structural 
causes of phenomena. Certainly in the narrow domain of substate conflict contagion, I am 
arguing that structural factors — i.e., poverty in the potential receiving state — have been 
overemphasized, and that while these factors are important, the intentional choices of state 
governments are important as well. This insight may have currency outside the confines of this 
dissertation. Specifically, it may contribute to the age-old “agent-structure debate,” by suggesting 
that the balance between agency and structure in explanations of security outcomes may need to 
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be readjusted in favor of the former. No reasonable international relations theorist expects either 
agency or structure to explain all variation; hence the well-documented “agent-structure 
problem” of reconciling the two variables’ roles in the same theory. Nevertheless, the current 
mix of the two variables seems to be too structure-heavy in the domain of substate conflict 
contagion; Michael Brown argues it is also so in the domain of civil war onset in general (see 
above); and it may be true in the domain of interstate conflict as well.60 
 A final scholarly implication of the State Action Explanation, again pertinent to the civil 
war literature, is that state strength is not always conducive to peace, nor is state weakness 
always conducive to war. Though works too voluminous to cite have emphasized some form of 
“state weakness,” or “low state capacity,” as a major enabler of substate conflict,61 the State 
Action Explanation suggests that such weakness may have a silver lining. As noted above, at 
some point an embattled state government like that in Somalia may fall below a level of capacity 
where it can take one of the three actions generally required to spread a conflict across 
international borders. In those rare cases, the explanation predicts that contagion will be highly 
unlikely. Thus the State Action Explanation provides a useful counterpoint to the view, 
somewhat prominent among academics and highly prominent among American policymakers, 
that weak states have unequivocally negative consequences for international security. 
 As for the policy implications of the State Action Explanation, the most important 
implication is that substate conflict contagion is both less common and more preventable than 
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policymakers realize. The empirical discussions in Chapters 4 and 5 suggest that evangelization, 
expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality are fairly rare. This means that in most potential 
cases of substate conflict contagion, the natural obstacles to contagion will likely overcome any 
effort by nonstate actors, and any structural tendency, toward the spread of conflict. In most 
cases, then, the containment of faraway substate conflicts does not require any great power 
action at all.  
Meanwhile, in the small number of cases in which one of these three state actions is 
present or imminent, if the U.S. and other great powers can manage to dissuade other state 
governments from taking these actions before their full consequences obtain, this usually 
necessary condition for contagion will be knocked out.62 State-to-state coercion is not easy, but it 
is doubtlessly easier than coercing violent nonstate actors — an enterprise deemed by many 
experts to be utterly fruitless63 — or reversing the structural socioeconomic tendencies that make 
civil war likely in a given state. Also, as discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, coercive 
diplomacy — including the threat or imposition of diplomatic or economic sanctions — has the 
potential to prevent contagion without constituting meddling with overt partiality itself, a 
frequent danger of great power military interventions in the developing world. 
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75 
 
Looking Ahead 
 The remainder of this dissertation weighs the evidence for and against the State Action 
Explanation, first by probing its empirical plausibility and then by more thoroughly testing it. In 
the next chapter, the plausibility probe, I look at the actual universe of cases of substate conflict 
contagion and identify the causal mechanisms by which contagion occurred in each case. In so 
doing, I identify the frequency of the state-driven mechanisms discussed in this chapter, and 
demonstrate their general causal centrality to the onset of substate conflict contagion. Then, 
having explained the cases where contagion occurred, I test the explanation in a region where 
substate conflict has generally not spread, Central America (1978-1996) — despite a high 
volume of potentially contagious conflicts, large refugee flows, profligate small arms and drugs, 
and significant transnational ethnic ties. Drawing on my own archival research and elite 
interviews in the region, I attempt to marshal the State Action Explanation to account for this 
outcome. Finally, I conduct a similar test in an entirely different region of the world, Southeast 
Asia (1959-1980). In this case study, I not only assess whether the State Action Explanation 
applies to historical instances of contagion and non-contagion in the region, but also contrast my 
explanation with the simplistic assumptions about contagion that motivated U.S. involvement in 
the Vietnam War. Empirically, then, I strive to probe the plausibility of my explanation by 
elucidating the mechanisms at work in all identified cases of substate conflict contagion, and I 
strive to test my explanation by harnessing it to explain “dogs that did not bark” in two widely 
different regions of the world. 
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Chapter 3: Explaining Actual Cases of Substate Conflict Contagion 
 
 In the last chapter, I laid out the State Action Explanation and essentially asserted that in 
the absence of evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality, substate conflicts are 
highly unlikely to spread. In this chapter, I perform a broad empirical plausibility probe of this 
explanation to determine whether it corresponds to a collection of original data on cases of 
substate conflict contagion. 
 To summarize, I find that the data support the explanation. In 67 out of the 84 identified 
cases of substate conflict contagion from 1946 to 2007 (about 80%), at least one of the three state 
actions discussed above was present during the spread of conflict from State A (the sender state) 
to State B (the receiver state). This finding suggests that substate conflict contagion rarely occurs 
in the absence of evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality.1 Furthermore, in at 
least 57 of these 67 cases (about 68% of all 84 cases), my analysis of the role of state action in 
the spread of conflict suggests that the state action was a necessary condition for contagion — I 
argue that without the state action in question, conflict probably would not have spread from 
State A to State B. These findings confirm the purported role of state actions as necessary but 
insufficient conditions for most cases of substate conflict contagion, and appear robust across 
post-1945 time periods and across geographic regions. I also quantify the “structural factors,” 
such as poverty, that I argue are also necessary but insufficient for substate conflict contagion in 
Chapter 2, and show using a rough proxy that this view of the role of structural factors appears to 
be consistent with the data. 
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 Interestingly, it is unusual to see multiple state actions involved in the same case of contagion — China to India, 
1956 is one such example (evangelization and meddling). We see this rarity in the regional case studies in Chapters 
4 and 5 as well. I am not sure why this is, although the simplest explanation may be that because these state actions 
are infrequent in general, they are highly unlikely to co-occur. 
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 The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. First, I describe the process by which I 
identified the 84 cases of substate conflict contagion — what I believe to be a comprehensive 
universe of this phenomenon between 1946 and 2007. Second, considering these 84 cases in the 
aggregate, I provide a summary of the State Action Explanation’s empirical performance and 
subject my findings to robustness checks. This section includes the aforementioned discussion of 
the “structural factors” involved in civil war onset. Third, I begin to address the foremost 
drawback to the methodology employed in this chapter — selection on the dependent variable — 
by introducing the more detailed empirical tests that will comprise Chapters 4 and 5 of this 
dissertation. Finally, in Appendix 3.1, I provide a systematic discussion of each of the 84 
identified cases, noting whether state action was present or absent in each case and how 
necessary the state action, if present, was to the contagion. 
Identification of Cases of Substate Conflict Contagion 
 As discussed in Chapter 1, prior study of the causes of substate conflict contagion has 
been hindered by the lack of a comprehensive universe of cases. For example, various 
quantitative studies of contagion referenced in Chapter 1 counted any two temporally and 
geographically clustered conflicts as a positive case of the dependent variable.2 Such studies also 
tend to consider contagion a phenomenon that can only occur between two contiguous states. To 
overcome the aforementioned shortcomings of these methods, I built a new dataset of cases of 
substate conflict contagion from scratch. Again, I define substate conflict contagion as occurring 
when a “substate conflict” — an armed conflict between a state and militarized rebels that has 
caused at least 25 cumulative battle-related deaths — makes a causal contribution to the onset of 
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a “civil war” — an armed conflict between a state and militarized rebels that has caused at least 
1,000 cumulative battle-related deaths — in another state. 
I started with a universe of possible cases, consisting of a set of directed dyad-years 
between 1946 and 2007. Each dyad contained a State A and a State B. State A was a country 
experiencing an internal armed conflict, as defined in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program / Peace 
Research Institute, Oslo Armed Conflict Dataset (Version 4-2009).3 Specifically, this definition 
of substate conflict requires “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or 
territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the 
government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.”4 By convention, conflicts 
between metropoles and their nonstate colonies — known as “extrastate” or “extrasystemic” 
conflicts — are excluded from this definition.5 The “State A” component of the dyad-year may 
also have included a state in which a substate conflict ended five or fewer years ago. This 
allowance was meant to capture any lagged contagion effects, and was particularly pertinent 
given that one of the state action mechanisms — evangelization — generally only occurs once 
the conflict in State A is over. In some cases I decided that the substate conflict in State A was 
sufficiently influential that I needed to expand the five-year lag time allowance. For example, the 
Cuban Revolution’s influence in Latin America and elsewhere in the developing world definitely 
extended past 1966, five years after the 1961 termination of that conflict. I kept Cuba in the 
dataset until 1974, at which point Cuba was still sparking conflicts elsewhere (as discussed 
below). These exceptions are noted in Table 3.1, and are excluded in some robustness checks of 
the analysis later in this chapter. 
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 http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/, downloaded October 26, 2009. 
4
 UCDP and PRIO, “UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook,” http://www.prio.no/sptrans/-
1423485763/Codebook_UCDP_PRIO%20Armed%20Conflict%20Dataset%20v4_2009.pdf (accessed November 
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5
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Table 3.1: Neighborhoods 
Neighborhood States 
North America Canada, United States, Mexico 
Central America Mexico, Guatemala, Belize, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, 
Panama (plus Cuba as a neighbor until 1974, because of its influence in 
Latin America) 
Caribbean Cuba (to 1974), Haiti, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago 
South America Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, Brazil, Argentina, 
Uruguay, Chile, Suriname (plus Cuba as a neighbor until 1974) 
Western Europe United Kingdom, Ireland, France, Spain, Portugal, Germany, Netherlands, 
Belgium, Denmark, Switzerland, Italy, Austria, Norway, Sweden, Finland 
Eastern Europe Poland, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, 
Bosnia (to 2001), Croatia (to 2001), Macedonia, Slovenia, Greece, Hungary, 
Albania 
Former Soviet 
Union (Eastern 
Europe) 
Moldova (with Romania as a neighbor), Ukraine, Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Estonia, Russia 
Former Soviet 
Union (Caucuses) 
Russia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia 
Former Soviet 
Union (Central 
Asia) 
 Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Russia 
(plus Afghanistan, China, and Pakistan) 
Near East Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Cyprus (plus 
Afghanistan as neighbor for Egypt and Iraq) 
Persian Gulf 
States 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Oman, 
Yemen/North Yemen, South Yemen 
Central Asia Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan 
South Asia India (plus Burma), Pakistan (to 1989 for India and 1984 for Sri Lanka), 
Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka (plus China for all South Asian 
states, including India to 1982 and Sri Lanka to 1984) 
Southeast Asia Burma (plus India), Thailand (plus Afghanistan and Sri Lanka), Laos, 
Cambodia, Vietnam/North Vietnam, South Vietnam (to 1975), Malaysia, 
Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei, Papua New Guinea, Philippines (plus China 
for all Southeast Asian states to 1974) 
Northeast Asia Mongolia, China, Taiwan, Japan, North Korea, South Korea (plus Russia as 
a neighbor for China and Mongolia) 
North Africa Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Mali, Niger, Chad, Mauritania 
(plus Afghanistan as a neighbor for Algeria) 
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West Africa Mauritania, Mali, Senegal, Gambia (to 1989), Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, 
Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte D’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Ghana (to 1989), Togo, 
Benin, Niger, Nigeria (plus Somalia, Sudan 1983-2007, and D.R. Congo 
1996-2007 due to arms trade; plus Afghanistan due to Islamist influence), 
Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon 
Central Africa Chad, Sudan, Ethiopia (plus Iraq 1958-68 due to pan-Arab influence), 
Eritrea, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (including 1973-75), Republic of the Congo, Central African 
Republic, Tanzania, Djibouti (plus Angola as a neighbor for both Congo’s) 
Southern Africa Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Mozambique, Botswana, Namibia, 
South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, Madagascar, Comoros (plus D.R. Congo 
as a neighbor for Angola) 
— 
State B was a country in the same “neighborhood” as State A. In Table 3.1, I list 19 
neighborhoods that I initially defined based on geographic proximity, colonial histories, cultural 
similarities and a rough comparison of states’ GDP per capita and democracy (POLITY IV) 
scores. (Note that states can be members of more than one neighborhood; Mexico, for instance, 
is a member of both North America and Central America.) The final definition of neighborhoods 
came about through an iterative process, in which individual neighborhoods were expanded 
when the coding process described below uncovered new networks of state-to-state influence, 
and collapsed when coding suggested that two states did not have sufficiently deep relations with 
one another to be considered “neighbors.” Even so, a few cases of substate conflict identified 
below appear to be out-of-neighborhood (for example, Peru to Nepal in 1996). These 
geographically exceptional cases were counted as substate conflict contagion, but as with the  
temporally exceptional cases discussed above, they were excluded in some robustness checks 
that consider only the cases that fit the temporal and geographic scope conditions, strictly 
defined. In total, this universe of possible cases numbered 22,035 directed dyad-years. 
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 The use of directed dyad-years as the unit of observation is relatively new to the study of 
substate conflict contagion (it was pioneered by Forsberg).6 Other works have used country-
years; the dependent variable in these studies is civil war onset and the explanatory variable is a 
dichotomous indicator of whether one of the state’s neighbors was involved in a civil war — or, 
alternatively, a count of the number of neighbors at war. Such a set-up would certainly yield 
fewer total observations, because each state would appear in the dataset only once per year. 
However, directed dyad-years are the superior set-up given the research question I am trying to 
answer. We are not concerned with civil war onset per se, but rather civil war onset related to a 
specific neighboring substate conflict. Many states, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, have 
multiple neighbors in conflict at the same time. Thus, in many cases a country-year research 
design with a “neighbor at war” explanatory variable would not permit us to distinguish which 
neighboring wars, if any, have spread to the state in question. The directed dyad-year research 
design is suitable for precisely that purpose. 
 Next, I winnowed the 22,035 observations in the universe of possible cases down to 665 
cases of potential contagion. In this smaller subset of directed dyad-years, a substate conflict 
began in State B. (In general the UCDP/PRIO dataset mentioned above was used to determine 
when conflicts began, although some exceptions were made due to inaccuracies in this dataset.7) 
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 See Forsberg, “Polarization and Ethnic Conflict,” p. 289. Forsberg is also the originator of the “State A” and “State 
B” designations, and of the use of the five-year lag between State A’s conflict termination and its removal from the 
dataset. 
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 List of exceptions: The China 1946 onset is excluded, as it is inaccurately coded (the insurgency involving the 
People’s Liberation Army began long before 1946); the Azerbaijan 1992 onset is excluded, as this was merely the 
continuation of the Soviet Union 1990 intrastate conflict (over Nagorno-Karabakh); the Azerbaijan 2005 onset is 
excluded, as I did not find it corroborated anywhere outside the UCDP/PRIO dataset; the Equatorial Guinea 1979 
onset is excluded, as it was subsequently determined by UCDP/PRIO to not rise to the 25-death threshold; the Niger 
1994 onset is excluded, as it appears to be a simple continuation of the Niger 1991 conflict; the Ethiopia 1989 onset 
is excluded, as it cannot be corroborated; in its place, I have added a 1996 onset in Ethiopia versus the ARDUF; the 
India 1992 onset is excluded, as it appears to be an uninterrupted continuation of the Nagaland insurgency (from 
1956); the Burma onsets in 1992 and 2005 are excluded, as they appear to be uninterrupted continuations of the 
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Hence I had reason to suspect that the ongoing (or recently ended) substate conflict in State A 
contributed to the onset of the substate conflict in State B. These cases are listed in Table 3.2. 
To stop here would be to commit the same error as that found in the existing quantitative 
literature on substate conflict contagion: to equate spatial and temporal clustering of substate 
conflicts in State A and State B with the spread of conflict from State A to State B. Instead, I 
researched each of these 665 cases to determine whether it was a case of actual substate conflict 
contagion, or merely illusionary substate conflict contagion. In the “actual” cases, at least one 
secondary source that I consulted mentioned the substate conflict in State A as a cause of the 
substate conflict onset in State B. State A’s conflict needed to be mentioned as a cause of State  
B’s conflict; it did not need to be elevated to be the cause. Thus the causal threshold for actual 
substate conflict contagion is rather low; the State B conflict could have been caused by 25 
different factors, and I code the presence of actual contagion if State A’s conflict is one of those 
factors. Likewise, if conflicts in multiple State As contributed to the conflict in State B — for 
example, the conflicts in Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and Angola all contributed to the 
subsequent conflict in Zaire — each directed dyad-year (i.e., Rwanda-Zaire 1996, Burundi-Zaire 
1996, Uganda-Zaire 1996, and Angola-Zaire 1996) was coded as actual contagion. In the 
“illusionary” cases, by contrast, I found no causal link asserted between State A’s substate 
conflict and State B’s substate conflict onset. Generally I consulted at least three secondary 
sources before classifying a case as “illusionary,” and whenever possible I checked these codings 
with an area expert (usually an author of one of the secondary sources that I read). Full details on  
                                                                                                                                                             
Karenni insurgency (from 1957); the Burma onsets in 1990 and 1996 are excluded, as they appear to be 
uninterrupted continuations of the Mon insurgency (from 1949); the Malaysia onsets in 1958, 1974 and 1981 are 
excluded, as they appear to be uninterrupted continuations of the communist extra-state conflict with the United 
Kingdom (from 1948); the Philippines onsets in 1946 and 1969 are excluded, as they appear to be the essentially 
uninterrupted continuations of the communist insurgency (from 1942); and the Indonesia onsets in 1976 and 1999 
are excluded, as they appear to be the uninterrupted continuations of the West Papua insurgency (from 1965) and the 
Aceh insurgency (from 1990), respectively. Also, South Vietnam is coded as having a civil war until 1975, not 1964. 
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Table 3.2: List of Cases of Potential Substate Conflict Contagion 
Potential State B 
(potential receiver) 
Onset Year of State B’s 
Conflict 
Potential State A(s) 
(potential senders) 
United States (vs. Al Qaeda) 2001 Mexico 
Dominican Republic (vs. 
military faction) 
1965 Cuba 
Trinidad and Tobago (vs. 
Jamaat al-Muslimeen) 
1990 Haiti 
Mexico (vs. EZLN/EPR) 1994 El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua, Panama 
Guatemala (vs. military 
faction, etc.) 
1949 Costa Rica 
Guatemala (vs. FAR I) 1965 Cuba 
El Salvador (vs. forces of 
Benjamin Mejia) 
1972 Guatemala, Cuba 
El Salvador (vs. 
ERP/FPL/FMLN) 
1979 Guatemala, Nicaragua, Cuba 
Nicaragua (vs. FSLN/Contras) 1978 Guatemala, Cuba 
Panama (vs. forces of Moisés 
Giroldi) 
1989 El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua 
Colombia (vs. FARC, etc.) 1964 Argentina, Venezuela, Cuba 
Venezuela (vs. navy military 
faction) 
1962 Cuba 
Venezuela (vs. Bandera Roja) 1982 Argentina, Colombia, Peru 
Venezuela (vs. forces of Hugo 
Chavez) 
1992 Colombia, Paraguay, Peru, 
Suriname 
Suriname (vs. SLA/Jungle 
Commando) 
1986 Colombia, Peru, Venezuela 
Peru (vs. ELN/MIR) 1965 Argentina, Colombia, 
Venezuela, Cuba 
Peru (vs. Sendero Luminoso, 
etc.) 
1982 Argentina, Colombia, 
Venezuela 
Peru (vs. Sendero Luminoso) 2007 Colombia 
Bolivia (vs. MNR) 1952 Paraguay 
Bolivia (vs. ELN) 1967 Argentina, Colombia, Peru, 
Venezuela, Cuba 
 
Paraguay (vs. Febreristas, 
Liberals and Communists) 
1947 Bolivia 
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Potential State B 
(potential receiver) 
Onset Year of State B’s 
Substate Conflict 
Potential State A(s) 
(potential senders) 
Paraguay (vs. forces of 
General Alfredo Stroessner) 
1954 Bolivia, Cuba 
Paraguay (vs. forces of 
General Rodriguez) 
1989 Colombia, Peru, Suriname 
Chile (vs. forces of Augusto 
Pinochet) 
1973 Colombia, Uruguay, Cuba 
Argentina (vs. forces of 
Eduardo A. Lonardi Doucet) 
1955 Bolivia, Paraguay, Cuba 
Argentina (vs. Colorados) 1963 Venezuela, Cuba 
Argentina (vs. 
ERP/Monteneros) 
1974 Chile, Colombia, Uruguay, 
Cuba 
Uruguay (vs. 
MLN/Tupamaros) 
1972 Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba 
Spain (vs. ETA) 1980 United Kingdom 
Spain (vs. ETA) 1987 United Kingdom 
Macedonia (vs. UCK) 2001 Russia, Serbia, Bosnia, Croatia 
Croatia (vs. Serbian Republic 
of Krajina) 
1992 Bosnia, Romania, Russia, 
Serbia 
Serbia (vs. Slovenia/Croatia) 1991 Romania, Russia 
Serbia (vs. UCK) 1998 Bosnia, Croatia, Russia 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (vs. 
Serbian Republic of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina) 
1992 Romania, Russia, Serbia 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (vs. 
Autonomous Province of 
Western Bosnia) 
1993 Croatia, Romania, Russia, 
Serbia 
Moldova (vs. Dniestr 
Republic) 
1992 Russia, Romania 
Soviet Union (vs. Forest 
Brothers/LNPA/BDPS/UPA) 
1946 China 
Russia (vs. parliamentary 
forces) 
1993 Azerbaijan, Georgia 
Russia (vs. Chechen Republic 
of Ichkeria) 
1994 Azerbaijan, Georgia 
Russia (vs. Wahhabi 
movement of the Buinaksk 
district) 
 
1999 Azerbaijan 
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Potential State B 
(potential receiver) 
Onset Year of State B’s 
Substate Conflict 
Potential State A(s) 
(potential senders) 
Georgia (vs. anti-government 
alliance) 
1991 Soviet Union 
Georgia (vs. Abkhazia) 1992 Azerbaijan, Russia 
Georgia (vs. South Ossetia) 2004 Russia 
Azerbaijan (vs. forces of Suret 
Husseinov) 
1993 Georgia 
Guinea-Bissau (vs. Military 
Junta for the Consolidation of 
Democracy, Peace and 
Justice) 
1998 Liberia, Mali, Niger, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone 
Gambia (vs. NRC) 1981 Liberia, Mauritania 
Mali (vs. MPA/FIAA) 1990 Burkina Faso, Liberia, 
Senegal, Togo, Morocco, 
Chad, Afghanistan, Israel, 
Lebanon 
Mali (vs. ATNMC) 2007 Côte D’Ivoire, Liberia, Niger, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Algeria, 
Chad 
Senegal (vs. MFDC) 1990 Burkina Faso, Liberia, Mali, 
Togo 
Mauritania (vs. POLISARIO) 1975 Nigeria, Chad, Morocco 
Niger (vs. FLAA) 1991 Burkina Faso, Liberia, Mali, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, 
Morocco, Algeria, Chad 
Niger (vs. FDR) 1996 Liberia, Mali, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Togo, Algeria, Egypt, 
Chad 
Niger (vs. MNJ) 2007 Côte D’Ivoire, Liberia, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Algeria, 
Chad 
Côte D’Ivoire (vs. MJP, etc.) 2002 Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Liberia, Niger, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone 
 
Guinea (vs. RFDG) 2000 Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Niger, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone 
Burkina Faso (vs. Popular 
Front) 
1987 Cameroon, Ghana, Togo, 
Gambia 
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Potential State B 
(potential receiver) 
Onset Year of State B’s 
Substate Conflict 
Potential State A(s) 
(potential senders) 
Liberia (vs. forces of Samuel 
Doe) 
1980 Mauritania 
Liberia (vs. NPFL, etc.) 1989 Burkina Faso, Cameroon, 
Togo, Gambia, Ghana 
Sierra Leone (vs. RUF, etc.) 1991 Burkina Faso, Liberia, Mali, 
Niger, Senegal, Togo 
Ghana (vs. NLC) 1966 Cameroon, Gabon, Nigeria, 
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo 
Ghana (vs. forces of Jerry 
John Rawlings) 
1981 Gambia, Liberia, Mauritania 
Togo (vs. MTD) 1986 Cameroon, Gambia, Ghana 
Cameroon (vs. forces of 
Ibrahim Saleh) 
1984 Gambia, Ghana, Liberia 
Nigeria (vs. forces of Patrick 
Nzeogwu) 
1966 Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana 
Nigeria (vs. Republic of 
Biafra) 
1967 Gabon, Ghana 
Nigeria (vs. Ahlul Sunnah 
Jamaa/NDPVF) 
2004 Côte D’Ivoire, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Sudan, Somalia, 
Afghanistan 
Gabon (vs. forces loyal to 
Léon M’Ba) 
1964 Cameroon 
Central African Republic (vs. 
forces of Cyriac Souke) 
1996 Burundi, Chad, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, 
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Republic 
of the Congo, Rwanda, 
Somalia, Sudan, Uganda 
Chad (vs. FROLINAT, etc.) 1966 Burundi, Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, Ethiopia, Sudan 
Republic of the Congo (vs. 
Cobras, Ninjas, etc.) 
1993 Burundi, Chad, Djibouti, 
Ethiopia, Rwanda, Somalia, 
Sudan, Uganda, Angola 
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (vs. CNL, etc.) 
1964 Ethiopia, Sudan, China 
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Potential State B 
(potential receiver) 
Onset Year of State B’s 
Substate Conflict 
Potential State A(s) 
(potential senders) 
Democratic Rep. of the Congo 
(vs. FLNC) 
1977 Chad, Ethiopia, Sudan, 
Uganda, Angola, Cuba 
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (vs. AFDL, etc.) 
1996 Burundi, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Djibouti, 
Ethiopia, Republic of the 
Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, 
Sudan, Uganda, Angola 
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (vs. BDK) 
2007 Burundi, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Republic of the 
Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, 
Sudan, Uganda, Angola 
Uganda (vs. forces of Idi 
Amin, etc.) 
1971 Chad, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Ethiopia, Sudan 
Kenya (vs. forces of Hezekiah 
Ochuka) 
1982 Chad, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Ethiopia, Somalia, 
Sudan, Uganda 
Burundi (vs. forces loyal to 
Gervais Nyangoma) 
1965 Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Ethiopia, Sudan 
Burundi (vs. Palipehutu, etc.) 1991 Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, 
Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, 
Uganda 
Rwanda (vs. FPR/FDLR) 1990 Chad, Ethiopia, Somalia, 
Sudan, Uganda 
Somalia (vs. forces of 
Abdulaahi Yusuf, etc.) 
1978 Chad, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Ethiopia, Sudan, 
Uganda 
Djibouti (vs. FRUD) 1991 Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia, 
Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, 
Uganda 
Ethiopia (vs. forces of 
Mengistu Neway) 
1960 Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Iraq 
Ethiopia (vs. ELF) 1964 Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Sudan, Iraq, Cuba 
Ethiopia (vs. ALF) 1975 Chad, Sudan, Uganda, 
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo 
Ethiopia (vs. EPRP/TPLF/WSLF) 1976 Chad, Sudan, Uganda 
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Potential State B 
(potential receiver) 
Onset Year of State B’s 
Substate Conflict 
Potential State A(s) 
(potential senders) 
Ethiopia (vs. OLF) 1977 Chad, DR Congo, Sudan, Uganda 
Ethiopia (vs. ONLF) 1994 Burundi, Chad, Djibouti, 
Republic of the Congo, 
Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, 
Uganda 
Ethiopia (vs. al-Itahad al-
Islami) 
1995 Burundi, Chad, Djibouti, 
Republic of the Congo, 
Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, 
Uganda 
Ethiopia (vs. ARDUF) 1996 Burundi, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, 
Djibouti, Republic of the 
Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, 
Sudan, Uganda 
Eritrea (vs. EIJM-AS) 1997 Burundi, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, 
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Republic 
of the Congo, Rwanda, 
Somalia, Sudan, Uganda 
Angola (vs. FNLA/UNITA) 1975 Madagascar, South Africa, 
Zimbabwe, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, China 
Angola (vs. FLEC-
FAC/FLEC-R) 
1991 Comoros, Mozambique, South 
Africa 
Mozambique (vs. RENAMO) 1977 Angola, South Africa, 
Zimbabwe 
South Africa (vs. ANC) 1981 Angola, Mozambique, 
Zimbabwe 
Lesotho (vs. military faction) 1998 Angola, Comoros 
Madagascar (vs. Monima) 1971 South Africa 
Comoros (vs. presidential 
guard) 
1989 Angola, Mozambique, South 
Africa 
Comoros (vs. MPA/Republic 
of Anjouan) 
1997 Angola, Mozambique 
Morocco 1971 Chad 
Morocco (vs. POLISARIO) 1975 Chad, Mauritania 
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Potential State B 
(potential receiver) 
Onset Year of State B’s 
Substate Conflict 
Potential State A(s) 
(potential senders) 
Algeria (vs. Takfir wa’l Hijra, 
etc.) 
1991 Morocco, Mali, Niger, Chad, 
Afghanistan 
Tunisia (vs. Résistance Armée 
Tunisienne) 
1980 Morocco, Chad, Mauritania 
Sudan (vs. Anya Nya) 1963 Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Ethiopia 
Sudan (vs. Sudanese 
Communist Party) 
1971 Chad, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Ethiopia, Uganda 
Sudan (vs. SPLM/A) 1983 Chad, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Somalia, Uganda 
Iran (vs. KDPI) 1966 Iraq, Israel, Syria 
Iran (vs. MEK/APCO) 1979 Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, 
Lebanon, Pakistan, Syria 
Turkey (vs. PKK) 1984 Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, 
Syria 
Turkey (vs. Devrimci Sol) 1991 Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon 
Turkey (vs. MKP) 2005 Iran, Iraq, Israel 
Iraq (vs. Free Officers 
Movement, etc.) 
1958 Israel, Lebanon 
Iraq (vs. KDP) 1961 Israel, Lebanon 
Iraq (vs. SCIRI) 1982 Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, 
Afghanistan 
Iraq (vs. Al-Mahdi Army, etc.) 2004 Iran, Israel, Turkey, 
Afghanistan 
Egypt (vs. al-Gama’a al-
Islamiyya) 
1993 Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Israel, 
Lebanon, Morocco, Turkey, 
Mali, Niger, Chad, 
Afghanistan 
Syria (vs. forces loyal to 
Nureddin Atassi and Youssef 
Zeayen) 
1966 Iran, Iraq, Israel 
Syria (vs. Muslim 
Brotherhood) 
1979 Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon 
Lebanon 
(vs. Independent Nasserite 
Movement/Mourabitoun 
militia) 
1958 Israel 
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Potential State B 
(potential receiver) 
Onset Year of State B’s 
Substate Conflict 
Potential State A(s) 
(potential senders) 
Lebanon (vs. LNM/LAA) 1975 Iraq, Israel 
Lebanon (vs. LNM, etc.) 1982 Iran, Iraq, Israel, Syria 
Israel (vs. Palestinian 
insurgents, etc.) 
1949 Iran 
Israel (vs. Hezbollah) 1990 Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Turkey 
Israel (vs. Hezbollah) 2006 Iran, Iraq, Turkey 
Saudi Arabia (vs. JSM) 1979 Oman 
North Yemen (vs. Royalists) 1962 Oman 
North Yemen (vs. National 
Democratic Front) 
1980 Oman, Saudi Arabia 
South Yemen (vs. Yemenite 
Socialist Party — Abdul 
Fattah Ismail faction) 
1986 North Yemen 
Oman (vs. PFLO) 1972 North Yemen, China 
Tajikistan (vs. UTO, etc.) 1992 Afghanistan, Pakistan, Russia 
Afghanistan (vs. Hizb-i 
Demokratik-i Khalq-i 
Afghanistan, etc.) 
1978 Pakistan 
Uzbekistan (vs. IMU) 1999 Afghanistan, Pakistan, Russia, 
Tajikistan 
China (vs. Taiwanese 
insurgents) 
1947 Soviet Union 
China (vs. Tibet) 1950 Soviet Union 
India (vs. CPI) 1948 Burma, China 
India (vs. NNC) 1956 Burma, China 
India (vs. MNF) 1966 Nepal, Burma, China 
India (vs. CPI-ML) 1969 Burma, China 
India (vs. TNV) 1978 Bangladesh, Pakistan, Burma, 
China 
India (vs. PLA) 1982 Bangladesh, Pakistan, Burma, 
China 
India (vs. Sikh insurgents) 1983 Bangladesh, Burma, Pakistan 
India (vs. Kashmir 
insurgents/ABSU) 
1989 Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, 
Burma, Pakistan 
India (vs. ULFA/PWG) 1990 Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka, Burma 
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Potential State B 
(potential receiver) 
Onset Year of State B’s 
Substate Conflict 
Potential State A(s) 
(potential senders) 
Pakistan (vs. Mufti Bahini) 1971 India, Sri Lanka, Iran 
Pakistan (vs. Baluchi 
insurgents) 
1974 India, Sri Lanka 
Pakistan (vs. MQM) 1990 Afghanistan, Bangladesh, 
India, Sri Lanka, Iran 
Pakistan (vs. BLA/Baluch 
Ittehad) 
2004 Afghanistan, India, Nepal, Sri 
Lanka, Iran, Uzbekistan 
Pakistan (vs. TNSM/TTP) 2007 Afghanistan, India, Nepal, Sri 
Lanka, Iran, Uzbekistan 
Bangladesh (vs. JSS/SB) 1975 India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan 
Burma (vs. White 
Band/Arakan insurgents) 
1948 Philippines, India, China 
Burma (vs. KNU/MFL-
MUF/PNDF) 
1949 Philippines, India, China 
Burma (vs. KNPP) 1957 Indonesia, Philippines, South 
Vietnam, India, China 
Burma (vs. NSH) 1959 Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Philippines, South Vietnam, 
India, China 
Burma (vs. KIO) 1961 Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
South Vietnam, India, China 
Burma (vs. UWSA) 1997 Cambodia, Indonesia, Papua 
New Guinea, Philippines, 
India 
Sri Lanka (vs. JVP) 1971 India, China, Pakistan 
Sri Lanka (vs. LTTE/TELO) 1984 Bangladesh, India, China, 
Pakistan 
Sri Lanka (vs. JVP) 1989 Bangladesh, India 
Nepal (vs. Nepali Congress) 1960 India, China 
Nepal (vs. CPN-M) 1996 Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, 
Pakistan, Peru 
Thailand (vs. Navy military 
faction) 
1951 Indonesia, Burma, Philippines, 
China 
Thailand (vs. CPT) 1974 Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, 
Malaysia, Burma, Philippines, 
South Vietnam, China 
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Potential State B 
(potential receiver) 
Onset Year of State B’s 
Substate Conflict 
Potential State A(s) 
(potential senders) 
Thailand (vs. Patani 
insurgents) 
2003 Cambodia, Indonesia, Burma, 
Philippines, Afghanistan, Sri 
Lanka 
Cambodia (vs. Khmer Rouge, 
etc.) 
1967 Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Burma, South Vietnam, China 
Laos (vs. Pathet 
Lao/Neutralists) 
1959 Indonesia, Malaysia, Burma, 
Philippines, South Vietnam, 
China 
Laos (vs. LRM) 1989 Cambodia, Indonesia, Burma, 
Papua New Guinea, 
Philippines 
South Vietnam (vs. FNL) 1955 Indonesia, Burma, Philippines, 
Thailand, China 
Malaysia (vs. CCO) 1963 Indonesia, Laos, Burma, South 
Vietnam, China 
Philippines (vs. MIM/MNLF) 1970 Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, 
Malaysia, Burma, South 
Vietnam, China 
Indonesia (vs. Republic of 
South Moluccas) 
1950 Burma, Philippines, China 
Indonesia (vs. Darul Islam) 1953 Burma, Philippines, Thailand, 
China 
Indonesia (vs. OPM) 1965 Laos, Malaysia, Burma, South 
Vietnam, China 
Indonesia (vs. FRETILIN) 1975 Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Burma, Philippines, South 
Vietnam, Thailand 
Indonesia (vs. GAM) 1990 Cambodia, Laos, Burma, 
Papua New Guinea, 
Philippines 
Papua New Guinea (vs. BRA) 1989 Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, 
Burma, Philippines 
—  
my codings are available in the Dissertation Appendix (Chapter 7).  
This low threshold for the identification of actual contagion was chosen because substate 
conflict causation is an extraordinarily complex phenomenon. To my knowledge, no such 
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conflict has ever been caused by a single factor. Insisting that a State A conflict be the sole cause 
of a State B conflict, or even that State A’s conflict be a necessary condition for State B’s 
conflict, would have led me to throw out dozens of contagion cases in which State A’s conflict 
was an important but not necessarily a determinative factor in the onset of the State B conflict. 
Defining contagion more broadly — as the influence of State A’s conflict on the onset of State 
B’s conflict — allowed me to consider the full spectrum of relationships between pairs of 
conflicts, while allowing the reader to exclude “weaker” cases at his discretion rather than mine. 
So it is important to note that the identification of a causal link between a State A conflict and a 
State B conflict should not be interpreted as the assertion that State A’s conflict was necessary 
for the onset of State B’s conflict. That being said, later in this chapter I do try to assess the 
extent to which state actions were necessary for specific cases of contagion — necessary, in 
other words, to establish a relationship between the State A and State B conflicts. This effort 
should be distinguished from the effort to determine whether a factor was necessary for the onset 
of a State B conflict in general, which I generally do not attempt. (In a small number of cases, I 
do assert that a state action was necessary for a State B conflict onset; these exceptional cases are 
identified below.) 
 This coding process yielded 162 cases of actual substate conflict contagion, with 
contagion defined as one substate conflict contributing to the onset of another. I then took one 
final step, however, filtering out any cases in which the State B substate conflict did not qualify 
as a “civil war” — in other words, cases in which the State B conflict resulted in at least 25 but 
fewer than 1,000 cumulative battle-related deaths. (These cases are listed in Table 3.3. Cases are 
sorted first by State B region — Americas, Eastern Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, North 
Africa/Middle East, and Asia — and then alphabetically by State A.) As discussed in Chapter 1,  
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Table 3.3: 78 Excluded Cases of Substate Conflict Contagion (No State B Civil War) 
State A (sender state) State B (receiver state) Year 
Colombia Peru 2007 
Colombia Venezuela 1982 
Cuba Bolivia 1967 
Cuba Dominican Republic 1965 
Cuba Peru 1965 
Cuba Uruguay 1972 
Cuba Venezuela 1962 
Guatemala Mexico 1994 
Bosnia-Herzegovina Macedonia 2001 
Romania Moldova 1992 
Russia Georgia 2004 
Serbia Macedonia 2001 
Afghanistan Nigeria 2004 
Afghanistan Mali 1990 
Angola Congo-Kinshasa 1977 
Chad Mali 1990 
Chad Niger 1991 
Chad Niger 1996 
Chad Niger 2007 
Côte D’Ivoire Niger 2007 
Congo-Kinshasa Burundi 1965 
Congo-Kinshasa Ghana 1966 
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State A (sender state) State B (receiver state) Year 
Congo-Kinshasa Nigeria 2004 
Cuba Congo-Kinshasa 1977 
Ethiopia Djibouti 1991 
Ethiopia Eritrea 1997 
Ghana Togo 1986 
Guinea-Bissau Guinea 2000 
Guinea-Bissau Nigeria 2004 
Israel Mali 1990 
Lebanon Mali 1990 
Liberia Côte D’Ivoire 2002 
Liberia Gambia 1981 
Liberia Guinea 2000 
Liberia Guinea-Bissau 1998 
Liberia Niger 2007 
Liberia Nigeria 2004 
Mali Niger 1991 
Morocco Mali 1990 
Niger Mali 2007 
Senegal Guinea-Bissau 1998 
Sierra Leone Guinea 2000 
Sierra Leone Nigeria 2004 
Somalia Djibouti 1991 
Somalia Ethiopia 1995 
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State A (sender state) State B (receiver state) Year 
Somalia Nigeria 2004 
South Africa Comoros 1989 
Sudan Eritrea 1997 
Sudan Ethiopia 1995 
Sudan Nigeria 2004 
Afghanistan Egypt 1993 
China Oman 1972 
Iraq Iran 1979 
Israel Iraq 1958 
Israel Turkey 1991 
Lebanon Iraq 1958 
Lebanon Israel 1990 
Afghanistan Pakistan 1990 
Afghanistan Pakistan 2004 
Afghanistan Thailand 2003 
Afghanistan Uzbekistan 1999 
Burma India 1982 
Burma India 1990 
Cambodia Thailand 2003 
China India 1966 
China India 1969 
China India 1982 
China Malaysia 1963 
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State A (sender state) State B (receiver state) Year 
India Bangladesh 1975 
India Pakistan 1990 
Indonesia Thailand 2003 
Pakistan India 1978 
Pakistan India 1982 
Pakistan India 1989 
Pakistan India 1990 
Philippines Thailand 2003 
Sri Lanka Thailand 2003 
Tajikistan Uzbekistan 1999 
— 
we are substantively most concerned with the cases in which the spread of conflict ultimately 
results in civil war. To capture the empirical landscape of this most troubling phenomenon, I 
needed to exclude cases in which substate conflicts merely contributed to violent but low-level 
conflicts. 
 The final result of this exhaustive data collection and filtration process was a list of 84 
cases of substate conflict contagion, shown in Table 3.4 (sorted the same way as Table 3.3). This 
list in itself is a significant contribution to the literature on contagion, because it is the most 
comprehensive and accurate universe of contagion to date. A flowchart showing how I arrived at 
this list — in effect summarizing this section — is shown in Figure 3.1. Now the question 
becomes what caused the actual contagion in these 84 cases — a question which we will now 
begin to address. 
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Table 3.4: 84 Actual Cases of Substate Conflict Contagion 
State A (sender state) State B (receiver state) Year 
Bolivia Paraguay 1947 
Cuba Argentina 1974 
Cuba Colombia 1964 
Cuba El Salvador 1981 
Cuba Guatemala 1965 
Cuba Nicaragua 1978 
Nicaragua El Salvador 1981 
Uruguay Argentina 1974 
Azerbaijan Russia 1994 
Bosnia-Herzegovina Serbia 1998 
Croatia Serbia 1998 
Georgia Russia 1994 
Serbia Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992 
Serbia Bosnia-Herzegovina 1993 
Serbia Croatia 1992 
Angola Congo-Kinshasa 1996 
Burkina Faso Liberia 1989 
Burkina Faso Sierra Leone 1991 
Burundi Congo-Kinshasa 1996 
China Angola 1975 
China Congo-Kinshasa 1964 
Congo-Kinshasa Angola 1975 
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State A (sender state) State B (receiver state) Year 
Congo-Kinshasa Uganda 1971 
Cuba Ethiopia 1964 
Ethiopia Somalia 1978 
Ethiopia Sudan 1983 
Gambia Liberia 1989 
Ghana Liberia 1989 
Iraq Ethiopia 1964 
Liberia Sierra Leone 1991 
Rwanda Burundi 1991 
Rwanda Congo-Kinshasa 1996 
Somalia Ethiopia 2009 (see Appendix 3.1) 
South Africa Angola 1975 
Sudan Ethiopia 1964 
Sudan Ethiopia 1976 
Sudan Ethiopia 1977 
Sudan Uganda 1971 
Uganda Congo-Kinshasa 1996 
Uganda Rwanda 1990 
Zimbabwe Mozambique 1977 
Zimbabwe South Africa 1981 
Afghanistan Algeria 1991 
Afghanistan Iraq 2004 
Iraq Iran 1966 
100 
 
State A (sender state) State B (receiver state) Year 
Iraq Turkey 1984 
Israel Iran 1979 
Israel Iraq 2004 
Israel Lebanon 1958 
Israel Lebanon 1975 
Israel Lebanon 1982 
Israel Turkey 1984 
Lebanon Syria 1979 
North Yemen South Yemen 1986 
Afghanistan Pakistan 2007 
Afghanistan Tajikistan 1992 
Burma India 1956 
Cambodia Indonesia 2003 
Cambodia Thailand 1976 
China Burma 1948 
China Burma 1949 
China Burma 1959 
China Burma 1961 
China Cambodia 1967 
China India 1948 
China India 1956 
China Laos 1959 
China South Vietnam 1955 
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State A (sender state) State B (receiver state) Year 
China Sri Lanka 1971 
China Sri Lanka 1984 
China Thailand 1976 
India Burma 1948 
India Nepal 1996 
Laos Thailand 1976 
Malaysia Thailand 1976 
Pakistan Afghanistan 1978 
Pakistan India 1983 
Pakistan Sri Lanka 1984 
Peru Nepal 1996 
South Vietnam Cambodia 1967 
South Vietnam Laos 1959 
South Vietnam Thailand 1976 
Sri Lanka India 1990 
Uzbekistan Pakistan 2007 
— 
Summary of the State Action Explanation’s Performance and Robustness Checks 
I now summarize the aggregate findings of 84 “mini-case studies,” the specific details of 
which can be found in Appendix 3.1. In each mini-case study, I consulted secondary literature to 
determine (1) how the contagion between State A and State B occurred, (2) whether or not  
evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality was present in the case, and (3) if a 
state action was present, the extent to which that state action was necessary to the contagion —  
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Figure 3.1: Flowchart of Contagion Coding Methodology 
 
— 
in other words, would contagion from State A to State B have occurred in the absence of the 
state action in question? For question (3), I judge a state action to have been “necessary” for a 
case of contagion if either of these two criteria is met: 
(a) Civil War Necessity Criterion: The state action appears to have been necessary for the onset 
of the State B civil war. Had the state action in question not occurred, seemingly the State B civil 
war would not have occurred. 
(b) Main Link Criterion: In the absence of the state action, there might still have been a State B 
civil war, but the State B civil war would have been causally unrelated to the substate conflict in 
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State A. In other words, the state action constitutes the main, or the only, connection between the 
State A and State B conflicts. Therefore, while the state action in question was not necessary for 
the State B civil war, it was necessary for the contagion between State A and State B. (As 
discussed above, there is a critical difference between arguing that a factor was necessary for a 
civil war and arguing that a factor was necessary to establish a relationship between two 
conflicts. I generally attempt to make the latter argument rather than the former. However, I do 
invoke the Civil War Necessity Criterion when it seems plausible to do so.) Given that 
evaluating necessary conditions for individual contagion cases involves difficult and 
unfalsifiable counterfactual analysis, I plan to subject these necessity codings to intercoder 
reliability tests in future research.  
In general, the State Action Explanation seems to perform well with respect to the 
identified cases of substate conflict contagion. As shown in Figure 3.2, of the 84 cases reviewed 
below, 67 (80 percent) had at least one state action present. In 57 of these 67 (68 percent of all 84 
cases), I argue that the state action in question was necessary for the contagion to occur. Thirty-
one cases were coded as necessary according to the Main Link Criterion only, and in twenty-six 
more, either the Civil War Necessity Criterion or both criteria were met. In the other ten cases 
(12 percent) — Cuba to Nicaragua, 1978; Azerbaijan to Russia, 1994; Bosnia-Herzegovina to 
Serbia, 1998; Rwanda to Burundi, 1991; Lebanon to Syria, 1979; Afghanistan to Tajikistan, 
1992; China to Laos, 1959; China to Thailand, 1976; Burma to India, 1956; and Pakistan to 
India, 1983 — a state action was present, but it was not clearly a necessary condition in order for 
contagion to have occurred (see the case discussions below for an explanation of each). Finally, 
in the remaining 17 cases (20 percent of the total), state action appears to have been absent, yet 
substate conflict spread anyway. These are the cases for which the State Action Explanation falls  
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Figure 3.2: Cases of Substate Conflict Contagion  
 
— 
short; in these cases, nonstate and structural factors were actually sufficient to spread conflict 
from one state to another. Table 3.5 details which nonstate factors specifically spread conflict in 
these 17 cases, as well as in the 10 cases where state action was present but not clearly necessary 
for contagion. These nonstate factors, while they frequently occur across the universe of cases 
writ large and are probably themselves necessary for some cases of contagion, seem in only a 
handful of cases to be able to cause contagion without accompanying state actions. (On structural 
factors, see the separate section below.) Overall, we can assert that if evangelization, expulsion, 
and meddling with overt partiality were not committed by the state governments in question, 
there would have been at least a two-thirds reduction in the frequency of substate conflict 
contagion between 1946 and 2007.  
 Interestingly, these 84 cases in which substate conflict contagion ended in a State B civil  
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Table 3.5: Nonstate Causal Mechanisms at Work in 27 Non-State-Action-Driven Cases 
Nonstate Causal Mechanism Number of Cases with 
Causal Mechanism Present 
among 17 Cases with State 
Action Absent 
Number of Cases with 
Causal Mechanism Present 
among 10 Cases with State 
Action Present but Not 
Clearly Necessary 
Rebellion in State A Inspires 
Rebels in State B 
8 5 
Rebels in State A Assist 
Rebels in State B 
4 2 
Weapons from State A’s 
Conflict Move to Rebels in 
State B (without the 
complicity of State A’s 
government) 
2 2 
Drug Trade in State A Creates 
Insurgent-Exploited Drug 
Trade in State B 
0 1 
Combatants from State B 
Fight in State A’s Conflict, 
Then Return Home (Not 
Through State A Expulsion) 
and Start Conflict 
1 1 
Refugees from State A 
Destabilize State B 
1 1 
Other 1 1 
Total 17 138 
 
 
                                                 
8
 Adds to more than 10 because some cases have multiple nonstate mechanisms present. 
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war differ markedly from the 78 cases in which contagion ended only in a low-intensity State B 
substate conflict (these 78 cases are listed in Table 3.3). As shown in Table 3.6, the frequency of 
state action in these low-intensity contagion cases is substantially lower, at 35 percent versus the 
80 percent frequency for the high-intensity conflicts. If we combine these data with the data from 
the 84 high-intensity conflicts, we see in Table 3.7 that contagion cases involving state action 
ended in a State B civil war 71 percent of the time (67 of 94 cases), while contagion cases 
involving only nonstate causal mechanisms ended in a State B civil war only 25 percent of the 
time (17 of 68 cases). These differences support a key proposition of the State Action 
Explanation: that conflicts usually only spread with high intensity when state action is present, 
due to the natural obstacles to the movement of high-intensity conflict across borders. These 
results also suggest that the spread of low-intensity conflict is not nearly as state-driven, and that 
the causes of low-intensity substate conflict contagion are considerably more diffuse. 
Returning now (and for most of the rest of this chapter) to only the 84 high-intensity 
contagion cases, Figure 3.3 shows the breakdown of these cases with the following categories 
excluded: cases in which State A was Cuba, Israel, or China, and cases in the Balkans. 
Collectively these cases form a “cluster” totaling 31 of the 84 cases, so it is worth considering 
whether the substantive results change when these cases are excluded. In fact, the substantive 
results do not change; if anything, the frequency of state action in the remaining 53 cases is 
slightly higher, at 45 cases (85%) with necessity uncertain in 6. 
Figure 3.4 shows how the state actions break down across the contagion cases, if the state 
actions are considered individually rather than collectively.9 From this we see that meddling with 
overt partiality appears to be the modal cause of substate conflict contagion at 31 cases,  
                                                 
9
 The denominator for these percentages is 84 cases; in the rare cases where multiple state actions were present, I 
identified which one state action was most clearly involved in the contagion. 
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Table 3.6: Causal Mechanisms Present in 78 Low-Intensity Contagion Cases 
(see Table 3A.1 in Appendix 3.1 for case-by-case listing) 
 
Causal Mechanism Number of Low-Intensity Cases in which 
Causal Mechanism was Present 
Evangelization 13 
Expulsion 1 
Meddling with Overt Partiality 13 
Weapons from State A’s Conflict Move to 
Rebels in State B (without the complicity of 
State A’s government) 
17 
Rebellion in State A Inspires Rebels in State B 12 
Combatants from State B Fight in State A’s 
Conflict, Then Return Home (Not Through 
State A Expulsion) and Start Conflict 
12 
Rebels in State A Assist Rebels in State B 8 
Refugees from State A Destabilize State B 8 
Drug Trade in State A Creates Insurgent-
Exploited Drug Trade in State B 
1 
Other 5 
Total 9010 
Total Unique Cases Involving State Action 27 (35% of 78 unique cases) 
 
Table 3.7: High- and Low-Intensity Conflict Outcomes by State Action Presence 
State Action Present? Civil War Low-Intensity Conflict 
Yes 67 contagion cases 27 contagion cases 
No 17 contagion cases 51 contagion cases 
 
                                                 
10
 Adds to more than 78 because some cases have multiple mechanisms present. 
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Figure 3.3: Cases of Substate Conflict Contagion with “Clusters” Excluded 
 
— 
Figure 3.4: Cases of Substate Conflict Contagion by Individual State Action  
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Table 3.8: Substate Conflict Contagion and State Action by Decade 
Decade/Time Period Number of Cases of 
Substate Conflict 
Contagion 
Number of Cases 
Involving State 
Action 
Percent Frequency 
of State Action 
1940s (1946-1949) 5 0 0% 
1950s (1950-1959) 7 5 71% 
1960s (1960-1969) 10 10 100% 
1970s (1970-1979) 22 1911 86% 
1980s (1980-1989)  14 12 86% 
1990s (1990-1999) 20 1612 80% 
2000s (2000-2007) 6 5 83% 
Cold War 
(1946-1989) 
58 46 79% 
Post-Cold War 
(1990-2007) 
26 21 81% 
— 
although evangelization (22 cases), expulsion (14 cases), and non-state-driven causes (17 cases) 
are not far behind. 
How well does this support for the State Action Explanation hold up across time periods 
and across regions? Table 3.8 shows the frequency of state action among substate conflict 
contagion cases split up by decade. In six of the seven decades, the frequency of state action is 
greater than two thirds — only in the 1940s (1946-1949) did all (five) cases of substate conflict 
                                                 
11
 The high figure is driven by a high number of meddling cases (11), particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
12
 Again, the high figure is driven by a high number of meddling cases (11), again in Africa but also in the Balkans 
and former Soviet Union. 
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contagion occur in the absence of evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality.13 
Furthermore, although these temporal data do not show a clear secular trend, the Cold War 
frequency of state action is slightly lower than the post-Cold War frequency of state action. In 
short, my findings appear not to be an artifact of unique historical events or of conditions in the 
international system that are unlikely to reappear in the near future, such as bipolarity. Rather, 
the importance of state action to substate conflict contagion is fairly consistent over time, and 
seems particularly relevant today. 
A similar inference can be made about the contagion cases when broken down by the 
geographic region in which State B resides (see Table 3.9). In all five regions with cases of 
substate conflict contagion, state action was present in the majority of the cases. Interestingly, 
the highest regional frequency of state action is in Sub-Saharan Africa, where states are generally 
considered weakest and borders most artificial. This is strong evidence for the importance of 
state action — even on the part of relatively weak states — to the spread of violent conflict 
across borders. Meanwhile, the region where state action matters least is Asia. To a large extent 
this seems attributable to the unique ideological influence of Maoism on Asian dissidents in the 
months preceding and the decades following the 1949 communist victory in China. Six of the 
twelve Asian cases in which state action was not involved instead involved the Chinese model of 
revolution inspiring insurrection elsewhere (without direct encouragement from Beijing, as that 
would have constituted evangelization). This wave of inspiration seemingly counteracted the 
tendency for substate conflicts to horrify potential rebels elsewhere. Instead, for at least some 
period of time in this region, leftist insurrection actually looked promising. The total rebel 
victory in China and the subsequent transformation of China into a communist great power was  
                                                 
13
 Four of these five 1940s cases involved communist rebellion in State A inspiring communist rebellion in State B, 
and in three of those four cases, State A was China. On the exceptional nature of the Chinese demonstration effect in 
the years immediately before and after 1949, see the regional discussion below. 
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Table 3.9: Substate Conflict Contagion and State Action by Region 
Region of State B Number of Cases of 
Substate Conflict 
Contagion 
Number of Cases 
Involving State 
Action 
Percent Frequency 
of State Action 
Latin America 8 7 88% 
Eastern Europe and 
Former Soviet Union 
(excluding Central 
Asian states) 
7 6 86% 
Sub-Saharan Africa 27 27 100% 
North Africa/Middle 
East 
12 9 75% 
Asia (including 
former Soviet states in 
Central Asia) 
30 18 60% 
North 
America/Western 
Europe/Oceania 
0 0 NA 
— 
an exceptionally rare sequence of events, and absent a similar occurrence we should expect the 
natural obstacle of the “reverse demonstration effect” (see Chapter 2) to dominate. (If these six 
cases of Chinese inspiration are excluded, the frequency of state action in Asia rises to 75%.) 
Next, there are 18 cases of substate conflict contagion described below in which the State A-
State B pairing could potentially be considered outside the scope conditions of this project. 
Either the State B conflict began more than five years after the end of the State A conflict, or 
State A was a vast geographic distance from State B (i.e., Cuba to Ethiopia, 1964). These cases 
were counted as substate conflict contagion in the analyses above, because my goal is to be data-
inclusive rather than data-exclusive. However, since they are technically outside the scope 
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conditions, I excluded these cases from the robustness checks that follow. Figure 3.5 shows the 
distribution of state action among the 66 cases that are unquestionably within-scope. The 
frequency of state action is actually even greater — 54 cases (82 percent) had state action 
present, and in at least 47 of these cases (71 percent) the state action was necessary to the 
contagion. 
 As a final robustness check, from this new population of 66 cases I also raised the low 
causal threshold for contagion and removed the two cases identified below in which the 
contribution of State A’s conflict to State B’s civil war was extremely limited (Cambodia to 
Indonesia, 2003; and Uzbekistan to Pakistan, 2007). As shown in Figure 3.6, the frequency of 
state action among the remaining 64 cases of substate conflict contagion again rises — there are 
now 53 cases (83 percent) involving state action in all, and 46 cases (72 percent) in which the 
state action was necessary to the contagion. Overall, then, the robustness checks that involved 
the exclusion of contagion cases only increased the frequency of state action, and thus increased 
the plausibility of the State Action Explanation. 
Thus the general results of the analysis of the 84 identified cases of substate conflict 
contagion, as well as the more cursory analysis of 78 low-intensity contagion cases and various 
robustness checks, support the State Action Explanation. The high frequency of evangelization, 
expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality among the 84 contagion cases, as well as the 
general necessity of these mechanisms to the individual cases of contagion, supports the 
prediction from Chapter 2 that these state actions are usually necessary (but insufficient) 
conditions for substate conflict contagion to occur. These actions were not necessary for the 
spread of violent civil conflict across borders in at most a third of the 84 actual cases of 
contagion. Therefore, it can be asserted that in the absence of these state actions, the vast 
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Figure 3.5: Cases of Substate Conflict Contagion; Potentially Out-of-Scope Cases Excluded 
 
— 
Figure 3.6: Cases of Substate Conflict Contagion; Potentially Out-of-Scope 
and Ambiguous Cases Excluded 
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majority of these 84 instances of substate conflict contagion would not have occurred — a key 
takeaway for both scholars and policymakers. 
The Role of Structural Factors in Contagion Cases 
 In Chapter 2, I argued that the presence of at least one of the state actions of 
evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality is a necessary condition for most 
cases of substate conflict contagion, a supposition confirmed in this chapter. I also argued, 
though, that these state actions are not sufficient conditions for contagion — that they must 
combine with nonstate and structural factors in order to produce contagion outcomes. A part of 
this latter proposition will be put to a preliminary test in this section. 
I have discussed nonstate factors above to a limited extent, and I hope to further develop 
my understanding of the interaction between state actions and nonstate factors in future research. 
As yet unmentioned in this chapter, though, are the structural factors such as poverty that cause 
civil war in general, not just the contagion of substate conflict. These factors play a critical role 
in my explanation, because we do not expect substate conflict to spread to states where civil war 
in general is unlikely. To draw on the epidemiologic analogy discussed in Chapter 1, the host 
state (State B) cannot be infected by the agent of substate conflict (from State A) unless it is 
generally susceptible to such an infection. If its “immunity” is too high — if, in other words, the 
structural factors that cause civil wars in general are absent from State B — then no amount of 
evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality will be sufficient to overcome the 
structural tendency toward peace in that polity.14 
Hence we expect the structural factors for civil war onset to be present in the State B of 
the vast majority of substate conflict contagion cases. However, because structural factors are 
                                                 
14
 A similar argument for the importance of factors increasing a state’s natural “resistance” to contagion can be 
found in Alex Braithwaite, “Resisting Infection: How State Capacity Conditions Conflict Contagion,” Journal of 
Peace Research, Vol. 47, No. 3 (2010): 311-319. 
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necessary but also insufficient for contagion, we further expect there to be unexplained variation 
in the occurrence and nonoccurrence of substate conflict contagion when structural factors alone 
are considered. The State Action Explanation asserts that the most important variables omitted 
from such an analysis are evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality. 
To hold our empirics up against these expectations, we first need a methodology for 
measuring the vague concept of “structural factors” and comparing its presence and intensity 
across contagion and non-contagion cases. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the question of 
what causes civil wars in general is highly complex, is the source of a vast literature only lightly 
referenced in this work, and is outside the scope of this dissertation. Fortunately, this broader 
literature includes several seminal studies which have constructed reasonably comprehensive 
multivariate regression models of civil war onset. These regression models attempt to 
simultaneously estimate the causal effects of most of the major factors considered to be structural 
causes of violent civil conflict. (The word “attempt” is key here, since correlation does not 
necessarily imply causation.) 
The most seminal of these statistical studies, and also the most appropriate for my 
purposes, is the article on “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War” by James D. Fearon and David 
D. Laitin.15 I use their replication data,16 which code 6,610 country-years for the presence or 
absence of civil war onset and the values of a variety of independent variables from 1945 to 
1999. Using these data, I have constructed, for each of 6,327 country-years (data on the other 
                                                 
15
 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review, 
Vol. 97, No. 1 (2003): 75-90. The other two most seminal statistical studies of civil war onset are Paul Collier and 
Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 56, No. 4 (2004): 563-595; and 
Håvard Hegre and Nicholas Sambanis, “Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset,” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, Vol. 50, No. 4 (2006): 508-535. The Collier and Hoeffler study only considers the 1960-1999 
period and thus is missing a substantial amount of data; the Hegre and Sambanis study is a meta-analysis of other 
regressions, not a set of full models itself. 
16
 Available at http://www.stanford.edu/~jfearon. 
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283 observations are missing), the predicted probability of civil war onset. Using the standard 
logistic regression equation which Fearon and Laitin estimate, this probability is given as 
follows: 
Pr(Civil War Onset) =   1  
1 + e – z 
 
Where z = -7.019 + -0.916 × Prior War + -0.318 × Per Capita Income, in thousands, lagged one 
year + 0.272 × Log(Population, in thousands, lagged one year) + 0.199 × Log(Percent 
Mountainous Terrain) + 0.426 × Noncontiguous State + 0.751 × Oil Exporter + 1.658 × New 
State + 0.513 × Instability + 0.164 × Ethnic Fractionalization + 0.326 × Religious 
Fractionalization + 0.521 × Anocracy, lagged one year + 0.127 × Democracy, dichotomous 
measure, lagged one year. 
 
This particular specification of z is Model 3 in Fearon and Laitin’s Table 1.17 I chose it over the 
other logistic regression models available in the article because it uses the most agreed-upon 
version of the dependent variable, and it includes the most fine-grained measures of political 
instability. Specific definitions of all of these independent variables can be found in Fearon and 
Laitin’s article or the supplementary materials thereto.18 (Note that road networks between states, 
a potential vector of contagion discussed in Chapter 1, are not included among the structural 
variables coded by Fearon and Laitin. I will hope to account for road networks in future 
research.) 
Individual probability of civil war onset values range from 0.0000000441% per year 
(Kuwait, 1964) to 49.39% per year (Indonesia, 1949 and 1950). As shown in Figure 3.7, this 
probability variable has a right-skewed distribution. Thus the median is a more reliable measure 
of its central tendency than the mean. Among all 6,327 country-years for which data are  
                                                 
17
 Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity,” p. 84. 
18
 For the supplementary materials, see http://www.stanford.edu/~jfearon (click on “Additional Tables for 
‘Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War’”). 
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Figure 3.7: Distribution of Probability of Civil War Onset (N = 6327) 
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— 
available, the median probability of civil war onset is 1.05% per year. Fearon and Laitin identify 
111 cases of civil war onset in their dataset (naturally, we do disagree on some cases and some 
years of onset); predicted probability data are available for 106 of these cases. Among these 106 
cases of actual civil war onset, as defined by Fearon and Laitin, the median predicted probability 
of civil war onset is 2.47% per year, and ranges from 0.245% per year (Cyprus, 1974) to 49.39% 
per year (Indonesia, 1950). The low median and large range here are indicative of the 
considerable variation in civil war’s occurrence in general left unexplained by the literature — a 
topic beyond the scope of this dissertation. Nevertheless, these data are the best we have. 
 I have identified 84 cases of substate conflict contagion. These 84 cases yield 56 unique 
country-years in which the country in question was a State B in a case of contagion that year. 
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(The number drops because there can be multiple State As for every State B; both Burundi and 
Rwanda were State As for Zaire in 1996, for example.) In other words, in these 56 country-years, 
the country in question experienced a receipt of contagion. These are the cases for which we 
want to know whether the structural conditions for civil war were present — whether the host 
was susceptible to infection. These 56 country-years are listed in Table 3.10, along with 
predicted probabilities of civil war onset for 46 of them. (The other 10 are either post-1999, 
meaning Fearon and Laitin do not have data available, or are missing data on individual 
structural variables.) 
 The first thing to notice about these 46 civil war onset probabilities in receipt of 
contagion cases is that they are generally high, where “high” means roughly comparable to the 
median probability of civil war onset in all actual civil war onset cases (2.47% per year). The 
median probability of civil war onset in these 46 cases is 2.095% per year, roughly double the 
median probability of civil war onset across the entire dataset (1.05% per year). In only 11 of the 
46 cases is the predicted probability of civil war onset low, where “low” means below the 1.05% 
per year population median. This evidence supports the claim that substate conflict contagion 
usually only occurs when the structural conditions for civil war onset in general are present. This 
claim is consistent with the State Action Explanation’s assertion that the structural conditions for 
civil war onset, like evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality themselves, are 
usually necessary conditions for substate conflict contagion. 
 However, we also expect these structural factors to leave some variation in the receipt of 
substate conflict contagion unexplained — and that is precisely what they do. To show this, 
Table 3.11 compares the results of two logistic regressions, one of which explains much more 
variation than the other. In the first column of the table, I estimate the association of the  
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Table 3.10: Country-Years which Experienced Receipt of Substate Conflict Contagion 
State B Year Predicted Probability of 
Civil War Onset per Year 
(from Fearon and Laitin) 
Paraguay 1947 0.564% 
Argentina 1974 0.35% 
Colombia 1964 1.123% 
Guatemala 1965 2.176% 
Nicaragua 1978 0.557% 
El Salvador 1981 0.933% 
Russia 1994 6.983% 
Serbia 1998 Missing Data 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992 Missing Data 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1993 Missing Data 
Croatia 1992 Missing Data 
Congo-Kinshasa 1996 7.92% 
Liberia 1989 0.859% 
Sierra Leone 1991 1.0544% 
Angola 1975 22.745% 
Congo-Kinshasa 1964 2.333% 
Ethiopia 1964 3.922% 
Uganda 1971 2.0295% 
Somalia 1978 1.11% 
Sudan 1983 1.919% 
Burundi 1991 2.17% 
Ethiopia 2009 Post-1999 
Ethiopia 1976 2.848% 
Ethiopia 1977 2.872% 
Rwanda 1990 2.161% 
Mozambique 1977 0.547% 
South Africa 1981 1.651% 
Algeria 1991 6.146% 
Iraq 2004 Post-1999 
Iran 1966 2.47% 
Turkey 1984 3.188% 
Iran 1979 0.634% 
Lebanon 1958 1.471% 
Lebanon 1975 1.124% 
Lebanon 1982 0.873% 
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State B Year Predicted Probability of 
Civil War Onset per Year 
(from Fearon and Laitin) 
Syria 1979 0.997% 
South Yemen 1986 1.29% 
Pakistan 2007 Post-1999 
Tajikistan 1992 10.449% 
Indonesia 2003 Post-1999 
Cambodia 1967 0.939% 
India 1948 Missing Data 
India 1956 3.517% 
Laos 1959 3.0559% 
Burma 1948 14.515% 
Burma 1949 6.364% 
Burma 1959 1.313% 
Burma 1961 1.296% 
South Vietnam 1955 Missing Data 
Sri Lanka 1971 1.679% 
Sri Lanka 1984 0.863% 
Thailand 1976 4.225% 
Nepal 1996 4.187% 
Afghanistan 1978 2.489% 
India 1983 3.787% 
India 1990 3.592% 
— 
predicted probability of civil war onset with the actual onset of civil war. In other words, I 
estimate α and β1 in the following equation:
 
Pr(Civil War Onset) =    1    
1 + e – (α + β1 × Pr(Civil War Onset)) 
 
Naturally, since we are regressing a dependent variable on a transformation of itself, the 
coefficient β1 is extremely positive and statistically significant. But compare this coefficient to its 
analogue in the second column of Table 3.11, where we change the dependent variable from civil 
war onset to receipt of substate conflict contagion (the latter variable takes the value of 1 if the  
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Table 3.11: Comparison of Explanatory Power of Structural Conditions for Civil War 
Onset vs. Receipt of Substate Conflict Contagion 
Parameter Estimate 
(Dependent Variable: Civil 
War Onset) 
Estimate 
(Dependent Variable: 
Receipt of Substate Conflict 
Contagion) 
α (Constant) -4.546 -5.117 
β1 (Coefficient on Probability 
of Civil War Onset) 
18.667 
(z = 5.31, p ≈ 0.000) 
9.284 
(z = 3.26, p = 0.001) 
N 6327 6327 
Pseudo-R2 of Model 0.0747 0.0163 
NOTE: These models use robust standard errors clustered by country, even though Fearon and 
Laitin do not follow this convention in their article. The substantive results using non-robust, 
non-clustered standard errors are the same. 
— 
Table 3.12: Marginal Effect of Structural Conditions on Probability of Receipt of Substate 
Conflict Contagion 
Simulated Value of Pr(Civil 
War Onset), percent per year 
Simulated Value of Pr(Receipt 
of Substate Conflict 
Contagion), percent per year 
95% Confidence Interval, 
percent per year 
1.05% (median) 0.669% 0.466% – 0.931% 
3.38% (+1 standard deviation) 0.830% 0.566% – 1.169% 
5.72% (+2 standard deviations) 1.035% 0.645% – 1.520% 
NOTE: Results simulated using the “Clarify” software built by Michael Tomz, Jason Wittenberg 
and Gary King (version 2.0). 
— 
country-year in question is a State B in a contagion case): 
Pr(Receipt of Contagion) =    1    
1 + e – (α + β1 × Pr(Civil War Onset)) 
 
Although β1 is still positive and statistically significant, its magnitude and z-statistic are both 
substantially lower. The marginal effect of the probability of civil war onset on the probability of 
receipt of contagion appears low, as shown in Table 3.12; the predicted probability of receipt of 
substate conflict contagion increases by only about 0.2% per year when the predicted probability 
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of civil war onset is raised by one standard deviation (2.33% per year) from the median. 
Furthermore, the pseudo-R2 of the second logistic regression model, with receipt of contagion as 
the dependent variable, is more than four times lower than the pseudo-R2 of the first model, 
which had civil war onset as the dependent variable. Similar results are obtained when we use 
Fearon and Laitin’s actual variables, rather than the predicted probability index; as shown in 
Table 3.13, four variables lose statistical significance when the dependent variable is changed 
from civil war onset to receipt of contagion, the sign on the significant “Prior War” variable 
mysteriously changes, and the pseudo-R2 again drops. 
 This analysis tells us that our proxies for the structural conditions for civil war cannot 
explain all variation in the occurrence or non-occurrence of substate conflict contagion. So the 
structural factors which cause civil war in general, while generally necessary for contagion, are 
not sufficient to cause contagion on their own. We also need to bring in factors related to the 
interaction between State B and State A — between the host and the sender of the agent, 
respectively — in order to understand this phenomenon. 
The most important element of this interstate interaction, I argue, is the occurrence of 
evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality. To fully test this argument, I 
would need to measure the presence or absence of these state actions across all 6,327 country-
years, and see how well they were associated with receipt of contagion. While I do not have this 
amount of coding completed, I do have 79 of these country-years coded for the presence (1) or 
absence (0) of any of the three state actions. This includes all 46 country-years in which the 
country in question was a State B in a case of substate conflict contagion, and all 33 additional 
country-years in which the country in question was a State B in a case of low-intensity 
contagion— a case which resulted in the deaths of more than 24 but fewer than 1,000 people in  
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Table 3.13: Civil War Onset vs. Receipt of Substate Conflict Contagion Comparison with 
Actual Fearon/Laitin Variables 
Variable Coefficient 
(Dependent Variable: Civil 
War Onset) 
Coefficient 
(Dependent Variable: 
Receipt of Substate Conflict 
Contagion) 
Constant -7.019 -7.992 
Prior War -0.916 
(z = 3.74, p ≈ 0.000) 
0.666 
(z = 2.19, p = 0.029) 
Per Capita Income (in 
thousands, lagged one year) 
-0.318 
(z = 4.43, p ≈ 0.000) 
-0.209 
(z = 2.29, p = 0.022) 
Log(Population) (in 
thousands, lagged one year) 
0.272 
(z = 4.55, p ≈ 0.000) 
0.165 
(z = 1.45, p = 0.148) 
Log(Percent Mountainous 
Terrain) 
0.199 
(z = 2.38, p = 0.017) 
0.405 
(z = 3.09, p = 0.002) 
Noncontiguous State 0.426 
(z = 1.61, p = 0.108) 
-0.690 
(z = 1.55, p = 0.121) 
Oil Exporter 0.751 
(z = 2.91, p = 0.004) 
0.640 
(z = 1.78, p = 0.074) 
New State 1.658 
(z = 4.98, p ≈ 0.000) 
1.441 
(z = 2.32, p = 0.020) 
Instability (lagged one year) 0.513 
(z = 2.26, p = 0.024) 
0.378 
(z = 1.06, p = 0.289) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.164 
(z = 0.48, p = 0.632) 
0.727 
(z = 1.31, p = 0.191) 
Religious Fractionalization 0.326 
(z = 0.61, p = 0.540) 
0.515 
(z = 0.55, p = 0.581) 
Anocracy (lagged one year) 0.521 
(z = 2.12, p = 0.034) 
0.123 
(z = 0.30, p = 0.764) 
Democracy (dichotomous, 
lagged one year) 
0.127 
(z = 0.40, p = 0.687) 
0.491 
(z = 0.94, p = 0.347) 
N 6327 6327 
Pseudo-R2 of Model 0.1112 0.0894 
NOTE: Statistically significant coefficients (p ≤ 0.05) are bolded. These models use robust 
standard errors clustered by country, even though Fearon and Laitin do not follow this 
convention in their article. The substantive results using non-robust, non-clustered standard 
errors are the same. 
 
124 
 
battle.19 Analysis of this subpopulation can tell us whether state actions can explain the variation 
between high-intensity and low-intensity substate conflict contagion. The answer to this question 
may begin to give us leverage on the larger question of whether state actions can explain the 
variation between high-intensity contagion and non-contagion. To conduct this analysis, we need 
to estimate this multivariate version of the logistic equation (the dependent variable is the receipt 
of high-intensity contagion, as above): 
Pr(Receipt of Contagion) =     1     
        1 + e – (α + β1 × Pr(Civil War Onset) + β2 × State Action Present) 
 
The results of this estimation, shown in Table 3.14, constitute strong preliminary evidence that 
state actions can explain the variation in contagion left unexplained by structural factors. In these 
79 cases, the association between a given state’s predicted probability of civil war onset and its 
receipt of high-intensity substate conflict contagion is statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
Meanwhile, the association between the presence of state action and the receipt of contagion is 
positive and statistically significant. And, as shown in Table 3.15, the marginal effect of the 
presence of state action on the probability of contagion, simulated while holding the probability 
of civil war onset constant at its median, is quite dramatic. Without state action the probability of 
receipt of contagion is about 33 percent, and with state action that probability roughly doubles to 
about 65 percent, although there is some overlap in the confidence intervals between the two 
estimated parameters. 
These results do not directly tell us whether the presence of state action better explains 
the variation between high-intensity contagion cases and non-contagion cases. For that, we 
                                                 
19
 In cases where the country-year was a State B in multiple cases of contagion, I coded state action as present if it 
was present in any one of the multiple contagion cases. 
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Table 3.14: Association of State Action with High-Intensity Contagion 
Parameter Estimate 
(Dependent Variable: Receipt of (High-
Intensity) Substate Conflict Contagion) 
α (Constant) -0.815 
β1 (Coefficient on Probability of Civil War 
Onset) 
6.999 
(z = 0.82, p = 0.412) 
β2 (Coefficient on State Action Present) 1.360 
(z = 2.36, p = 0.018) 
N 79 
Pseudo-R2 of Model 0.0758 
NOTE: Robust standard errors clustered by country, but substantive results remain the same with 
non-robust, non-clustered standard errors. 
— 
Table 3.15: Marginal Effect of Presence of State Action on Probability of Receipt of (High-
Intensity) Substate Conflict Contagion 
Simulated Value of State 
Action Present 
Simulated Value of Pr(Receipt 
of Substate Conflict 
Contagion), percent per year 
95% Confidence Interval, 
percent per year 
0 (absent) 33.22% 15.39% – 56.80% 
1 (present) 64.92% 48.89% – 77.93% 
NOTE: Results simulated using the “Clarify” software built by Michael Tomz, Jason Wittenberg 
and Gary King (version 2.0). Probability of Civil War Onset is set to 1.05% per year. 
— 
would need all 6,327 observations coded for the presence or absence of state action. But these 
results clearly show that the presence of state action better explains the variation between high-
intensity contagion cases and low-intensity contagion cases, and this is suggestive of a broader 
role for state actions in the variation left unexplained by structural factors. 
What, then, is the overall role of structural factors in substate conflict contagion? These 
rough and preliminary statistical analyses have suggested that, consistent with the State Action 
Explanation, a high baseline probability of civil war onset is necessary but insufficient for most 
cases of contagion. Contagion generally cannot occur in places where the susceptibility of the 
host is low, but nor can these structural factors explain all of the variation between contagion and 
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non-contagion. State actions, meanwhile, show the early potential to explain this unexplained 
variation. The multivariate logistic regression above suggests that the presence of evangelization, 
expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality explains the variation between low-intensity and 
high-intensity contagion much better than the probability of civil war onset. In short, we need 
structural factors to explain contagion, but we need much more than that — and I argue that 
evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality fill this need to a substantial 
degree.  
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I first identified a comprehensive list of 84 cases of substate conflict 
contagion between 1946 and 2007, and then analyzed the causes of each of these cases in the 
aggregate. (In Appendix 3.1, each individual case is discussed in some detail.) Ultimately I found 
the support for the State Action Explanation to be strong. Contagion occurs only rarely in the 
absence of evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality. And when these state 
actions do occur, they usually appear to have been necessary for the spread of violent conflict 
across borders. Meanwhile, I roughly quantified the “structural factors” of civil war onset in 
general, and found that while the presence of these factors also appears to be necessary for most 
cases of contagion, they are not sufficient either. 
 However, the analysis in this chapter is vulnerable to a significant critique: By studying 
only the cases of substate conflict contagion which occurred, I have selected on the dependent 
variable. A good explanation of substate conflict contagion should certainly be able to account 
for the cases in which contagion occurred — and the State Action Explanation clearly qualifies 
on that front — but it should also be able to account for the 21,951 cases in which contagion did 
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not occur.20 If not, the explanation would be logically similar to the statement that “male gender 
causes incarceration in the U.S. prison system.” It is true that most incarcerated Americans are 
males, but there is also a far greater number of American males who are not incarcerated, leaving 
this simple statement wanting in explanatory power. Likewise, it is possible that although most 
cases of substate conflict contagion involve evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt 
partiality, these state actions are nearly ubiquitous in the modern state system — there would 
then be little to distinguish the cases in which conflict spread from the cases in which it did not. 
It turns out, though, that these state actions are not ubiquitous in the modern state system. 
Like contagion, they happen rarely. When they do, negative security consequences — up to and 
including substate conflict contagion — are likely to result. When these state actions do not 
happen, substate conflict contagion almost never occurs. To demonstrate these claims and fully 
test the State Action Explanation, I conduct two broad regional case studies, so that I can analyze 
both cases and non-cases of substate conflict contagion. First, I study Central America between 
1978 and 1996 — a region which at the time had as many as five substate conflicts, but only one 
genuine case of substate conflict contagion. Then I study Southeast Asia between 1959 and 1980 
— a region with six cases of contagion, though that too is a relatively small number, given that 
virtually every state on the mainland was embroiled in conflict. Collectively, these case studies 
overcome the methodological problem of selection on the dependent variable, put the State 
Action Explanation to its first complete tests, and ultimately strengthen the empirical case for the 
explanation. 
                                                 
20
 21,951 = 22,035 directed dyad-years in the universe of possible cases minus 84 cases of actual substate conflict 
contagion. 
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In the next chapter I discuss the Central American case study, which in addition to 
secondary source material relies on archival and interview research in Belize, Costa Rica, and 
Honduras. 
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Appendix 3.1: State Action Coding for the Cases of Substate Conflict Contagion 
 In this appendix, I discuss each of the 84 identified cases of substate conflict contagion in 
turn. The cases are titled according to the format “State A to State B, Year” — for example, 
“Bolivia to Paraguay, 1947.” If the case is technically outside either the temporal scope (State 
B’s conflict began more than five years after State A’s conflict ended) or the geographic scope 
(State A and State B are a vast distance from each other), this fact is noted in the title of the case. 
If the causal connection between State A’s conflict and State B’s civil war is particularly weak, 
this is also noted in the title. I then discuss for each case (1) how the contagion between State A 
and State B occurred, (2) whether or not evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt 
partiality was present in the case, and (3) if a state action was present, the extent to which that 
state action was necessary for the contagion. For question (3), if I judge state action to have been 
necessary for contagion, I also note which of the two criteria described above — the Civil War 
Necessity Criterion or the Main Link Criterion — forms the basis for this judgment. These 
codings are based on extensive consultation of the secondary source literature on each pair of 
conflicts.  
 These “mini-case studies” are followed by Table 3A.1, which more succinctly identifies 
the causal mechanisms present in the 78 cases of low-intensity substate conflict contagion. 
Bolivia to Paraguay, 1947 
 How did conflict spread? The civil war in Paraguay broke out after the Feberista political 
faction was expelled from the cabinet.21 The Feberistas had been banned from Paraguay until 
1946, when they were invited back to participate in the country’s political process. They received 
this invitation because the “bloody revolution in Bolivia” frightened the leadership of Paraguay 
                                                 
21
 Paul H. Lewis, “Leadership and Conflict within the Febrerista Party of Paraguay,” Journal of Inter-American 
Studies, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1967): 283-295, p. 287. 
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into expanding their political tent.22 Hence it can be argued that without the substate conflict in 
Bolivia, the Feberistas would never have been in a position to start their insurrection in 
Paraguay. Indeed, the Feberistas appear to have been in a holding pattern outside Paraguay until 
the 1946 decision to include them in the government.23 
 Was state action present? No, evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt 
partiality appear to have been absent from this case. Conflict instead spread under a set of 
political conditions best described as unique. 
Cuba to Argentina, 1974 (potentially outside the temporal scope conditions) 
 How did conflict spread? Multiple sources have alleged that the Cuban government, 
specifically its General Intelligence Department, provided both strategic and tactical training — 
on how to recruit, for instance — to the Montoneros and to the People’s Revolutionary Army in 
Argentina.24 Others dispute this claim.25 
 Was state action present? Yes, if the majority of the sources consulted are to be believed, 
this was a clear case of Cuban evangelization. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Evangelization appears 
to have been the main connection between the conflicts in these two countries. The leftist 
insurgents in Argentina were also inspired by the Cuban Revolution,26 but this no doubt stemmed 
in part from the significant Cuban support for those leftists. Therefore, evangelization appears to 
                                                 
22
 Philip Raine, Paraguay (New Brunswick, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1956), p. 262. 
23
 Lewis, “Leadership and Conflict,” pp. 286-287. 
24
 Carlos Alberto Montaner, “The Cuban Revolution and its Acolytes,” in Irving Louis Horowitz and Jaime 
Suchlicki, eds., Cuban Communism, Tenth Edition (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2001), p. 608; 
Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking’s Support for Wars of National Liberation 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970, p. 113; U.S. Department of State, “Cuba’s Renewed Support of 
Violence in Latin America,” Special Report No. 90 (December 14, 1981), p. 11 — available online at http://cuban-
exile.com/doc_201-225/doc0224.html. 
25
 Bruce M. Davidson, “‘Isolation’ vs. ‘Engagement’: A Comparative Analysis of U.S. and Latin American Policies 
Toward Castro’s Cuba,” Colegio Interamericano de Defensa (1994), p. 20. 
26
 Jonathan C. Brown, A Brief History of Argentina (New York: Facts on File, 2003), pp. 230-244. 
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have been a necessary condition for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the 
Main Link Criterion. 
Cuba to Colombia, 1964 
 How did conflict spread? The Cuban influence on the numerous armed groups in 
Colombia’s civil war varied from group to group. However, the leaders of the Army of National 
Liberation (ELN), one of the most important insurgent groups at the onset of the Colombian civil 
war, were trained in Havana prior to the ELN’s formation.27 
 Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of Cuban evangelization. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? As with the Argentine 
case above, although leftists in Colombia were also simply inspired by the Cuban Revolution, 
this is a difficult link to separate from the direct Cuban support for the leftists in State B. Again, 
evangelization appears to have been the main connection between the conflicts in these two 
countries, and hence appears to have been necessary for the case of substate conflict contagion, 
according to the Main Link Criterion. 
Cuba to El Salvador, 1981 (potentially outside the temporal scope conditions) 
 How did conflict spread? As discussed in Chapter 4 (see the section in that chapter on 
Nicaraguan contagion to El Salvador), the Cuban government was a major sponsor of the 
Salvadoran FMLN rebel group in the months leading up to the civil war onset in January 1981. 
Havana supplied arms, training, and strategic advice to the Salvadoran leftists. 
 Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of Cuban evangelization. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Chapter 4 makes clear 
that both Cuban and Nicaraguan support were essential for the increase in FMLN capability that 
led to the “Final Offensive” rebel campaign in January 1981. It was, in turn, this “Final 
                                                 
27
 Jenny Pearce, Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth (London: Latin America Bureau, 1990), p. 165. 
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Offensive” that raised battle deaths in El Salvador to the level of civil war intensity. Therefore, I 
believe Cuban evangelization was necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, 
according to the Civil War Necessity Criterion. 
Cuba to Guatemala, 1965 
 How did conflict spread? Beginning around 1962, Havana trained guerillas in Guatemala, 
including leftist insurgent leaders Cesar Montes and Luis Turcios Lima.28 
 Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of Cuban evangelization. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? As with the other 
Central and South American contagion cases involving Cuba, evangelization appears to have 
been the main link between these conflicts and appears to have been inseparable from the 
“inspiration” that also occurred.29 Thus evangelization seems to have been necessary for this case 
of substate conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion. 
Cuba to Nicaragua, 1978 (potentially outside the temporal scope conditions) 
 How did conflict spread? The Cuban government began aiding the Sandinista rebels in 
Nicaragua in the 1960s, and training of leftist Nicaraguans in Cuba continued throughout the 
1970s. Castro actually tried to dissuade key Sandinista fighter Edén Pastora from attacking the 
National Palace in Managua, deeming the plan too offensive in nature. But after Pastora ignored 
Castro and carried out the “enormously successful” attack anyway in August 1978, Castro 
                                                 
28
 Louis A. Pérez, Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution, Fourth Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2011), p. 287; Eugene Pons, “Castro and Terrorism: A Chronology,” Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American 
Studies Occasional Paper (September 2001), p. 9. 
29
 On Cuba to Guatemala inspiration, see the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) summary on the Guatemala 
conflict. Available online: http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=66&regionSelect=4-
Central_Americas#. 
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“personally zeroed in on the FSLN” and began providing arms via Panama and Costa Rica.30 
Also, the original founding of the FSLN in 1961 drew “inspiration … from the Cubans.”31  
 Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of Cuban evangelization. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Cuban aid to the 
Sandinistas actually seems to have been fairly limited around the time of the Nicaraguan civil 
war onset in 1978. According to one source, “In the final three years of struggle [prior to 1979], 
overt contacts between Castro’s regime and the FSLN remained limited. … The U.S. State 
Department and Central Intelligence Agency … argued that such Cuban assistance was relatively 
minor in the overall arms flow to the insurgents.”32 Even though Cuban aid increased following 
Pastora’s bold August 1978 raid in Managua, that raid may have postdated the crossing of the 
1,000 battle death threshold. Meanwhile, we have a nonstate factor present, that of (Cuban) 
rebels inspiring (Nicaraguan) rebels. Given this evidence, I cannot conclude that Cuban 
evangelization was necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion. 
Nicaragua to El Salvador, 1981 
 How did conflict spread? As discussed in much more detail in Chapter 4, the Sandinista 
government in Nicaragua helped arm the FMLN rebels in El Salvador after ousting the Somoza 
regime in Managua. 
 Was state action present? Yes, I argue in Chapter 4 that this was a clear case of 
evangelization. 
                                                 
30
 John A. Booth, The End and the Beginning: The Nicaraguan Revolution (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), p. 133; 
Roger Miranda and William Ratliff, The Civil War in Nicaragua: Inside the Sandinistas (London: Transaction 
Publishers, 1993, pp. 97-100 (source of both quotations); Robert Kagan, A Twilight Struggle: American Power and 
Nicaragua, 1977-1990 (New York: Free Press, 1996), pp. 78-80. 
31
 Eduardo Crawley, Nicaragua in Perspective, Revised Edition (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984), p. 128. 
32
 Booth, “The End and the Beginning,” p. 133. 
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 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? As discussed in Chapter 
4, although there were also nonstate links between the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran conflicts — 
namely inspiration — full-scale civil war in El Salvador probably would not have been possible 
without Nicaraguan evangelization. Therefore, evangelization was necessary for this case of 
substate conflict contagion, according to the Civil War Necessity Criterion. 
Uruguay to Argentina, 1974 
 How did conflict spread? The leaders of what eventually became the anti-Buenos Aires 
Montoneros cut their teeth “contributing to the political and military development of the 
Tupamaros” in Uruguay in the 1960s.33 
 Was state action present? Yes, this appears to be a cause of Uruguayan expulsion of 
Argentine combatants back to Argentina. The future Montonero leaders who assisted the 
Tupamaros appear to have left Montevideo in late 1966 and early 1967, in the wake of a 
Uruguayan government crackdown on the leftists.34 Certainly the Uruguayan government 
intended to expel Argentine combatants; in July 1967 they arrested and attempted to extradite 
future Montonero José Luis Nell, although Nell escaped prison before he could be formally 
extradited to Argentina.35 (He ended up there anyway.) 
How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? The main link between 
the Uruguayan and Argentine conflicts appears to be the rebel network between the Tupamaros 
and the Montoneros. In addition, it can be argued that the major leaders of the Montoneros might 
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 Richard Gillespie, Soldiers of Peron: Argentina’s Monteneros (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 51, 
96, 182; see also Paul H. Lewis, Guerillas and Generals: The ‘Dirty War’ in Argentina (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 
2002), pp. 36-41. 
34
 James Kohl and John Litt, Urban Guerilla Warfare in Latin America (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1974), p. 
186. 
35
 Michael Goebel, “A Movement from Right to Left in Argentine Nationalism? The Alianza Libertadora 
Nacionalista and Tacuara as Stages of Militancy,” Bulletin of Latin American Research, Vol. 26, No. 3 (2007): 356-
377, p. 368. 
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not have returned to Argentina and played their roles in the civil war onset there, had they not 
been forced out of the country by the Uruguayan government. Therefore, expulsion appears to 
have been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to both the Civil War 
Necessity Criterion and the Main Link Criterion. 
Azerbaijan to Russia, 1994 
 How did conflict spread? Some of the anti-Moscow fighters in Chechnya came from the 
conflict in Azerbaijan; weapons moved from the Azerbaijani conflict to the Chechen conflict as 
well.36 
 Was state action present? Yes, the Russian government meddled with overt partiality in 
the Azerbaijani conflict by providing arms to the government there.37 Seemingly expulsion was 
not present in this case; the Azerbaijani fighters appear to have come to Chechnya of their own 
free will.38 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? In this case it does not 
appear that the Russian meddling in the Azerbaijani conflict had any direct security 
consequences. There was no retaliation by the Azerbaijani government, I found no evidence that 
Azerbaijani rebels crossed into Chechnya because of Russian meddling, and I found no evidence 
that the Chechen population rebelled because of Russian actions in Azerbaijan. Instead, conflict 
appears to have spread through the Azerbaijani-Chechen transnational rebel network, and 
through the spillover of arms. 
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 Carlotta Gall and Thomas de Waal, Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus (New York: New York University Press, 
1998), pp. 191, 306. 
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 James Hughes, Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), p. 
80. 
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 Gall and De Waal, “Chechnya,” p. 191. 
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Bosnia-Herzegovina to Serbia, 1998 
 How did conflict spread? Kosovar Albanian elites vacillated for some time between those 
who favored a peaceful push for Kosovar independence from Serbia and those who favored an 
armed struggle. According to one account, “The crucial event that turned the tide in favor of the 
[Kosovar Liberation Army, away from the ‘peaceful path institutionalists’] was the signing of the 
Dayton Accords at the end of 1995.” Kosovars surmised from the resolution of the Bosnian 
conflict that peaceful protest would yield nothing, while armed struggle would yield international 
intervention in their favor.39 In this way the Bosnian conflict inspired the onset of the Kosovar 
armed struggle. 
 Was state action present? Yes, the Serbian government meddled with overt partiality in 
the Bosnian conflict by supporting anti-Sarajevo Serb militias. For more detail, see the Serbia to 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992 case below. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Interestingly, the 
Serbian meddling in Bosnia-Herzegovina does not appear to have contributed directly to the 
contagion in this case. The government in Sarajevo did not support the Kosovar Liberation Army 
in any meaningful way, most KLA fighters were local,40 and Serbian meddling in Bosnia-
Herzegovina does not appear to have been a major grievance of the Kosovar rebels. Thus it could 
be argued that the state action in question was not necessary to this case of substate conflict 
contagion. 
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 Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 2008), p. 32. 
40
 Ibid, p. 117. 
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Croatia to Serbia, 1998 
 How did conflict spread? The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) obtained a significant 
share of its small arms supplies from the recently completed civil war in Croatia, although 
Albania — which has never experienced a substate conflict — was an even larger source.41 
 Was state action present? No, evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt 
partiality appear to have been absent from this case of substate conflict contagion. In fact, “state-
supplied weapons were a KLA dream and one of its greatest disappointments. No state stepped 
forward to supply weapons.”42 Meanwhile, because must Kosovar insurgents were local 
Albanians, expulsion appears not to have occurred to any significant degree either. Instead, 
conflict spread via the movement of small arms from State A to State B. 
Georgia to Russia, 1994 
 How did conflict spread? In 1992 and 1993, Russia supported the Abkhazian rebels in the 
Georgian civil war by sending into Georgia a pro-Abkhazia militia led by Shamil Basaev. But in 
1994, Basaev and his militia crossed back into Russia and began fighting for Chechen 
independence. James Hughes writes, “Russia played a vital role in the creation of a militarily 
proficient Chechen insurgent army by assisting Shamil Basaev’s ‘international brigade’ in 
Abkhazia.”43 
 Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of Russian meddling with overt 
partiality. This meddling blew back when the anti-government force Russia sponsored in the 
Georgian conflict became a major anti-government force in the Russian conflict. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Based on the quote 
above, it appears that if Russia had not supported Basaev’s Georgian adventure, the Chechen 
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 Ibid, p. 117. 
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 James Hughes, “Chechnya,” pp. 71, 154, 179 (quote from p. 179). 
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insurgents may never have become “militarily proficient,” making the prospect of full-scale civil 
war unlikely. From this perspective, meddling appears to have been necessary for this case of 
substate conflict contagion, according to the Civil War Necessity Criterion. 
Serbia to Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992 
 How did conflict spread? Serb rebels in Bosnia were assisted by Serb militants from 
Serbia and Croatia, sent to Bosnia in part by the Serbian state.44 
 Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of expulsion by Serbia. 
How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? The presence of Serb 
militants in Bosnia appears to constitute the main connection between these two conflicts. 
Therefore, expulsion appears to have been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, 
according to the Main Link Criterion. 
Serbia to Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1993 
 How did conflict spread? The Croat anti-Sarajevo insurgency in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
which started in 1993, received significant support from the Croatian state government in 
Zagreb. In fact, the leader of the Bosnian Croat insurgency, Mate Boban, was “a former clothing 
store manager” who “emerged through [Croatian President] Tudjman’s patronage.” This 
Croatian state support resulted in large part from the Bosnian state’s support for the Yugoslav 
National Army (JNA) during the Croatian war of independence in 1991 (an anti-Serbia conflict, 
making Serbia, or Yugoslavia, the State A in this dyad). Essentially, Sarajevo permitted Belgrade 
to use Bosnian territory “as a base from which attacks against the Croatian national guard could 
be commanded.”45 
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 Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of meddling with overt partiality by the 
Bosnian state in the Serbian/Yugoslavian conflict involving Croatia. The Croatian government 
retaliated for this meddling by supporting Croat insurgents inside Bosnia. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Although there was also 
a nonstate factor in this dyad — Bosnian Croats who fought in Croatia’s war against Belgrade, 
then returned to Bosnia in 1992 “bloodied by their experience and ready for the war in Bosnia”46 
— the support from Zagreb appears to have been the key catalyst of the Croat civil war in 
Bosnia. In addition to lifting rebel leader Boban out of obscurity, the Croatian state’s support 
propelled him past Franjo Boras and Stjepan Kljuić, the two Croatian representatives on the 
Bosnian Presidency. Boras and Kljuić represented a majority of Bosnian Croats who, prior to 
1993, were “much more inclined to live in a multi-ethnic Bosnian state than to seek its partition 
into ethnically pure units.”47 Thus it was Zagreb’s support for Boban that catalyzed the shift 
toward violent separatism among Bosnian Croats. Zagreb’s support, in turn, was facilitated in 
large part by Sarajevo’s meddling with overt partiality. Although “Tudjman … had never 
accepted the long-term viability of Bosnia as a state” anyway,48 the Bosnian meddling gave him 
a security motivation as well as an ideological motivation to support Bosnian Croat separatists. I 
consider it unlikely that Tudjman would have supported Boban to the same extent without this 
security motivation present. Therefore, I consider meddling to have been necessary for this case 
of contagion, according to the Civil War Necessity Criterion. 
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Serbia to Croatia, 1992 
 How did conflict spread? As it did in Bosnia-Herzegovina around the same time, the 
Serbian government supplied Serb militants to the Serb anti-Zagreb insurgency inside Croatia.49 
 Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of expulsion by Belgrade. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? The movement of 
militants between Serbia and Croatia appears to have been the main connection between these 
two conflicts. Therefore, expulsion appears to have been necessary for this case of substate 
conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion. 
Angola to Congo-Kinshasa, 1996 
 How did conflict spread? As discussed in Chapter 2, the Angolan state retaliated against 
the Zairean state’s harboring of anti-Luanda rebels. Angola joined an anti-Kinshasa coalition led 
by Rwanda and also including Uganda.50 
 Was state action present? Yes, this was a clear case of meddling with overt partiality. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? The Angolan influence 
on the civil war in the former Zaire was rather small; Rwanda was by far the most important state 
player in the conflict. However, Angola and Zaire had a long history of meddling in each other’s 
conflicts (see other cases discussed below), and this was a major component of the antipathy 
between the two states. Had the Zairean state not meddled in the Angolan conflict, undermining 
the security of Angola, there is little reason to suppose that Angola would have bothered to 
sponsor a civil war on its doorstep. Therefore, meddling seems to have been necessary to the 
contagion of conflict from Angola to what was then Zaire, according to the Main Link Criterion. 
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Burkina Faso to Liberia, 1989 
 How did conflict spread? Charles Taylor, who led the rebellion in Liberia in 1989, also 
participated in the 1987 coup in Burkina Faso that replaced Thomas Sankara with Blaise 
Compaoré.51 In return, once in power Compaoré provided significant help to Taylor. The 
Burkina Faso government provided Taylor with some troops for his expedition into Liberia, and 
Compaoré also introduced Taylor to Muammar Qaddafi, a major sponsor of the Liberian civil 
war.52 
 Was state action present? Yes, this was a clear case of evangelization from Burkina Faso 
to Liberia. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Without Compaoré’s 
provision of troops for Taylor’s Liberian invasion, there would have been no direct link between 
the 1987 coup in Burkina Faso and the 1989 civil war onset in Liberia. Furthermore, Taylor’s 
ties to Qaddafi — facilitated by Compaoré — were a major contributor to the onset of the 
Liberian civil war in general, in that they increased Taylor’s capabilities. Therefore, it can be 
argued that evangelization was necessary to this case of substate conflict contagion, according to 
both the Civil War Necessity Criterion and the Main Link Criterion. 
Burkina Faso to Sierra Leone, 1991 
 How did conflict spread? As with Charles Taylor, Revolutionary United Front leader 
Foday Sankoh also participated in the pro-Compaoré coup in Burkina Faso prior to his leadership 
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of the rebellion in Sierra Leone.53 And, as above, “Burkina Faso … acted as a supporting party to 
[the] RUF, providing the movement with valuable supplies throughout the conflict.”54 
 Was state action present? As above, this was a clear case of evangelization from Burkina 
Faso to Sierra Leone. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? As above, the Burkina 
Faso government’s desire to spread conflict to Sierra Leone formed the basis for the connection 
between the 1987 Burkina Faso coup and the 1991 Sierra Leone civil war. Without the 
evangelization in question, there likely would have been little or no connection between the two 
conflicts. Therefore, evangelization appears to have been necessary for this case of substate 
conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion. 
Burundi to Congo-Kinshasa, 1996 
 How did conflict spread? Like Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola, though to a lesser extent, 
the Burundian government supported the anti-Mobutu insurgency in Zaire. It did so in retaliation 
for Mobutu’s harboring of CNDD-FDD rebels from the Burundian conflict in eastern Zaire.55 
 Was state action present? Yes, this was a clear case of Burundian retaliation for Zairean 
meddling with overt partiality. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? It seems unlikely that 
Burundi would have supported a bloody civil war in a neighboring state had its security not been 
threatened by Mobutu’s meddling. Therefore, the evangelization in question seems to have been 
necessary to this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion. 
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China to Angola, 1975 (potentially outside both the geographic and temporal scope conditions) 
 How did conflict spread? After winning the Chinese Civil War in 1949 and taking control 
of the Chinese state in Beijing, the Chinese Communist Party supported two of the warring 
groups in Angola — UNITA and the FNLA — at various points in the late 1960s up until 1975. 
Support included arms and training.56 
 Was state action present? Yes, this was a clear case of Chinese evangelization. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Given the distance 
between China and Angola, it is safe to assume that without Chinese evangelization there would 
have been no connection between the Chinese Civil War and the conflict in Angola. Thus 
evangelization was necessary to contagion in this case, according to the Main Link Criterion. 
China to Congo-Kinshasa, 1964 (potentially outside the geographic scope conditions) 
 How did conflict spread? The Chinese Communists trained anti-Kinshasa rebels in the 
1960s Congo, specifically the National Liberation Council.57 
 Was state action present? Yes, this was a clear case of Chinese evangelization. 
How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Without Chinese 
evangelization, these two distant conflicts would likely have been unrelated. Therefore 
evangelization appears to have been necessary to this case of substate conflict contagion, 
according to the Main Link Criterion. 
Congo-Kinshasa to Angola, 1975 (potentially outside the temporal scope conditions) 
 How did conflict spread? Zairean leader Mobutu Sese Seko provided training to the 
FNLA rebels in Angola, and Zairean troops accompanied FNLA units on some infiltrations into 
Angola. Zairean sponsorship of the Angolan rebellion was undertaken, in part, because “Mobutu 
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had been angry for some time at the MPLA [which governed Angola] for its close association 
with the Katanga [rebel separatists in Zaire] gendarmes.”58 
 Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of meddling with overt partiality on the 
part of Angola, leading to retaliation by Zaire. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Although Mobutu 
supported the FNLA for various other reasons, including familial ties to the FNLA leader, none 
besides the Angolan meddling were related to the Katanga rebellion in Zaire.59 This meddling 
seems to have been the sole connection between the two conflicts. Therefore, meddling with 
overt partiality was a necessary condition for this case of substate conflict contagion, according 
to the Main Link Criterion. 
Congo-Kinshasa to Uganda, 1971 
 How did conflict spread? The civil war in Uganda began when the Ugandan army 
rebelled against the leader in Kampala, Apolo Milton Obote. The army would not have been in a 
position to rebel had it not been for the 1964-1965 civil war in neighboring Congo-Kinshasa. 
Uganda’s armed forces, at Obote’s direction, intervened in the Congolese war, supporting the 
anti-Kinshasa rebels by providing them sanctuary in Uganda and also by mounting incursions 
into Congolese territory. These operations ultimately led to the enlargement of the army, the 
establishment of an air force, and an increase in the equipment and general prestige of the armed 
forces.60 
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 Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of Ugandan meddling with overt 
partiality in the Congolese conflict. This meddling resulted in blowback in Uganda by 
empowering an anti-state element that ultimately rebelled. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Absent Uganda’s 
meddling, the conflicts in Congo-Kinshasa and Uganda would probably not have been related. In 
fact, the civil war in Uganda may not even have broken out had the military adventure in Congo-
Kinshasa not strengthened Uganda’s armed forces. Hence the meddling in this case was 
necessary for substate conflict contagion, according to both the Civil War Necessity Criterion 
and the Main Link Criterion. 
Cuba to Ethiopia, 1964 (potentially outside the geographic scope conditions) 
 How did conflict spread? The Cuban government trained leftist rebels in Ethiopia.61 
 Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of Cuban evangelization. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? It is doubtful that these 
distant conflicts would have been related at all without the direct Cuban effort to support the 
Ethiopian rebels. Therefore, evangelization appears to have been necessary for this case of 
substate conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion. 
Ethiopia to Somalia, 1978 
 How did conflict spread? The instability in Ethiopia, including the 1974 overthrow of 
Haile Selassie, created in the minds of the leaders of Somalia a window of opportunity in which 
to capture the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. Consequently Somalia increased its longtime 
antagonism in the Ogaden region from support for Ethiopian separatists to a full-scale invasion. 
However, Somalia ultimately lost the interstate war with Ethiopia. As a result, elites in Somalia 
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lost faith in the government and staged a coup in 1978. This coup began the unraveling of the 
government and the eventual civil war that persists to this day.62 
 Was state action present? Yes, this is a case of Somali meddling with overt partiality. 
Although Somalia’s actions included the initiation of an interstate war over the Ogaden region, 
this can be seen as a continuation of their policy of support for separatist rebels in that region. 
(The “separatists” generally also wanted the Ogaden region to join Somalia.) As mentioned in 
Chapter 2, Somali meddling embittered the home population and ultimately resulted in civil war. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? It can be argued that 
had Somalia not invaded Ethiopia, there would not have been a civil war in Somalia. Seemingly 
it took this specific spark to prompt Somali elites to set off the decades-long conflict. Therefore, 
the Somali meddling was a necessary condition for this case of substate conflict contagion, 
according to the Civil War Necessity Criterion. 
Ethiopia to Sudan, 1983 
 How did conflict spread? The Ethiopian government was a major sponsor of the SPLA 
rebel group in Southern Sudan. In fact, “the SPLA [had an] early dependence on Mengistu’s 
government.” This support, in turn, was given due to Sudan’s support for the Eritrean rebels. In 
1976, the Ethiopian government threatened the Sudanese government with support for the 
Southern Sudanese rebels if the Sudanese government did not stop supporting the Eritrean 
rebels; the Sudanese government ignored this warning.63 
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 Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of Sudanese meddling with overt 
partiality and Ethiopian retaliation for that meddling. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Given the SPLA’s 
dependence on Mengistu, the civil war in Southern Sudan might not even have started without 
Ethiopia’s support. And Ethiopia’s support appears to have followed from the Sudanese 
meddling in the Eritrean insurgency. Therefore, meddling in this case was a necessary condition 
for substate conflict contagion, according to the Civil War Necessity Criterion. 
Gambia to Liberia, 1989 (potentially outside the temporal scope conditions) 
 How did conflict spread? The invasion force that Charles Taylor led into Liberia was 
supplemented by “internationalist revolutionaries from Gambia,” including Kukoi Samba 
Sanyang, who “was officially listed as Taylor’s vice president” in 1989.64 These 
“revolutionaries” left the Gambia after a failed coup attempt in 1981. 
 Was state action present? Yes, this is a case of expulsion by the government of the 
Gambia — and also by the governments of Senegal and Guinea-Bissau. During the 1981 coup 
attempt, the Gambian and Senegalese governments “drove out” the rebels, who first escaped to 
Guinea-Bissau. Subsequently, Sanyang and others were deported to Cuba, and then went to 
Libya (where they met Taylor), and finally ended up in Liberia.65 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? If the expulsion of the 
Gambian revolutionaries had not occurred, they almost certainly would not have ended up in 
Liberia. The two countries are quite distant from one another. In fact, the small conflict in the 
Gambia likely would have had nothing to do with the subsequent major civil war in Liberia. 
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Therefore, expulsion appears to have been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, 
according to the Main Link Criterion. 
Ghana to Liberia, 1989 (potentially outside the temporal scope conditions) 
 How did conflict spread? Ghanaian leader Jerry John Rawlings came to power in a 
bloody 1981 coup that killed about 50 people.66 Subsequently Rawlings supported revolutionary 
Pan-Africanists throughout West Africa, including Charles Taylor on his insurrectionary 
adventure in Liberia.67 
 Was state action present? Yes, this is a case of evangelization. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? The small coup in 
Ghana probably would have had nothing to do with the major Liberian civil war had 
evangelization from Ghana to Liberia not taken place. Therefore, evangelization appears to have 
been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion. 
Iraq to Ethiopia, 1964 (potentially outside the geographic scope conditions) 
 How did conflict spread? Following the 1958 pan-Arab coup in Iraq, the government 
there became a “mainstay” of support for the rebel Eritrean Liberation Front in Ethiopia.68 
 Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of Iraqi evangelization. 
How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? The Iraqi and Ethiopian 
conflicts probably would have had little to do with each absent Iraqi evangelization. Also, given 
the importance of Iraqi government support to the Eritrean rebels, it can be argued that the 
Eritrean conflict would never have escalated into a civil war without this early Iraqi support. 
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Therefore, evangelization appears to have been necessary for this case of substate conflict 
contagion, according to both the Civil War Necessity Criterion and the Main Link Criterion. 
Liberia to Sierra Leone, 1991 
 How did conflict spread? As discussed in Chapter 2, Charles Taylor supported the rebel 
Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone after capturing the government of Liberia.69 
 Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of Liberian evangelization. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? The main connection 
between the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars appears to have been Taylor’s evangelization 
program. Therefore, evangelization seems to have been necessary for this case of substate 
conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion. 
Rwanda to Burundi, 1991 
 How did conflict spread? The anti-Hutu civil war in Rwanda sparked fears in Burundi of 
a Tutsi takeover of the region and increased “popular sympathy” for the Palipehutu, a Hutu party 
in Burundi that ultimately fought in the Burundian civil war. Also, “as it became apparent that 
the Burundi government was doing nothing to prevent certain Rwanda refugees of Tutsi origins 
from joining the [Rwandan Tutsi rebels] and was possibly encouraging the move, the Rwanda 
authorities understandably responded in kind and gave their whole-hearted support to Palipehutu 
refugees in Rwanda.”70 
 Was state action present? Yes, this appears to be a case of Burundian meddling with overt 
partiality in the Rwandan conflict, prompting retaliation by Rwanda. 
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 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Burundian meddling 
and Rwandan retaliation do not constitute the only link between the Rwandan and Burundian 
civil wars; as noted above, the events in Rwanda also changed the political environment in 
Burundi without state action being involved. Therefore, meddling cannot be considered 
necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion. 
Rwanda to Congo-Kinshasa, 1996 
 How did conflict spread? As discussed in Chapter 2, Rwanda famously retaliated for 
Zaire’s harboring of anti-Rwanda rebels by leading an international effort to start a civil war in 
Zaire. 
 Was state action present? Yes, this is the banner case of meddling with overt partiality 
resulting in retaliation by State A. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Zairean meddling and 
subsequent Rwandan retaliation constitute the clearest and most discussed link between these 
two conflicts. Therefore, meddling appears to have been necessary for this case of substate 
conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion. 
Somalia to Ethiopia, 2009 (originally included in the 1946-2007 temporal scope because of the 
substate conflict onset in 1994) 
 
 How did conflict spread? The Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), which began 
fighting for independence from Ethiopia in the 1990s, was strengthened by flows of refugees 
from Somalia starting in 1991, when the government in Mogadishu collapsed. Many of these 
refugees were originally from the Ogaden region in Ethiopia and had crossed over to Somalia 
when that government was more stable. When they returned, it allowed “the ONLF … to 
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establish a presence within the territory it sought to liberate.”71 However, the Ethiopia-ONLF 
conflict did not reach the level of a civil war — 1,000 cumulative battle-related deaths — until 
2009.72 By this point, the Ethiopian state was three years into a major military intervention in the 
Somali civil war, in support of a Transitional National Government set up in Mogadishu. The 
fighting in Ogaden “escalated sharply” starting in 2007, “fueled by Ethiopia’s intervention in 
Somalia.”73 The ONLF was upset with Ethiopia’s incursion into Somali territory and with 
Ethiopia’s use of the Ogaden region as a base for these incursions.74 
 Was state action present? Yes, the Ethiopian government meddled with overt partiality in 
the Somali civil war starting in 2006. This meddling appears to have embittered the ONLF 
further and intensified their violence. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? The origins of the 
ONLF conflict cannot be attributed to a state action but rather to flows of refugees from Somalia 
to Ethiopia in the early 1990s. However, the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia starting in 2006 
appears to be linked to the escalation of the Ogaden conflict into a full-scale civil war; absent 
Ethiopian meddling, Ogaden might well have remained a small-scale conflict. Therefore, 
meddling appears to have been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according 
to the Civil War Necessity Criterion. 
South Africa to Angola, 1975 
 How did conflict spread? The Angolan government, led by the MPLA, supported the two 
main anti-Pretoria rebel groups in South Africa, the anti-apartheid ANC and the pro-Namibia 
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SWAPO. In retaliation, the South African government gave “significant military and logistic 
support” to two Angolan rebel groups, the FNLA and UNITA.75 
 Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of South African retaliation for 
Angolan meddling with overt partiality. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? South African support 
for Angolan rebel groups appears to have been the main connection between these two conflicts. 
Therefore, meddling seems to have been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, 
according to the Main Link Criterion. 
Sudan to Ethiopia, 1964 
 How did conflict spread? The Sudanese government provided significant support to the 
Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) fighting in Ethiopia. Apparently they did this in retaliation for 
Ethiopian involvement in the Southern Sudanese civil war — specifically, during the 1960s, 
Ethiopia permitted Israel to “push aid through to the rebels in Southern Sudan” via Ethiopian 
territory.76 
 Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of Sudanese retaliation for Ethiopian 
meddling with overt partiality. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Sudanese support for 
the ELF, the sole connection found between these two conflicts, appears to have occurred mainly 
as a consequence of Ethiopian meddling in Southern Sudan. Therefore, meddling appears to have 
been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion. 
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Sudan to Ethiopia, 1976 
 How did conflict spread? The EPRP and TPLF rebel movements in Ethiopia also 
received support from the Sudanese government,77 seemingly again because of Ethiopian support 
for the Southern Sudanese rebels. (As noted in the Ethiopia to Sudan, 1983 coding, Ethiopia 
began supporting the Southern Sudanese anew in 1976.) 
 Was state action present? Yes, this is yet another case of Sudanese retaliation for 
Ethiopian meddling with overt partiality. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Again, the connection 
between these two conflicts appears to have hinged on Ethiopia’s involvement in the Southern 
Sudanese civil war. Therefore, meddling appears to have been necessary for this case of substate 
conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion. 
Sudan to Ethiopia, 1977 
 How did conflict spread? The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in Ethiopia had training 
bases in southwestern Sudan, again because of Ethiopian support for the Southern Sudanese 
rebels.78 
 Was state action present? Yes, this is yet another case of Sudanese retaliation for 
Ethiopian meddling with overt partiality. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Yet again, the 
connection between these two conflicts appears to have hinged on Ethiopia’s involvement in the 
Southern Sudanese civil war. Therefore, meddling appears to have been necessary for this case 
of substate conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion. 
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Sudan to Uganda, 1971 
 How did conflict spread? A sizeable portion of the Idi Amin-led rebel faction that began 
the Ugandan civil war in 1971 consisted of former Anya Nya guerillas who had earlier fought 
against Khartoum in Southern Sudan. Ironically, Anya Nya guerillas were supplied and trained 
in part by Israel, which used Ugandan territory as a “conduit” for this aid with the consent of 
Milton Obote’s government in Kampala.79 
 Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of Ugandan meddling with overt 
partiality in the Sudanese civil war. While Sudan did not retaliate for this meddling directly as 
they did in Ethiopia, the Ugandan meddling blew back by enabling rebel fighters who later 
assisted in the overthrow of the Ugandan state. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? The Sudanese and 
Ugandan conflicts appear unrelated except for the cadre of Anya Nya fighters in Amin’s rebel 
group, who in turn were as capable as they were because of Uganda’s meddling (allowing Israeli 
training) in the Sudanese civil war. Absent this training, the Anya Nya guerillas might not have 
been as useful to Amin, and a full-scale civil war would have been much more difficult to start. 
Therefore, meddling appears to have been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, 
according to both the Civil War Necessity Criterion and the Main Link Criterion. 
Uganda to Congo-Kinshasa, 1996 
 How did conflict spread? Along with Rwanda and Angola, Uganda sponsored the anti-
Mobutu insurgency in what was then Zaire, in retaliation for Zairean support of anti-Kampala 
rebels.80 
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 Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of meddling with overt partiality by 
Zaire, prompting retaliation by Uganda. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? As with the other dyads 
in the Central African war of 1996, the main connection between the Ugandan and Zairean 
conflicts appears to have hinged on Zaire’s meddling in Uganda. Therefore, meddling was 
necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion. 
Uganda to Rwanda, 1990 
 How did conflict spread? As I also described in Chapter 2, Uganda began discriminating 
against a cadre of Rwandan combatants after the National Resistance Army (NRA) took over the 
government in Kampala in 1986. These discriminatory policies eventually forced the repatriation 
of these combatants back into Rwanda, where they formed the majority of the members of the 
rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) that began fighting against Kigali in 1990.81 
 Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of expulsion by the Ugandan 
government. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? These Rwandan 
combatants, expelled by Uganda, appear to constitute the main link between the Ugandan and 
Rwandan civil wars. In addition, the Rwandan civil war may not have even started without this 
substantial influx of fighters into the RPF. Therefore, expulsion seems to have been necessary for 
this case of substate conflict contagion, according to both the Civil War Necessity Criterion and 
the Main Link Criterion. 
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Zimbabwe to Mozambique, 1977 
 How did conflict spread? From independence, the Marxist government of Mozambique 
“openly supported Rhodesian rebel group ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union).” In 
response, the government of Rhodesia “set about to assist the creation of a counter-revolutionary 
force” in Mozambique, which eventually became the rebel group RENAMO.82 
 Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of Rhodesian (Zimbabwean) retaliation 
for Mozambique’s meddling with overt partiality. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Rhodesian support for 
RENAMO appears to have been a key contributor to RENAMO’s formation, as well as the only 
connection identified between the Rhodesian and Mozambique conflicts. Therefore, meddling 
appears to have been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to both the 
Civil War Necessity Criterion and the Main Link Criterion. 
Zimbabwe to South Africa, 1981 
 How did conflict spread? In 1980, Robert Mugabe and his rebels in Rhodesia ousted the 
sitting government and established the state of Zimbabwe. Soon after, Mugabe began supporting 
the African National Congress (ANC) rebels fighting against the government of South Africa, 
providing a “launching ground for guerilla activity in South Africa.”83 The South Africa-ANC 
conflict first caused battle deaths in 1981.84 
 Was state action present? Yes, this is a case of evangelization by the government of 
Zimbabwe. 
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 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Zimbabwe’s support for 
the ANC appears to have been the main connection between the Rhodesian and South African 
conflicts. Therefore, evangelization appears to have been necessary for this case of substate 
conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion. 
Afghanistan to Algeria, 1991 (potentially outside the geographic scope conditions) 
 How did conflict spread? One of the major rebel groups at the start of the Algerian civil 
war, the Armed Islamic Movement (MIA), was started by jihadists returning to Algeria from the 
civil war in Afghanistan.85 
 Was state action present? Seemingly not. The most likely state action would have been 
expulsion, but the Algerian fighters in Afghanistan seem to have returned to Algeria of their own 
free will.86 Nor was there any apparent evangelization from the Afghan state to Algeria, nor 
meddling by the Algerian state in Afghanistan. This conflict, then, seems to have spread via 
nonstate factors alone — namely, the State A conflict militarized State B fighters who returned 
to contribute to the onset of the State B conflict. 
Afghanistan to Iraq, 2004 
 How did conflict spread? As described in Chapter 2, when the Northern Alliance, backed 
by the United States, took over the Afghan government in late 2001, military attacks forced 
many violent jihadists who for decades had been based in Afghanistan to flee elsewhere. A 
significant number of these jihadists, including Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, ended up in Iraq, where 
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they recruited and trained men to fight the government in Baghdad and significantly elevated the 
intensity of the civil war there.87 
 Was state action present? Yes, this was a clear case of expulsion. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? If the jihadist fighters 
had not been expelled from Afghanistan, it is likely they would have stayed there — after all, 
until 2001 Afghanistan was an ideal haven for terrorist groups. Thus they would likely not have 
ended up in Iraq. The Iraqi civil war may still have started without these foreign fighters, but 
there would have been little to no Afghan influence on the conflict in that case. Thus expulsion 
was necessary to contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion. 
Iraq to Iran, 1966 
 How did conflict spread? In 1966, the Shah of Iran began supporting the KDP, a Kurdish 
rebel group fighting against the government of Iraq. He did this to reduce the KDP’s dependence 
on the KDPI, another Kurdish faction which was advocating for independence from Iran. 
Barzani, the KDP rebel leader, welcomed Iranian state support and in return began to oppose the 
KDPI cause. Eventually, Barzani began expelling Iranian Kurds from Iraq back to Iran. These 
expelled Kurds ultimately initiated guerilla warfare in Iran.88 
 Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of Iranian meddling with overt 
partiality in the Iraqi conflict. This meddling blew back by introducing into Iran Kurds from the 
Iraqi conflict, who had the experience and the inclination to fight a guerilla war. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Based on this 
recounting, it seems likely that the Kurdish struggle in Iran would never have escalated to a civil 
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war without the Iranian meddling that prompted Barzani’s expulsion of experienced Kurdish 
fighters. Thus, in this case meddling appears to have been necessary for substate conflict 
contagion, according to the Civil War Necessity Criterion. 
Iraq to Turkey, 1984 
 How did conflict spread? The Iraqi Kurdish rebels (the KDP) supported the Turkish 
Kurdish rebels (the PKK) by providing them with territory in northern Iraq.89 
 Was state action present? Yes, there appears to have been Turkish meddling with overt 
partiality in support of the Iraqi government. The Turkish government made both air and ground 
incursions into northern Iraq in the early 1980s, in pursuit of Kurdish rebels and with the aid of 
intelligence from Baghdad.90 It is not clear whether the Turkish government engaged with KDP 
fighters as well as PKK fighters, but I suspect the two were difficult to distinguish and that 
Ankara must have fought the KDP in Iraq to some extent. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? In general the KDP and 
PKK disliked one another due to ideological differences,91 so some explanation for their 
cooperation is needed. Kirstin Hasler argues that “cooperation was possible primarily because 
the Kurds in … Iraq resented Ankara’s bombing campaigns in their territory, and their 
cooperation with the Iraqi … governments to subdue their own movement.”92 Therefore, it seems 
unlikely that the KDP and PKK would have cooperated in the absence of Turkish meddling — 
making meddling necessary for this case of contagion according to the Main Link Criterion. 
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Israel to Iran, 1979 
 How did conflict spread? Members of the Iranian rebel group Mujahedin e Khalq (MEK) 
were trained by Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) guerillas in Jordan and Lebanon in 
late 1960s and the very early 1970s (1971 at latest, as far as I can tell).93 
 Was state action present? Perhaps, but probably not. Evangelization and meddling with 
overt partiality are definitely absent.94 A case of expulsion is possible if the PLO trainers of the 
MEK were in Lebanon because they had been expelled there by the government of Jordan, a 
third-party state to this dyad. However, the Jordanian expulsion took place in late 1970, and as 
far as I can tell the PLO training of the MEK guerillas occurred almost entirely before then. Thus 
a state action appears not to have been involved in this case of substate conflict contagion. 
Instead, conflict spread solely through the means of rebels from State A assisting rebels in State 
B. 
Israel to Iraq, 2004 
 How did conflict spread? After being expelled from Afghanistan (see Afghanistan to 
Iraq, 2004), Abu Musab al-Zarqawi traveled throughout the Middle East trying to recruit al 
Qaeda adherents. Ultimately, the Ain al-Halwa Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon became 
“his prime recruiting ground.” This refugee camp existed because of the Israeli-Palestinian 
substate conflict; hence Israel is State A in this dyad. Subsequently Zarqawi and his followers 
went to Iraq, where they played a major role in the start of the anti-Baghdad insurgency there.95 
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 Was state action present? Yes, this is a case of expulsion by a third-party state, Jordan. 
(Recall that the expulsion mechanism can involve expulsion by State A or by another state.) In 
1970, Jordan expelled a number of mobilized Palestinian insurgents who had come to Jordan 
from Israel. These insurgents ended up in Lebanese refugee camps, including Ain al-Halwa, 
which they transformed into training grounds for a variety of Middle Eastern rebel groups,96 
including Al Qaeda in Iraq. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? The Jordanian 
expulsion seems to constitute the main link between the Israeli-Palestinian substate conflict and 
the civil war in Iraq. The two conflicts would probably be unrelated otherwise. It seems unlikely 
that Zarqawi would have been able to recruit fighters from refugee camps in Lebanon had Black 
September (the Jordanian expulsion) not occurred, because Black September significantly 
increased the militancy of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. (Most notably, Black September 
brought the PLO leadership and 3,000 to 5,000 commandos to Lebanon, adding significant 
mobilization capabilities to the discontent of the Palestinians already there.97) Similarly, had the 
Palestinian insurgents stayed in Jordan, they would have been forced to operate in the shadow of 
a stronger state government and therefore would have had a significantly decreased ability to 
staff and train foreign insurgent groups. Thus expulsion appears to have been necessary for this 
case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion. 
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Israel to Lebanon, 1958 
 How did conflict spread? Following Israel’s independence in 1948, approximately 
120,000 Palestinian refugees fled over the border to Lebanon. These refugees changed the 
demographic balance in Lebanon, a tightly calibrated consociational democracy. Muslim elites 
asked for a new census that would reflect this predominantly Muslim refugee influx, which the 
Christian leadership of Lebanon refused to grant. These religious tensions eventually led to the 
1958 Lebanese civil war.98 
 Was state action present? No, evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt 
partiality appear to be absent from this case of contagion. The Israeli government expelled 
refugees in 1948, but not combatants — the combatant expulsion into Lebanon came from 
Jordan in 1970 (see above). And the Lebanese state appears not to have meddled overtly in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict at this point.99 Therefore, in this case conflict spread solely as the 
result of the politically destabilizing effects of refugee flows. 
Israel to Lebanon, 1975 
 How did conflict spread? The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) presence in 
Lebanon had become highly destabilizing by the mid-1970s. The PLO was operating as a “state 
within a state,” and still participating in the anti-Israel substate conflict from which they had 
originated. The PLO presence in Lebanon was a significant cause of the 1975 Lebanese civil 
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war, in that it heightened the religious tensions present in the country since the 1940s and 
substantially undermined the legitimacy of the state in Beirut.100 
 Was state action present? Yes, this is a case of expulsion, again by Jordan in 1970. There 
were Palestinian refugees in Lebanon from 1948, but the insurgent presence was largely 
attributable to the events of Black September. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? The Israeli and the 
Lebanese conflicts shared two major links: the presence of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, 
which did not result from expulsion as defined by the State Action Explanation (see above), and 
the presence of Palestinian combatants in Lebanon, which did result to a significant degree from 
Jordanian expulsion. So in the absence of Jordanian expulsion, the Israeli and Lebanese conflicts 
might still have been related. However, the PLO presence in Lebanon — to a great extent the 
result of Jordanian expulsion — was such a significant factor in the 1975 civil war that it seems 
unlikely there would have been a civil war at all absent that state action. Therefore, I consider the 
Jordanian expulsion to have been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, 
according to the Civil War Necessity Criterion. 
Israel to Lebanon, 1982 
 How did conflict spread? After the 1975-1976 civil war in Lebanon, the continued PLO 
presence in southern Lebanon continued to pose a perceived threat to Israel. In response, in 1982 
Israel invaded Lebanon and installed Bashir Gemayel as its president. This touched off the 
infamous 1982-1990 Lebanese civil war.101 
 Was state action present? Yes, as with the cases above, the PLO presence in Lebanon was 
largely attributable to expulsion by Jordan. 
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 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? As with the 1975 case, 
the PLO presence in Lebanon — largely the result of Jordanian expulsion — appears to have 
been integral to the onset of the 1982 civil war. Therefore, expulsion was necessary for this case 
of substate conflict contagion, according to the Civil War Necessity Criterion. 
Israel to Turkey, 1984 
 How did conflict spread? The PKK rebels in Turkey trained in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley 
in the early 1980s. Palestinian insurgents from the anti-Israel substate conflict were among the 
trainers.102 
 Was state action present? Yes, as with the cases above, the Palestinian insurgent presence 
in Lebanon is largely attributable to the Jordanian expulsion in 1970. 
How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? The Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict and the Kurdish rebellion in Turkey would likely have had little connection to each other 
without the Palestinian training for the PKK, which was in turn largely the result of the Jordanian 
expulsion in 1970. (As in the Israel to Iraq, 2004 case, had expulsion not occurred, the PKK 
probably could not have trained with Palestinian insurgents in Jordan. The Jordanian government 
was more capable than the Lebanese government at stopping such illicit activity.) Therefore, 
expulsion was necessary to this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Main Link 
Criterion. 
Lebanon to Syria, 1979 
 How did conflict spread? In 1976, Syria intervened in the Lebanese civil war on the side 
of the Maronite Christians. This intervention “seriously compromised the [Syrian] leadership’s 
legitimacy as an Arab and Muslim proponent,” contributing to the rise of the Muslim 
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Brotherhood rebellion in Syria in 1979.103 Conditions in Syria were also worsened by an influx 
of “hundreds of thousands of Lebanese refugees” from the 1975-1976 civil war there.104 
 Was state action present? Yes, this is clear case of meddling with overt partiality by Syria 
in Lebanon, which fostered resentment among the Syrian population. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Although Syrian 
meddling and the subsequent boomeranging of conflict back to Syria appear to have constituted 
an important connection between the Syrian and Lebanese conflicts in the late 1970s, they were 
not the only connections; there were refugee flows from Lebanon to Syria as well. Therefore, I 
cannot assert that meddling was necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion. 
North Yemen to South Yemen, 1986 
 How did conflict spread? Rebel forces in South Yemen were augmented by North 
Yemeni rebels from the National Democratic Front, which had been “forced to retreat from the 
North into the South” by the North Yemeni government in 1982.105 
 Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of expulsion by North Yemen. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Other than the North 
Yemeni expulsion, no relationship between the conflicts in North Yemen and South Yemen was 
observed. Therefore, expulsion appears to have been necessary for this case of substate conflict 
contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion. 
Afghanistan to Pakistan, 2007 
 How did conflict spread? The Pakistani state supported the Taliban of the Afghan civil 
war during most of the 1990s and 2000s, with the exception of a brief hiatus during the 
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American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Islamabad’s assistance to and harboring of the 
Afghan Taliban allowed the Afghan Taliban to create a support network of Pashtun nationalists 
in northwestern Pakistan with Islamist sympathies. Shortly after the Afghanistan invasion in 
2001, these Pakistani Pashtun nationalists began to violently oppose the Pakistani regime, in 
attacks which crossed the 1,000 battle-death threshold in 2007. That same year, the so-called 
“Pakistani Taliban” was formed under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud, a former fighter for 
the Pakistan-supported Afghan Taliban.106 
 Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of Pakistani meddling with overt 
partiality in the Afghan civil war resulting in blowback, as a local network meant to support the 
Afghan Taliban ended up fighting the Pakistani government. 
  How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Pakistani journalist 
Ahmed Rashid describes the importance of the ties between the Afghan Taliban and the nascent 
Pakistani Taliban in the initial stages of the latter’s rebellion: 
“Many Pashtuns from FATA [the Federally Administered Tribal Area in Pakistan] had fought 
for the Afghan Taliban … in the 1990s and again during and after the U.S. invasion. … Now the 
Pakistani Pashtun in FATA became the hosts of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, providing safe 
houses, food, transport, and other logistics to their guests, who in turn paid … lavishly for the 
hospitality. … Living alongside foreign radicals for so many years, it was only natural that the 
local Pashtun would also become radicalized, even as they became rich, and that they would 
ultimately develop their own political agenda. Soon former fighters and guides who once used 
donkeys could afford fleets of pickup trucks and hire hundreds of bodyguards, who then 
developed into local militias.”107 
 
Although it is now debated whether the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban still maintain 
close ties, it is clear that the logistical and ideological influence of the Afghan Taliban was 
essential to the formation of the Pakistani Taliban. It is likely that the Pakistani Taliban civil war 
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would not have erupted without this Afghan Taliban influence, which in turn came about 
because of Islamabad’s support for and harboring of the Afghan Taliban in northwestern 
Pakistan. Therefore, Pakistani meddling appears to have been necessary for this case of substate 
conflict contagion, according to the Civil War Necessity Criterion. 
Afghanistan to Tajikistan, 1992 
 How did conflict spread? The Afghan civil war had a variety of influences on the Tajik 
civil war. First, it has been argued that “groups in … Tajikistan [saw] Afghanistan as a model for 
their own struggles.”108 Second, the Afghan conflict provided a steady supply of arms and drugs 
to the rebels in Tajikistan.109 Third, “the replacement of the Soviet-supported government in 
Kabul by a weak coalition of mujahidin (Islamic resistance fighters) strengthened forces in 
Afghanistan sympathetic to the opposition in Tajikistan.”110 
 Was state action present? Yes, there was clearly evangelization on the part of the Afghan 
government after Kabul passed from pro-Soviet to mujahedin hands. For example, around 1993 
the Afghan Defense Minister harbored Tajik rebels in northern Afghanistan and provided them 
with military training.111 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? In this case it is not 
clear whether contagion would have occurred in the absence of evangelization from the Afghan 
government. The Tajik civil war began in 1992, yet the best evidence we have for Afghan 
evangelization dates to 1993. It is possible that Kabul’s support for the anti-Dushanbe insurgency 
began earlier, but we cannot be sure. Meanwhile, there were several nonstate influences on the 
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Afghan civil war on Tajikistan — rebels inspiring rebels, arms flows, and drug flows. Overall, it 
would be a stretch to claim Afghan evangelization as a necessary condition for contagion. 
Burma to India, 1956 
 How did conflict spread? The Naga National Council (NNC), an insurgent group in 
Northeast India, received material support from various Burmese insurgent groups in its early 
years, including the communist and Kachin rebels in Burma.112 
 Was state action present? Yes, the Indian state meddled with overt partiality in the 
Burmese conflict by supporting the Burmese government. “At the height of the [Burmese] civil 
war in 1950, both India and Britain provided Burma with 10,000 small weapons each.”113 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? I did not find any 
evidence that the Indian support for the Burmese government caused the Burmese insurgent 
support for the NNC.114 It is certainly plausible that Indian enmity toward the Burmese rebels 
increased the Burmese rebels’ propensity to support an anti-India insurgent group, but I could 
not confirm this supposition in the secondary sources. Therefore, I cannot assert that Indian 
meddling was necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion. 
 It is also worth nothing that Bertil Lintner, an expert on Burmese-Indian relations, argues 
that had India not meddled on the side of the government in the Burmese conflict, the Burmese 
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government might well have collapsed.115 So this case could even be seen as one in which 
meddling with overt partiality had positive consequences on net. 
Cambodia to Indonesia, 2003 (potentially not a genuine case of substate conflict contagion) 
 How did conflict spread? At least some of the weapons used in the Acehnese civil war in 
Indonesia came from the eclipsing civil war in Cambodia.116 Whether these Cambodian arms 
were a non-negligible cause of the civil war in Indonesia is debatable. On the one hand, most 
Acehnese arms acquisitions in the 1989-1990 period, as the substate conflict in Indonesia began, 
were local — raids of Indonesian police caches, for example.117 On the other hand, by 2003, the 
year that the Acehnese conflict reached 1,000 cumulative battle-related deaths and thus qualified 
as a civil war, some arms were coming to Aceh from Cambodia.118 
 Was state action present? No, a review of the secondary sources cited above yielded no 
evidence of evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality. If this was a genuine 
case of substate conflict contagion, it seems to have occurred solely through the movement of 
arms between nonstate actors. 
Cambodia to Thailand, 1976 
 How did conflict spread? As discussed in Chapter 5, the Khmer Rouge, which governed 
Cambodia between 1975 and 1978, provided training, arms, and sanctuary to the Communist 
Party of Thailand. 
 Was state action present? Yes, this was a clear case of evangelization. Expulsion and 
meddling with overt partiality may have also been weakly present in this case (see Chapter 5), 
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although they do not seem to have contributed substantially to contagion. For the purposes of 
Figure 3.4, this is counted as an evangelization case. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? As discussed in Chapter 
5, the Khmer Rouge support was a crucial bulwark for the CPT’s capabilities, without which 
civil war onset in Thailand would likely have been impossible. Evangelization appears to have 
been necessary for this case of contagion, according to the Civil War Necessity Criterion. 
China to Burma, 1948 
 How did conflict spread? The Communist Party of Burma decided to launch its armed 
struggle in the spring of 1948, “support[ing] the Maoist strategy of guerilla warfare as opposed to 
general strikes.”119 Seemingly, then, Maoism was an important influence on the rebels’ election 
of armed insurrection. 
 Was state action present? No, there appears to have been no evangelization, expulsion, or 
meddling with overt partiality involved in this case of substate conflict contagion. Even if the 
Chinese Communist Party had supported the Communist Party of Burma (seemingly it did not at 
this time),120 this would not count as evangelization because the CCP was not a state actor in 
1948. Instead, conflict appears to have spread solely via the inspiration of one rebel group by 
another. 
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China to Burma, 1949 
 How did conflict spread? Like the Communist Party of Burma, the Karen National Union 
— the main rebel actors in this particular Burmese civil war — was influenced by revolutionary 
Maoism.121 
 Was state action present? No, neither evangelization, expulsion, nor meddling with overt 
partiality was identified in this case. Regarding evangelization in particular, although this 
conflict did not start until January 1949, the CCP did not become a state actor until October 
1949; and although the Chinese Communist Party did provide at least some support to the Karen 
rebels, this support seems to have begun in the 1950s, after the Karen civil war was already 
underway.122 As above, then, conflict appears to have spread solely via the inspiration of one 
rebel group by another. 
China to Burma, 1959 
 How did conflict spread? The civil war fought between the Burmese government and the 
Shan ethnic group “can be linked to the [Nationalist Chinese] invasion and the influx of ethnic 
Burman troops and officials into the state.”123 Essentially, the presence of defeated Kuomintang 
combatants in northern Burma led to a regime troop presence that aggrieved the Shan. 
 Was state action present? Yes, this appears to have been a case of Chinese expulsion. The 
Kuomintang combatants whose presence in large part caused the Shan civil war in Burma were 
there because they had been chased out of Yunnan Province in China by the advancing People’s 
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Liberation Army. This expulsion seems to have begun around December 1949 — after the 
Chinese Communist Party became a state actor — and continued well into the early 1950s.124 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? The Kuomintang 
presence in northern Burma appears to have been integral to the Shan civil war, and the 
expulsion of the Kuomintang from Yunnan Province appears to have been integral to their 
presence in Northern Burma. Therefore, expulsion was necessary for this case of substate 
conflict contagion, according to the Civil War Necessity Criterion. 
China to Burma, 1961 
 How did conflict spread? The war between the government of Burma and the Kachin 
Independence Army (KIA or KIO) was also related to the Kuomintang presence in northern 
Burma. The Nationalist Chinese presence provided the Chinese and Burmese governments with 
a critical piece of common ground — neither liked the anti-Beijing rebel hideout just over the 
border from China. The two governments were able to leverage this common ground to forge a 
treaty in 1960, in which Burma ceded three Kachin villages to China in exchange for joint 
Chinese-Burmese anti-Kuomintang operations in Burma. Yet “this historic treaty, made over the 
heads of local villagers, was a major factor behind the sudden outbreak of the Kachin uprising, 
begun by the … KIO in February 1961.”125 
 Was state action present? Yes — as above, the critical Kuomintang presence in Burma 
was the result of Chinese expulsion that had occurred roughly a decade earlier. By 1960 the 
Chinese may have been going back on their policy of expulsion, given that they were now 
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making a concerted effort to pursue the Kuomintang rebels across the Chinese-Burmese border. 
(As discussed in Chapter 4, State A’s pursuit of its rebels across international borders can be 
interpreted as evidence of a lack of a policy of expulsion.) Nevertheless, by this point the decade-
old expulsion had already been completed. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? As in the 1959 case 
above, the Kuomintang presence in Burma was integral to the Kachin civil war onset, and the 
Chinese state expulsion was integral to the Kuomintang presence. Therefore, expulsion was 
necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Civil War Necessity 
Criterion. 
China to Cambodia, 1967 (potentially outside the temporal scope conditions) 
 How did conflict spread? The Chinese Communists who became state actors at the end of 
the Chinese Civil War had an ambivalent relationship with the Cambodian Communists, who 
started the 30-year civil war in their country. However, at certain critical junctures, the PRC 
seems to have supported the Khmer Rouge. For example, Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot visited 
Beijing in 1966 and returned to Cambodia “with assurances of Chinese backing.”126 And in 
August 1967, “the Red Guards of the Cultural Revolution took charge of the foreign ministry and 
adopted the slogan ‘Revolution is always right’ to guide China’s foreign policy.” Although the 
influence of these Red Guards on Chinese foreign policy was supplanted by Chou En-lai by the 
beginning of 1968, some historians have asserted that in the interim few months the Red Guards 
covertly supported the Khmer Rouge.127 By the time this alleged covert support ended, the civil 
war in Cambodia was underway. 
                                                 
126
 Wilfred P. Deac, Road to the Killing Fields: The Cambodian War of 1970-1975 (College Station, Tex.: Texas 
A&M University Press, 1997), p. 51. 
127
 Elizabeth Becker, When the War was Over: Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge Revolution, Second Edition (New 
York: PublicAffairs, 1998), p. 106. 
174 
 
 Was state action present? Yes, this was a case of Chinese evangelization. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Maoism was an 
influence on Pol Pot apart from any tangible Chinese support for his rebellion; however, Maoism 
seems to have influenced his governance style once in Phnom Penh more so than his 
insurrectionary style.128 In fact, while in rebellion against the Cambodian government, Pol Pot 
usually harbored a strong resentment for the Chinese Communists.129 Therefore, the main 
connection between the Chinese Civil War and the Cambodian civil war appears to be this 
intermittent alleged evangelization of the PRC, making that evangelization a necessary condition 
for this case of substate conflict contagion according to the Main Link Criterion. 
China to India, 1948 
 How did conflict spread? The leftist anti-New Delhi rebels in Hyderabad were influenced 
by Maoist ideas of revolution, according to multiple secondary sources.130 
 Was state action present? No, neither evangelization, expulsion, nor meddling with overt 
partiality were identified in this case of substate conflict contagion. Even if the Chinese 
Communist Party had supported the Hyderabad rebels — and there is no evidence that they did 
— this would not count as evangelization, because the CCP was not a state actor in 1948. 
Instead, conflict appears to have spread solely via the inspiration of one rebel group by another. 
China to India, 1956 
 How did conflict spread? As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Chinese Communist Party 
armed and trained the Naga rebels in northeast India in the 1950s.131 
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 Was state action present? Yes, this was a clear case of Chinese evangelization. Also, 
Chinese support for the Naga rebels may have increased due to Indian support for the Tibetan 
rebels in China; thus this may also be a case of Indian meddling with overt partiality.132 (For the 
purposes of Figure 3.4 above, this case is considered evangelization only, as a stronger case can 
be made for evangelization than for meddling.) 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? The Chinese support for 
the Naga rebels appears to have been highly significant to the onset of the Naga civil war in 
general. For example, the CCP provided the Naga “with sophisticated weapons” that no doubt 
substantially increased rebel capabilities.133 It could be argued, then, that in the absence of that 
evangelization there would have been no Naga civil war at all — perhaps just a low-level 
substate conflict. Thus evangelization appears to have been necessary for this case of substate 
conflict contagion, according to the Civil War Necessity Criterion. 
China to Laos, 1959 
 How did conflict spread? Starting in 1959, China trained some of the Pathet Lao rebels in 
Yunnan Province. Also, “the ideological orientation of the Pathet Lao movement was influenced 
from the outset [i.e., prior to 1959] by the Maoist model.” However, these Chinese influences on 
the Lao rebellion were overshadowed by the Vietnamese influence until later in the Lao civil 
war.134 
 Was state action present? Yes, this was a clear case of Chinese evangelization. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Here it could be argued 
that even if China had not directly supported the Pathet Lao rebels, those rebels would still have 
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used Maoism as a strategic blueprint for their insurrection — after all, this was a link between 
the two conflicts predating the evangelization. Hence evangelization does not appear to have 
been a necessary condition for this case of substate conflict contagion. 
China to South Vietnam, 1955 
 How did conflict spread? As in several other South and Southeast Asian conflicts, the 
leftist rebels in South Vietnam “were very familiar with Mao’s ideas and repeatedly described 
themselves as practitioners of ‘people’s war.’”135 There was a clear influence of Maoism on this 
civil war from its origins. 
 Was state action present? No, the onset of the South Vietnamese civil war does not 
appear to have involved evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality. Prior to 
1960, the Chinese were reticent to support the South Vietnamese insurgency because of 
(justified) fears of a retaliatory U.S. intervention. This policy changed in 1960, and by the mid-
1960s Beijing was supplying significant quantities of weapons to the Viet Cong.136 By that point, 
however, a full-fledged civil war had been underway for years; hence this does not count as 
evangelization. Rather, conflict seems to have spread solely via the inspiration of one rebel group 
by another. 
China to Sri Lanka, 1971 (potentially outside the temporal scope conditions) 
 How did conflict spread? The leader of the rebel JVP in Sri Lanka, Rohana Wijeweera, 
was a “China wing” Marxist and adopted a Maoist approach to insurrection.137 
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 Was state action present? No, evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt 
partiality appear to be absent from this case of contagion. For instance, China actually supported 
the Sri Lankan government in their fight against the JVP.138 (This does not qualify as State A 
evangelization because no attempt was made by Beijing to spread civil war from China to Sri 
Lanka. It does qualify as Chinese meddling in Sri Lanka, but only in the Sri Lanka-China dyad 
— which saw no contagion — and not the China-Sri Lanka dyad.) “Ties” are alleged between 
the JVP and the Chinese Communist Party in the 1960s, but by 1971 these ties appear to have 
been broken.139 Instead, conflict appears to have spread solely via the inspiration of one rebel 
group (the JVP) by another (the Maoists in the Chinese Civil War that ended in 1949). 
China to Sri Lanka, 1984 (potentially outside the temporal scope conditions) 
 How did conflict spread? Like the JVP, the LTTE was influenced by Maoism.140 
 Was state action present? No, evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt 
partiality appear to be absent from this case of contagion. Again, the Chinese government 
actually supported the Sri Lankan government in the 1980s LTTE conflict.141 Instead, conflict 
appears to have spread solely via the inspiration of one rebel group by another. 
China to Thailand, 1976 (potentially outside the temporal scope conditions) 
 How did conflict spread? The Communist Party of Thailand was initially founded in 
1942 “as the Thai section of the Chinese Communist Party.” CCP influence continued for the 
next 30 years; for example, Beijing began broadcasting pro-CPT messages from Yunnan 
                                                 
138
 S. Arasaratnam, “The Ceylon Insurrection of 1971: Some Causes and Consequences,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 45, 
No. 3 (1972): 356-371; Schaffer, “On the LTTE,” p. 8. 
139
 Schaffer, “On the LTTE,” p. 8. 
140
 Alan J. Bullion, India, Sri Lanka and the Tamil Crisis, 1976-1994 (London: Pinter, 1995), p. 92. 
141
 Russell L. Ross and Andrea Matles Savada, eds., Sri Lanka: A Country Study (Washington: Federal Research 
Division, Library of Congress, 1990), p. 209. 
178 
 
Province in China in 1962.142 In addition, some CPT leaders gained valuable experience in the 
Chinese Civil War. For instance, Udom Srisuwan fought in China and then returned to Thailand 
to become the CPT’s “main theoretician.”143 
 Was state action present? Yes, this appears to have been a case of evangelization from 
China to Thailand. It would be a more clear-cut case of evangelization if Beijing’s support for 
the CPT was not just political but also material — weapons, training, etc. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? The non-evangelization 
link between these two conflicts — the experience gained by Thai rebel elites in the Chinese 
Civil War — may have been sufficient on its own for substate conflict contagion, much as 
Maoist inspiration was sufficient in the China to Sri Lanka cases. Therefore, I cannot state with 
certainty that evangelization was necessary to contagion in this case. 
India to Burma, 1948 
 How did conflict spread? The connection between the communist uprising in India and 
the subsequent communist uprising in Burma is disputed, but it is clear that the two rebel groups 
were in contact with one another and that Indian developments influenced Burmese ones. For 
example, in December 1946, after the Indian rebellion in Hyderabad had begun, “the 
[Communist Party of Burma] acknowledged criticism from the Indian Communist Party for its 
Browderist [peaceful] line and the following month first discussed its future slogan, ‘the final 
seizure of power.’”144 
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 Was state action present? No, there is no evidence of evangelization, expulsion, or 
meddling with overt partiality in this case of contagion.145 Instead, conflict appears to have 
spread solely through the mechanism of rebels in State A influencing (and perhaps assisting) 
rebels in State B. (In Table 3.5, this case is counted under the rebels helping rebels mechanism.) 
India to Nepal, 1996 
 How did conflict spread? The Maoist rebels in Nepal “received … training and military 
hardware from a number of Indian Maoist insurgency movements, amongst them the Maoist 
Communist Centre and the People’s War Group.”146 
 Was state action present? No, there is no evidence of evangelization, expulsion, or 
meddling with overt partiality in this case of contagion.147 Instead, conflict appears to have 
spread solely through the mechanism of rebels in State A assisting rebels in State B. 
Laos to Thailand, 1976 
 How did conflict spread? The government of Laos was taken over by communist 
insurgents in 1975. The Laotian communists, who had long supported the Communist Party of 
Thailand (CPT), continued their support while heading the government of the Laotian state.148 
 Was state action present? Yes, this is a case of evangelization by the Laotian government. 
Although the communist Pathet Lao had supported the CPT while the Pathet Lao was a non-state 
actor as well (1959-1974), it was not until 1976 that the Thai unrest became a high-casualty 
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substate conflict. There were 40 Thai battle deaths in 1974, 25 in 1975, 544 in 1976, and 544 in 
1977, according to the PRIO Battle Death Dataset (version 3.0).149 Therefore, the Laotian state 
was evangelizing up to and just prior to the time that Thailand’s full-scale civil war began. Pathet 
Lao support for the CPT may also have been due in part to Thai meddling in the Lao civil war; 
see Chapter 5 for a discussion of this possibility. (The evidence for evangelization is stronger, so 
for the purposes of Figure 3.4 Laos to Thailand is counted as an evangelization case.) 
How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? In Chapter 5, I make the 
claim that Laotian evangelization in the form of support to the CPT was necessary for the 
occurrence of the Thai civil war onset in general. Therefore, this case meets the Civil War 
Necessity Criterion. 
Malaysia to Thailand, 1976 
 How did conflict spread? The rebel Malayan (or Malaysian) Communist Party (CPM) 
and the rebel Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) cooperated for decades preceding the onset of 
the Thai civil war in the late 1970s.150 
 Was state action present? No, evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt 
partiality appear to have been absent from this case of substate conflict contagion. Instead, 
conflict appears to have spread due to rebels in State A assisting rebels in State B. It is possible 
that CPM rebels originally set up bases in Thailand because of British or Malayan/Malaysian 
state expulsion; in the late 1940s and early 1950s, CPM cadres withdrew to Thailand following a 
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series of military defeats at the hands of what was then the colonial Malay government.151 
However, the pressure applied on the CPM by Kuala Lumpur does not constitute expulsion 
because there is not convincing evidence that Kuala Lumpur actually wanted CPM rebels to 
leave the country. In fact, in future decades the Malayan/Malaysian government joined Thai 
forces in pursuit of CPM cadres in Thailand, suggesting that the CPM presence in Thailand was 
just as vexing to Kuala Lumpur as the CPM presence in Malaya/Malaysia.152 This, in turn, 
suggests that Kuala Lumpur did not deliberately attempt to expel the CPM to Thailand — that in 
the eyes of the Malay government, no security problem was solved by the CPM’s departure from 
their own soil — and that the CPM withdrew to Thailand of their own free will.153 
Pakistan to Afghanistan, 1978 
 How did conflict spread? Two causes of the initial outbreak of civil war in Afghanistan 
stemmed from the sitting Afghan government’s support for the Baluchi insurgency in Pakistan. 
First, this support alienated the Soviet Union, leading Afghan leader Daoud to purge his 
government of communists, which in turn led to the (brief) unification of the two communist 
factions which eventually ousted Daoud in an April 1978 coup.154 Second, when Daoud agreed 
to stop harboring anti-Islamabad Baluchi and Pashtun insurgents within Afghanistan in March 
1978, these militants were deeply embittered. “[Communist leader Nur Muhammad] Taraki used 
this issue to arouse mass support against Daoud in the critical interlude between the assassination 
of Khalq trade unionist Amir Khaiber on April 17 and the coup 10 days later.”155 
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 Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of Afghan meddling with overt 
partiality in the Pakistani conflict. This meddling — and Daoud’s attempt to cut it short — 
ultimately embittered the Afghan population and contributed to the coup that began the Afghan 
civil war. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Afghan meddling 
constituted the only connection identified between the Baluchi insurgency in Pakistan and the 
1978 civil war in Afghanistan. Therefore, meddling was necessary for this case of substate 
conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion. 
Pakistan to India, 1983 (potentially outside the temporal scope conditions) 
 How did conflict spread? In 1971, India intervened in the separatist civil war in East 
Pakistan, playing a pivotal role in the ultimate independence of Bangladesh. Then, in 1983, a 
Punjabi insurgency broke out in western India, inspired in part by the successful revolt in East 
Pakistan.156 There seems to be general agreement that the Pakistani government supported the 
Punjabi insurgency to some extent — when this support began is up for debate — and that 
Pakistani support was motivated in part by a desire to retaliate for India’s role in the 
independence of Bangladesh.157 
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 Was state action present? Yes, this is a case of Indian meddling with overt partiality in 
Pakistan’s 1971 civil war, followed by Pakistani retaliation in the form of support for the Punjabi 
insurgency. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Although Pakistani 
support (in retaliation for Indian meddling) may have played a significant role in the Indian 
Punjabi insurgency, it was not the only connection between the East Pakistan and Punjabi 
conflicts. As mentioned above, rebels in the Punjab were also simply inspired by the successful 
civil war in East Pakistan. Arguably this latter, nonstate-driven link could have caused the 
contagion all on its own. Therefore, meddling cannot be confirmed as necessary for this case of 
substate conflict contagion. 
Pakistan to Sri Lanka, 1984 (potentially outside the temporal scope conditions) 
 How did conflict spread? The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), a predecessor to 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), was founded in 1976, “encouraged by the 
separation of East Pakistan from West Pakistan and the creation of the state of Bangladesh.”158 
 Was state action present? No, evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt 
partiality appear to have been absent from this case of substate conflict contagion. The only Sri 
Lankan involvement in the East Pakistan civil war of 1971 was that Colombo permitted Pakistani 
planes to use Sri Lankan airspace for some military operations (in lieu of flying over India).159 
Although this is partial meddling in the Pakistani civil war by the Sri Lankan government, it 
does not strike me as sufficiently overt to code as a state action under the auspices of my State 
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Action Explanation. Instead, conflict appears to have spread solely via the inspiration of one 
rebel group by another. 
Peru to Nepal, 1996 (potentially outside the geographic scope conditions) 
 How did conflict spread? The Maoist rebels in Nepal were significantly influenced by the 
Maoist civil war in Peru, half a world away — much more so, it seems, than by Chinese 
Maoism.160 
 Was state action present? No, evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt 
partiality appear to be absent from this case of contagion.161 Instead, conflict spread solely via 
the inspiration of one rebel group by another. 
South Vietnam to Cambodia, 1967 
 How did conflict spread? Although Cambodia’s Prince Sihanouk adhered diplomatically 
to a policy of neutrality during the early years of the Vietnam War, beginning in 1964 he 
covertly permitted Chinese military aid to the Viet Cong in South Vietnam to pass through 
Sihanoukville in Cambodia.162 Around that same time, he undertook an anti-leftist purge in 
Phnom Penh, forcing Khmer Rouge elites over the border into Vietnam, where they sheltered 
with the very Viet Cong whom Sihanouk was simultaneously supporting.163 
 Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear (if long secret) case of Cambodian meddling 
with overt partiality in the South Vietnamese conflict. This meddling ultimately resulted in the 
empowerment of a rebel faction in Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge. Sihanouk’s support for the Viet 
Cong substantially assisted in their capacity to harbor the Khmer Rouge after the purge in Phnom 
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Penh, and ultimately allowed the Khmer Rouge to regroup and start their insurgency against 
Sihanouk in 1967. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? The ties between the 
Viet Cong and the Khmer Rouge appear to have been critical to the onset of the 1967 civil war in 
Cambodia, and these ties in turn were enabled by the secret Cambodian policy of support for the 
Viet Cong. The Chinese aid to the Viet Cong via Sihanoukville, enabled by the Cambodian 
government, was substantial — “weapons for 50,000 soldiers” between 1965 and 1967.164 Viet 
Cong capabilities, particularly vis-à-vis the harboring of Khmer Rouge dissidents, would have 
been substantially reduced without that aid. Therefore, meddling seems to have been necessary 
for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Civil War Necessity Criterion. 
South Vietnam to Laos, 1959 
 How did conflict spread? As described in more detail in Chapter 5, Laotian diplomatic 
support to South Vietnam spurred North Vietnam to step up its aid to the nascent Laotian rebel 
group, the Pathet Lao. 
 Was state action present? Yes, this appears to be a case of Laotian meddling with overt 
partiality. (I argue this meddling was “overt,” even though it did not involve direct military 
assistance to South Vietnam, in Chapter 5.) 
How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? As discussed in Chapter 
5, North Vietnamese support to the Pathet Lao appears to have been crucial to the onset of the 
Laotian civil war in general. Therefore, I view meddling as having been necessary for this case 
of substate conflict contagion, according to the Civil War Necessity Criterion. 
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South Vietnam to Thailand, 1976 
 How did conflict spread? In retaliation for Thai support for the South Vietnamese, North 
Vietnam provided significant support to the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT). (See Chapter 5 
for details.) 
 Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of North Vietnamese retaliation for 
Thai meddling with overt partiality in South Vietnam. 
How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? As discussed in Chapter 
5, North Vietnamese support — the result of Thai meddling — appears to have been essential to 
the increase in CPT capability in the mid-1970s, which allowed the Thai civil war to onset. 
Therefore, I view meddling to have been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, 
according to the Civil War Necessity Criterion. 
Sri Lanka to India, 1990 
 How did conflict spread? The Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka (LTTE) assisted the Naxalite 
People’s War Group in India (PWG) with explosives training.165 
 Was state action present? Yes, this appears to be a case of Indian meddling with overt 
partiality in the Sri Lankan conflict, resulting in retaliation by a Sri Lankan rebel group in the 
form of support for an Indian rebel group. Sandy Gordon attributes LTTE support for the PWG 
in part to “ruthless suppression of insurgency movements” in general in South Asia.166 One must 
surely include India’s military intervention in the Sri Lankan civil war (1987-1990) under this 
rubric of “ruthless suppression.” 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Northeast India and Sri 
Lanka are quite distant from one another; it is unlikely that the LTTE and PWG would have had 
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much contact with one another had India’s involvement in Sri Lanka not encouraged the LTTE 
to help anti-India insurgents. Thus, meddling appears to have been necessary for this case of 
substate conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion. 
Uzbekistan to Pakistan, 2007 (potentially not a genuine case of substate conflict contagion) 
 How did conflict spread? In late 2001, Uzbek rebel leaders (members of the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan, or IMU) were forced out of their sanctuaries in Afghanistan by U.S. 
and Northern Alliance operations.167 IMU cadres have since sheltered in Pakistan, contributing to 
the Pakistani Taliban civil war — but potentially not enough to make this a legitimate case of 
substate conflict contagion.168 
 Was state action present? Yes, if this is contagion at all, it appears to involve expulsion 
on the part of the American and Afghan governments. 
 How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? No other connection 
between these conflicts was identified. Therefore, expulsion appears to have been necessary for 
this (dubious) case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion. 
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Table 3A.1: Causal Mechanisms Involved in 78 Excluded Cases of Substate Conflict 
Contagion (With No State B Civil War) 
(for more detailed codings, see the Dissertation Appendix, Chapter 7) 
 
State A (sender state) State B (receiver 
state) 
Year Causal 
Mechanism(s) 
Present 
Colombia Peru 2007 Rebels in State A 
Assist Rebels in 
State B 
Colombia Venezuela 1982 Rebels in State A 
Assist Rebels in 
State B 
Cuba Bolivia 1967 Evangelization 
Cuba Dominican Republic 1965 Evangelization 
Cuba Peru 1965 Rebellion in State 
A Inspires Rebels 
in State B 
Cuba Uruguay 1972 Rebellion in State 
A Inspires Rebels 
in State B 
Cuba Venezuela 1962 Rebellion in State 
A Inspires Rebels 
in State B 
Guatemala Mexico 1994 Refugees from 
State A Destabilize 
State B 
Bosnia-Herzegovina Macedonia 2001 Rebellion in State 
A Inspires Rebels 
in State B 
Romania Moldova 1992 Other (unique) 
Russia Georgia 2004 Rebellion in State A 
Inspires Rebels in State B 
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State A (sender state) State B (receiver 
state) 
Year Causal 
Mechanism(s) 
Present 
Serbia Macedonia 2001 Rebellion in State 
A Inspires Rebels 
in State B 
Afghanistan Nigeria 2004 Rebellion in State 
A Inspires Rebels 
in State B 
Angola Congo-Kinshasa 1977 Meddling with 
Overt Partiality; 
Combatants from 
State B Fight in 
State A’s Conflict, 
Then Return Home 
(Not Through State 
A Expulsion) and 
Start Conflict 
Afghanistan Mali 1990 Combatants from 
State B Fight in 
State A’s Conflict, 
Then Return Home 
(Not Through State 
A Expulsion) and 
Start Conflict 
Chad Mali 1990 Weapons from State 
A’s Conflict Move to 
Rebels in State B 
(without the 
complicity of State 
A’s government); 
Combatants from 
State B Fight in State 
A’s Conflict, Then 
Return Home (Not 
Through State A 
Expulsion) and Start 
Conflict 
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State A (sender state) State B (receiver 
state) 
Year Causal 
Mechanism(s) 
Present 
Chad Niger 1991 Combatants from 
State B Fight in 
State A’s Conflict, 
Then Return Home 
(Not Through State 
A Expulsion) and 
Start Conflict 
Chad Niger 1996 Weapons from 
State A’s Conflict 
Move to Rebels in 
State B (without the 
complicity of State 
A’s government); 
Refugees from 
State A Destabilize 
State B 
Chad Niger 2007 Rebels in State A 
Assist Rebels in 
State B 
Congo-Kinshasa Burundi 1965 Other (unique) 
Congo-Kinshasa Ghana 1966 Meddling with 
Overt Partiality 
Congo-Kinshasa Nigeria 2004 Weapons from 
State A’s Conflict 
Move to Rebels in 
State B (without the 
complicity of State 
A’s government) 
Côte D’Ivoire Niger 2007 Weapons from State A’s 
Conflict Move to Rebels 
in State B (without the 
complicity of State A’s 
government) 
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State A (sender state) State B (receiver 
state) 
Year Causal 
Mechanism(s) 
Present 
Cuba Congo-Kinshasa 1977 Evangelization 
Ethiopia Djibouti 1991 Weapons from 
State A’s Conflict 
Move to Rebels in 
State B (without the 
complicity of State 
A’s government); 
Refugees from 
State A Destabilize 
State B; 
Combatants from 
State B Fight in 
State A’s Conflict, 
Then Return Home 
(Not Through State 
A Expulsion) and 
Start Conflict; 
Rebellion in State 
A Inspires Rebels 
in State B 
Ethiopia Eritrea 1997 Refugees from 
State A Destabilize 
State B; Rebels in 
State A Assist 
Rebels in State B 
Ghana Togo 1986 Evangelization; 
Refugees from 
State A Destabilize 
State B 
Guinea-Bissau Guinea 2000 Refugees from 
State A Destabilize 
State B 
Guinea-Bissau Nigeria 2004 Weapons from 
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State A’s Conflict 
Move to Rebels in 
State B (without the 
complicity of State 
A’s government) 
Israel Mali 1990 Combatants from 
State B Fight in 
State A’s Conflict, 
Then Return Home 
(Not Through State 
A Expulsion) and 
Start Conflict 
Lebanon Mali 1990 Combatants from 
State B Fight in 
State A’s Conflict, 
Then Return Home 
(Not Through State 
A Expulsion) and 
Start Conflict 
Liberia Côte D’Ivoire 2002 Evangelization 
Liberia Gambia 1981 Rebellion in State 
A Inspires Rebels 
in State B 
Liberia Guinea 2000 Evangelization 
Liberia Guinea-Bissau 1998 Rebellion in State 
A Inspires Rebels 
in State B 
Liberia Niger 2007 Weapons from 
State A’s Conflict 
Move to Rebels in 
State B (without the 
complicity of State 
A’s government) 
Liberia Nigeria 2004 Weapons from 
State A’s Conflict 
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Move to Rebels in 
State B (without the 
complicity of State 
A’s government) 
Mali Niger 1991 Other (unique) 
Morocco Mali 1990 Weapons from 
State A’s Conflict 
Move to Rebels in 
State B (without the 
complicity of State 
A’s government) 
Niger Mali 2007 Rebellion in State 
A Inspires Rebels 
in State B 
Senegal Guinea-Bissau 1998 Meddling with 
Overt Partiality 
Sierra Leone Guinea 2000 Rebels in State A 
Assist Rebels in 
State B 
Sierra Leone Nigeria 2004 Weapons from 
State A’s Conflict 
Move to Rebels in 
State B (without the 
complicity of State 
A’s government) 
Somalia Djibouti 1991 Weapons from 
State A’s Conflict 
Move to Rebels in 
State B (without the 
complicity of State 
A’s government); 
Combatants from 
State B Fight in 
State A’s Conflict, 
Then Return Home 
(Not Through State 
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A Expulsion) and 
Start Conflict; 
Rebellion in State 
A Inspires Rebels 
in State B 
Somalia Ethiopia 1995 Other (unique) 
Somalia Nigeria 2004 Weapons from 
State A’s Conflict 
Move to Rebels in 
State B (without the 
complicity of State 
A’s government) 
South Africa Comoros 1989 Other (unique) 
Sudan Eritrea 1997 Evangelization 
Sudan Ethiopia 1995 Evangelization 
Sudan Nigeria 2004 Weapons from 
State A’s Conflict 
Move to Rebels in 
State B (without the 
complicity of State 
A’s government) 
Afghanistan Egypt 1993 Combatants from 
State B Fight in 
State A’s Conflict, 
Then Return Home 
(Not Through State 
A Expulsion) and 
Start Conflict 
China Oman 1972 Evangelization 
Iraq Iran 1979 Meddling with 
Overt Partiality 
Israel Iraq 1958 Meddling with 
Overt Partiality 
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State A (sender state) State B (receiver 
state) 
Year Causal 
Mechanism(s) 
Present 
Israel Turkey 1991 Rebels in State A 
Assist Rebels in 
State B 
Lebanon Iraq 1958 Meddling with 
Overt Partiality 
Lebanon Israel 1990 Meddling with 
Overt Partiality 
Afghanistan Pakistan 1990 Weapons from 
State A’s Conflict 
Move to Rebels in 
State B (without the 
complicity of State 
A’s government); 
Refugees from 
State A Destabilize 
State B 
Afghanistan Pakistan 2004 Expulsion 
Afghanistan Thailand 2003 Combatants from State 
B Fight in State A’s 
Conflict, Then Return 
Home (Not Through 
State A Expulsion) and 
Start Conflict 
Afghanistan Uzbekistan 1999 Combatants from 
State B Fight in State 
A’s Conflict, Then 
Return Home (Not 
Through State A 
Expulsion) and Start 
Conflict; Drug Trade 
in State A Creates 
Insurgent-Exploited 
Drug Trade in State 
B 
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State A (sender state) State B (receiver 
state) 
Year Causal 
Mechanism(s) 
Present 
Burma India 1982 Refugees from 
State A Destabilize 
State B 
Burma India 1990 Rebels in State A 
Assist Rebels in 
State B 
Cambodia Thailand 2003 Weapons from 
State A’s Conflict 
Move to Rebels in 
State B (without the 
complicity of State 
A’s government) 
China India 1966 Evangelization 
China India 1969 Evangelization 
China India 1982 Evangelization 
China Malaysia 1963 Evangelization 
India Bangladesh 1975 Meddling with 
Overt Partiality (by 
Pakistan, prior to 
Bangladeshi 
independence) 
India Pakistan 1990 Meddling with 
Overt Partiality 
Indonesia Thailand 2003 Rebels in State A 
Assist Rebels in 
State B 
Pakistan India 1978 Meddling with 
Overt Partiality 
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State A (sender state) State B (receiver 
state) 
Year Causal 
Mechanism(s) 
Present 
Pakistan India 1982 Meddling with 
Overt Partiality 
Pakistan India 1989 Meddling with 
Overt Partiality 
Pakistan India 1990 Meddling with 
Overt Partiality 
Philippines Thailand 2003 Weapons from 
State A’s Conflict 
Move to Rebels in 
State B (without the 
complicity of State 
A’s government) 
Sri Lanka Thailand 2003 Weapons from 
State A’s Conflict 
Move to Rebels in 
State B (without the 
complicity of State 
A’s government) 
Tajikistan Uzbekistan 1999 Combatants from 
State B Fight in 
State A’s Conflict, 
Then Return Home 
(Not Through State 
A Expulsion) and 
Start Conflict 
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Chapter 4: Testing the State Action Explanation in Central 
America, 1978-1996 
 
 Imagine that you are analyzing the political stability of a small, militarily weak country in 
a region of eight states. Over the last 15 years, the region has been extraordinarily civil conflict-
prone. Five of the eight states have experienced some form of violent civil conflict in the last 15 
years, including both of the states with which the country in question shares land borders. One of 
those two neighboring states has had a bloody civil war ongoing, off and on, for more than 40 
years. By some estimates, 20 percent of the population of the state you are analyzing is 
comprised of refugees from those conflicts, many of whom are poor and do not speak the 
country’s official language. This has created significant social tensions in the populace. The 
region is awash with small arms, making violence easy for those so inclined. And the country 
you are analyzing is a key conduit for the illicit drug trade, providing a valuable source of 
revenue for potential anti-regime elements. Making matters worse, the rebels in one of the 
neighboring states — the one with the 40-year civil war — have been alleged to cooperate with 
narco-traffickers in the state you are analyzing, making the inspiration of dissidents a genuine 
possibility. 
 At first glance, this country would appear to be primed for a civil war, and more 
specifically for a case of substate conflict contagion. And yet the country I am describing is 
Belize, circa 1996. Since achieving independence in September 1981, Belize has never 
experienced a violent civil conflict that has killed 25 people in battle, much less 1,000. Indeed, in 
a region where political stability is fleeting, Belize is a bastion of calm. It is known more for its 
beaches than for its domestic politics. 
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 The surprising lack of conflict in Belize is part of the broader puzzle that this chapter will 
seek to explain. That puzzle is: Why did substate conflict contagion occur so rarely in Central 
America between 1978 and 1996? Despite the presence of the five violent civil conflicts noted 
above, there was only one case of actual contagion in the region during this time period — the 
spread of conflict from Nicaragua to El Salvador in 1981 (see Figure 4.1). At the same time, as I 
will demonstrate, numerous nonstate factors existed that the conventional wisdom identifies as 
sufficient conditions for contagion. Although Belize is an extreme case, socially destabilizing 
refugee flows were present throughout the region. Meanwhile, Alvaro de Soto, the chief envoy 
of the United Nations to the Central American peace process, told me in an interview, “I 
remember the guerillas saying to me, … ‘Look, getting weapons in Central America is just not 
an issue. If you’ve got money to pay for them, the whole region is awash with them.’”1 The 
region also has a sizable drug trade. Furthermore, the states have significant transnational ethnic 
ties, paving the way for rebel-to-rebel inspiration and assistance. The fact that conflict spread 
only once in Central America during this time period suggests that contrary to the conventional 
wisdom, these nonstate factors — while often involved in and sometimes necessary for the 
spread of conflict — are insufficient to cause contagion on their own. 
 Instead, I argue that the State Action Explanation helps us understand the outcome of 
limited substate conflict contagion in this region. In the one case of contagion that did occur, I 
show that the mechanism of evangelization was present and heavily involved in the onset of the 
Salvadoran civil war. Otherwise, I find that evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt 
partiality were quite rare in the region, and note that the rarity of state actions coincides with the 
rarity of contagion. In the two notable exceptions to this general tendency — instances of 
meddling by the government of Honduras and, to a lesser extent, the government of Costa Rica  
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Figure 4.1. Map of Central America showing civil wars (uppercase X’s), lower-intensity substate 
conflicts (lowercase x’s), and the sole case of substate conflict contagion (the arrow).2 
— 
— I find that both countries experienced serious security consequences for their meddling, but 
that stability-favoring structural factors in each state prevented a large-scale conflict from 
breaking out. These findings thus support the proposition that at least one state action is a 
necessary, but insufficient, condition for most cases of substate conflict contagion. 
 A brief note on “structural factors”: In my analyses, I will use the predicted probabilities 
of civil war onset derived in Chapter 3 as a rough proxy for the structural conditions that make 
civil war likely in general. However, while this proxy was useful to summarize the likelihood of 
civil war onset across more than 6,000 possible cases around the postwar world, I find it less 
useful in a more discrete region over a more discrete period of time. There are two particularly 
important variables in the Central American context, which I would consider to be structural 
factors for civil war, which are omitted from the Fearon and Laitin regression that formed the 
basis of these predicted probabilities. The first omitted variable is income inequality, which 
tended to be pronounced in Central American states where civil war occurred and less 
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201 
 
pronounced in states where peace prevailed. The second omitted variable is the level of state 
repression of the political left, which tended to be extremely brutal in Central American states 
where civil war occurred and less brutal where war did not occur. So although I report the 
predicted probabilities and use them as a starting point for a discussion of structural factors in 
individual cases, I do not view this proxy as being fully explanatory, and I introduce other factors 
— most commonly these two omitted variables — when talking about the structural conditions 
that were relevant to this particular region. 
 In the next section, I provide a brief summary of the five Central American substate 
conflicts that took place between 1978 and 1996. Then I discuss the sole case of substate conflict 
contagion, showing the importance of Nicaraguan evangelization to the outbreak of civil war in 
El Salvador. After that, I measure the presence of state actions, nonstate factors, and structural 
factors in the three Central American states which never experienced substate conflict during this 
time period — Belize, Costa Rica, and Honduras — showing in general that state actions were 
absent while several of the nonstate factors were present. (On structural factors the picture is 
more complicated, as discussed below.) This section is bolstered by primary-source research, 
including 24 interviews of former government officials across all three countries and archival 
research in Belize. Next, in the conclusion, I summarize the results of this test of the State Action 
Explanation and give an overview of the Southeast Asian test that follows in Chapter 5. Finally, 
in Appendix 4.1, I discuss 19 other Central American State A-State B dyads in which contagion 
might have occurred, but did not. As in the previous section, I frequently find the nonstate 
factors but only rarely find evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality (and also 
only rarely find structural factors — an inferential concern discussed in the conclusion of this 
chapter). 
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Central American Substate Conflicts 
 Five substate conflicts occurred in Central America between 1978 and 1996. For 
background, this section briefly describes them. 
 In Guatemala, a civil war between the government and various leftist groups — which 
consolidated into the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) in the early 1980s 
— began in 1965 and continued until a peace settlement in 1995. Thus the civil war did not onset 
during the time period under study, but the conflict was ongoing. Although the Guatemalan civil 
war was the longest and bloodiest of the Central American conflicts during the entire Cold War, 
during the 1980s it had a relatively low intensity, killing about 800 people in battle between 1978 
and 1995.3 
 In Nicaragua, major instability began in 1978, when the leftist Sandinista group 
challenged the sitting, rightist government led by President Anastasio Somoza Debayle. The 
Sandinistas ousted Somoza in 1979, but the Somocistas did not go quietly. By the early 1980s the 
Sandinista government was fighting its own war for regime survival against the right-wing 
Contras, who as discussed below were based primarily in Honduras (and to a lesser extent Costa 
Rica). This civil war ended in a peace settlement in 1989. 
 In El Salvador, leftist rebels — the main group was the Frente Farabundo Martí para la 
Liberación Nacional (FMLN) — fought the rightist regime beginning in the late 1970s, although 
the conflict did not reach the intensity of a civil war until January 1981. The conflict continued 
until 1991, ending in peace settlement. 
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 Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) summary on the Guatemala conflict (“best” death estimates used). 
Available online: http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=66&regionSelect=4-Central_Americas#. 
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 In Panama, Major Moisés Giroldi tried to oust President Manuel Noriega in an October 
1989 coup attempt that killed approximately 77 people.4 The coup attempt quickly failed. Thus 
Panama experienced a substate conflict but not a civil war during this time period. (This event, it 
should be noted, was distinct from the subsequent U.S. invasion of Panama, which was an 
interstate war.) 
 In Mexico, “Zapatista” rebels in the southern state of Chiapas carried out a sporadic and 
largely unsuccessful armed revolt against the central government between 1994 and 1996. While 
the Chiapas conflict received worldwide media attention, it ultimately only killed about 182 
people in battle, making it a substate conflict but not a civil war.5 
 Since there were five substate conflicts in Central America during this time period, and 
eight total states in the region, there are 35 State A-State B dyads (five times seven). This chapter 
will assess whether substate conflict contagion, state actions, nonstate factors, and structural 
factors were present in each of these dyads. Because my focus in this chapter is on Central 
America as a region, I only discuss these within-region dynamics, generally leaving aside 
discussion of how extra-regional actors such as Cuba influenced the course of events. However, 
several Central American contagion cases involving Cuba are discussed in Chapter 3. 
The State Action Explanation and the One Case of Substate Conflict Contagion in Central 
America 
 
 As mentioned above, the only identified case of substate conflict contagion in Central 
America between 1978 and 1996 was the spread of conflict from Nicaragua to El Salvador. In 
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 Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) summary on the Panama conflict (“best” death estimates used). Available 
online: http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=123&regionSelect=4-Central_Americas#. 
5
 Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) summary on the Mexico conflict (“best” death estimates used). Available 
online: http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=107&regionSelect=4-Central_Americas#. 
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this section, I will show that state action — specifically evangelization — appears to have been 
necessary for the outbreak of civil war in El Salvador. 
Overview of the Civil War Onset in El Salvador 
 Violent leftist resistance to the rightist government in San Salvador began in the early 
1970s, and escalated following a 1979 coup in which President Carlos Humberto Romero was 
ousted by even more right-wing elements in the Salvadoran military.6 However, up to mid-1980, 
the FMLN was not a sophisticated rebel group and the death toll resulting from the substate 
conflict was low (at most 206 in 1979, and at most 500 in 1980).7 Brian J. Bosch writes, “Prior to 
mid-1980, the guerillas acquired funds by kidnapping and by robbing banks. The weapons 
utilized were mostly homemade explosive devices, pistols, hunting shotguns, and whatever 
weapons they could take from Salvadoran troops.”8 
 The nature of the conflict transformed rapidly in the latter half of 1980, when the FMLN 
amassed significantly improved weaponry and adopted a more offensive military strategy. 
Guerilla leaders planned a “Final Offensive” for January 1981, essentially “a large, simultaneous 
push through El Salvador.”9 The Final Offensive did not succeed in toppling the government in 
San Salvador, but it dramatically increased the death toll from the conflict, transforming it into a 
full-scale civil war in 1981.10 
The Occurrence of Nicaraguan Evangelization 
 The Sandinista regime began supporting the leftist dissidents in El Salvador shortly after 
Somoza’s ouster in 1979 — exactly when is uncertain. Because the Sandinistas were a former 
                                                 
6
 Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) summary on the El Salvador conflict. Available online: 
http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=51&regionSelect=4-Central_Americas#. 
7
 Ibid (“high” death estimates used because of lack of “best” estimates). 
8
 Brian J. Bosch, The Salvadoran Officer Corps and the Final Offensive of 1981 (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & 
Company, 1999), p. 60. 
9
 Ibid, p. 75. 
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 UCDP summary on the El Salvador conflict. 
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rebel group, having taken the reins of the state during a substate conflict, and subsequently 
sponsored a rebel group in another state, this was a clear case of evangelization. By the late 
summer of 1980, the Nicaraguan government was advising the FMLN on military strategy, and 
specifically pressuring FMLN leaders to adopt a more offensive theory of victory.11 (Cuba was 
also a major sponsor of the FMLN at this time, as indicated periodically below. The Cuba to El 
Salvador, 1981 case of substate conflict contagion — identified in Chapter 3 — is not discussed 
explicitly in this chapter because I have attempted to focus here only on within-region dynamics 
in Central America.) 
 Around the fall of 1980, Nicaraguan support for the FMLN became more tangible. Bosch 
writes, “An infiltration of modern arms began by air and sea from Nicaragua and overland from 
Nicaragua through Honduras.”12 (The government of Honduras appears to have been an 
unwilling participant in this supply route.) FMLN cadres were trained in Nicaragua (and Cuba),13 
and even practiced a victory parade through San Salvador while based in Nicaragua.14 As a result 
of Nicaraguan evangelization, FMLN capability and strategy were dramatically transformed. 
Salvadoran guerillas went from hand-making explosive devices and poaching rifles off soldiers 
to firing rockets, which “removed the monopoly of airpower from the Salvadoran armed 
forces,”15 and from engaging in hit-and-run attacks and kidnappings to launching a full-scale 
offensive in January 1981. 
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 As we will see later in this chapter, evangelization was out of character for the Sandinista 
regime in Nicaragua. In fact, I found no firm evidence of Nicaraguan evangelization to any other 
countries in Central America. So why did the Sandinistas support the FMLN so overtly? In part, 
it may have been because the Salvadoran leftists had provided the Sandinistas with “men, 
training, weapons, and money” when they themselves were merely a rebel group.16 Shortly after 
the Sandinistas took control of Managua, their military strength increased substantially — from 
an armed force of about 6,700 in 1980 to about 21,500 in 1981 (meanwhile, FMLN strength was 
about 4,000 in October 1980 and about 8,700 in January 1981).17 Thus the newly capable 
Sandinistas were able to pay the FMLN back for their earlier help with significant military 
support. 
Meanwhile, other state actions appear not to have occurred in the Nicaragua-El Salvador 
dyad. I found no evidence of expulsion — the anti-Sandinista Contras operated out of Honduras 
and Costa Rica but not El Salvador — and as for any meddling with overt partiality by the 
Salvadoran government in the Nicaraguan conflict, “the Contra war never had any significant 
Salvadoran participation.”18 
The Importance of Nicaraguan Evangelization 
 How important was Nicaragua’s policy of evangelization to the onset of the Salvadoran 
civil war in 1981? On the one hand, it was not the sole cause of the conflict; there were nonstate 
factors at work as well. The officers who undertook the 1979 coup, a key step on the path to civil 
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war, were worried about recent events in Nicaragua repeating themselves at home19 — 
ironically, then, the Nicaraguan conflict contributed to an overcorrection by the Salvadoran 
military that further destabilized the latter country. Furthermore, “literally every guerilla faction 
in Latin America, with the exception of Peru’s Shining Path, contributed to the [Salvadoran] war 
with money, weapons, and personnel,”20 a clear case of rebels helping rebels. Rebels inspired 
rebels as well; part of the reason the FMLN adopted a “Final Offensive” strategy was that a 
similar strategy had worked in Cuba and Nicaragua.21 
On the structural side, the predicted probability of civil war onset in El Salvador in 1981 
was actually quite low (about 0.9% that year, according to the Fearon and Laitin proxy measure 
discussed in Chapter 3). However, there were structural conditions for civil war onset present in 
El Salvador that are not included in the Fearon/Laitin regression models. Most prominently, 
several of my interview subjects mentioned crushing inequality in El Salvador — a small number 
of families controlling a hugely disproportionate share of land and wealth.22 Furthermore, the 
Salvadoran government was notorious for its brutal repression of the political left, which 
increased popular outrage against the regime. Without these nonstate and structural factors, the 
violent leftist movement in El Salvador would have been significantly smaller and less assertive, 
and a civil war might not have been possible. 
 On the other hand, Nicaraguan evangelization appears to have been the key event that 
carried the Salvadoran instability over the threshold to a civil war. As noted above, weapons and 
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training from Nicaragua (and Cuba) caused a dramatic transformation in FMLN capability in the 
months leading up to the “Final Offensive” — the campaign that resulted in civil war onset in El 
Salvador. Nonstate and structural factors did not cause this. Furthermore, while pure inspiration 
also played a role, most of the credit for transforming FMLN strategy from hit-and-run to 
offensive appears to be attributable to the influence of Nicaraguan (and, again, Cuban) 
government efforts. Multiple secondary-source authors note the criticism of the hit-and-run 
strategy by “Havana and Managua” and the use of material support by both governments as 
leverage to bring about a shift in FMLN strategy toward the offensive.23 Finally, while the 
transnational rebel networks described above were important in the early years of the FMLN, it 
is important to note that “Cuba and Nicaragua acted as clearinghouses for assistance from 
abroad”24 — without Nicaraguan evangelization, then, much of this rebel assistance would not 
have materialized. 
 Overall, I judge Nicaraguan evangelization to have been necessary for the onset of the 
Salvadoran civil war in 1981, and this case was coded in Chapter 3 as meeting the Civil War 
Necessity Criterion. Without this state action and its influence on FMLN capability and strategy, 
it seems that the nonstate and structural factors would not have “added up” to a major violent 
civil conflict. On the other hand, this case is an excellent illustration of the way in which state 
actions, nonstate factors, and structural factors must combine to produce contagion outcomes. 
Nicaraguan evangelization on its own would not have been sufficient to create a civil war in El 
Salvador, because without the nonstate and structural factors there would have been no leftist 
dissidents for the Sandinistas to support. Evangelization was necessary for this case of substate 
conflict contagion, then, but it was not sufficient.  
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The State Action Explanation and Cases of Non-Contagion: Belize, Costa Rica, and 
Honduras 
 
Belize 
Absence of Contagion 
 Belize never experienced substate conflict contagion; in fact, between its independence 
(1981) and 1996, Belize never experienced substate conflict at all. The only political violence of 
note in the country’s 30-year history was the death of four people during riots in the spring of 
1981, half a year prior to Belize’s official independence on September 21. The riots were 
organized by opposition elements in Belize, which saw the colonial government’s agreement 
with Guatemala over their territorial dispute as a sellout.25 Otherwise, despite numerous spillover 
effects of the Central American substate conflicts described below, Belize has remained free of 
anti-regime violence. 
 Understanding this puzzling lack of political violence, let alone contagion, is complicated 
by the fact that there is virtually no secondary source literature on Belizean history and politics; 
books published in English, available in university libraries, and concerning the post-
independence period number less than a dozen. I attempted to compensate for this dearth of 
secondary material by spending three weeks in Belmopan, Belize’s small inland capital. I read 
the personal papers of George Price, Belize’s first prime minister (1981-1984 and 1989-1993), at 
the George Price Centre for Peace and Development. Numerous records of security-related 
government meetings were available in these papers, some of which I have been advised are still 
classified information (hence some bibliographic information has been redacted here, and is only 
available on request). I also went to the Belize Archives and Records Service to read issues of 
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one of Belize’s most influential weekly newspapers, The Reporter, from 1984-1989 and 1993-
1996, the years Price was not in office. Finally, I interviewed eight current and former Belizean 
political elites, including former Prime Ministers Sir Manuel Esquivel (1984-1989, 1993-1998) 
and Said Musa (1998-2008, Foreign Minister 1989-1993), former Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Assad Shoman (2002-2003, also Attorney General, 1974-1978), former Ambassador to the 
United Nations Robert Leslie (1981-1985), former Ambassador to the United States Dean Lindo 
(1993-1996, also Leader of the Opposition in the colonial government, 1974-1979), two 
longtime members of the House of Representatives, Fred Hunter (1961-1984) and Hector Silva 
(1961-1974), and René Villanueva, Sr., the Chairman and CEO of RSV Media, the country’s 
most influential media conglomerate. 
Presence and Insufficiency of Nonstate Factors 
 If nonstate factors were sufficient to cause substate conflict contagion, then Belize should 
have seen a catastrophic spread of conflict. Four of the six nonstate factors were present in 
Belize. Most strikingly, Belize experienced enormous inward refugee flows from the Central 
American civil wars, mainly Guatemala and El Salvador. The number of refugees who came to 
Belize in the 1980s from those two conflicts has been estimated at levels ranging from 12,000 
(the official UNHCR estimate)26 to “25,000 to 31,000”27 to 50,000,28 in a country that had just 
under 150,000 people at independence in 1981.29 Thus, by the end of the 1980s, about one-fifth 
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of Belize’s population consisted of refugees from conflict zones.30 Most of these refugees had 
not returned to their home countries by the mid-1990s.31 
Many of my interview subjects painted a rosy picture of a welcoming and tolerant Belize 
that embraced these refugees with open arms; government documents, public statements, and 
press reports from the time period tell a different story. In 1986, the Belizean High 
Commissioner to London, Denton Belisle, was paraphrased as saying that “illegal immigrants … 
are placing a tremendous strain on Belize social and educational infrastructure, and their 
penchant for violence threatens to unravel Belize’s social and cultural fabric.”32 A 1992 “Report 
by the Belize Crimes Commission” concurred: “Both [refugees and unofficial immigrants] exert 
a severe strain on our social, education, and security services in addition to posing a cultural 
confrontation with the local populace.”33 The links between inward population flows and crime 
were often exaggerated in such reports, but in 1989 Prime Minister Esquivel did state that 
approximately 40 percent of the prisoners at the Belize Central Prison were illegal immigrants, a 
rate double their approximate share of the population.34 More frequently, tensions between 
“Roots” Belizeans and newcomers manifested in land disputes, as they did in the summer of 
1995 when a group of refugees faced eviction.35 There was also a major political scandal 
surrounding the 1993 national elections — elections which ultimately came down to a handful of 
votes — when it was alleged that Central American immigrants were illegally registering to vote 
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on a large scale.36 In short, the refugee influx from the Central American civil wars caused 
severe sociopolitical tensions in Belize. The Reporter put it best in a 1994 editorial: “The 1980s 
experience very nearly killed us.”37 
On top of these refugee flows, Belize developed a destabilizing illicit drug trade due in 
large part to its proximity to nearby substate conflicts. The country morphed from being the 
“fourth-ranking producer of marijuana” bound for the U.S. in 198538 to becoming a major 
transshipment point for the cocaine route from South America to the U.S.39 Some of the 
marijuana was grown indigenously and some may have come via Guatemalan guerillas trading 
drugs for money or weapons — so Guatemalan officials told British forces stationed in Belize in 
198940 — but the far more sinister cocaine trade was almost entirely a byproduct of the 
Colombian civil war and the search of the Medellin cartels for secure supply routes into North 
America.41 
Arms from the Central American substate conflicts were probably smuggled into Belize 
as well. The Guatemalan government notified the British of their concern about Guatemalan 
arms traffickers operating in Belize in 1991,42 and in 1993 Guatemala was listed by The Reporter 
as a major source of arms used in the Belizean drug trade (along with Mexico and the U.S.).43 
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Finally, transnational links between Guatemalan guerillas and the Belizean underworld 
have frequently been alleged and have occasionally been confirmed. In May 1982, the 
Guatemalan government complained to the Belizean government that Guatemalan guerillas had a 
support network in northern Belize.44 This claim was never substantiated. Nine years later, the 
U.S. Department of Defense claimed that “Belizean narco-traffickers work closely with 
Guatemalan guerillas.”45 This claim is supported by a Belizean government document describing 
the arrest of six Guatemalan guerillas during a March 25, 1989 drug bust.46 Furthermore, a 
government document from March 1990 identifies a Belizean drug trafficking organization as a 
funding source to not only the FAR guerillas in Guatemala — a group under the URNG umbrella 
— but also to the FMLN in El Salvador.47 Although three months later another government 
document linked the same group to elements within the Guatemalan intelligence community,48 
leaving its true allegiance unclear, the point remains that there appears to have been at least some 
level of collaboration between Central American guerilla and Belizean criminal elements. 
There was, in brief, no shortage of nonstate factors pointing toward substate conflict 
contagion to Belize. The fact that contagion ultimately did not occur suggests that these factors, 
while possibly necessary for contagion, were insufficient. A large part of what was missing, I 
argue, was at least one of the three state actions of evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with 
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overt partiality. As I demonstrate below, none of these state actions occurred with respect to 
Belize during the 1981-1996 time period. 
Evangelization: Absent 
 Of the five substate conflicts in Central America between 1978 and 1996, only one, in 
Nicaragua, involved a decisive rebel victory and the usurpation of the sitting government (in 
1979). Therefore, evangelization to Belize could only have come from Nicaragua. 
 In all the archival and secondary source material I consulted, as well as in my interviews, 
I did not find a shred of evidence that the government of Nicaragua ever tried to start a civil war 
in Belize. Some Belizean union leaders and politicians were considered too close to the 
communists by the government in Belmopan in the early 1980s, as well as by some of my 
interview subjects.49 And former legislator Hector Silva alleged that Managua sent priests to 
Belize to preach liberation theology.50 But there is no evidence to suggest that Nicaragua ever 
encouraged violent opposition to the government. In fact, the Sandinistas had supported the 
Belizean push for independence from Britain since at least 1979, and was one of the first Latin 
American states to do so.51 As a result, multiple interview subjects said, Belize and Nicaragua 
had excellent relations at a time when Nicaragua was a pariah state in the rest of the region.52 “I 
never got the sense that Daniel Ortega was a Ché Guevara — that he was interested in exporting 
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revolution,” said former Ambassador to the UN Robert Leslie.53 On the basis of this consistent 
lack of evidence, evangelization from Nicaragua to Belize was clearly absent. 
Expulsion: Absent 
 Theoretically, any one of the five Central American states in conflict could have expelled 
combatants to Belize. In practice, I only found reports of Guatemalan and Salvadoran guerillas 
present in Belize, meaning expulsion only could have come from those two countries. The 
alleged FMLN presence is based on a single newspaper report from February 1987; a small 
group of men (probably less than five) who held a businessman hostage in northern Belize 
claimed they were working for the Salvadoran guerillas.54 I have no evidence to further 
substantiate this claim. 
There is more evidence for a Guatemalan guerilla presence in Belize, with sporadic 
reports of such guerillas surfacing throughout government and newspaper records. Many of these 
reports were unsubstantiated; for example, an October 22, 1981 report that Guatemalan guerillas 
had fled from Guatemala to Belize via Mexico was discredited in a December 7, 1981 
government meeting.55 This sequence of events recurred in April 1983, when the Guatemalan 
government notified Belmopan of a 100-member cadre of guerillas in the western part of the 
country but the Belizean government found no evidence of this.56 Two other unsubstantiated 
sightings were reported in 1991 government records,57 and three similar incidents in 1987 and 
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1988 were recorded in The Reporter.58 There were also some more substantiated claims of 
Guatemalan guerillas in Belize — three men were swiftly deported from Belize in 1982, 1988, 
and 1990 on suspicion of guerilla associations,59 and in 1983 Belizean authorities broke up a 
suspected guerilla cell on their territory.60 Overall, though, it is safe to state that the Guatemalan 
guerilla presence in Belize was quite limited. Both government assessments of Belizean security 
and my interview subjects consistently confirmed this.61 
In any case, even if there were Guatemalan or Salvadoran guerillas in Belize, it is evident 
that no such guerillas were there because of a Guatemalan or Salvadoran government policy of 
expulsion. The non-expulsion policy of El Salvador will be discussed at length in the Honduras 
case study below. As for Guatemala, Belizean records and interviews indicate that the 
government of Guatemala wanted its rebels in Guatemala, not in Belize or any other country. 
The Guatemalan government expressed concern over, and periodically investigated, the alleged 
use of Belizean territory as a safe haven by Guatemalan guerillas.62 This level of concern 
suggests that the presence of Guatemalan guerillas in Belize was unacceptable to Guatemala — 
not the attitude we would expect from a government that was deliberately expelling combatants. 
While Guatemala did not condone its army’s pursuit of guerillas across the border into Belize, 
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this non-pursuit policy appears to have been adopted because of the delicate diplomatic status 
quo between Belize and Guatemala, not because of any desire to get the Guatemalan guerillas 
out of their country.63 Instead, former Ambassador to the UN Robert Leslie told me in an 
interview, the Guatemalan government had a policy of annihilation toward the Guatemalan 
guerillas, as well as any of their civilian supporters — the goal was to kill these subversives, not 
expel them.64 Finally, former Foreign Minister (and, later, Prime Minister) Said Musa and former 
Ambassador to the U.S. Dean Lindo both told me that the guerillas present in Belize were 
generally there to recuperate before crossing back over into Guatemala to continue the fight.65 A 
government document confirms these statements.66 The fact that the guerillas were returning to 
Guatemala of their own free will suggests that the Guatemalan government was not exerting 
much effort to keep them out. 
Overall, then, while some guerillas from nearby conflicts do seem to have crossed into 
Belize at least temporarily, the state action of expulsion from El Salvador, Guatemala, or 
elsewhere in the region into Belize was absent. 
Meddling with Overt Partiality: Absent 
 Belmopan took an explicit and remarkably consistent hands-off approach to the Central 
American substate conflicts. This policy was articulated in both public statements and private 
deliberations. Publicly, Deputy Prime Minister C.L.B. Rogers told the UN General Assembly in 
1982, “Our foreign policy is rooted on certain cardinal principles of international behavior: non-
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intervention in the internal affairs of states …” (notice the top billing of this principle).67 
Privately, while planning for the British troop withdrawal in the early 1990s (see below), military 
officials assumed that the Belize Defence Force would not be deployed outside its borders68 — 
as indeed it never has been, with the exception of a 35-man contingent of peacekeepers sent to 
Haiti in 1994.69 Around 1984, Belize did accept an unspecified cash payment from the U.S. 
government in exchange for setting up a Voice of America repeating station in the west of the 
country,70 but that was about the extent of Belizean involvement in the Cold War struggle for 
Central America. 
My interview subjects unanimously confirmed that the government of Belize never 
supported any party to any of the Central American substate conflicts in any material way. 
Allegations by the Guatemalan Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1986 that the Price 
administration (1981-1984) had harbored Guatemalan guerillas71 were flatly rejected by the 
former Prime Minister from Price’s political opposition, Sir Manuel Esquivel.72 (As noted above, 
in reality, suspected Guatemalan guerillas captured in Belize were deported as expeditiously as 
possible.) Another former Prime Minister, Said Musa, acknowledged that his People’s United 
Party “maintained good relations with the FAR in Guatemala [and] the [FMLN] in Salvador,” 
                                                 
67
 “Statement by the Hon. C.L.B. Rogers, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence and Home Affairs, 
Delivered at the Thirty-Seventh Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, ‘Belize in relation with 
Latin America and the Caribbean and the World situation as it affects Belize,’ October 15, 1982,” p. 2, courtesy of 
the George Price Archival Collection at the George Price Centre for Peace and Development, in International 
Relations 1938-1982 box. 
68
 Official document, June 18, 1990, courtesy of the George Price Archival Collection at the George Price Centre for 
Peace and Development. 
69
 “Belize and CARICOM contingent will play non-combat role in Haiti,” The Reporter, September 4, 1994, p. 24. 
70
 Communication from the Embassy of the United States to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the VOA 
repeating station, Unclassified, 1984 (undated), courtesy of the George Price Archival Collection at the George Price 
Centre for Peace and Development, in USA & Canada box; Interview with former Ambassador to the UN Robert 
Leslie, near Camalote, Belize, July 6, 2011. 
71
 “Guatemala ready to drop its claim,” The Reporter, November 2, 1986, p. 4. 
72
 Interview with former Prime Minister Sir Manuel Esquivel, Belmopan, July 12, 2011. 
219 
 
including favorable coverage of the guerilla groups in the party newspaper, but characterized 
official Belizean government policy as one of “discreet neutrality.”73 Most strikingly, according 
to longtime legislator Fred Hunter, the FMLN approached Prime Minister Price in 1981 to ask 
for help (presumably of the more tangible variety), and “George said ‘No. … We’re not getting 
into it.’”74 
What motivated this clear and consistent non-interference policy on the part of the 
Belizean government? Put simply, there were two reasons: Belize’s military vulnerability and its 
ties to the U.K. On the vulnerability front, former Prime Minister Musa emphasized the risk-
averseness in foreign policy that Guatemala — which has at various points claimed all or part of 
Belizean territory as its own — imposed on Belmopan: 
“We weren’t out to create any enemies. That was always Mr. Price’s thing. … Because here’s 
this big country, Guatemala, with a population of what, 10 million? We were at the time two 
hundred and something thousand. We could have been swamped overnight. So we realized … 
that we had to be very careful in how we conducted our affairs.”75 
 
On the British front, multiple interview subjects pointed out that London would have strongly 
objected to any substantive Belizean involvement in the Central American conflicts, because 
such involvement could have endangered the British troops in the country. “The British didn’t 
want Belize doing anything that got their kids shot,” said former Ambassador to the UN Robert 
Leslie.76 On the other hand, Leslie said, “There was immense pressure from the U.S. for Belize 
to assist the U.S. to achieve their agenda in Central America.”77 (Interestingly, this pressure 
never seems to have been linked to American USAID disbursements to Belize, as it was in 
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Honduras and Costa Rica.78) Ultimately, though, between the two great powers the U.K. had 
more leverage over Belmopan. Aside from outspending the U.S. in military aid by approximately 
$962,500 to $617,000 annually,79 the British had troops in Belize and the Americans did not (see 
also the discussion on this troop presence below). Thus, apart from the VOA repeating station, 
Belize did little in support of U.S. efforts in the region. 
 Clearly, meddling with overt partiality was almost certainly absent from Belizean foreign 
policy during this time period. Belize faced substantial internal and external pressures to 
maintain its “discreet neutrality” policy, as former Prime Minister Musa described it to me, and 
appears to have been successful in its adherence to what two writers have called a “self-imposed 
isolation from Central American politics.”80 
Lack of Structural Factors as an Alternative Explanation for Lack of Contagion to Belize 
Before giving any hints about my hypotheses, I asked each of my interview subjects why 
they thought civil war was averted in Belize. They gave fairly consistent answers that are worth 
reviewing as structurally based alternative explanations for the lack of substate conflict 
contagion. Most prominently mentioned was the 1,600-strong British troop presence in Belize 
between 1981 and 1993 (by contrast, Belize had about 600-950 active-duty soldiers during this 
time period, and another 300-1,100 reserves).81 These troops were initially deployed amid border 
tensions with Guatemala and, according to former Foreign Minister Assad Shoman, stayed on for 
12 years in large part because of “U.S. pressure” on the British to provide a bulwark against 
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communism.82 Aside from discouraging meddling on Belmopan’s part, the British garrison 
supposedly deterred political violence from both external and internal sources. Interview subjects 
also mentioned a variety of other structural factors that supposedly kept Belize peaceful. The 
country’s low population density and relative abundance of land were commonly noted.83And 
the two former prime ministers I spoke with both pointed out that unlike much of the rest of 
Central America, Belize does not have a landed elite with wealth far surpassing that of the 
common people.84 Finally, former Ambassador to the U.S. Dean Lindo and longtime legislator 
Fred Hunter both pointed to the British institutional legacy, including free education and 
unarmed police, as a significant factor in Belizean stability.85 (That said, I can personally attest 
that unarmed police in crime-ridden Belize City are a thing of the past.)  
These qualitative impressions of a low general likelihood of civil war in Belize are 
further supported by the predicted civil war probabilities that were used in Chapter 3 to proxy for 
structural factors. Belize is not included in the Fearon/Laitin dataset because its population is 
under 500,000, so I had to try to collect data on the twelve independent variables used in that 
regression analysis myself. I successfully collected data on eight of these twelve variables — six 
using the same sources identified by Fearon and Laitin themselves,86 plus Ethnic 
Fractionalization and Religious Fractionalization by coding these values manually using the CIA 
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World Factbook entry on Belize.87 For the four other variables — Log(Percent Mountainous 
Terrain), Instability, Anocracy, and Democracy — the available data sources do not include 
Belize either.88 So I next created a new “predicted probability of civil war onset” variable which 
used the original regression model with these four variables dropped; across the Fearon/Laitin 
dataset the new, Belize-inclusive predicted probabilities have a 0.8967 correlation with the 
probabilities used in Chapter 3. The median value of these new predicted probabilities in Belize, 
1981-1996, was 0.314% per year, an extremely low value. 
This relative lack of structural factors surely did play a major role in the lack of substate 
conflict contagion to Belize, as it took the edge off the grievances of Belize’s poor and thereby 
made the prospect of rebel mobilization more difficult. Even if evangelization, expulsion, or 
meddling with overt partiality had occurred with respect to Belize, there is a good chance that 
this lack of structural factors would have prevented contagion (similar to the Costa Rica case 
discussed below). Therefore, this case study of Belize cannot tell us for certain whether the lack 
of state action or the lack of structural factors played the larger role in preventing contagion. 
What the case study can tell us is that nonstate factors, which were present in abundance in 
Belize, were insufficient to spread conflict on their own. 
Overall Assessment, and Identification of Natural Obstacles to Contagion 
If we only look at the nonstate factors that supposedly cause substate conflict contagion 
on their own, Belize is a puzzling case. Belize experienced spillovers of refugees, drugs, and 
arms from the nearby Central American substate conflicts (and South American, in the case of 
drugs), and there appear to have been at least some ties between Belizean underworld types and 
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Guatemalan and Salvadoran guerillas. And yet none of the Central American substate conflicts 
of the late Cold War spread to Belize. 
The best explanation for this non-case of contagion is the State Action Explanation. I 
have shown that evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality were definitively 
absent from Belize. It appears that this lack of state action prevented the natural obstacles to 
contagion — those mentioned in Chapter 2 — from being overcome. For example, many of the 
Central American refugees in Belize were terrified of the prospect of facing another civil war, 
and would have been loath to support any violent anti-regime movement89 — a clear case of the 
obstacle of nearby conflict dissuading local conflict rather than inspiring it, or a “reverse 
demonstration effect.” (Meanwhile, native Belizeans both inside and outside the elite expressed a 
great deal of pride to me to have been part of “an oasis of peace” in the region, suggesting that 
they were uninspired by nearby conflicts as well.) And, as mentioned above, the Belizean 
government allowed a significant British troop presence to protect Belize from communist 
encroachment from the neighboring civil war in Guatemala — a case of the obstacle of a state 
government fortifying itself against the potential for contagion. I argue that it would have taken 
evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality to overcome such obstacles to 
substate conflict contagion. 
In addition, as noted above, Belize did not have the structural factors present for a civil 
war. I do not view state actions and structural factors as competing causes of this lack of 
contagion — rather, the State Action Explanation views them as complementary. The lack of 
evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality left significant natural obstacles to 
contagion in place; meanwhile, the lack of structural factors made rebel mobilization a Herculean 
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task in Belizean society. Thus we can conclude from this case that nonstate factors alone were 
not sufficient to spread conflict to Belize, but to better differentiate between the roles of state 
actions and structural factors in other non-contagion cases, we need to examine situations in 
which one such variable was present and the other was absent. That happens to be the case in 
Costa Rica, to which we now turn our discussion. 
Costa Rica 
Absence of Contagion 
 Costa Rica also never experienced substate conflict contagion, nor substate conflict at all, 
between 1978 and 1996. That is to say, there were no violent civil conflicts between the 
government and militarized rebels that caused at least 25 deaths in battle.  However, the country 
experienced a number of small-scale civil disturbances that will be discussed in more detail 
below. 
 While in Central America, I spent two weeks in San José, Costa Rica’s capital, 
interviewing former government officials from the time period in question. Interview subjects 
included former Presidents Luis Alberto Monge (1982-1986), Rafael Angel Calderón (1990-
1994), José María Figueres (1994-1998), and Miguel Angel Rodriguez (1998-2002), former Vice 
President Arnoldo López Echandi (1990-1994), former Security Ministers Juan José Echeverria 
(1978-1980), Harry Wohlstein Rubinstein (1982), and Juan Diego Castro (1994-1996), former 
Information Minister Armando Vargas Araya (1982-1986), former Minister of Governance and 
Police90 Antonio Álvarez Desanti (1988-1990), former Vice Foreign Minister Carlos Rivera 
Bianchini (1986-1990), former Chief of Staff of the Foreign Ministry Luis Guillermo Solís  
(1986-1990), and former Vice Minister for the Presidency Alejandro Matamoros Bolaños (1990-
1994). 
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Presence and Insufficiency of Nonstate Factors 
 Again, potential nonstate causes of substate conflict contagion were in ample supply in 
Costa Rica during the 1978-1996 time period. The country had a six-figure refugee problem, 
with the UNHCR reporting 130,000 refugees from Nicaragua in 1978 (roughly 6 percent of the 
Costa Rican population of the time).91 These numbers subsequently decreased, but by 1996 more 
than 15,000 Nicaraguan refugees still resided in Costa Rica, and more than 10,000 Salvadorans 
had sheltered there as well between 1981 and 1983.92 The proportion of the population did not 
rival that in Belize, but there were significant social tensions accompanying these refugee flows, 
with “refugee camp residents complain[ing] of being taken advantage of by local farmers as 
nearly captive labor for the coffee harvest.”93 The refugee flows also strained the delivery of 
social services in Costa Rica.94 
 Meanwhile, a significant illicit drug trade sprang up in the region bordering Nicaragua, 
linked partially to the conflict there and partially to the Medellin drug traffickers from 
Colombia.95 Arms spilled over as well; a document from the Socialist International (found in 
Belizean archives) reported “the discovery of large arms caches in San José,” and speculated that 
“although it is likely that many of these arms were destined for the Salvadoran or Guatemalan 
insurgencies, there is concern that some may have been intended for use in Costa Rica,” 
presumably by Costa Rican leftists.96 In addition, as discussed further below, the rebel 
Sandinistas inspired and assisted some violent leftist groups in Costa Rica, and the rebel Contras 
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inspired and assisted some violent right-wing groups. Finally, the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran 
civil wars caused the collapse of the Central American Common Market, which “closed the only 
viable market for domestically produced manufactured goods” in Costa Rica, deepening an 
economic crisis in the country that was at its worst in 1982.97 (This is not one of the six nonstate 
factors identified in Chapter 2, but is nevertheless an international effect of nearby conflicts 
worth noting.) Once more, the fact that these nonstate factors did not cause substate conflict 
contagion on their own is indicative of their insufficiency for that phenomenon. 
Evangelization: Absent 
 Yet again, Nicaragua is the only possible source of evangelization to Costa Rica, and yet 
again, that evangelization appears to have been absent. Right-wingers in both Costa Rica and the 
U.S. accused Managua of attempting to spread a violent leftist revolution to Costa Rica, but these 
accusations appear to have been unfounded. For example, in a 1986 U.S. State Department 
bulletin titled “Nicaragua’s Role in Revolutionary Internationalism,” the author blames the leftist 
Sandinistas for a series of terrorist attacks in Costa Rica, but other secondary sources indicate 
that these attacks were not targeted against Costa Rica (instead targeting American and 
Honduran outposts in the country).98 Meanwhile, former President Monge, who ran on an anti-
Sandinista platform in 1982,99 claimed to me that the Sandinistas had “financed two strikes of the 
banana companies” in Costa Rica and trained foreign guerillas to assassinate him, but he did not 
point to any true attempt on Managua’s part to start a civil war in Costa Rica.100 
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 Indeed, the evidence suggests that the maximum extent of Sandinista involvement in 
Costa Rica was a series of “counterintelligence” operations against the Contras who were 
operating from there, mainly consisting of assassinations.101 These moves were defensive on 
Nicaragua’s part, not an attempt to start a civil war in Costa Rica. We also know that the U.S. 
support for the Contras’ “Southern Front” in Costa Rica was kept secret, while U.S. support for 
the “Northern Front” in Honduras was not so closely guarded, because the Reagan administration 
did not believe it could make the claim that the Sandinistas were supplying guerillas in Costa 
Rica. The Honduras operations could be publicly justified because Nicaragua was definitely 
moving arms through Honduras to supply the FMLN in El Salvador, but no such Sandinista 
involvement could be showcased in Costa Rica.102 Washington’s handling of these two different 
operations speaks volumes about the true level of evidence for Nicaraguan evangelization into 
Costa Rica — or lack thereof. 
 In addition, most of my interview subjects rejected the idea that Nicaragua had ever tried 
to start a civil war in Costa Rica. “It [Managua] never even attempted it,” said former President 
José Figueres. “I think they were smart enough to know that there was no base of civil unrest in 
Costa Rica that they could leverage.”103 Furthermore, as former Security Minister Juan José 
Echeverría pointed out, the Costa Rican communists were led by a staunch nationalist, Manuel 
Mora, who “[did not] allow the Nicaraguan Sandinistas to get very much involved in Costa 
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Rica.”104 These Costa Rican communists did participate in some anti-Contra operations on the 
Sandinistas’ behalf in the early 1980s,105 but as above this does not seem to have been part of a 
Sandinista attempt to spread civil war to Costa Rica. Overall, it seems safe to state that 
evangelization from Nicaragua to Costa Rica was absent. 
Expulsion: Absent 
 There was a substantial Nicaraguan guerilla presence in Costa Rica, so the question is 
why they were there. Biographical accounts of several Contra elites suggest that they generally 
left Nicaragua of their own free will — Southern Front leader Edén Pastora did so because he 
was disillusioned with Sandinista politics, the key figure Brooklyn Rivera left for similar 
reasons, and another major player, Alfonso Robelo, switched sides to the Contras while stationed 
in San José as the Sandinista Ambassador to Costa Rica.106 I found no evidence of Contras being 
forced across the border deliberately by Managua. In fact, we have evidence of Sandinista troops 
crossing over into Costa Rica “to try to circle round and hit some of Edén Pastora’s forces,”107 
which is characteristic of a government with an annihilation or cooptation policy rather than an 
expulsion policy. 
 My interview subjects confirmed the lack of a concerted effort by Nicaragua to drive 
combatants over the border into Costa Rica. “It never did happen,” said former President 
Figueres. In fact, he added, even if they had wanted to, “[the Sandinistas lacked] the military 
wherewithal … to be able to effectively deploy their forces in such a way as to drive the Contras 
… across the border.”108 Former Vice Minister for the Presidency Alejandro Matamoros Bolaños 
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confirmed that the Contra exodus from Nicaragua was “their decision,” not one forced upon 
them by Managua.109 Expulsion, then, was absent in the Nicaragua-Costa Rica dyad, and my 
interview subjects confirmed that there was no expulsion from El Salvador, Guatemala, or 
Panama either.110 (The Chiapas conflict, meanwhile, was not even mentioned.) 
Meddling with Overt Partiality: Present 
 Costa Rica meddled with overt partiality in the Nicaraguan civil war, although its role 
was more reluctant and circumscribed than that of Honduras (see below). The government of 
President Rodrigo Carazo (1978-1982) “allowed the Sandinista-led … guerilla forces and 
shadow government to operate freely in Costa Rica in 1978 and 1979, … [and] helped smuggle 
arms to the Nicaraguan rebels.” After the Sandinista takeover, however, “Carazo changed his 
opinion of the Nicaraguan revolution … and began to assist its opponents.”111 Arguably this 
episode of meddling was overt but not partial, since the Costa Rican president switched his 
allegiance roughly halfway through his term. 
Subsequent Costa Rican meddling was both overt and partial, although several interview 
subjects pointed out that it was smaller in scale than the Carazo government’s brief support for 
the Sandinistas.112 The government of President Monge (1982-1986), though internally divided 
over the issue of whether to support the anti-Sandinista Contras,113 ultimately provided basing 
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rights — specifically the right to operate in the north of the country and to build airfields — to 
the Contras throughout Monge’s term, while simultaneously proclaiming Costa Rican 
“neutrality” in the conflict.114 This aid was provided in conjunction with a CIA plan to topple the 
Nicaraguan government using two Contra fronts based in Honduras and Costa Rica.115 (Monge 
denied aiding the Contras in our interview116 — see Appendix 4.2 for his response to these 
claims — but virtually all of my other interview subjects besides his own Information Minister 
confirmed that his government provided support.) The beginning of the end of the Costa Rican 
meddling in Nicaragua’s civil war came on May 8, 1986, when newly inaugurated President 
Oscar Arias (1986-1990) ordered the U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica to shut down the Santa 
Elena airstrip, a major Contra asset.117 From that point forward, any Costa Rican government 
involvement in the Contra war was emphatically unsanctioned by the president and the central 
security apparatus. 
Consequences of Costa Rican Meddling with Overt Partiality 
 So why did this meddling with overt partiality — albeit dubiously partial under Carazo 
— not result in the spread of civil war from Nicaragua to Costa Rica? The most accurate answer 
is that both episodes of meddling did move Costa Rica closer to civil war, although a genuine 
danger of major civil conflict never existed (for reasons discussed in the next section). 
 Carazo’s brief support to the Sandinistas inadvertently created the conditions for 
increased militarization among the Costa Rican left — a loosely organized political faction 
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which had not been substantially militarized prior to 1978.118 A Costa Rican witness to the 
Sandinista arms smuggling operations said: 
“The Costa Rican left supported the southern front of the Sandinistas quite heavily. And as a 
result of that, a group of Costa Ricans developed military capacities, which they didn’t have 
before. … A lot of people … stayed on in Nicaragua after the Sandinista triumph, and then came 
back with a lot of knowhow. And some of them were enchanted with the idea of a revolutionary 
axis running from San Salvador to San José, going through Managua, … because all of a sudden, 
it was possible to have a successful revolution.”119 
 
Several other interview subjects pointed out that the influence of Nicaraguan leftism on Costa 
Rican leftism was much stronger because the Sandinistas were physically present in northern 
Costa Rica and working alongside many of the country’s youth.120 And the Sandinistas were 
physically present in Costa Rica because the Carazo administration either harbored them or 
looked the other way. Ultimately, most of these Sandinista-inspired leftists did not turn to 
organized violence. Those who did, such as the members of the Carlos Agüero Echeverría 
Commando, were often foreigners, or had only dubious ties to the Sandinistas, or had Sandinista 
ties that predated or postdated Carazo’s meddling.121 Nevertheless, the rise of militarization 
among the mainstream left, which Carazo’s meddling inadvertently permitted, could well have 
increased popular support for the violent extremist groups, had the structural conditions for civil 
war been present in Costa Rica.  
 As for the Monge-era support to the Contras, Costa Rica suffered a “wave of terrorist 
acts” in the early 1980s, most seemingly committed by domestic right-wing groups that were 
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either working with or inspired by the Contras — with names such as “International Saviors of 
Nicaragua against Communism.”122 The most prominent of these violent groups was the 
Movimiento Costa Rica Libre (MCRL), “a well-financed, far-right paramilitary group that uses 
its significant funds to fight communism (very broadly defined).”123 The MCRL, “small and 
without significant political influence” prior to the 1980s,124 was significantly strengthened by 
the Contra presence in Costa Rica. In exchange for farms that were converted into bases and 
other logistical support, the Contras paid the MCRL handsomely125 — a symbiosis strikingly 
similar to the relationship between the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban in the 2000s, which 
ultimately resulted in contagion to Pakistan (see Appendix 3.1). Also, MCRL cadres trained with 
U.S. Green Berets who were ostensibly in Murciélago, Costa Rica to train Contras.126 As a result 
of the boost to its economic, military, and political strength, “the MCRL became increasingly 
violent, … participated in an attack on the Nicaraguan embassy in 1985, and former members 
took part in a 1985 bombing of a power facility that exported electricity to Nicaragua.”127 Many 
of my interview subjects were dismissive of the MCRL as a true threat to Costa Rican stability, 
but former Chief of Staff of the Foreign Ministry Luis Guillermo Solís said that they had 
significant links to the Costa Rican national security apparatus, “that could have given them, had 
[the] time come to operate really in a military context, some muscle.”128 
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(On the subject of the Green Beret base in Murciélago, it is worth noting that prominent 
American journalist Martha Honey also alleges that “soldiers and intelligence agents from 
Guatemala … and El Salvador” may have trained there.129 If true, the training of pro-government 
forces from those two conflicts could constitute Costa Rican meddling with overt partiality in 
Guatemala and El Salvador. However, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, I think it is 
more likely that the training of Guatemalan and Salvadoran operatives at Murciélago, if it did 
occur, was almost entirely an American project with little or no complicity in San José. A similar 
decision was made below regarding the Guatemala-Honduras dyad.) 
Thus the Contra presence in Costa Rica — the product of San José’s meddling with overt 
partiality in the Nicaraguan civil war — strengthened violent right-wing domestic elements in 
Costa Rica that could well have initiated a more deadly anti-regime movement. These right-
wingers did in fact transform northern Costa Rica into an area of general lawlessness, as 
landowners, “behind the pretext of preparing for a Sandinista invasion, … organized and trained 
armed vigilante squads which battled land squatters and hunted for leftists.”130 Furthermore, a 
former Somocista from Nicaragua, Juan José Saborio, broke with the Contra-strengthened 
MCRL because it was not rightist enough and “approached high-level Rural Guard officers about 
dropping out of government service and forming a Mano Blanca-type organization. He told … 
[the] deputy director of the Rural Guard that the group’s goal was ‘the elimination of Marxist-
Leninists in the country, including those in the government.’”131 The emboldening of such 
figures suggests that there were clear stirrings of violent right-wing anti-regime sentiment in 
Costa Rica, which drew strength from the government-supported Contra presence in that 
country. 
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Structural Factors Favoring Costa Rican Stability 
It appears that slow-changing structural factors deserve the credit for preventing a full-
scale Costa Rican civil war in the face of significant security consequences arising from San 
José’s meddling. First, San José had a wisely moderate policy vis-à-vis its leftist political 
opposition.132 The Costa Rican government suppressed some leftist groups — for instance, it 
dismantled the “La Familia” group and detained one leader for three years133 — but it did not 
resort to the populace-alienating brutality of Guatemala or El Salvador. Second, the Costa Rican 
government politically accommodated some potentially violent enemies of the regime. For 
example, in 1984 President Monge appointed a founding member of the MCRL, Benjamín Piza 
Carranza, as Minister of Security to appease the far right and the U.S. Embassy.134 (In a 
testament to the durability of Costa Rica’s moderate repression policy, the far-right Carranza 
apparently lacked either the willingness or the political leverage to use his cabinet post to 
meaningfully increase anti-left repression.) Third, San José pushed through some reforms in the 
wage and land distribution system that kept hope alive among the working poor.135 
Fourth, Costa Rica was the third-wealthiest state in Central America after Mexico and 
Panama, judging by average GDP per capita in constant dollars between 1978 and 1996, and was 
far ahead of fourth-ranked Belize.136 Thus, while hurt by the 1980s Latin American debt crisis 
and the collapse of the Central American Common Market, Costa Rica was still better off 
economically than most of its neighbors, and had a more equitable distribution of wealth as 
well.137 Several interview subjects gave striking statistics illustrating these facts — Costa Rica 
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had about 100,000 coffee producers while El Salvador had about 1,000;138 “the average size of a 
farm was just a few acres, against thousands of acres that you would find in other [Central 
American] countries”;139 and social security and healthcare coverage of the population was near 
100 percent, versus figures on the order of 6-7 percent elsewhere in the region.140 Costa Rica’s 
relative prosperity and extensive social welfare spending engendered “a very strong middle class 
that had a lot to lose by going to conflict,” according to former President Figueres.141 
Ironically, the Costa Rican welfare state was largely kept alive in the early 1980s by U.S. 
aid that was provided in exchange for the Monge-era support to the Contras.142 So in the final 
analysis this “deal with the devil” may have been a wise one — meddling certainly increased 
Costa Rican instability at the margins, but it may have also allowed the preservation of the 
structural conditions that made civil war in the country highly unlikely. On the other hand, 
perhaps Monge could have found a way to inject cash into the country’s social institutions 
without accepting U.S. aid and destabilizing the country in the short term. 
Costa Rica has also had a tradition since the late 1940s of peaceful transitions of power 
between civilian-controlled governments, which no other state in the region besides Belize can 
truly claim (and Costa Rica’s tradition is 30 years older than Belize’s). This lack of militarism 
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bolstered the extent to which violent anti-regime conflict was unthinkable in the minds of most 
Costa Ricans.143 
As in the Belizean case, these qualitative impressions of a lack of structural conditions 
for civil war in Costa Rica are confirmed by quantitative data. The median predicted probability 
of civil war onset in Costa Rica between 1978 and 1996 was 0.601% per year, and the median 
probability during the years of Costa Rica’s meddling (1978-1986) was 0.578% per year, well 
below average. Even in the presence of state action, then, there was little opportunity for the 
mobilization of a significant rebel movement in Costa Rica. 
Overall Assessment, and Identification of Natural Obstacles to Contagion 
 Once again, the outcome of no substate conflict contagion to Costa Rica seems to fit the 
State Action Explanation. Refugees, drugs, arms, and rebel inspiration spilled into the country 
from nearby conflicts, meaning these factors were insufficient to cause contagion on their own. 
Meanwhile, evangelization and expulsion were both absent, but the Costa Rican government did 
meddle in the Nicaraguan civil war with dangerous security consequences, namely the 
militarization of the mainstream left and the strengthening of the extreme right. Ultimately, 
however, Costa Rica in the 1980s was a prosperous, relatively egalitarian state with a moderate 
civilian government, and these structural factors prevented the violence-prone far-left and far-
right elites who roamed northern Costa Rica from mobilizing enough mass anger to start a full-
scale civil war — and not for lack of trying, as the Saborio episode illustrates. 
The structural factors may also have created the conditions for some of the 
aforementioned natural obstacles to contagion; for example, former Security Minister Juan Diego 
Castro said that given Costa Rica’s prosperity, it would have been “very hard” for Costa Ricans 
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to “look at what was going on in Nicaragua and want to mirror here what was going on there”144 
(a reverse demonstration effect). Meanwhile, the obstacle of Costa Rica “fortifying” itself against 
contagion existed as well. As former Chief of Staff of the Foreign Ministry Solís said: 
“[President] Carazo was not a soft cookie. He had the national security apparatus looking at 
internal groups. … Whatever support Costa Rica provided, formal or informal, to the Sandinistas 
in those years, was never accompanied by a loosening of the internal grip of national security. 
There was no sympathy for the organization of internal groups that could eventually develop into 
something else.”145 
 
In the Costa Rican case, then, we see evidence for the State Action Explanation’s supposition 
that in order for substate conflict contagion to occur, at least one state action must join with some 
combination of nonstate and structural factors. In the Costa Rican case, state action was present, 
but the structural conditions for a civil war were fortunately absent. 
Honduras 
Absence of Contagion 
 As in Belize in Costa Rica, not only did Honduras not experience substate conflict 
contagion between 1978 and 1996, but there was also no substate conflict in the country at all 
during this time period. There were some more minor civil disturbances, which are described in 
detail below. 
 High crime and lingering political instability (the latter being a more recent phenomenon) 
in Honduras’ capital, Tegucigalpa, prevented me from traveling there. However, I was able to 
conduct phone or e-mail interviews with two prominent former Honduran government officials 
as a supplement to my secondary source research: former Commander in Chief of the Armed 
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Forces Walter López Reyes (1984-1986), and former Vice President Jaime Rosenthal (1986-
1990). 
Presence and Insufficiency of Nonstate Factors 
 Like Belize and Costa Rica, Honduras had multiple potential nonstate causes of 
contagion present that failed by themselves to result in a contagion outcome. The FMLN rebels 
supported nascent leftist rebels in Tegucigalpa, though the number of total FMLN-supported 
dissidents committed to violence remained small (perhaps under 100).146 Interestingly, when it 
came to this rebel network, the “reverse demonstration effect” obstacle to substate conflict 
contagion seems to have obtained strongly among the Honduran population of the time:  
“There was little support for revolutionary change and considerable fear that what was 
happening in neighboring lands might spill over into their own country. Under the 
circumstances, association with … the FMLN was a weakness rather than a strength: It 
discredited the left from the very beginning.”147 
 
The nonstate mechanism of rebel-to-rebel inspiration was also present in Honduras, 
where leftists inclined toward violence were inspired by the success of the Sandinistas.148 
Furthermore, Honduras had a sizable number of refugees from El Salvador and Nicaragua — 
about 43,000 in the 1980s according to the best estimate.149 In terms of percentage of total 
population this influx of refugees was significantly smaller than those in Belize and Costa Rica, 
at just under 1 percent of the total Honduran population at the time.150 Nevertheless, there were 
non-trivial consequences to these refugee flows; for example, Nicaraguan refugees in Honduras 
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were recruited by the Contras and the refugee camps were beds of “lawlessness.”151 The 
transnational small arms market was also alive and well in Honduras, with many U.S.-Honduran 
joint operations focusing on interdictions of arms en route to El Salvador or Guatemala.152 
Finally, “Honduras became a transshipment point for drugs going from Colombia to the United 
States,”153 a nonstate mechanism between the Colombian civil war (heavily funded by drug 
money) and Honduras. Once again, then, we see numerous nonstate factors in Honduras that 
would seem at first glance to create the perfect conditions for the spread of substate conflict. And 
yet no such contagion occurred. 
Evangelization: Absent 
 Again, evangelization only could have come from Nicaragua. And, again, evangelization 
from Nicaragua to Honduras appears not to have occurred. This coding is more ambiguous than 
the Belizean and Costa Rican codings, however. The Sandinista government did support anti-
regime elements in Honduras: “In 1980, the Nicaraguans began to provide logistical support, 
training, arms, and advice to the proliferating [leftist] factions seeking to overthrow the 
Honduran government.”154 Furthermore, in July 1983, the Sandinistas dispatched a 96-member 
cadre of leftist guerillas to Honduras, where they were promptly mopped up by the Honduran 
military.155 So how do these actions by the Nicaraguan government not constitute 
evangelization? I believe they do not, because as discussed further below (under “Meddling”), 
these actions appear to have been taken largely in retaliation for the Honduran government 
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support for the anti-Sandinista Contras. Therefore, they are better viewed as part of the third state 
action mechanism than as part of the first. 
 When pressed, both of my Honduran interview subjects — former Vice President Jaime 
Rosenthal, and former Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces Walter López Reyes — could 
only point to this 1983 incident as a case in which the Nicaraguan government tried to spread 
leftist revolution to Honduras.156 A U.S. State Department bulletin from 1986 mentions a similar 
incursion in 1984, but no additional detail could be located, and we must bear in mind that the 
Reagan administration was highly prone to exaggeration of the Nicaraguan threat to Central 
American stability.157 Otherwise, direct attempts by the Sandinistas to spread conflict to 
Honduras appear to have been absent. 
Expulsion: Absent 
 Theoretically, combatants could have been expelled to Honduras from any of the five 
Central American states which experienced substate conflict between 1978 and 1996. In practice, 
there is simply no evidence of expulsion from Guatemala, Mexico, or Panama. (In fact, in the 
Guatemalan case, Belizean government documents record evidence that the Guatemalan and 
Honduran governments worked together to prevent Guatemalan guerillas from operating in 
Honduras.158) As for El Salvador and Nicaragua, more discussion is needed — but I ultimately 
code expulsion to have been absent from these conflicts to Honduras as well. 
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 Rebels certainly did cross from El Salvador into Honduras; as noted above, they even 
assisted leftist dissidents in Tegucigalpa with plans for a violent revolution. So the question is 
why those Salvadoran rebels were in Honduras — whether they crossed the border because they 
were forced out of their home country by the government of El Salvador (constituting the state 
action of expulsion), or whether they left the country voluntarily (not constituting expulsion). I 
believe the latter explanation is closest to the truth. The government of El Salvador does not 
appear to have had any desire to expel combatants from its territory; quite the contrary, the 
government’s military strategy seems to have centered around trapping suspected rebels in the 
country and then eliminating them. Consider, for example, the following account of a joint 
Salvadoran-Honduran military operation from May 1980: “As hundreds of fleeing peasants 
attempted to cross the [Sumpúl] River into Honduras, they were forced back into El Salvador and 
systematically gunned down by the Salvadoran army and national guard.”159 Salvadoran troops 
also “pursued suspected guerillas across the [Honduran] border”160 after they had crossed over, 
which constitutes more evidence that the Salvadoran government wanted its rebels dead, not 
expelled. (A state pursuing a policy of expulsion should generally stop pursuing the combatants 
once they have left the country, and focus on fortifying the border to prevent their return.) 
One of my interview subjects, former Honduran Vice President Jaime Rosenthal, argued 
that the Salvadoran government did not try very hard to keep the FMLN in or out of 
Honduras.161 This contradicts the secondary source account above — in which San Salvador was 
clearly trying to keep its rebels in-country — but even if Rosenthal is correct, this laissez-faire 
policy of the Salvadoran government would not constitute expulsion. 
                                                 
159
 Schulz and Schulz, “Crisis in Central America,” p. 60. 
160
 Ibid, p. 62. 
161
 Interview with former Vice President Jaime Rosenthal (by phone), March 21, 2011. 
242 
 
So there was seemingly no expulsion from El Salvador to Honduras. What about 
expulsion from Nicaragua to Honduras? Other than the 1983 incident noted above, which I 
consider to have been retaliation for Honduran meddling rather than evangelization or expulsion, 
I found no evidence of the Sandinistas deliberately moving or forcing combatants (whether 
leftists or Contras) across the border into Honduras. Rather, like the government of El Salvador, 
the government of Nicaragua appears to have been primarily interested in annihilating enemy 
combatants no matter where they were — Nicaragua, Honduras, or elsewhere. We again have 
evidence of pursuit operations undertaken by State A into State B’s territory; in this case, 1,500 
Nicaraguan soldiers pursued Contras into Honduras in March 1988.162 Again, we would not 
expect to observe such behavior from a State A with an expulsion policy.  
A stronger case for Nicaraguan expulsion to Honduras can be made about the period 
immediately following the Sandinista takeover in July 1979, when “a majority of the defeated 
national guardsmen … fled across the border into Honduras.”163 These “national guardsmen” 
were eventually organized into the Contra force that fought the Sandinista regime. If they can be 
considered combatants at the time they fled Nicaragua, then this certainly sounds like an incident 
of expulsion. However, in late 1979 these guardsmen were “weak, fragmented, and 
demoralized,” and stayed that way until Honduran and American aid transformed them into a 
cohesive fighting force. Two experts on Honduras write, “Had it not been for the arrival of 
Reagan in the White House, [the guardsmen] would almost certainly have merged into the 
Caribbean underworld, just as the defeated Cuban army of Fulgencio Batista had done 20 years 
before.”164 Therefore, while the Nicaraguan government may have intended to oust the 
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guardsmen in 1979, I argue that the guardsmen were not sufficiently militarized to be considered 
combatants at the time of their arrival in Honduras, making this a non-case of expulsion. 
The careful reader will note the parallel between this case of non-expulsion and the China 
to Myanmar, 1959 and 1961 cases discussed in Chapter 3, where I did identify expulsion. In both 
cases the CIA helped organize and equip a cadre of defeated men who had fled their home 
country. The key difference between these cases is that prior to the CIA’s involvement in Burma, 
the Kuomintang rebels had a central leadership under Li Mi and the structure of the Yunnan 
Anti-Communist Salvation Army; prior to the CIA’s involvement in Honduras, the guardsmen 
were a ragtag bunch headed for underworld oblivion. It is for this reason that I code the 
Kuomintang as combatants, but not the defeated Nicaraguan national guardsmen. 
Meddling with Overt Partiality: Present 
 The Honduran government did meddle with overt partiality on two major fronts. They 
supported the Salvadoran government against the FMLN, and, more infamously, they supported 
the Contras against the Nicaraguan government. Both of these meddling actions resulted in 
substantial security consequences for Honduras, as elaborated below, although neither ultimately 
resulted in a Honduran civil war. 
(On a more minor front, the Honduran government may have meddled in the Guatemalan 
conflict by allowing the U.S. to train pro-government troops for counterinsurgency operations on 
Honduran territory.165 It is debatable how complicit Tegucigalpa was in these training programs 
and whether this meddling was sufficiently “overt.” I suspect the training programs were 
primarily orchestrated by Washington with limited Honduran participation, and thus have coded 
meddling as absent in the Guatemala-Honduras dyad; a similar coding decision was made for the 
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Guatemala-Costa Rica dyad for similar reasons, as discussed above. Meanwhile, Tegucigalpa’s 
cooperation with the government of Guatemala against Guatemalan guerillas based in Honduras, 
noted above, constitutes homeland defense rather than external meddling on Tegucigalpa’s part.) 
 With respect to El Salvador, between 1983 and late 1984 the government of Honduras 
deliberately provided territory for American training grounds for pro-San Salvador troops.166 As 
above with respect to Guatemala, by itself it is debatable whether this meddling was sufficiently 
overt. In addition, however, the Honduran government cooperated with the Salvadoran 
government on anti-FMLN military operations — one such operation on the Sumpúl River is 
described above in the “Expulsion” section. That massacre, executed with Honduran complicity, 
took Tegucigalpa’s actions beyond homeland defense — which, as in the Guatemala-Honduras 
dyad, I generally do not consider to constitute meddling in another state’s conflict — and over 
the threshold to direct involvement in the Salvadoran civil war. Together, I consider these actions 
to have constituted Honduran meddling with overt partiality in the El Salvador conflict. 
 The history of Honduran meddling in the Nicaraguan conflict is considerably more 
involved. Tegucigalpa initially supported both sides in Nicaragua in the late 1970s; Richard 
Lapper and James Painter sardonically write, “During the Nicaraguan civil war, [the Honduran] 
interior minister … displayed a heightened sense of neutrality by selling arms to the Sandinistas 
and intelligence to Somoza.”167 This meddling was thus overt but not partial. Then, in early 
1980, Honduras Colonel Gustavo Alvarez Martínez began, “on his own initiative, … aiding anti-
Sandinista rebels in Honduras with arms, medicine, and other materials.” This policy met with 
the reluctant approval of General Policarpo Paz Garcia, who was running the military, and by 
extension the country, at the time (though he was soon replaced by Alvarez). In April 1981, 
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Alvarez contacted the CIA for help with his Contra support program, and by November of that 
year the U.S. was contributing substantially to the program. The official Contra organization, the 
Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense, was stood up on August 11, 1981 under the auspices of this 
aid program, which besides supplies came to include bases and training.168 
 From late 1981 to 1984, aid to the Contras flowed intensely from both the U.S. and 
Honduras. Then, in March 1984, General Walter López Reyes — one of my interview subjects 
— replaced Alvarez as head of the military in a bloodless coup. López was no friend of the 
Contras, and tried to limit the Honduran support that Alvarez had given so freely.169 Then, in late 
1986 as the Iran-Contra scandal enveloped Washington, new military leader Humberto Regalado 
told the Reagan administration that the Contras had to leave Honduras. U.S. Ambassador Ted 
Briggs “presented his hosts with a timetable under which the Contras would be sent into 
Nicaragua over the next four months.”170 The Contras did not fully leave Honduras, however, 
until May 1990, when they reached an agreement with the new Chamorro government in 
Nicaragua. By this point the Honduran government policy of support for the Contras was a long-
abandoned relic.171 Thus Honduran meddling in the Nicaraguan conflict was strongest from 1980 
to 1984, and diminished rapidly thereafter despite the continued presence of Contras in the 
country for the next six years. 
Consequences of Honduran Meddling with Overt Partiality 
 So why did Honduran meddling with overt partiality in the Salvadoran and Nicaraguan 
conflicts not result in the boomeranging of conflict back to Honduras? To answer that question, it 
is first important to note that both cases of meddling did have significant negative security 
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consequences for Honduras, even if these consequences did not rise to the level of a full-scale 
civil war (or even a 25-death substate conflict). 
 The chief consequence of the meddling in El Salvador was that FMLN guerillas retaliated 
against the Honduran state. For example, “During the late spring of 1982, the FMLN 
revolutionaries darkened much of Honduras by blowing up electrical power stations.”172 
Historians Donald and Deborah Schulz explicitly identify the 1982 FMLN attacks as 
“retaliation” for joint Salvadoran-Honduran military operations.173 
 Meanwhile, there were manifold consequences of the meddling in Nicaragua. First, as 
alluded to above, the Sandinista government appears to have attempted to retaliate for Honduran 
meddling by sowing instability in Honduras, just as we have seen in numerous positive 
contagion cases in Chapter 3. Nicaragua did so by supporting the small leftist factions in 
Honduras and by sending “advance parties” of guerillas over the border. Schulz and Schulz 
describe Nicaraguan efforts in Honduras as follows: 
“The [Sandinista] operations that were undertaken were exploratory, designed to test Honduran 
defenses and gauge the potential mass support for the revolutionary movement. In part, too, they 
were a response to Honduras’ growing cooperation with the U.S. strategic plan [to aid the 
Contras]. A message was being sent: If the Hondurans joined Reagan’s wars, they could expect 
retaliation.”174 
 
Based on this evidence — and the fact that Honduran meddling with overt partiality in the 
Nicaraguan conflict began in early 1980, around the same time that Nicaraguan operations in 
Honduras began — I believe Nicaraguan actions are best viewed as retaliation for Honduran 
meddling. To the extent that the Nicaraguans were simply trying to evangelize, their actions were 
“exploratory” only, that is, not particularly forceful. 
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 There were other consequences as well. The Contras sheltering in Honduras engaged in 
“payroll holdups and kidnappings” for revenue during the early 1980s.175 Toward the end of the 
1980s, Schulz and Schulz describe a general mayhem that stemmed from the close of the Contra 
chapter in Honduras: 
“The disintegration of the Contras … released hundreds of unemployed guerillas into Honduran 
society. Many were frustrated, bitter, and prone to violence. They were not necessarily political; 
many were only too happy to sell their guns to anyone with money. Those who had been in 
command positions, in particular, had access to weapons caches. … The largest customer was 
the Salvadoran FMLN, but there were others also.”176 
 
Furthermore, throughout the 1980s, the Honduran government feared that if the Contras got tired 
of their (losing) fight with the Sandinistas, they might direct their violent energy toward 
Tegucigalpa.177 “The ultimate nightmare,” Schulz and Schulz write, “was that the insurgents 
might dissolve into uncontrollable marauding bands. … The Contras had almost as many men 
under arms as the Honduran military.”178 In addition, former Vice President Jaime Rosenthal told 
me in an interview that the Contra operations in Honduras gave the U.S the opportunity to 
strengthen the Honduran military. He viewed this development as a negative security 
consequence in light of the frequent military interdictions of civilian control.179 Finally, 
Rosenthal also identified the strengthening of Honduras’ left — the small size of which has 
generally been considered a factor favoring Honduran security — as a consequence of U.S.-
Honduran aid to the Contras, in that the aid provided the left with an anti-American rallying 
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cry.180 A 1988 incident in which “over 1,000 people marched on the U.S. embassy” and set off 
riots lasting several days seems to support this view.181 
Structural Factors Favoring Honduran Stability 
 So if there were so many negative security consequences for Honduran meddling in El 
Salvador in Nicaragua, why did Honduras ultimately not experience a civil war? Secondary 
sources and my interview subjects advanced various reasons, all of which can be broadly 
classified as structural factors favoring civil peace in Honduras. Both López and Rosenthal 
argued that the Honduran government repressed its populace less than the likes of Nicaragua and 
El Salvador.182 Such claims from former government officials must be taken with a grain of salt, 
but Schulz and Schulz agree: “Although human rights violations existed and were on the rise, the 
situation was a far cry from the kind of indiscriminate and massive carnage that might have made 
radicals of a large number of Hondurans.”183 Partly as a result of this low-to-moderate level of 
repression, the political left in Honduras — the most likely group to initiate an armed rebellion 
— was weak and factionalized.184 Former Vice President Rosenthal told me, “The leftist parties 
in Honduras … are permitted to operate and participate in elections, and they never get more 
than 5 percent of the vote.”185 Former Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces López agreed: 
“Left-wing ideological movements were small and without popular support.”186 
 Multiple sources also credited the “flexibility” of the Honduran political system for 
preventing enough grievance from arising. As Schultz and Schultz write, “The very fact that 
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peasants could organize and sometimes win disputes and recover ‘stolen’ properties or otherwise 
benefit from land distribution programs co-opted many and gave hope to many others, 
buttressing the legitimacy of the system.”187 Unions were stronger in Honduras than elsewhere in 
Central America, and the military was less interventionist in civilian affairs188 (though this latter 
tendency was undermined somewhat by the Contra presence, as Rosenthal noted above). Hence 
the Honduran government had at least an illusion of legitimacy that many other Central 
American states at the time did not. 
 Finally, like Belize and Costa Rica, Honduras was a less socially stratified society than 
the rest of its Central American peers. As former Vice President Rosenthal put it to me, “The 
very wealthy in Honduras are not that wealthy. The class differences are not that big. … [And] 
the wealthy families in Honduras are more recent. … There is not a lot of wealth from the 
land.”189 Schulz and Schulz put the total size of the elite at “probably not more than 1,000 
people” and note that they “lacked the aristocratic traditions of most Central American ruling 
classes.”190 A country that is almost universally poor and that does not have a sizable landed 
aristocracy has fewer visible distinctions between haves and have-nots. Such “relative 
deprivation” is a crucial structural cause of civil war.191 Relatedly, the 1980s debt crisis that 
significantly increased social tensions in the rest of Central America did not impact Honduras as 
severely — “the economy had less distance to fall.”192 
 The qualitative evidence above strongly suggests that the structural conditions for civil 
war were absent in Honduras. The quantitative evidence disagrees with this conclusion, however. 
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The median predicted probability of civil war onset in Honduras, 1978-1996, was 1.933% per 
year; during the meddling years of 1980-1984, the median probability was 2.37%. Both of these 
statistics are well above the population median probability of civil war onset (1.05%), and in the 
neighborhood of the median probability of civil war onset in cases of high-intensity substate 
conflict contagion (2.095%). Thus the Fearon/Laitin regression model suggests that the structural 
conditions for civil war were present in Honduras. We must decide which set of evidence — 
quantitative or qualitative — to favor. 
 As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, the Fearon/Laitin proxy for structural 
conditions is useful for describing and comparing thousands of observations, but at the level of 
analysis of individual Central American cases, important structural variables are missing. None 
of the qualitatively identified structural conditions favoring peace in Honduras are captured in 
Fearon and Laitin’s twelve-variable model. So, for example, while the low per capita income of 
Honduras is one of the determinants of its high predicted probability of civil war onset, the 
relatively even distribution of that income is not accounted for quantitatively. Given that the 
quantitative probability of civil war onset in Honduras is high but not extreme (it is not 5% per 
year, or 10% per year), and given the weight of the qualitative evidence in favor of the absence 
of structural conditions for civil war, I judge the overall level of structural factors to have been 
low. 
As an aside, the disconnect between the quantitative evidence and the qualitative 
evidence in the Honduran case suggests that future research on the causes of civil war in general 
should take account of regional variations in the importance of various structural factors. The 
Fearon and Laitin regressions, and others like them, have greatly advanced our knowledge of 
why civil wars occur in the world, but we are still in search of more complete and more 
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geographically specific models. (And this dissertation, which seeks to explain substate conflict 
contagion around the postwar world, is vulnerable to a similar critique, although I have tried to 
overcome it by testing the State Action Explanation in specific regions.) 
Overall Assessment 
 Overall, the outcome of no substate conflict contagion to Honduras seems to be 
consistent with the State Action Explanation. Five out of the six nonstate factors (all except for 
the foreign fighters mechanism) were present in Honduras, so their presence alone cannot 
explain the negative value on the dependent variable. Meanwhile, evangelization and expulsion 
appear to have been absent. Meddling with overt partiality was present on two fronts — the 
Honduran government supported the government in El Salvador and the rebels in Nicaragua — 
and this resulted in significant negative security consequences for Honduras in both cases. 
Ultimately, though, this meddling was not sufficient to cause contagion from El Salvador or 
Nicaragua to Honduras, because numerous structural factors favoring civil peace were present in 
the Honduran polity (although the qualitative and quantitative evidence disagree on this point). 
Thus the Honduran case demonstrates the insufficiency of nonstate factors alone for contagion 
and the tendency for state actions to endanger the internal stability of states. But the case also 
demonstrates the necessity of structural factors in addition to state actions for the actual outbreak 
of contagious civil war. 
Summary and Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I examined the history of 35 State A-State B dyads in Central America 
between 1978 and 1996. (Nineteen of these dyads are specifically discussed in Appendix 4.1 
below. The other sixteen dyads involved either Belize, Honduras, or Costa Rica as State B, or 
involved the Nicaragua-El Salvador contagion case, and were covered in the longer case studies 
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above.) I found evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality present in only eight 
of those dyads. In one, Nicaragua-El Salvador, evangelization played a major role in the spread 
of substate conflict, although the Salvadoran civil war also required nonstate and structural 
factors to get off the ground. The other seven state actions identified were all meddling with 
overt partiality, including three prominent cases of meddling by Costa Rica in Nicaragua, 
Honduras in Nicaragua, and Honduras in El Salvador, and four more minor cases of meddling by 
Guatemala in El Salvador, Panama in El Salvador, Mexico in Nicaragua, and Panama in 
Nicaragua. None of these instances of meddling with overt partiality resulted in the spread of 
substate conflict from State A to State B — although both Costa Rica and Honduras experienced 
negative security consequences for their meddling — again reinforcing the supposition that state 
actions, while necessary for substate conflict contagion, are not sufficient on their own. 
 In the other 27 State A-State B dyads, I found no convincing evidence of evangelization, 
expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality. I believe this relative rarity of state action in Central 
America plays a significant, though not all-encompassing, role in explaining the relative rarity of 
substate conflict contagion in the region. After all, nonstate factors — particularly spillovers of 
refugees, arms, and drugs from conflict zones — existed throughout the region to varying 
degrees, and yet these factors did not on their own cause the spread of substate conflict. In other 
words, the natural obstacles to substate conflict contagion, which we directly observed in the 
form of reverse demonstration effects in Belize, Costa Rica, and Honduras, as well as 
government fortification against contagion in Belize and Costa Rica — and which were 
doubtlessly present elsewhere in the region — could not be overcome by these nonstate factors 
alone. 
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On the other hand, it seems from a combination of quantitative indicators and qualitative 
evidence that the structural conditions for civil war onset in general were for the most part absent 
from Central America. It could be argued, then, that even given more frequent state actions, 
contagion would still have been rare. This argument, if true — the codings of structural factors 
are still too ambiguous to know for sure — would also support the State Action Explanation, 
which postulates that state actions and structural factors must combine to produce contagion 
outcomes. Nevertheless, to better test the causal contribution of state actions specifically, we 
would prefer less co-occurrence of missing state actions and missing structural factors, which 
fortunately we find in Southeast Asia (Chapter 5). 
 This chapter has thus provided a useful first regional test of the State Action Explanation. 
The state action of evangelization was present in and necessary for the one case of substate 
conflict contagion that did occur, and state actions were absent from roughly four fifths of the 34 
cases where contagion did not occur. Meanwhile, the presence of nonstate factors by themselves 
appears to have had no direct correlation with the occurrence of substate conflict contagion. 
These findings suggest that at least one state action is a necessary but insufficient condition for 
most cases of substate conflict contagion, just as the explanation predicts. 
 The next chapter will continue testing the State Action Explanation by looking at 
Southeast Asia between 1959 and 1980. Unlike Central America, Southeast Asia had six cases of 
substate conflict contagion during the time period under study — but also had thirty directed 
dyads in which, despite the presence of a State A conflict, contagion did not occur. There is thus 
again a mix (albeit a different one) of cases and non-cases of contagion for us to study. I do so, 
ultimately finding further empirical support for the State Action Explanation. 
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Appendix 4.1: Coding of Other Dyads 
 These 19 brief, dyad-specific “mini-case studies” are organized as follows. The dyads are 
titled “State A-State B” — for example, in the “El Salvador-Guatemala” dyad just below, El 
Salvador is State A and Guatemala is State B. The value of the dependent variable for each of 
these 19 dyads is negative — there were no additional cases of substate conflict contagion in 
Central America between 1978 and 1996 — so there are no dyad-specific dependent variable 
codings below. Instead, I skip to coding the presence or absence of the three state actions, each 
of which is considered in turn. Next, I report the median predicted probability of civil war in 
State B between the year of the State A conflict onset (or 1978, whichever is later) and five years 
after the State A conflict termination (or 1996, whichever is earlier), again as a rough proxy for 
the presence of structural factors. Structural factors are considered to be “present” if this 
predicted probability is 1.5% per year or higher (rounding to the nearest tenth of a percentage 
point). Finally, I discuss the presence of any identified nonstate factors in the dyad. (Not every 
dyad has nonstate factors identified.) 
El Salvador-Guatemala 
 Evangelization: Impossible, because the rebels in El Salvador did not unseat the 
government. 
 Expulsion: Seemingly absent. As discussed above, the Salvadoran government’s general 
approach to its counterinsurgency was to try to keep rebels in the country, not force them out. 
This policy seems to have been applied with respect to Guatemala as well; on January 12, 1981, 
Guatemalan troops sealed the Salvadoran border, seemingly with San Salvador’s approval.193 
Furthermore, former UN envoy to Central America Alvaro de Soto told me in an interview of 
widespread suspicion that the Salvadoran and Guatemalan governments were cooperating to 
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eliminate FMLN rebels who did manage to get into Guatemala.194 Again, this suggests that El 
Salvador was pursuing a policy of annihilation rather than a policy of expulsion. 
 Meddling with Overt Partiality: Weakly present. The Guatemalan government, with the 
assistance of the Israelis, provided some advanced weaponry to the Salvadoran government 
during 1983 and 1984 at least.195 However, other than de Soto’s suggestion of Salvadoran-
Guatemalan cooperation to eliminate FMLN in Guatemala, I found no hard evidence of more 
direct Guatemalan involvement in the Salvadoran conflict. (Anti-rebel operations conducted by 
the Guatemalan government on Guatemalan soil sound more like homeland defense than 
meddling in another state’s conflict.) Overall, Guatemala’s role in El Salvador seems to have 
been too limited to have invited any sort of boomeranging. In addition, as noted below, the 
quantitative proxy suggests that the structural factors for civil war onset in Guatemala — more 
specifically, an additional civil war onset in Guatemala — were absent. 
 Median Predicted Probability of Civil War in Guatemala, 1981-1996: 0.934% per year 
(low, below the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, 
structural conditions for civil war appear absent. 
Nonstate Factor of Refugees: Present. The UNHCR estimates that there were 100,000 
Salvadoran refugees in Guatemala in 1981 — about 1.4 percent of the Guatemalan population at 
the time196 — and 70,000 refugees from 1982 to 1984.197 Despite the presence of this sizable 
refugee population, substate conflict did not spread from El Salvador to Guatemala. 
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 Nonstate Factor of Arms: Present. Two Belizean government documents from March and 
April 1992 record the Guatemalan government’s concern that guerilla forces there were getting 
advanced weaponry from the eclipsing Salvadoran conflict.198 
El Salvador-Mexico 
 Evangelization: Impossible, because the rebels in El Salvador did not unseat the 
government. 
 Expulsion: Seemingly absent. I found no evidence of Salvadoran expulsion of rebels into 
Mexico, and it seems unlikely given San Salvador’s general preference to keep its rebels in-
country. 
 Meddling with Overt Partiality: Seemingly absent. The Mexican government did meddle 
in the Salvadoran conflict, at least in the 1970s and perhaps the early 1980s, by “supporting” the 
leftist dissidents.199 However, this support does not seem to have been sufficiently tangible to 
qualify as “overt.” Mexico “provided” Salvadoran rebels “with a clandestine publications 
agency”200 and lent political support to Salvadoran insurgents living in Mexico City.201 But 
according to the primary and secondary sources I consulted, that is the extent of Mexican aid to 
Salvadoran leftists; there was little to no operational support for the revolution. (A Socialist 
International document from 1983 found in Belizean archives does allege Mexican training and 
logistical support for the FMLN, but no evidence is given for these claims.202) 
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 Median Predicted Probability of Civil War in Mexico, 1981-1996: 1.878% per year (high, 
well above the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, 
structural conditions for civil war appear present. The absence of state action may independently 
explain the lack of contagion in this case. 
Nonstate Factor of Return of Foreign Fighters from State A to State B: Present. James 
Stevenson writes of southern Mexico’s Zapatista insurgency in the 1990s, “It has been suggested 
[by Mexican officials] that the nucleus of the 2,000 well-drilled fighters was drawn from 
Mexicans who had fought as volunteers with Nicaragua’s Sandinistas and El Salvador’s left-
wing guerillas in … the 1980s.”203 
 Nonstate Factor of Refugees: Present. The UNHCR estimates there were 140,000 
Salvadoran refugees in Mexico in 1981, and 120,000 from 1982 to 1988.204 Another source 
estimates that there were as many as 250,000 Salvadoran refugees in Mexico during this time 
period.205 Though these numbers are massive, we must bear in mind that even 250,000 refugees 
would only have been about 0.3 percent of Mexico’s 1987 population.206 
El Salvador-Nicaragua 
 Evangelization: Impossible, because the rebels in El Salvador did not unseat the 
government. 
 Expulsion: Seemingly absent. I found no evidence of Salvadoran expulsion of rebels into 
Nicaragua, and it seems unlikely given San Salvador’s general preference to keep its rebels in-
country. 
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 Meddling with Overt Partiality: The Nicaraguan government was, of course, involved in 
the Salvadoran conflict, as discussed at length above. However, this better qualifies as 
evangelization than meddling because it came in the wake of a rebel victory in Nicaragua. 
 Median Predicted Probability of Civil War in Nicaragua, 1981-1996: 1.056% per year 
(low, roughly equivalent to the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of 
this proxy alone, structural conditions for civil war appear absent. 
Nonstate Mechanism of Refugees: Weakly present. The UNHCR estimates there were 
over 20,000 Salvadoran refugees in Nicaragua in 1981 and 1982 — about 0.6 percent of 
Nicaragua’s 1981 population207 — and over 16,000 refugees from 1983 to 1985.208 
El Salvador-Panama 
 Evangelization: Impossible, because the rebels in El Salvador did not unseat the 
government. 
 Expulsion: Seemingly absent. I found no evidence of Salvadoran expulsion of rebels into 
Panama, and it seems unlikely given San Salvador’s general preference to keep its rebels in-
country. 
 Meddling with Overt Partiality: Present, though to a limited degree. In 1981, U.S. 
Secretary of State Alexander Haig accused the Panamanian government of “funneling arms to 
the Salvadoran rebels” — Panama denied it.209 Haig was right, however; the Panamanian 
government under Omar Torrijos was a small-scale arms supplier to the Salvadoran rebels in the 
late 1970s. By 1980, however, the small Panamanian role was “supplanted” by Nicaragua.210 The 
limitations of scale and time in Panama’s meddling, and the sheer distance between Panama and 
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El Salvador, probably help explain why this meddling did not boomerang back to Panama in any 
discernible way. Perhaps more importantly, though, the quantitative proxy suggests that the 
structural conditions for civil war in Panama were absent. 
 Median Predicted Probability of Civil War in Panama, 1981-1996: 0.537% per year (low, 
below the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, 
structural conditions for civil war appear absent. 
 Nonstate Factor of Refugees: Weakly present. The UNHCR estimates there were 3,000 
Salvadoran refugees in Panama in 1980 — about 0.2 percent of Panama’s 1980 population211 — 
and around 1,000 thereafter.212 
Guatemala-El Salvador 
 Evangelization: Impossible, because the rebels in Guatemala did not unseat the 
government. 
 Expulsion: Seemingly absent. Some Guatemalan rebels did cross the border into El 
Salvador in late 1982, but as historian Greg Grandin narrates the event, some of these rebels hid 
in the mountains in Guatemala while others crossed into El Salvador.213 This suggests the leftists 
in Guatemala were not forced out of the country (if some chose to stay in-country and were able 
to do so). Also, the fact that the Guatemalan government sealed the border with El Salvador in 
January 1981, noted above, suggests that Guatemala did not want its rebels leaving their territory 
any more than El Salvador did. 
 Meddling with Overt Partiality: Seemingly absent. I found no evidence of Salvadoran 
involvement in the Guatemalan conflict — if Salvadoran forces worked to eliminate FMLN 
                                                 
211
 World Development Indicators. 
212
 UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database. 
213
 Greg Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2004), p. 130. 
260 
 
guerillas in Guatemala, as former UN envoy Alvaro de Soto suggested to me in an interview, 
then that would constitute Salvadoran involvement in the Salvadoran conflict. Likewise, any 
Salvadoran cooperation with Guatemalan authorities to neutralize the Guatemalan guerilla 
presence in El Salvador would constitute homeland defense on San Salvador’s part, not 
meddling.214  
Median Predicted Probability of Civil War in El Salvador, 1978-1996: 0.869% per year 
(low, below the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, 
structural conditions for civil war appear absent. 
Nonstate Factor of Rebels Helping Rebels: Possibly present. Grandin describes the 
movement of some Guatemalan leftists “to insurgent territory in El Salvador to regroup” in 
1982.215 This suggests that the Guatemalan leftists and the FMLN were cooperating, and that the 
FMLN gave some Guatemalan leftists safe haven while they were recuperating. 
Guatemala-Mexico 
 Evangelization: Impossible, because the rebels in Guatemala did not unseat the 
government. 
 Expulsion: Seemingly absent. Guatemalan leftists definitely fled Guatemala for Mexico; 
some “worked from Mexico City during the 1980s,” for example.216 However, they do not 
appear to have left because of a deliberate Guatemalan policy of expulsion. As noted above, the 
Guatemalan government was generally similar to the Salvadoran government in that it wanted its 
rebels inside the country rather than outside of it. According to a 1984 CIA report, “Various 
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sources indicate that [Guatemalan President] Mejia believes that the Guatemalan insurgents’ use 
of Mexican territory is a more important factor in their survival than Sandinista support.”217 This 
report suggests that the Guatemalan regime was frustrated by the insurgent presence in Mexico, 
and would have preferred to have had the rebels in-country. This view is supported by a Belizean 
government document from May 1982, which describes attempts by the Guatemalan government 
to cooperate with the Mexican Defense Ministry to keep the Guatemalan guerillas from crossing 
into Mexico.218 Furthermore, the ratio of Guatemalan refugees in Mexico to Guatemalan 
internally displaced persons — “at least 100,000 refugees” to “a further million” IDPs219 — 
suggests that the Guatemalan government did not deliberately try to force suspected rebels out of 
the country. (If they had, we would expect the reverse ratio.) 
 Meddling with Overt Partiality: Seemingly absent. Although “successive Mexican 
governments during the 1970s and 1980s … backed the [Guatemalan leftist group] URNG,”220 
this meddling does not seem to have been either overt or partial. The Mexican government had 
“an ambivalent and at times contradictory policy toward the Guatemalan conflict,” sometimes 
allowing the Guatemalan leftists to “use Mexican territory for political or even limited 
operational activities,” but at other times “support[ing] counterinsurgency operations launched 
by the Guatemalan army” and “maintain[ing] intensive surveillance [of leftist leaders] and 
conduct[ing] sporadic operations to detain, torture, and expel them.”221 Thus Mexican meddling 
was not truly partial. Furthermore, in a March 1982 cable the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, John 
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Gavin, “painted a picture of a policy of [Mexican] pragmatism, one which granted the 
[Guatemalan] left relative freedom to operate in the capital, but limited their activities to political 
agitation rather than operational.”222 Thus Mexican meddling was not that overt either. 
Median Predicted Probability of Civil War in Mexico, 1978-1996: 2.097% per year (high, 
well above the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, 
structural conditions for civil war appear present. The absence of state action may independently 
explain the lack of contagion in this case. 
Nonstate Factor of Rebels Inspiring Rebels: Present. Stevenson claims that the Zapatista 
rebels, while not directly supported by the URNG, were inspired by their tactics.223 
 Nonstate Factor of Refugees: Present. As noted above, about 100,000 refugees fled 
Guatemala for Mexico; other estimates put that figure as high as 300,000.224 While even the high 
estimate is only about 0.3 percent of Mexico’s 1994 population,225 the refugee flows into 
southern Mexico put significant strain on land resources there by contributing to a near-tripling 
of the indigenous population.226 These population pressures contributed to the outbreak of the 
Zapatista rebellion in Mexico,227 although this rebellion did not escalate to the intensity of a civil 
war. 
Guatemala-Nicaragua 
 Evangelization: Impossible, because the rebels in Guatemala did not unseat the 
government. 
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 Expulsion: Seemingly absent. I found no evidence of Guatemalan expulsion to 
Nicaragua,228 and it seems unlikely given the Guatemalan government’s general preference to 
keep its rebels in-country. 
 Meddling with Overt Partiality: Seemingly absent. The Nicaraguan civil war did not start 
because of any Nicaraguan involvement in Guatemala. Any Sandinista support for Guatemalan 
leftists would fit better under the rubric of Nicaraguan evangelization rather than Nicaraguan 
meddling, because it would have occurred in the wake of a rebel victory in Managua. (See the 
Nicaragua-Guatemala dyad below for a discussion of whether Nicaragua evangelized.) 
Median Predicted Probability of Civil War in Nicaragua, 1978-1996: 0.904% per year 
(low, below the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, 
structural conditions for civil war appear absent. 
Guatemala-Panama 
 Evangelization: Impossible, because the rebels in Guatemala did not unseat the 
government. 
 Expulsion: Seemingly absent. I found no evidence of Guatemalan expulsion to 
Panama,229 and it seems unlikely given the Guatemalan government’s general preference to keep 
its rebels in-country. 
 Meddling with Overt Partiality: Seemingly absent. I found no evidence of Panamanian 
involvement in the Guatemalan conflict. Furthermore, in his well-known study of Latin 
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American insurgencies, Timothy Wickham-Crowley claims that the Guatemalan guerillas had 
almost no external support (the possible FMLN support mentioned above notwithstanding).230 
Median Predicted Probability of Civil War in Panama, 1978-1996: 0.534% per year (low, 
below the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, 
structural conditions for civil war appear absent. 
Mexico-El Salvador 
 Evangelization: Impossible, because the rebels in Chiapas, Mexico did not unseat the 
government. 
 Expulsion: Seemingly absent. I found no evidence of Mexican expulsion in multiple 
secondary sources.231 
 Meddling with Overt Partiality: Seemingly absent. Salvadoran government involvement 
in the Chiapas conflict was never mentioned in the secondary sources consulted. In fact, in 
January 1994 the Zapatistas “stated that there was no foreign participation in or assistance to the 
EZLN [the Zapatistas] nor any connection to armed groups in Central America or elsewhere.”232 
Median Predicted Probability of Civil War in El Salvador, 1994-1996: 0.984% per year 
(low, below the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, 
structural conditions for civil war appear absent. 
Mexico-Guatemala 
 Evangelization: Impossible, because the rebels in Chiapas, Mexico did not unseat the 
government. 
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 Expulsion: Seemingly absent. I found no evidence of Mexican expulsion in multiple 
secondary sources (see the Mexico-El Salvador dyad for the list). 
 Meddling with Overt Partiality: Seemingly absent. Guatemalan government involvement 
in the Chiapas conflict was never mentioned in the secondary sources consulted, and as noted 
above, the Zapatistas themselves have denied foreign involvement. 
Median Predicted Probability of Civil War in Guatemala, 1994-1996: 0.924% per year 
(low, below the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, 
structural conditions for civil war appear absent. 
 Nonstate Factor of Refugees: Weakly present. According to Philip L. Russell, “Many 
Chiapans not involved in actual combat were affected by the rebellion. As many as 50,000 
people fled the war zone. … Some Mexicans took refuge in … Guatemala, reversing the 
direction of recent refugee flow.”233 This would only have been about 0.5 percent of Guatemala’s 
1994 population, however.234 
Mexico-Nicaragua 
 Evangelization: Impossible, because the rebels in Chiapas, Mexico did not unseat the 
government. 
 Expulsion: Seemingly absent. I found no evidence of Mexican expulsion in multiple 
secondary sources (see the Mexico-El Salvador dyad for the list). 
 Meddling with Overt Partiality: Seemingly absent. Nicaraguan government involvement 
in the Chiapas conflict was never mentioned in the secondary sources consulted, and as noted 
above, the Zapatistas themselves have denied foreign involvement. 
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Median Predicted Probability of Civil War in Nicaragua, 1994-1996: 1.191% per year 
(low, slightly above the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy 
alone, structural conditions for civil war appear absent. 
Mexico-Panama 
 Evangelization: Impossible, because the rebels in Chiapas, Mexico did not unseat the 
government. 
 Expulsion: Seemingly absent. I found no evidence of Mexican expulsion in multiple 
secondary sources (see the Mexico-El Salvador dyad for the list). 
 Meddling with Overt Partiality: Seemingly absent. Panamanian government involvement 
in the Chiapas conflict was never mentioned in the secondary sources consulted, and as noted 
above, the Zapatistas themselves have denied foreign involvement. 
Median Predicted Probability of Civil War in Panama, 1994-1996: 0.536% per year (low, 
below the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, 
structural conditions for civil war appear absent. 
Nicaragua-Guatemala 
 Evangelization: Seemingly absent. The Nicaraguan government was generally averse to 
attempts to export leftist revolution abroad, with the notable exception of El Salvador (where the 
leftists had supported the Sandinistas when they themselves were rebels). Nicaraguan support for 
other leftist movements in Central America is unmentioned in three prominent accounts of 
Nicaraguan foreign policy.235 In an interview, former UN envoy Alvaro de Soto also expressed 
doubts to me that the Nicaraguans were evangelizing to countries other than El Salvador. 
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“Did they actively … try to subvert or otherwise undermine their neighbors? That I would find 
somewhat surprising. … If they’d gone beyond [El Salvador], it would probably have been used 
by supporters of the likes of Alexander Haig … to increase aid to the armed forces in El 
Salvador. They weren’t ready to take on another front. It just doesn’t strike me as logical that 
they would do that.”236 
 
Indeed, the Sandinista government seemed genuinely concerned about avoiding the pariah status 
of Cuba, and tried to remain on friendly terms with the U.S. on many matters, including the 
Lebanon intervention and the Los Angeles Olympic Games.237 So instead of an evangelist 
foreign policy, Managua remained primarily defensively oriented toward the outside world. 
Reasoning that “the new Nicaragua could not expect favorable international opinion 
indefinitely,” the Sandinistas tried to match the strength of the other Central American militaries 
while investing in counterinsurgency capabilities for their own fight against the Contras.238 An 
offensive effort to spread revolution elsewhere was simply out of character for the Nicaraguan 
government, generally speaking. 
 Against all of this evidence, it has been alleged that the Sandinista government supported 
the Guatemalan guerillas specifically. The 1984 CIA report quoted above continues, 
“[Guatemalan President] Mejia is aware that the Sandinistas are providing material and training 
assistance to the Guatemalan insurgents, … [but] he and other Guatemalan leaders apparently do 
not view Managua’s support as critical to the guerillas.”239 In my judgment, claims of 
Nicaraguan assistance to the Guatemalan guerillas are inflated. They seem to go against 
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Nicaragua’s generally non-interventionist foreign policy, and it seems odd that they were not 
mentioned in historical accounts of Sandinista foreign policy. The U.S. government habitually 
exaggerated the Nicaraguan threat in the 1980s, so it would not surprise me to see the CIA claim 
evangelization that was not there. 
 Expulsion: Seemingly absent. As noted in the Honduras and Costa Rica case studies, the 
Nicaraguan government appears not to have had a policy of expulsion toward the Contras. 
Rather, like El Salvador and Guatemala, the Sandinistas appear to have preferred to keep their 
rebels in-country. In addition, I found no evidence of expelled Contras ending up in Guatemala. 
 Meddling with Overt Partiality: Seemingly absent. The Guatemalan government 
explicitly refused to get involved in the Nicaraguan conflict when pressed to do so by the U.S. 
and other states in the region, expressing concern “that the guerillas are under control and that a 
regionalization of the conflict would favor the development of the rebels.”240 
Median Predicted Probability of Civil War in Guatemala, 1978-1994: 0.926% per year 
(low, below the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, 
structural conditions for civil war appear absent. 
Nicaragua-Mexico 
 Evangelization: Seemingly absent. As discussed in the dyad above, there was no mention 
of Nicaraguan evangelization to anywhere besides El Salvador in several prominent accounts of 
Sandinista foreign policy. 
 Expulsion: Seemingly absent. As noted above, the Nicaraguan government appears not to 
have had a policy of expulsion toward the Contras. In addition, I found no evidence of expelled 
Contras ending up in Mexico. 
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 Meddling with Overt Partiality: Present. Along with Costa Rica and Panama, the 
Mexican government supplied the Sandinistas prior to 1979.241 Then, in 1981, the Mexicans 
agreed to give the Sandinista government $200 million in “aid,” in an attempt to “counter 
Reagan’s attempts to isolate Nicaragua.”242 It is not clear whether this aid went specifically 
toward the war against the Contras, but I suspect at least some of it did. So why, in the face of 
this meddling with overt partiality, did major violent conflict not spread to Mexico? For one 
thing, Mexico at the time was a one-party authoritarian state with a strong grip on power;243 this 
is not a favorable structural condition for the outbreak of a civil war. Also, the sheer distance 
between Nicaragua and Mexico probably lessened the probability of a boomeranging of conflict 
back to Mexico. 
Median Predicted Probability of Civil War in Mexico, 1978-1994: 2.198% per year (high, 
well above the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, 
structural conditions for civil war appear present. Since this is also a case where meddling with 
overt partiality occurred, the non-occurrence of contagion in this dyad is mysterious. I do think 
the aforementioned political stability of Mexico — its strong, one-party rule — contributed to 
Mexico’s peace in ways not captured by the Fearon/Laitin data. 
Nonstate Factor of Return of Foreign Fighters from State A to State B: Present. As 
discussed in the El Salvador-Mexico dyad above, some of the fighters in the Chiapas conflict had 
prior experience in the Nicaraguan civil war.244 
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Nicaragua-Panama 
 Evangelization: Seemingly absent. As discussed in the two dyads above, there was no 
mention of Nicaraguan evangelization to anywhere besides El Salvador in several prominent 
accounts of Sandinista foreign policy. 
 Expulsion: Seemingly absent. As noted above, the Nicaraguan government appears not to 
have had a policy of expulsion toward the Contras. In addition, I found no evidence of expelled 
Contras ending up in Panama. 
 Meddling with Overt Partiality: Present, to a limited degree. As noted in the Nicaragua-
Mexico dyad above, the Panamanian government was also a Sandinista supplier in the late 
1970s.245 But I found no evidence of Panamanian meddling continuing past the 1979 Sandinista 
victory. The limited extent of the Panamanian meddling probably explains the lack of 
boomeranging of conflict back to Panama to some degree. Perhaps more importantly, as noted 
below, the predicted probability data suggest that the structural factors for civil war were absent 
from Panama during this time period. 
Median Predicted Probability of Civil War in Panama, 1978-1994: 0.533% per year (low, 
below the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, 
structural conditions for civil war appear absent. 
Panama-El Salvador, Panama-Guatemala, Panama-Mexico, and Panama-Nicaragua 
 All three state actions go unmentioned in two major accounts of the 1989 attempted coup 
in Panama, as well as the UCDP/PRIO conflict synopsis of the attempted coup.246 Nicaragua did 
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support the Noriega regime militarily,247 but as far as I can tell did not get involved in this 
specific conflict. 
Median Predicted Probability of Civil War in El Salvador, 1989-1994: 0.415% per year 
(low, below the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, 
structural conditions for civil war appear absent. 
Median Predicted Probability of Civil War in Guatemala, 1989-1994: 0.958% per year 
(low, below the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, 
structural conditions for civil war appear absent. 
Median Predicted Probability of Civil War in Mexico, 1989-1994: 1.475% per year 
(medium, above the population median of 1.05% per year but not substantially so). Judging on 
the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for civil war appear to have been present, 
though only to a limited degree. 
Median Predicted Probability of Civil War in Nicaragua, 1989-1994: 1.716% per year 
(high, above the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, 
structural conditions for civil war appear present. The absence of state action may independently 
explain the lack of contagion in the Panama-Nicaragua dyad. 
Nonstate Factor of Drug Flows: Present. Panama — including, at times, the Panamanian 
government — played a major role in the Central American drug trade throughout this period. 
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Appendix 4.2: Statement from President Luis Alberto Monge 
 Luis Alberto Monge, the President of Costa Rica from 1982-1986, wished to provide the 
following statement in light of claims made in this chapter about his government’s support to the 
Nicaraguan Contras. The original text is in Spanish and the English translation is my own (with 
the aid of Google Translate). 
 “The people of Costa Rica were almost unanimous in their opposition to the despotism 
of the Somoza dynasty. Costa Rica was the leading country of political asylum for her 
persecuted. We were always in solidarity with those struggling for democracy. As an 
international leader of democratic unionism, I conducted a bitter campaign against the military 
dictatorship, which had brother countries. I could not visit those countries without risking my 
freedom and physical integrity. Among my friends are Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, Romulo 
Betancourt, Juan Bosch, prominent Nicaraguan opposition leaders and many other fighters 
against dictatorship. 
“During the process of the Sandinista war in my campaign for the 1982 elections, there 
was a Committee of Exiles with several friends of mine, among others Dr. Sergio Ramirez, who 
was Vice President under Daniel Ortega, later dissident of the party of Ortega, and now again in 
exile in Costa Rica. 
“I was very active in the Socialist International (also called the Second International). 
Among its leading figures was Willy Brandt. The first prominent Sandinista to come to a 
meeting of the Socialist International was the famous poet and priest Ernesto Cardenal. I took 
him and presented him to the audience at the SI meeting in Lisbon. (I do not remember if this 
was shortly before or after the Sandinista triumph.) Father Ernesto Cardenal has for several years 
been against Daniel Ortega. 
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“Our problems began when the first and long-term de facto ruler Daniel Ortega urged 
aggressive action against Costa Rica. Returning to the presidency after elections seriously 
questioned by the opposition, he resumed and deepened the attacks on Costa Rica. Even in 
October 2010 he militarily occupied Costa Rican territory. The case was raised in international 
forums, and decisions on the merits of the case are pending a ruling by the International Court of 
Justice in The Hague. 
“I remember that in those years the Communist International (called the Third 
International of Lenin) was still alive. It developed a worldwide campaign of disinformation and 
vilification against the Costa Rican democracy and its President. (‘We were a false democracy, 
we lied about being a country without an army, our President was a CIA agent and instrument of 
President Reagan,’ etc.) They hurt our image, especially through small left-wing groups 
embedded in friendly parties of Western Europe and the Nordic region. 
“I could not support any of the parties involved in a war. Since my election campaign, it 
was announced that I would formally and officially proclaim that Costa Rica was neutral to the 
conflicts within nations and between nations. I received pressures, internal and external, in 
opposite directions. On November 17, 1983, my government launched to the world the 
Proclamation of Neutrality of Costa Rica in the war. This unilateral declaration of peace to the 
world won the almost unanimous support of the Costa Rican people. It was also massively well-
received internationally by individuals and institutions from different religious and ideological 
positions. Among those supporters were the Sandinista Commandantes who governed Nicaragua. 
Political and military factors in Washington, D.C. never agreed with the Proclamation. The event 
took place in a formal session at the National Theater, attended by the presidents of the supreme 
powers, the diplomatic corps — prominent in our country — and, as a special guest, a 
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prestigious Swiss jurist specializing in the issue of neutrality.” 
 
Luis Alberto Monge 
September 2, 2011 
 
Original Text in Spanish: 
“El pueblo de Costa Rica era casi unánime en su oposición a la Dinastía Despótica de los 
Somoza.  Costa Rica fue el principal país de asilo político para sus perseguidos. Siempre fuimos 
solidarios con los que luchan por la democracia.  Como dirigente internacional del sindicalismo 
democrático, realicé una dura campaña contra las dictaduras militares que padecían países 
hermanos.  No podía visitar esos países sin riesgo para mi libertad y mi integridad física.  Entre 
mis amigos están Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, Rómulo Betancourt, Juan Bosch, destacados 
dirigentes de la oposición  nicaragüense y muchos otros luchadores contra las dictaduras.   
“Cuando  el proceso de la guerra sandinista en mi campaña electoral para las elecciones 
de 1982 existía un Comité de Exilados con varios amigos míos, entre otros, el Dr. Sergio 
Ramírez, quien fue Vicepresidente de Daniel Ortega, después  disidente del Partido de Ortega  y 
actualmente otra vez exilado en Costa Rica. 
“Estuve muy activo en la Internacional Socialista (llamada la  Segunda Internacional).  
Entre sus figuras más destacadas estaba Willy Brandt.  El primer destacado sandinista que llegó a 
una reunión de la Internacional Socialista fue el Sacerdote y poeta famoso Ernesto Cardenal.  Lo 
llevé y presenté al auditorio en la reunión de la IS en Lisboa.  (No recuerdo si fue poco antes o 
después del triunfo sandinista).  El Padre Ernesto Cardenal desde hace varios años está contra 
Daniel Ortega. 
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“Nuestras dificultades comenzaron cuando el primer y prolongado mandato de facto de 
Daniel Ortega impulsó  acciones agresivas contra Costa Rica.  Al volver a la Presidencia, 
después de unas elecciones muy cuestionadas por la oposición, reanudó  y profundizó las 
agresiones a Costa Rica.  Inclusive en octubre 2010 ocupó militarmente territorio costarricense. 
El caso debió elevarse a foros internacionales y las decisiones sobre el fondo del caso, están 
pendientes  de un fallo de la Corte Internacional de Justicia de La Haya. 
“Debo recordar que para esos años todavía estaba viva la Internacional Comunista.  
(llamada la Tercera Internacional de Lenin).  Desarrolló a nivel mundial una campaña de 
desinformación y desprestigio sobre la democracia costarricense y su Presidente.   (Falsa 
democracia; mentira que era un país sin ejército; su Presidente agente de la CIA e instrumento  
del Presidente Reagan, etc. etc. etc.).  Hicieron daño a nuestra imagen, sobre todo a través de 
pequeños grupos de extrema izquierda incrustados en partidos amigos de Europa Occidental y 
Nórdica. 
“No podía apoyar a ninguna de las partes involucradas en un conflicto bélico.  Desde la 
campaña electoral  anuncié que iba a proclamar formal y oficialmente que Costa Rica era neutral 
frente a los conflictos bélicos  al interior de las naciones y entre naciones.  Recibí presiones, 
internas y externas, en direcciones contrapuestas.  El 17 de noviembre 1983, se lanzó al mundo 
la Proclama de la Neutralidad de Costa Rica en los Conflictos Bélicos.  Esta declaración 
unilateral de paz al mundo entero, mereció el apoyo casi unánime del pueblo costarricense.  
También fue masivo en el ámbito internacional por parte de personalidades e instituciones de 
diferentes posiciones  ideológicas y religiosas.  Entre esos apoyos estuvo el de los Comandantes 
Sandinistas que gobernaban Nicaragua.  Factores políticos y militares de Washington DC., nunca 
estuvieron de acuerdo con la Proclama.  El acto se dio en sesión solemne en el Teatro Nacional, 
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con presencia de los Presidentes de los Supremos Poderes, el Cuerpo Diplomático destacado en 
nuestro país y como invitado especial un prestigioso jurista suizo, especializado en el tema de la 
neutralidad.” 
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Chapter 5: Testing the State Action Explanation in Southeast Asia, 
1959-1980 
 
 On June 25, 1952, President Harry Truman’s National Security Council issued NSC 
124/2, “Statement of Policy by the National Security Council on United States Objectives and 
Courses of Action with Respect to Southeast Asia.” Near the top of this document was a crucial 
justification for American involvement in this faraway region: 
“The loss of any of the countries of Southeast Asia to communist control … would have critical 
psychological, political, and economic consequences. In the absence of effective and timely 
counteraction, the loss of any single country would probably lead to relatively swift submission 
or an alignment with communism by the remaining countries of this group. Furthermore, an 
alignment with communism of the rest of Southeast Asia and India, and in the longer term, of the 
Middle East (with the probable exceptions of at least Pakistan and Turkey) would in all 
probability progressively follow. Such widespread alignment would endanger the stability and 
security of Europe.”1 
 
Although the administrations of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower differed substantially on 
foreign policy means and ends, this language from NSC 124/2 was duplicated almost verbatim in 
a document produced by the Eisenhower NSC (NSC 5405) on January 16, 1954: 
“Such is the interrelation of the countries of the area that effective counteraction would be 
immediately necessary to prevent the loss of any single country from leading to submission to or 
an alignment with communism by the remaining countries of Southeast Asia and Indonesia. 
Furthermore, in the event all of Southeast Asia falls under communism, an alignment with 
communism of India, and in the longer term, of the Middle East (with the probable exceptions of 
at least Pakistan and Turkey) could follow progressively. Such widespread alignment would 
seriously endanger the stability and security of Europe.”2 
 
                                                 
1
 Document available in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Volume XII: 
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2
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Roughly three months after that, on April 7, 1954, Eisenhower made a public statement 
justifying American involvement in Southeast Asia that forever memorialized the private 
rationalizations of NSC 124/2: 
“You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the 
last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could have the beginning of a 
disintegration that would have the most profound influences.”3 
 
 This “Domino Theory,” which is generally attributed to Eisenhower but which clearly 
originated in the prior administration, forms a crucial bulwark of the pro-intervention debate that 
makes substate conflict contagion an important phenomenon to understand today. The dependent 
variable is slightly different now — modern policymakers worry about the spread of conflict, 
whereas Truman, Eisenhower, and their contemporaries worried about the spread of rebel victory 
in communist conflict — but the underlying logic of intervention is the same: Pay the price of 
intervention now, or pay an even higher price later when conflict has spread further afield. And 
this theory, though it had its predecessors, experienced its proper birth in the context of debates 
over intervention in Southeast Asia during the Cold War. 
 The historical policy relevance of Southeast Asia is one of two reasons I chose to test the 
State Action Explanation on the region in this chapter. In short, it would be useful to know 
whether the Domino Theory, in its original neighborhood, was right or wrong. (In this way, I 
hope to add to the debate over the Domino Theory’s veracity discussed in Chapter 1.) The other 
reason Southeast Asia is a useful testing ground for the State Action Explanation is that unlike 
Central America, there were multiple positive cases of substate conflict contagion between 1959 
and 1980 — six, to be exact (see Figure 5.1). Meanwhile, there were also intriguing cases of 
non-contagion, just as there were in Central America. 
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Vol. 12, No. 2 (1987): 105-134, p. 105. 
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Figure 5.1. Map of Southeast Asia showing civil wars (uppercase X’s), the lower-intensity 
substate conflict in Malaysia (lowercase x), and the six cases of substate conflict contagion (the 
arrows).4 
— 
In this chapter, I seek to use the State Action Explanation to better understand the 
occurrence and non-occurrence of substate conflict contagion in Southeast Asia — North 
Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Burma (also known as 
Myanmar) — between 1959 and 1980. Some notes should first be made about both the 
geographic and the temporal scope. Geographically, Southeast Asia is a larger and less clearly 
defined region than Central America. To keep the regional case study manageable, I focused on 
continental Southeast Asia, where fears of contagion were most acute, excluding Indonesia,5 the 
Philippines, and Papua New Guinea. (Singapore, in which substate conflict is essentially 
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 Image source: http://www.phuket-guide.net. 
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 NSC 5405 does express concern about the spread of communism to Indonesia (see above), but I view this as an 
artifact of the Eisenhower administration’s covert intervention in the country during the 1950s. Later versions of the 
Domino Theory focused on continental Southeast Asia. 
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unimaginable, was also excluded.) I also decided to generally exclude the People’s Republic of 
China as a state actor in my analysis, in spite of its frequent role as an evangelizer of conflict, so 
that, as in Chapter 4, the within-region dynamics could be explicated more clearly. China’s role 
in individual contagion cases is discussed at length in Chapter 3. Temporally, I start in the year 
of the first case of contagion wholly contained within the region (not one involving China or 
India), and end five years after the conclusion of the Vietnam War and a string of communist 
rebel victories. 
 I find, first, that in at least four and possibly five out of the six substate conflict contagion 
cases, state action was both present and necessary for contagion. The ambiguous fifth case, 
South Vietnam to Laos, is discussed in detail below. In the sixth contagion case, Malaysia to 
Thailand, the nonstate factor of rebels helping rebels was apparently jointly sufficient with 
structural factors to cause contagion in the absence of state action. So not every contagion case in 
the region fits the State Action Explanation, but on the whole the explanation performs well 
among the positive cases. As for the non-cases, as in Central America, state action was fairly 
uncommon in the region. That being said, state action was more frequent than in Central 
America, and more often than not occurred without the result of contagion. This finding 
underscores the fact that these state actions are usually necessary but insufficient for contagion 
outcomes. Meanwhile, nonstate factors were present in the majority of directed dyads, and unlike 
Central America, structural factors for civil war onset in general were present (defined as a 
Fearon/Laitin predicted probability of 1.5% per year or greater) in about half of the directed 
dyads. The commonality of these nonstate and structural factors suggests their insufficiency for 
the rare occurrence of substate conflict contagion. 
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 This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I provide a brief synopsis of the six substate 
conflicts ongoing in Southeast Asia between 1959 and 1980. Second, I trace the evolution of the 
six identified cases of substate conflict contagion in the region, teasing out the role of state 
action, nonstate factors, and structural factors in each. Third, I discuss the two most prominent 
non-cases of contagion: the fact that conflict never spread from war-torn Burma, and the fact that 
conflict never spread to the meddlesome state of North Vietnam. In the conclusion, I summarize 
my findings, briefly discuss what these findings say about the Domino Theory, and preview the 
concluding chapter of this dissertation. Finally, in Appendix 5.1, I briefly discuss 19 other 
Southeast Asian cases of non-contagion. 
Southeast Asian Substate Conflicts 
 There were six substate conflicts in Southeast Asia between 1959 and 1980; five of them 
(all except Malaysia) escalated to full-scale civil wars during their duration. Official dates and 
intensities are drawn from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (version 4-2009).6 
 Burma is one of the rare states in the world that has had multiple civil wars raging 
simultaneously within its borders for decades. Major civil disturbances began with the rebellion 
of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) in 1948, and continued with the onset of ethnic 
separatist rebellion in 1949. Today there are approximately ten ideological and ethnic wars being 
fought in Burma, though many of them are now low-intensity. 
 In South Vietnam, a North Vietnam-backed communist insurgent group — the National 
Liberation Front, or FNL — began violently challenging the state in 1955. The conflict ended in 
rebel victory and unification with North Vietnam in 1975. 
 In Laos, an insurgency of the communist Pathet Lao (also backed by North Vietnam) 
began in 1959. The conflict ended in rebel victory in 1975. 
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 In Cambodia, an insurgency of the communist Khmer Rouge (only periodically backed 
by North Vietnam) began in 1967. A rebel victory in 1975 halted the conflict, but it resumed 
anew when the newly united Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978, toppling the Khmer Rouge 
regime and returning them to rebel group status. The conflict then continued until 1998, when a 
peace settlement concluded the fighting; by this point, the Khmer Rouge had more or less 
exhausted themselves. 
 In Thailand, a low-level insurgency of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) first 
surfaced in the 1960s, crossed the 25 battle-death threshold in 1974, and crossed the 1,000 battle-
death threshold in 1976. Due in large part to a loss of foreign support discussed below, by 1982 
the CPT had virtually been wiped out. 
 In Malaysia, an off-and-on conflict between involving the Communist Party of 
Malaya/Malaysia (CPM) first targeted the newly independent government of Malaysia in 1958, 
fizzled out in the early 1960s, briefly flared up again in 1974 and 1975, and then flared anew in 
1981. Due in part to an effective counterinsurgency program initiated by the British and 
continued by the indigenous Malaysian government, this conflict never reached the intensity of a 
civil war and never resulted in lasting gains by the communists. 
 With six substate conflicts and seven states in the region, there are 36 State A-State B 
dyads (six times six). As in Chapter 4, I plan to evaluate each of these dyads for its congruence 
with the State Action Explanation. 
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The State Action Explanation and the Six Cases of Substate Conflict Contagion in 
Southeast Asia 
 
South Vietnam to Laos, 1959 
Overview of the Civil War Onset in Laos 
 Since independence in 1949, the Royal Lao Government (RLG) had been plagued by 
resistance from the communist Pathet Lao (PL), which was supported by the North Vietnamese. 
In 1957, however, the low-level hostilities ceased and the leaders of the RLG and the PL — half-
brothers Prince Souvanna Phouma and Prince Souphanouvong, respectively — negotiated an 
agreement in which the RLG promised neutrality in the Cold War, and the PL promised to 
integrate its military units into the RLG army.7 
 For the first 12-18 months of neutrality, the RLG adhered closely to the agreement. A key 
fixture of this neutrality was Vientiane’s refusal to grant an embassy to either North or South 
Vietnam.8 However, the Eisenhower administration did not favor Laotian neutrality, and in 1958 
the Central Intelligence Agency helped to topple the RLG’s Prince Souvanna. Souvanna was 
replaced by Phoui Sananikone, a veteran politician (not the CIA’s first choice, although their 
man, Phoumi Nosavan, would come to power in 1960).9 Phoui took the RLG on a decisive turn 
to the right. He cracked down on PL activities at home and, perhaps more importantly, opened 
embassies with the Republic of China and the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) while 
continuing to deny embassies to the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam (North Vietnam).10 This blatant violation of the neutrality agreement, among other 
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actions, alarmed the North Vietnamese regime in Hanoi, which (justifiably) feared American 
backing of the Laotian regime. Nor was Hanoi’s alarm without teeth: “The trump card remaining 
in North Vietnam’s hand was the 1,500 Pathet Lao soldiers … still awaiting assignment to the 
national army.”11 
 In mid-May 1959, the RLG gave the PL an ultimatum: accept integration into the army 
on the RLG’s terms or the integration deal (and, hence, essentially all of the surviving elements 
of the 1957 agreement) was off. In response, on May 18-19, the Second Pathet Lao Battalion 
escaped from the camp where RLG Army guards were keeping them. The Second Pathet Lao 
Battalion was rapidly joined by the First Pathet Lao Battalion, both of which fled into the jungle 
and began preparations for a full-scale civil war.12 These preparations were heavily supported by 
the North Vietnamese regime, which, in addition to their “active encouragement” of the PL 
itself, deployed seven regiments or parts thereof to Laos to assist their communist compatriots.13 
North Vietnam apparently took these actions to “signal to the Royal Government its displeasure 
at the growing U.S. involvement in Laos.”14 
The Possible Occurrence of Laotian Meddling with Overt Partiality 
 On the one hand, the RLG clearly meddled in the South Vietnamese civil war by 
permitting the establishment of a South Vietnamese embassy in Vientiane and not permitting a 
North Vietnamese one. Phoui’s blatant violation of the 1957 neutrality agreement lent political 
support to the government side in the South Vietnamese conflict, and alarmed the chief sponsor 
of the South Vietnamese rebels. On the other hand, while this Laotian meddling was clearly 
“partial,” it does not meet our standard definition of “overt.” There is no evidence that the RLG 
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supported the South Vietnamese government militarily — nor, given the perpetual weakness of 
the Laotian state, would we expect such support. Laotian meddling appears to have been 
diplomatic only, and is therefore strictly excluded from the category of “meddling with overt 
partiality.”  
 That being said, the diplomatic meddling with partiality by Vientiane upset a delicate 
balance of interest between the RLG, the PL, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, China, and the U.S 
— a balance verbalized in the 1957 neutrality agreement. As a result of this upset, North 
Vietnam stepped up its support for the PL, which was probably the decisive factor in the onset of 
the Laotian civil war, as discussed below. Arguably this meddling, even though it did not involve 
the transfer of tangible assets (arms, training, territory, etc.) to Saigon, was sufficiently brazen in 
the context of an extraordinarily fragile diplomatic situation to be considered “overt” anyway. 
On this basis, I provisionally count this contagion case as one involving Laotian meddling with 
overt partiality, resulting in retaliation by a party (North Vietnam) to State A’s (South 
Vietnam’s) conflict. This coding seems consistent with the general narrative of how civil war in 
Laos broke out. 
 The other two state actions were absent from the South Vietnam to Laos dyad. 
Evangelization from South Vietnam was impossible, since the South Vietnamese rebels did not 
become state actors — a key precondition for evangelization — following their 1975 victory 
(rather, the south was united politically with the north).15 Meanwhile, I found no evidence of 
combatant expulsion from South Vietnam to Laos, and in fact found some isolated cases in 
                                                 
15
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which combatants either did not leave South Vietnam at all, or left South Vietnam of their own 
free will.16 
The Importance of (Possible) Laotian Meddling with Overt Partiality 
 As in the Salvadoran case discussed in Chapter 4, state action did not cause substate 
conflict contagion on its own. In the Laotian case, although I did not find evidence of any 
nonstate factors, the structural factors for civil war were strongly present. The predicted 
probability of civil war onset in Laos in 1959, according to the Fearon and Laitin data described 
in Chapter 3, was 3.06%, roughly three times the median worldwide annual probability of 
1.05%. Without a doubt, then, the population of Laos was primed for a major substate conflict, 
and the North Vietnamese role in the civil war onset cannot be viewed as sufficient on its own 
for contagion. 
 However, the strong presence of structural factors cannot fully explain why civil war 
began in Laos when it did. The predicted probability of civil war onset in Laos was also above 
3% in the years 1955-1958 (prior to 1955, data are not available); in 1955-1957, the probability 
exceeded 4%. In order to understand the escalation of violence in 1959 specifically, we need to 
understand the contribution of the North Vietnamese. The PL were apparently a ragtag bunch 
when they broke away from the RLG-guarded camps in May 1959: 
“The two PL battalions which were to have been integrated into the Royal Army had fled to 
North Vietnam only a few months before the [summer 1959 offensive] and would hardly have 
had time to regroup or prepare for such an offensive. … The summer of 1959 was probably the 
low point of PL military strengths.”17 
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Thus the North Vietnamese provided support to the PL when they needed it most. Grant Evans 
and Kevin Rowley write, “At critical times, such as the late 1950s, it is certain that the Pathet 
Lao base areas only survived because of Vietnamese support.”18 Based on this evidence, it 
appears that North Vietnamese aid to the PL — as well as direct military involvement in Laos — 
were necessary for the growth and sustainment of a rebel movement substantial enough to cause 
the onset of the Laotian civil war in 1959. In turn, as discussed above, North Vietnamese aid to 
the PL was rendered in retaliation for the RLG’s meddling with (possibly overt) partiality in the 
South Vietnamese civil war.19 On this basis, I consider meddling to have been necessary for this 
case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Civil War Necessity Criterion described in 
Chapter 3. 
South Vietnam to Cambodia, 1967 
Overview of the Civil War Onset in Cambodia 
 In 1964, Cambodia’s ruling Prince Sihanouk undertook an anti-leftist purge in Phnom 
Penh. This purge forced elites from the communist Khmer Rouge (KR) over the border into 
South Vietnam, where they sheltered with the South Vietnamese rebel National Liberation Front 
(FNL).20 Three years later, due in large part to their association with the FNL, the KR were 
strong enough to launch a full-scale rebellion against Sihanouk, resulting in a civil war onset in 
Cambodia in 1967. According to historian Arthur J. Dommen, “The fighting was intense because 
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the Khmer Rouge were equipped with modern weapons of all types, which had been supplied to 
them by the Vietnamese.”21 
The Occurrence of Cambodian Meddling with Overt Partiality 
 Although Cambodia’s Prince Sihanouk adhered diplomatically to a policy of neutrality 
during the early years of the Vietnam War, beginning in 1964 he covertly permitted Chinese 
military aid to the FNL in South Vietnam to pass through Sihanoukville in Cambodia.22 
According to an unauthorized biography of Sihanouk: 
“In acting as he did, Sihanouk believed he was recognizing the inevitability of a communist 
victory in South Vietnam. He also calculated, correctly, that many in the army’s officer corps 
would profit from his agreement with China and the Vietnamese communists, and that this 
would temper their concern at the rejection of American aid.”23 
 
Notably missing from this account is any indication that Sihanouk was forced to support the FNL 
by North Vietnam or the Chinese. Although his support to the FNL did neutralize the North 
Vietnamese “subversive or military threat for several years,”24 Sihanouk could have achieved 
this goal more effectively by continuing to accept U.S. military aid, which (as suggested above) 
he cut off in 1963.25 The military aid he received from the Soviets, China, and Czechoslovakia 
instead “was useful largely for parades.”26 Meanwhile, although Beijing did evangelize to 
Cambodia by supporting Pol Pot, the relationship between the Chinese Communist Party and the 
KR was ambivalent throughout most of the 1960s, intensifying only a few years after the arms 
shipments through Sihanoukville began (see the China to Cambodia, 1967 contagion case 
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discussion in Chapter 3). Thus, rather than being forced by the threat of leftist subversion from 
abroad, Sihanouk seemingly undertook this FNL aid program voluntarily, on the basis of 
domestic and regional political calculations. 
This is a clear (if long secret) case of Cambodian meddling with overt partiality in the 
South Vietnamese conflict. This meddling ultimately resulted in the empowerment of a rebel 
faction in Cambodia, the KR. Sihanouk’s support for the FNL substantially assisted in the FNL’s 
capacity to harbor the KR after the purge in Phnom Penh, and ultimately allowed the KR to 
regroup and start their insurgency against Sihanouk in 1967. 
 Other state actions, meanwhile, appear to have been absent. Evangelization from South 
Vietnam was impossible at the time, since the FNL had not won their victory in 1967. Expulsion 
is possible but unlikely, given that South Vietnamese troops conducted periodic “hot pursuit” 
operations into Cambodia while fighting FNL forces.27 As discussed at length in Chapter 4, these 
hot pursuit operations tend to be evidence of a lack of a State A expulsion policy. 
The Importance of Cambodian Meddling with Overt Partiality 
 Unlike Laos, the structural conditions for civil war were not strongly present in 
Cambodia in 1967; the predicted probability according to Fearon and Laitin was 0.94%, below 
the global median of 1.05%. There was certainly political discontent with Sihanouk in Cambodia 
at this time, but it would be difficult to characterize the state as teetering on the brink of a major 
conflict. As for nonstate factors, the factor of rebels helping rebels was certainly present — the 
FNL helping the KR, although this support seems to have been enabled in large part by 
Cambodian meddling (see below) — and there was also “a trickle of Khmer Krom refugees” 
from South Vietnam into Cambodia, some of whom eventually forged links to the KR.28 
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 In comparison to these rather weak structural and nonstate factors, the state action in this 
case of contagion stands out considerably more than usual as a significant causal factor. The 
discussion above indicates that the ties between the FNL and the KR were critical to the onset of 
the 1967 civil war in Cambodia, in that they provided the KR with the capacity to regroup from 
the 1964 purge and with modern weaponry. And these ties, in turn, were enabled by the secret 
Cambodian policy of support for the FNL. The Chinese aid to the FNL via Sihanoukville, 
facilitated by the Cambodian government, was substantial — “weapons for 50,000 soldiers” 
between 1965 and 1967.29 FNL capabilities, particularly vis-à-vis the harboring and supplying of 
KR dissidents, would have been significantly reduced without that aid. Therefore, I consider 
Cambodia’s meddling with overt partiality to have been necessary for this case of substate 
conflict contagion, according to the Civil War Necessity Criterion. 
South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Malaysia to Thailand, 1976 
Overview of the Civil War Onset in Thailand 
 The Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) originally formed in the 1920s, and had strong 
links to the Chinese Communist Party. Over the following decades, the CPT slowly shifted to a 
violence-based political program, but they were never able to inflict significant casualties until 
1974, when they crossed the 25 battle-death threshold according to the UCDP/PRIO Armed 
Conflict Dataset. Even at that point, casualty counts resulting from the CPT conflict with 
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Bangkok were small — 40 Thai battle deaths in 1974 and about 25 in 1975, according to the 
PRIO Battle Death Dataset (version 3.0).30 
 Then, in 1976, the intensity of the CPT conflict markedly increased. Battle deaths 
exceeded 500 in both 1976 and 1977, according to the PRIO Battle Death Dataset, and the 1,000 
battle-death threshold was crossed in 1976. A CSIS study shows a 47% increase in government 
casualties, a 48% increase in civilian casualties, and a 41% increase in CPT casualties between 
the period of October 1975 to September 1976 and the period of October 1976 and September 
1977.31 This increase in the conflict’s intensity was due in large part to an increase in the 
manpower and the capabilities of the CPT; from late 1976 to late 1977, CPT ranks “reportedly” 
grew from 8,000-9,000 to about 12,000 (a 41% increase if the middle of the range is used).32 
This increase in CPT capability, in turn, was due in part to a government crackdown which 
constituted the “abrupt termination” of “Thailand’s three-year experiment with popular 
democracy” in October 197633 — and also to increased foreign support of the CPT during the 
late 1970s, which is discussed at length below. 
The Occurrence of Laotian Evangelization and Thai Meddling with Overt Partiality in Laos 
 The government of Laos was taken over by the communist Pathet Lao (PL) in 1975. The 
Laotian communists, who had long supported the CPT — primarily with weapons and weapons 
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sourcing from China, as discussed below — continued their support while heading the 
government of the Laotian state, actions which clearly constituted evangelization.34 
 Meanwhile, the Thai government meddled with overt partiality in Laos from 1961 
onward, by assisting U.S. overt and covert military operations against the PL. By 1973 there 
were approximately 20,000 “volunteer” Thai troops fighting the communists in Laos.35 PL 
support for the CPT following the PL accession to state actor status may have been, in part, 
retaliation for this Thai meddling: “The Vientiane government’s only other bargaining chip was 
its provision of weapons and a base area to the [CPT]. Both governments could play the game of 
promoting insurgencies.”36 
 The final potential state action, expulsion from Laos to Thailand, was probably absent. 
About 2,500 Hmong (Laotian anti-communists) were evacuated by the U.S. from Laos to 
Thailand in 1975, but the PL government in Laos does not seem to have been particularly 
interested in pursuing an expulsion policy against these Hmong. Rather, a May 6, 1975 PL 
broadcast titled “The U.S.-Vang Pao [Hmong leader] Special Forces Must Be Completely 
Cleaned Up” averred that the Hmong must be “duly punished or wiped … out”37 — which 
sounds more like an annihilation policy than an expulsion policy. 
The Occurrence of Cambodian Evangelization (and Other, Limited State Actions) 
 Following the Khmer Rouge (KR) takeover of the Cambodian government in 1975, the 
KR supported the CPT by providing training to cadres, as well as “supplementary” assistance in 
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the form of both sanctuary and weapons.38 Since the KR was a state actor at the time and since 
the Cambodian civil war was on hiatus between 1975 and 1978 due to the KR victory, this is a 
clear case of Cambodian evangelization to Thailand. 
 Expulsion and meddling with overt partiality were also present in this dyad to a limited 
extent. During the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978, “The Vietnamese army raced the 
retreating remnants of the army of Democratic Kampuchea [the KR] to the Thai border. But once 
there, the guerilla war began as the Khmer dug in along the border.”39 It sounds as though the 
Vietnamese attempted to expel the KR from Cambodia to Thailand, but did not fully succeed. 
That being said, senior KR cadres did end up in Thailand (see the Thailand-Cambodia dyad 
below), so these Vietnamese attempts at expulsion were probably not a total failure either. 
Meanwhile, the Thai government supported the right-wing terrorist Free Khmers (Khmer Serei) 
in Cambodia, and may have assisted the pre-1975 Cambodian government in their fight against 
the KR (although it is more likely that the Thai special force deployments to Cambodia were 
directed against the South Vietnamese rebels).40 As far as I can tell, none of these instances of 
meddling were directly retaliated for or otherwise boomeranged back to Thailand. 
The Occurrence of Thai Meddling with Overt Partiality in South Vietnam 
 Thailand supported the American military intervention in South Vietnam by providing 
territory for an airbase.41 The North Vietnamese appear to have retaliated directly for this Thai 
meddling with overt partiality in the South Vietnamese conflict; “Vietnamese support for the 
Thai insurgents was used as a means of punishing Thailand for its cooperation with the United 
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States.”42 Specifically, Hanoi provided “substantial” stocks of weaponry to the CPT, making it 
second only to China as an external supplier of arms, helped transport those Chinese weapons 
into Thailand, and provided specialized training to CPT cadres.43 Meanwhile, the CPT used 
Bangkok’s support for the U.S. intervention in Vietnam as a rallying cry against the Thai 
government in the mid-1960s.44 No other state actions were identified in this dyad. 
The Importance of Laotian Evangelization, Cambodian Evangelization, and Thai Meddling in 
South Vietnam 
 
 Once again, we cannot claim that the state actions of Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand 
caused contagion to Thailand by themselves. As noted above, there were internal domestic 
reasons for the increase in CPT capability in the fall of 1976, namely a crackdown by Bangkok. 
In addition, the structural factors for civil war appear to have been strongly present in 1976 
Thailand; Fearon and Laitin lists the predicted probability of onset as 4.22% in that year, well 
above the global median. Numerous nonstate factors affected the onset of the Thai civil war as 
well. The support of the PL for the CPT prior to the PL takeover of Vientiane constituted the 
nonstate mechanism of rebels helping rebels. Weapons from neighboring conflicts poured into 
Bangkok, “the capital of the region’s burgeoning black market arms trade.”45 Refugees from 
conflict zones in Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam strained land resources in Thailand and 
also provided foot soldiers for CPT units.46 And drugs likely flowed from Laos into the teeming 
Bangkok black market.47 
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 As in the case of the Laotian civil war, however, foreign support for the CPT appears to 
have been the critical factor that pushed it from an irritant to a civil war combatant. By 1970, the 
CPT was no longer able to meet its weaponry and logistics needs through internal sources.48 The 
communist regimes in Laos, North Vietnam, and Cambodia gladly stepped in to fulfill these 
needs. From 1973, the PL — an evangelizing state actor in Laos from 1975 onward — was a 
major arms supplier and arms conduit for the CPT: “By 1975 it was apparent that the jungle 
force in north Thailand had access to as many weapons as it required from Laos.”49 North 
Vietnam was also a major source of arms and training for the CPT, although for the most part 
this support did not materialize until after Vietnamese unification in 1975: “Vietnam’s role as a 
source of supplies has been substantial but secondary [to that of China]. With the conclusion of 
the war, Vietnam had vast stockpiles of armaments on which the CPT could draw for its 
increasing requirements.”50 Cambodia under the KR, meanwhile, housed the CPT headquarters, 
was the base for more than half of CPT operations by 1978, and was a “supplemental” arms 
supplier as well.51 
 Perhaps the best evidence for the importance of this foreign support to the CPT is what 
happened when, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, ideological fissures and battlefield outcomes 
caused most of this support to be withdrawn. Internecine communist battles inside Cambodia 
between the Vietnamese regime and the KR “seriously disrupted” the CPT’s arms supply lines, 
“forcing the party to sharply restrict its activities, which had been expanding in 1977 and 1978.” 
This disruption in the supply chain, as well as the loss of sanctuaries in Cambodia due to the 
Vietnamese invasion, also led to “large-scale defections,” reducing the CPT’s strength from 
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12,000 to 10,000 in 1979 alone.52 The withdrawal of Laotian and Vietnamese support in the late 
1970s, in line with both regimes’ attempts to move away from internal armed struggle, also 
resulted in “a succession of military setbacks and mass defections — … [the CPT’s] role in the 
regional power struggle, and probably in Thai politics as well, is over.”53 The near-total collapse 
of the CPT in the wake of the withdrawal of foreign support speaks volumes about the necessity 
of that foreign support for the operations and cohesiveness of the Thai communists. 
 Based on this evidence, I consider Laotian, Cambodian, and Vietnamese state support to 
the CPT to have been necessary for the onset of the CPT civil war in Thailand in late 1976. 
Clearly each external sponsor played a vital role in the buildup of CPT capabilities. In turn, I 
have shown above that Laotian and Cambodian support were both largely the result of 
evangelization (and possibly Thai meddling in Laos), while Vietnamese support seems to have 
been the direct result of Thai meddling with overt partiality in the South Vietnamese civil war. 
Thus we have identified three cases of substate conflict contagion (Laos to Thailand, Cambodia 
to Thailand, and South Vietnam to Thailand) in which a state action was necessary for contagion, 
according in each case to the Civil War Necessity Criterion. 
The Exceptional Malaysia to Thailand Case of Contagion 
 Substate conflict also spread from Malaysia to Thailand in 1976, in that the rebel 
Communist Party of Malaya/Malaysia (CPM) and the CPT cooperated for decades in the jungles 
of southern Thailand, constituting the nonstate factor of rebels helping rebels.54 Meanwhile, the 
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role of the Laotian, Cambodian, and Vietnamese state actors described above was considerably 
more limited in the south,55 rendering CPM support quite significant. 
 As far as I can tell, the state actions of evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with 
overt partiality were absent from the Malaysia-Thailand dyad. Evangelization was impossible, 
since the CPM never even came close to winning their conflict in Malaysia. The coding for 
expulsion is more complicated. It is possible that CPM rebels originally set up bases in Thailand 
because of British or Malayan/Malaysian state expulsion; in the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
CPM cadres withdrew to Thailand following a series of military defeats at the hands of what was 
then the colonial Malay government.56 However, the pressure applied on the CPM by Kuala 
Lumpur does not constitute expulsion because there is not convincing evidence that Kuala 
Lumpur actually wanted CPM rebels to leave the country. In fact, in future decades the 
Malayan/Malaysian government joined Thai forces in pursuit of CPM cadres in Thailand, 
suggesting that the CPM presence in Thailand was just as vexing to Kuala Lumpur as the CPM 
presence in Malaya/Malaysia.57 This, in turn, suggests that Kuala Lumpur did not deliberately 
attempt to expel the CPM to Thailand — that in the eyes of the Malay government, no security 
problem was solved by the CPM’s departure from their own soil — and that the CPM withdrew 
to Thailand of their own free will.58 As for Thai meddling, I found no evidence of it other than 
the aforementioned efforts by Thailand to cooperate with Malaysia against CPM rebels on Thai 
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soil.59 These efforts constitute homeland defense rather than meddling with overt partiality, so 
long as Bangkok did not try to fight the CPM in Malaysia itself (which I have no evidence of). 
 This is a rare case, then, in which substate conflict contagion occurred in the absence of a 
state action. It is one of just 17 such cases in the entire universe of contagion cases (see Chapter 
3), and the only one identified in our in-depth regional studies of Central America (1978-1996) 
and Southeast Asia (1959-1980). So why did contagion occur here? The best explanation I can 
offer is that the strong presence of structural conditions for civil war in Thailand — recall the 
extraordinarily high predicted probability of 4.22% — combined with the presence of a long-
standing transnational rebel network to produce a contagion outcome. This suggests that when 
the conditions for contagion are so ripe, a state action may not be necessary to form a link 
between two conflicts. However, further investigation of such cases, with strong structural 
conditions and nonstate factors but no state action, is required. 
The State Action Explanation and Cases of Non-Contagion 
Why Conflict Never Spread From Burma 
 Burma has had approximately ten civil wars going on inside its borders, including the 
longest-running civil war on Earth (the war between the government and the Communist Party of 
Burma). These conflicts have resulted in the deaths of as many as 500,000 people in battle since 
1948.60 Given these facts alone, it is somewhat surprising that substate conflict never spread 
from Burma to any of the other Southeast Asian states between 1959 and 1980. Furthermore, 
there have been numerous nonstate factors present in Burma over the decades. The Communist 
Party of Burma (CPB), its ideology aside, supported right-wing guerilla movements against 
hostile leftist regimes in Laos, Cambodia, and (North) Vietnam, a clear case of rebels helping 
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rebels.61 The CPB also attempted to assist leftist rebels in Malaysia and Thailand, although they 
were mostly prevented from doing so, as discussed below.62 Meanwhile, illicit drugs flowed 
from revenue-seeking nonstate groups in Burma to markets in Laos, Thailand, and Malaysia;63 
arms flowed into Thailand, as mentioned above,64 and about 10,000 Burmese refugees fled to 
Thailand in the early 1960s.65 For the most part, structural factors were present in the potential 
receivers of contagion from Burma as well. In Thailand, Malaysia, North Vietnam, and Laos, the 
median predicted probability of civil war onset between 1959 and 1980 exceeded 1.8% 
(Thailand: 2.884%; Malaysia: 2.679%; North Vietnam: 2.06%; Laos: 1.808%). (However, I 
believe the North Vietnam figure is exaggerated, as discussed in the North Vietnam case study 
below.) Only South Vietnam and Cambodia had relatively low median probabilities of onset, at 
1.157% and 0.946%, respectively. 
 Given the duration and brutality of the Burmese civil wars, the number of nonstate links 
between Burma and neighboring states, and the strong general presence of the structural 
conditions for civil war in Burma’s neighbors, why did substate conflict never spread from 
Burma to other states in Southeast Asia? I believe the State Action Explanation is best positioned 
to help us understand this puzzling non-contagion outcome — because, with a few limited 
exceptions, state actions were absent from Burma. 
Evangelization: Impossible 
 Since none of the Burmese rebel groups have ever unseated the Burmese government, 
evangelization could not have occurred. 
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Expulsion: Generally Absent 
 In general, the Burmese government appears to have refrained from expelling combatants 
across borders into other Southeast Asian states. A prominent history of Burma does not mention 
any such incidents taking place between 1959 and 1980.66 The one exception I found to this 
general tendency is that in the late 1950s, the Burmese government played a role in the 
“pushing” of Chinese Nationalist (Kuomintang, or KMT) forces from Burma into Thailand.67 
These same KMT were in Burma because they had been expelled there by the Chinese People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA), as discussed in Chapter 3. However, journalist and area expert Bertil 
Lintner alleges that “the PLA formed the core of the force that drove the KMT out of the eastern 
border areas.”68 Thus, while expulsion did occur in the Burma to Thailand dyad, it was primarily 
led by China, not by Burma, and primarily concerned a combatant party to the Chinese civil war 
rather than to the Burmese conflicts. 
Meddling with Overt Partiality: Generally Absent 
 As with expulsion, meddling with overt partiality generally did not occur in Burma — 
that is to say, other Southeast Asian state governments generally did not interfere in the Burmese 
civil wars. (On whether Burma meddled in other conflicts, refer to those dyads discussed below 
in which Burma is State B.) Such occurrences of meddling again generally go unmentioned in a 
prominent history of Burma, and in a history of the Burmese conflicts specifically, Cambodia 
and Malaysia are barely mentioned at all.69 Meanwhile, although the rebel CPB and the 
governments of North Vietnam and Laos were theoretically all communist, support for the CPB 
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was highly unlikely to come from Hanoi or Vientiane. The CPB had remarkably poor relations 
with these two communist regimes, supporting rightist guerillas in those countries (see above) 
and even “exchang[ing] gunfire with Vietnamese and Laotian troops along the Mekong River” in 
the late 1970s.70 Given this antipathy, it seems fairly safe to assert that neither North Vietnam 
nor Laos meddled in the Burmese civil wars. 
 Again, however, we see an exception to this general tendency involving Thailand. In an 
effort to form a buffer zone between the core of the Thai homeland and the Burmese government 
and the Burmese CPB, both of whom Bangkok feared, the Thai government half-heartedly 
supported ethnic Burmese rebel groups such as the Karen and Shan, as well as the KMT. Such 
support generally involved looking the other way while these nonstate actors established 
sanctuaries along the Thai border and smuggled drugs into Thailand for revenue. Occasionally, 
Bangkok also helped these groups “procure munitions in Thailand,” although Lintner states that 
“no outside monetary assistance ever reached the rebels.”71 Such meddling by the Thai 
government was certainly overt — the provision of sanctuary qualifies as overt meddling — but 
is only dubiously partial, since Thailand was supporting one set of rebel groups in order to 
prevent another rebel group, the CPB, from penetrating Thailand and establishing a relationship 
with the Community Party of Thailand (CPT). In addition, Bangkok periodically withdrew their 
support for the Karen, Shan, and Nationalist Chinese rebels, instead rescinding their assurances 
of sanctuary and cooperating with Burmese security forces against these groups.72 This is, then, a 
fairly tenuous case of meddling with overt partiality. 
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Overall Assessment 
 In general, Burma did not evangelize, did not expel, and was not subject to meddling with 
overt partiality by the other Southeast Asian states. Some limited, tenuous exceptions to these 
tendencies are noted above. I believe this general lack of state action goes a long way toward 
explaining why substate conflict never spread from Burma to elsewhere in the region, especially 
since the abundance of nonstate and structural factors made contagion appear so likely. Just as 
the State Action Explanation predicts, in the general absence of evangelization, expulsion, or 
meddling with overt partiality, the natural obstacles to contagion seem to have overcome any 
effort by nonstate actors to spread conflict across Burma’s borders. We know, for example, that 
the Thai government was quite nervous about the potential for communist insurgency to spread 
to it, particularly in the wake of communist victories in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.73 
Bangkok thus took steps to fortify itself against the potential spread of communist rebellion. 
Interestingly, one step taken by the Thai government to fortify itself against the 
possibility of contagion was to meddle, albeit half-heartedly, in the Burmese ethnic civil wars, as 
described above. And, surprisingly, this gamble seems to have paid off. Burma expert Martin 
Smith credits the Bangkok-supported Karen, Shan, and KMT territorial holdings in eastern 
Burma and western Thailand with preventing the establishment of fuller links between the CPB 
and the CPT rebel groups — through the formation of a buffer zone, essentially.74 This suggests 
an interesting twist to the State Action Explanation: that if a state meddles in a multi-party civil 
war75 by supporting one rebel group against another (as best describes the Thai program), it may 
actually make contagion less rather than more likely. On the other hand, the Thai government 
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was clearly playing with fire. In Chapter 3, I related cases in which overt and partial meddling 
undertaken to prevent contagion ended up causing it (see, for example, Iraq to Iran, 1966). So, 
while meddling did seem to work in this case, it should not be expected to work more generally, 
and the conditions under which meddling does and does not backfire need to be more fully 
explored. 
Why Conflict Never Spread To North Vietnam 
If Burma is a puzzling non-sender of substate conflict across its borders, North Vietnam 
is a puzzling non-recipient of contagion. In other words, it is puzzling that the substate conflicts 
in South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Burma never spread to North 
Vietnam — in the form, perhaps, of a violent counterrevolution against the leftist regime. 
Certainly such a turn of events would have sat well with Saigon and Washington, and not 
surprisingly there were active efforts to encourage internal dissent in North Vietnam, discussed 
below. Yet in the end, no major violence occurred in the country, before, during, or after 
unification with the South. 
Like Burma, there were some nonstate links to other conflicts present in North Vietnam, 
though not to the same extent. The main links were the rebel networks between the Communist 
Party of Burma (CPB) and rightist guerillas (discussed in the Burma section above), and between 
the Khmer Rouge (KR) and disaffected minority groups in North Vietnam (discussed in the 
“meddling” section below). According to Fearon and Laitin, there were also ample structural 
conditions for a civil war onset in North Vietnam, with a median predicted probability of 2.06% 
per year — roughly double the global median of 1.05% — between 1959 and 1980. We will see 
below why I think this assessment of structural factors misreads the true political situation in 
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North Vietnam. But if we take the structural and nonstate indicators at face value, those two 
contagion factors were present. 
The question becomes, then, whether North Vietnam was ever on the receiving end of 
evangelization or expulsion from another Southeast Asian state, or was ever on the sending end 
of meddling with overt partiality. In the sections below, I will show that while evangelization 
and expulsion probably did not occur, North Vietnam was a profligate meddler in the 
contemporary ideological conflicts of the time period. Thus state actions, nonstate factors, and 
structural factors all appear to be present — and yet contagion never occurred. This mystery will 
be explored in more detail below. 
Evangelization: Absent 
 Evangelization could only have come from Laos or Cambodia, the two states where the 
rebels ultimately unseated the sitting governments in their substate conflicts (and did not 
immediately unify with North Vietnam). Evangelization from Laos to North Vietnam was highly 
unlikely, however, given the long-standing patron-client relationship between the governing 
Vietnamese Workers’ Party (VWP) in Hanoi and the governing Pathet Lao (PL) in Vientiane. As 
for Cambodia, between 1975 and 1978 the ruling KR did support efforts by dissident minority 
groups within now-united Vietnam to initiate a violent armed conflict. However, KR support for 
these dissidents is probably better viewed as retaliation for Vietnamese meddling with overt 
partiality than evangelization, and hence is discussed in the “meddling” section below. 
Expulsion: Probably Absent 
 There is no convincing evidence of expulsion from the other Southeast Asian states to 
North Vietnam. Laotian politicians did sometimes end up living in exile in North Vietnam, but 
seemingly of their own free will rather than because of a deliberate effort by Vientiane to remove 
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them from Laos.76 I found no evidence of expulsion from Burma (as discussed above), Thailand, 
or Malaysia either.77 The rebel National Liberation Front (FNL) may have been expelled from 
South Vietnam in 1970, given that they “retreated” into the North according to historian Arthur 
J. Dommen,78 but I located no additional information about this retreat, namely whether the FNL 
made a strategic and voluntary decision to retreat or whether they were forced to do so. 
Otherwise, combatant departures from South Vietnam appear to have been voluntary.79 As for 
Cambodia, in mid to late 1975 about 150,000 “destitute Vietnamese were pushed across the 
border” by the KR, “on suspicion of being a fifth column.”80 However, the validity of these 
suspicions on the part of the KR is unclear — the expelled Vietnamese may have been non-
combatants — and arguably the Cambodian civil war was not active during these months of 
1975 anyway. There are some weak potential cases of expulsion to North Vietnam, then, but 
none of them are terribly compelling. 
Meddling with Overt Partiality: Present in Four Cases 
 The North Vietnamese government meddled with overt partiality in four nearby substate 
conflicts: in South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Malaysia. Needless to say, in South Vietnam, 
the North Vietnamese government backed the insurgent FNL from 1959 to 1975.81 As above (see 
footnote 15), this counts as meddling rather than evangelization because the conflict won by Ho 
Chi Minh in 1954 was an “extrastate” (colonial) conflict with France, not an “intrastate” conflict, 
and is thus outside the scope of this dissertation. The South Vietnamese government, no doubt 
supported by the U.S., reciprocated by sending agents into North Vietnam to support disaffected 
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minority chiefs who at times attempted violence.82 But these efforts at counterrevolution went 
nowhere, for reasons discussed below. 
 North Vietnamese meddling in the Laotian civil war was similarly unambiguous; as 
discussed in the South Vietnam to Laos contagion case above, the North Vietnamese regime was 
the main patron of the Pathet Lao. This meddling significantly escalated in retaliation for Laotian 
meddling in South Vietnam (see the South Vietnam to Laos contagion case above), but 
originated prior to the events of 1958 and 1959. I found no evidence of any boomeranging of this 
meddling in Laos — no evidence that the Royal Lao Government attempted to retaliate for the 
meddling by supporting anti-regime elements in North Vietnam, no evidence that the Pathet Lao 
ever turned on the North Vietnamese (quite the contrary), and no evidence that North 
Vietnamese involvement in Laos spurred the North Vietnamese public to rebel against Hanoi. 
Given the profound weakness of the Lao state, it is somewhat less surprising that meddling in 
this case came without the usual negative consequences. 
 The North Vietnamese meddling in Cambodia also needs little introduction; Hanoi had 
bases and troops inside Cambodia from the 1960s onward, and invaded the country, ousted the 
Khmer Rouge (KR), and restarted the civil war in 1978.83 As in the South Vietnamese case, the 
KR seemingly tried to retaliate by supporting disaffected minority groups within North Vietnam, 
in this case by sending weapons to the Khmer Krom and the Front Uni pour la Lutte des Races 
Opprimés (FULRO).84 But, again, these efforts to sow major violence in North Vietnam failed to 
take hold. 
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 Hanoi engaged in meddling on a smaller scale in Malaysia. In his autobiography, the 
longtime leader of the Communist Party of Malaya/Malaysia (CPM), Chin Peng, claims that 
beginning in 1961, a small number (initially around ten) of “senior CPM cadres” were sent to 
Hanoi for specialized training. Chin also emphasizes the role of North Vietnamese pressure in 
convincing the CPM leadership to resume armed struggle in 1961 — reversing the CPM’s 
decision to abandon armed struggle in 1959.85 It appears that Malaysia began training and 
resupplying South Vietnamese security forces around the same time (beginning around 1959),86 
possibly in retaliation for this North Vietnamese meddling. 
 North Vietnam only refrained from meddling in Thailand and Burma. In Thailand, while 
Hanoi certainly supported the Communist Party of Thailand, this policy seems better viewed as 
retaliation for Thai meddling in the South Vietnamese civil war, as discussed above. As for 
Burma, the lack of evidence for Southeast Asian states’ meddling in that country was discussed 
in the Burma case study above. In brief, North Vietnamese antipathy toward the Communist 
Party of Burma renders an assistance relationship highly unlikely. 
Why Did Contagion Not Occur in North Vietnam? 
 We have seen, then, that North Vietnam seemingly possessed structural and nonstate 
factors favoring contagion, and that the North Vietnamese government meddled with overt 
partiality in four different contemporaneous substate conflicts. Most of this meddling did not 
come for free; seemingly it was retaliated for in all cases except the Laotian one, where the 
potential retaliating actor (the Laotian government) was probably too weak to resist. And yet 
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substate conflict never spread to North Vietnam, a clear puzzle even when we view the case 
through the lens of the State Action Explanation. 
 After researching this puzzling case in-depth, I believe this non-contagion outcome 
actually is consistent with the State Action Explanation, and that one of the indicators referred to 
thus far is inaccurate. In short, the presence of the structural factors for civil war onset in North 
Vietnam appears to be significantly overstated. Instead, there appear to be several structural 
factors favoring civil peace in North Vietnam that are not accounted for in the Fearon/Laitin 
statistical model. 
 Most prominently, North Vietnam was politically organized as a Marxist-Leninist police 
state. Therefore, despite its fairly low GDP per capita (a median of $1,043 in 1985 dollars 
between 1959 and 1980, according to the Fearon/Laitin dataset, compared to a global population 
median of $1,995), Hanoi’s state capacity — the variable proxied by GDP per capita in the 
Fearon and Laitin study87 — was considerably larger. First, because one of the Vietnamese 
Workers’ Party’s (VWP’s) first acts in power was to modify the tax code to capture a larger 
percentage of the income of small farmers, the state was able to appropriate a larger share of the 
GDP than the French had been able to do beforehand.88 Second, the basic political strategy of the 
VWP was to “colonize civil society” and thereby eliminate “all autonomous sources of power 
outside the state apparatus.”89 The VWP infiltrated local village governance to an extent never 
seen under the French, nor indeed since the 10th century.90 In its early years, the North 
Vietnamese Army (NVA) was made into a thoroughly political organization, with loyalty tests 
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for everyone from recruits to senior generals.91 This total “coup-proofing” eventually abated 
when conscription was introduced in April 1960, but by that point the NVA was so unabashedly 
communist that the conscripts were simply indoctrinated, strengthening “the links between army 
and people.”92 On the politico-religious dimension, the VWP infiltrated the Buddhist clerical 
leadership, putting a party member at the top and “develop[ing] a type of ‘National Buddhism’ 
patterned upon the ‘National Churches’ existing in the USSR and Eastern Europe.” Meanwhile, 
the minority Catholic Church was repressed.93 The VWP also thoroughly penetrated organized 
labor and the school system, introducing a “school police, composed of students” to the latter.94 
In short, by 1960, the VWP had so totally infiltrated all potential rival political institutions that 
there was nowhere for potential rebel elites to hide, let alone develop. 
 Simultaneously, when it came to less potentially threatening societal issues, the VWP 
vacillated between a remarkable degree of tolerance and the usual repression. Ethnic minorities 
such as the Thai were permitted to teach their children indigenous languages, and were spared 
from the land reform policies of the 1950s.95 While the Catholic Church was generally repressed 
and forbidden to participate in political activity, the authority of the Vatican over Catholic 
bishops “in internal church affairs” was acknowledged in 1955.96 These early policies of 
accommodation in the non-political sphere likely reduced the potential grievances of both ethnic 
minorities and Catholics. However, these policies were gradually reversed in the 1960s, when 
land reform was imposed on the minority highlanders, in combination with the resettlement of 
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ethnic Vietnamese from the lowlands into the highlands.97 When ethnic tensions broke out as a 
result, the VWP responded by attempting to further infiltrate local highland institutions, albeit 
with only partial success, and by increasing the presence of security forces in the region. These 
security forces repressed dissent, but also engaged in the “hearts and minds” counterinsurgency 
approach familiar today — building classrooms and “village clubs,” and assisting with thousands 
of childbirths.98 
 The combination of VWP omnipresence in North Vietnamese society and the limited 
accommodation of potential rebel populations in non-political spheres left potential rebel elites 
— a population already reduced by the mass exodus of Catholics and other potential dissidents 
across the southern border99 — either unwilling or unable to mobilize violent resistance on a 
significant scale. As historian Ken Post writes: 
“There was … no organized force to give articulation to protests and demands, only some artists 
and intellectuals whose contacts were outside the Party. … Such middle strata individuals had no 
links with the peasants or workers, merely some influence over students at the University of 
Hanoi and some secondary schools in the capital. The only potential mass support might … have 
come from the Catholics, but [they] lacked any overall leadership willing to give voice to general 
demands. … The Party leadership could bring into play its history as the rallier of all patriotic 
forces, its victory over the French, and not least of all its ability to use the state apparatus to 
control critics.”100 
 
The picture that emerges here is not one of a weak, impoverished state teetering on the brink of 
civil conflict, but rather a Marxist-Leninist police state which kept its elites isolated and its 
masses more or less content. And North Vietnam’s state capacity only increased as the American 
threat to the south intensified. Internal security efforts were stepped up in mid-1964, and the war 
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facilitated considerable unity within the Party itself.101 By the end of the war, North Vietnam had 
the third largest army in the world.102 Based on this evidence, I consider North Vietnam to have 
largely lacked the structural conditions for a civil war onset, the data of Fearon and Laitin 
notwithstanding. 
Overall Assessment 
 As a puzzling case of non-contagion, North Vietnam is doubly puzzling because state 
actions — largely meddling with overt partiality — were present and generally bore 
consequences, as were transnational rebel networks, as were structural factors according to 
Fearon and Laitin. I explain the outcome on the dependent variable here by taking issue with the 
last statement. In my judgment, the VWP’s thorough infiltration of political institutions and its 
isolation of potential rebel elites, combined with its selective accommodation of minority groups 
on non-political matters, rendered North Vietnam a state much less structurally prone to a civil 
war onset than the Fearon and Laitin data alone suggest. External actors certainly tried to start a 
civil war in North Vietnam, in part to retaliate for North Vietnamese meddling in their conflicts. 
They were just unable to lift such movements off the ground in a political environment so non-
conducive to mass mobilization against the state. 
Stepping away from this case, our discussion implies that we should be unlikely to see 
substate conflict contagion to highly repressive states (a modern-day example would be North 
Korea), even if those states have impoverished populations. More broadly, we have seen that the 
current measure of state capacity in the civil war literature writ large — GDP per capita — has 
significant limitations. As quantitative civil war scholars continue to improve on the seminal 
contribution of Fearon and Laitin, they should seek to develop more fine-grained measures of 
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state capacity, which take into account the tax code, in the first place, and also the ways in which 
the state in question uses its financial resources. 
Conclusion 
 In this final regional test of the State Action Explanation, I measured the occurrence of 
substate conflict contagion, state actions, nonstate factors, and structural factors in 36 State A-
State B directed dyads in Southeast Asia (1959-1980). (As in the Chapter 4, some of these dyads 
are covered explicitly in the appendix below, and some were subsumed into the broader, country-
specific case studies above.) Table 5.1 shows the dyads in which at least one state action was at 
least tentatively identified as present. There are at least 10 such dyads, and possibly as many as 
13 if ambiguous cases are counted. Thus, while state action still did not occur in the majority of 
dyads, it occurred more frequently than in Central America (where we saw state action in 8 of 35 
dyads). 
 In 5 of these 10-13 dyads in which state action was present, substate conflict contagion 
occurred, and was shown above to have been necessary for contagion according to the Civil War 
Necessity Criterion. In 2-6 other dyads, depending on how we code North Vietnam, a state action 
occurred in a state where the structural conditions for civil war onset were basically absent — 
thus the lack of structural conditions probably explains the lack of contagion. The State Action 
Explanation appears to be inconsistent with the outcome in the final 2 dyads — Burma-Thailand 
and South Vietnam-Malaysia — because in each, a state action is at least tentatively coded as 
present, structural conditions for civil war are coded as present, and yet there was no contagion. 
That being said, as discussed in the relevant section above, I am skeptical that the state actions of 
expulsion and meddling with overt partiality actually occurred in the Thai case. The Malaysian 
case needs further exploration, but the puzzling outcome in this dyad may be explained by 
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Table 5.1: Southeast Asian Directed Dyads with State Action Present 
State A State B State Action(s) 
Present 
Outcome and 
Comments 
South Vietnam North Vietnam Meddling with Overt 
Partiality and Possibly 
Expulsion 
No contagion; 
structural conditions 
for civil war 
(arguably) absent in 
North Vietnam 
South Vietnam Laos Possibly Meddling 
with Overt Partiality 
Contagion; may not 
be case of state action 
South Vietnam Cambodia Meddling with Overt 
Partiality 
Contagion 
South Vietnam Thailand Meddling with Overt 
Partiality 
Contagion 
South Vietnam Malaysia Meddling with Overt 
Partiality 
No contagion; 
structural conditions 
for civil war present 
in Malaysia; puzzling 
case that State A-State 
B distance may 
explain 
Laos North Vietnam Meddling with Overt 
Partiality 
No contagion; 
structural conditions 
for civil war 
(arguably) absent in 
North Vietnam 
Laos South Vietnam Possibly Meddling 
with Overt Partiality 
No contagion; 
structural conditions 
for (another) civil war 
absent in South 
Vietnam; may not be 
case of state action 
Laos Thailand Evangelization and 
Meddling with Overt 
Partiality 
Contagion 
Cambodia North Vietnam Meddling with Overt 
Partiality and Possibly 
Expulsion 
No contagion; 
structural conditions 
for civil war 
(arguably) absent in 
North Vietnam 
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State A State B State Action(s) 
Present 
Outcome and 
Comments 
Cambodia South Vietnam Meddling with Overt 
Partiality and Possible 
Expulsion 
No contagion; 
structural conditions 
for (another) civil war 
absent in South 
Vietnam 
Cambodia Thailand Evangelization, 
Expulsion, and 
Meddling with Overt 
Partiality 
Contagion 
Malaysia North Vietnam Meddling with Overt 
Partiality 
No contagion; 
structural conditions 
for civil war 
(arguably) absent in 
North Vietnam 
Burma Thailand Possibly Expulsion 
and Possibly 
Meddling with Overt 
Partiality 
No contagion; 
structural conditions 
for civil war present 
in Thailand; may not 
be case of state action 
— 
(1) the sheer distance between North and South Vietnam and Malaysia, (2) the associated 
dubious importance of Malaysia to Hanoi, and (3) the fact that the communist insurgency in 
Malaysia was already ongoing when Kuala Lumpur’s meddling in South Vietnam started. (See 
the relevant directed dyad in Appendix 5.1 below for further discussion.) 
 In the other 23 dyads explored in this chapter, where state actions were apparently absent, 
there was only 1 case of substate conflict contagion: Malaysia to Thailand, where the rebel 
network between the Communist Party of Malaysia and the Communist Party of Thailand was 
sufficient to spread the conflict across the border. If we count the South Vietnam to Laos 
contagion case as missing a state action, due to the dubious overtness of Laotian meddling, there 
were 2 cases in 24 dyads. Again, then, the supposition that at least one state action is usually a 
necessary, albeit insufficient, condition for substate conflict contagion is empirically supported. 
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In the absence of state action, contagion is quite rare; in the presence of state action, contagion 
often occurs (when it is not stopped by missing structural conditions), and state action tends to 
play a key role in the specific contagion events. 
 Interestingly, the analysis of Southeast Asia demonstrates more effectively than the 
analysis of Central America the importance of nonstate and structural factors to contagion. 
Nonstate factors were present in 21 of the 36 dyads, including 5 of the 6 cases of contagion (all 
except South Vietnam to Laos). Structural factors were “present” — which I define as a median 
predicted probability of civil war onset above 1.5% per year — in 21 dyads as well, or 15 if we 
subtract out the North Vietnamese dyads in which I believe the quantitative estimates of 
structural conditions are overstated. Again, structural factors were present in 5 of the 6 contagion 
cases (all except South Vietnam to Cambodia). So each set of factors — state action, nonstate 
factors, and structural factors — was present in 5 of the 6 contagion cases and absent from one 
exceptional case. This surprising symmetry underscores the argument made in Chapter 2, that 
state actions must combine with nonstate and structural factors in order to produce contagion 
outcomes. No one set of factors is sufficient on their own. 
 On the other hand, while the Southeast Asian findings underscore the non-sufficiency of 
state actions for contagion, they also underscore the empirical shortcomings of the conventional 
wisdom about substate conflict contagion. Nonstate factors were present in the majority of 
dyads, and structural factors were present in about half, yet contagion only occurred in six dyads 
(one-sixth of the total). Common events cannot explain rare events on their own. What the 
conventional wisdom is underemphasizing, I argue, is another set of factors — evangelization, 
expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality — which is less common than the nonstate and 
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structural factors, is also necessary but insufficient for contagion, and is more preventable by 
great power policymakers. 
 Having discussed the contemporary conventional wisdom about substate conflict 
contagion, it is now worth returning to one of the primary motivators for this chapter: the 
Domino Theory. Now that we have surveyed the empirical landscape of Cold War Southeast 
Asia from the perspective of the State Action Explanation, what can we say about whether the 
Domino Theory, in its original, 1950s incarnation, was right or wrong? At the risk of sounding 
thoroughly academic, I think the best answer is, (1) “We are talking about different things,” and 
(2) “It was right and wrong.” On the first point, recall from the introduction that policymaker 
fears in the 1950s concerned the spread of rebel victory in communist insurgencies, not the 
spread of substate conflict itself. My dissertation is about the spread of conflict, since that seems 
to be what primarily concerns policymakers today. So my work should not be considered a direct 
test of the Domino Theory. 
With that caveat, on the second point, the Domino Theory was right that evangelization 
— not called by that name at the time, of course — is a key mechanism by which violence 
spreads across borders. Laotian and Cambodian evangelization were both necessary for the onset 
of the ideological civil war in Thailand, constituting two of the six cases of substate conflict 
contagion in the region. But the Domino Theory was also wrong. First, the spread of substate 
conflict (let alone rebel victory) is not as automatic as Presidents Truman and Eisenhower — 
and, later, Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon — assumed. Indeed, a key lesson of the 
State Action Explanation in general is that the spread of violence is more difficult than 
policymakers tend to think. Conflict and rebel victory did spread in continental Southeast Asia, 
eliminating rightist regimes in Laos and Cambodia around the same time as in South Vietnam. 
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But the Indian and Middle Eastern dominoes never fell, as NSC 124/2 originally predicted. The 
structural factors for civil war were likely missing in some of these countries. Also, one of the 
main contributors to and encouragers of evangelization in Greater Asia, the People’s Republic of 
China, found itself both unable and unwilling to evangelize or further encourage evangelization 
in the 1970s, due to its rapprochement with Washington. 
Second, the Domino Theory was wrong in that it omitted two other state actions that can 
lead to the spread of substate conflict across borders. As a consequence, the Domino Theory 
implicitly assumed that military intervention in regions at risk of contagion would make 
contagion less likely. But the State Action Explanation suggests that when military interventions 
designed to curb one state action (evangelization) end up constituting another (meddling with 
overt partiality), they can actually make contagion more likely. We need look no further than 
Thailand for an example. The government of Thailand assisted the U.S. mission to contain 
communism in Indochina; in return, Indochinese communist regimes transformed the ideological 
insurgency in Thailand from a minor irritant into a major civil war combatant. Thus U.S. 
intervention probably created a case of substate conflict contagion — though not of rebel victory 
— where one would not have existed otherwise. 
In the concluding chapter of this dissertation, I will first summarize the argument and 
empirical findings, and then consider more fully the policy implications for great power 
intervention that have been touched on here. In situations like that of Cold War Indochina, where 
we know state action is present and the risk for contagion is substantial, I will argue for coercive 
diplomacy to disincentive evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality without 
constituting meddling itself. Then, I will close the dissertation with some thoughts on possible 
future research. 
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Appendix 5.1: Coding of Other Dyads 
 As in Chapter 4, 19 brief, dyad-specific “mini-case studies” follow below. The dyads are 
titled “State A-State B” — for example, in the “South Vietnam-Malaysia” dyad just below, 
South Vietnam is State A and Malaysia is State B. The value of the dependent variable for each 
of these 19 dyads is negative — there were no additional cases of substate conflict contagion in 
Southeast Asia between 1959 and 1980 — so there are no dyad-specific dependent variable 
codings below. Instead, I skip to coding the presence or absence of the three state actions, each 
of which is considered in turn. Next, I report the median predicted probability of civil war in 
State B between the year of the State A conflict onset (or 1959, whichever is later) and five years 
after the State A conflict termination (or 1980, whichever is earlier), again as a rough proxy for 
the presence of structural factors. Structural factors are considered to be “present” if this 
predicted probability is 1.5% per year or higher (rounding to the nearest tenth of a percentage 
point). Finally, I discuss the presence of any identified nonstate factors in the dyad. (Not every 
dyad has nonstate factors identified.) 
South Vietnam-Malaysia 
 Evangelization: Impossible, since the rebel victory in South Vietnam was immediately 
followed by state death and unification with North Vietnam. 
 Expulsion: No evidence found. 
 Meddling with Overt Partiality: Present. As noted in the North Vietnam section above, 
the Malaysian government supported the Republic of Vietnam militarily from around 1959 
onward. Malaysian meddling in South Vietnam may have been retaliation for North Vietnamese 
meddling in Malaysia (see above); or, North Vietnamese meddling in Malaysia may have been 
retaliation for Malaysian meddling in South Vietnam. The exact sequence of events is unclear. 
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 Median Predicted Probability of Civil War Onset in Malaysia, 1959-1980: 2.679% per 
year (high, well above the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this 
proxy alone, structural conditions for civil war appear present. On its face, then, this appears to 
be a surprising case of non-contagion that does not accord with the State Action Explanation, 
because both a state action and structural factors were present. On the other hand, the most likely 
carrier of any negative security consequences from Malaysia’s meddling, the Communist Party 
of Malaya/Malaysia (CPM), was already fighting a substate conflict with Kuala Lumpur when 
both the Malaysian and North Vietnamese meddling programs began, sometime during or after 
1959. In other words, North Vietnamese retaliation for Malaysian meddling in the form of 
support for the CPM, if North Vietnamese support for the CPM indeed was retaliation for 
Malaysian meddling, could have not started a communist insurgency, because one was already 
underway. Still, it is somewhat surprising that the Malaysian substate conflict involving the CPM 
never escalated to a full-scale civil war, given the ripe structural conditions and the presence of 
Malaysian meddling with overt partiality in a war involving one of the CPM’s natural allies. The 
sheer distance between Malaysia and North and South Vietnam, and the general focus of Hanoi 
on its closer neighbors, may explain this puzzling outcome better than anything else. 
South Vietnam-Burma 
 Evangelization: Impossible, since the rebel victory in South Vietnam was immediately 
followed by state death and unification with North Vietnam. 
 Expulsion: Goes unmentioned in a prominent Burmese historical account.103 
 Meddling with Overt Partiality: Unlikely, since both the pre- and post-1962 Burmese 
regimes adhered to a policy of neutrality in the region. The pre-1962 U Nu regime felt “antipathy 
toward communism and a fear of China. … But unlike Thailand, the Burmese leadership 
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believed that a ‘neutral’ foreign policy could ensure the country’s independence from foreign 
influence and Chinese domination.” Likewise, after the 1962 coup, the ruling General Ne Win 
feared both China and the U.S., and desired to keep the U.S. “at arm’s length.”104 “Even Ne 
Win’s sternest critics gave him credit for his determined and skillfully charted neutralism, 
[which] undoubtedly kept Burma, unlike Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia, from being dragged 
into the Vietnam War.”105 Given this firm neutralist posture, we would be surprised to see any 
Burmese meddling with overt partiality in the ideological substate conflicts of the rest of the 
region — and indeed, no such evidence is apparent from Michael W. Charney’s history of the 
country.106 
Median Predicted Probability of Civil War Onset in Burma, 1959-1980: 1.21% per year 
(medium-low, approximately the same as the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on 
the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for civil war appear more absent than present. 
Nonstate Factor of Arms: Present; both pro-government militias and the rebel Karen 
National Union were strengthened by “Vietnam-surplus” weapons after 1975.107 
Laos-South Vietnam 
 Evangelization: Impossible, since the rebel victory in Laos did not occur until November 
1975, seven months after the state death of South Vietnam. 
 Expulsion: Unlikely, given that the evidence we have of Laotian dissidents leaving Laos 
involves voluntary departures rather than ones forced by Vientiane.108 
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 Meddling with Overt Partiality: Possibly present. According to Dommen, in the early 
1960s “the South Vietnamese were in small numbers in the south [of Laos], doing what they 
could to interfere with DRV infiltration across the border.”109 This could be South Vietnamese 
meddling in the Laotian civil war, but it sounds like Saigon’s efforts were primarily directed 
against the National Liberation Front — a combatant in the South Vietnamese civil war — not 
the Pathet Lao. 
Median Predicted Probability of Civil War Onset in South Vietnam, 1959-1975: 1.157% 
per year (medium-low, approximately the same as the population median of 1.05% per year). 
Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for civil war appear more absent 
than present. 
Nonstate Factor of Drugs: Likely present, since “the generals in Vientiane … had the 
habit of commandeering C-47s to fly opium out of Laos to neighboring countries.”110 
Laos-Cambodia 
 Evangelization: Probably absent. The Khmer Rouge (KR), the natural ideological partner 
of the Pathet Lao (PL), had poor relations with Vientiane from at least 1979, rendering support 
from the PL to the KR unlikely.111 Furthermore, two accounts of post-1975 Laotian foreign 
policy do not mention any such evangelization.112 
 Expulsion: Unlikely since, as discussed in the dyad above, Laotian dissidents generally 
left the country voluntarily. 
 Meddling with Overt Partiality: No evidence found. 
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Median Predicted Probability of Civil War Onset in Cambodia, 1959-1980: 0.946% per 
year (low, below the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy 
alone, structural conditions for civil war appear absent. 
Nonstate Factor of Drugs: Likely present, since, as discussed in the dyad above, Laos was 
an illicit drug exporter. 
Laos-Malaysia 
 Evangelization: No evidence found in a prominent general account of Lao foreign 
policy.113 
 Expulsion: Unlikely since, as discussed in the two dyads above, Laotian dissidents 
generally left the country voluntarily. 
 Meddling with Overt Partiality: Probably absent, given that Malaysia was a leading 
proponent of neutrality in the region. In 1972, Malaysia convened and signed onto a regional 
neutralization agreement of ASEAN in Kuala Lumpur. 
“The committee defined a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality as one where ‘national identity, 
independence, and integrity of the individual States can be preserved and maintained.’ 
Furthermore, neutrality in the context of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration was taken to mean 
impartiality and refraining from involvement in … armed or any other conflict between powers 
outside the zone. … Malaysian leadership … has been anxious to get neutralization accepted by 
the Big Powers in order to ensure the stability and security of the region.”114 
 
Furthermore, an historical account of Malaysia does not mention any meddling in Laos or 
elsewhere.115 Malaysian meddling in South Vietnam (see South Vietnam-Malaysia, above) must, 
of course, be noted as an exception. 
Median Predicted Probability of Civil War Onset in Malaysia, 1959-1980: 2.679% per 
year (high, well above the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this 
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proxy alone, structural conditions for civil war appear present, meaning they were insufficient in 
this case for contagion to occur. 
Nonstate Factor of Refugees: Present. Refugees flowed from Vietnam, Laos, and 
Cambodia into Malaysia between 1978 and 1980, a development which Kuala Lumpur 
“perceived … to be a significant threat to their internal social and political stability.”116 
Laos-Burma 
 Evangelization: Unlikely, given the poor relations between the Pathet Lao and the 
Communist Party of Burma (see the discussion in the Burma case study above). 
 Expulsion: Unlikely since, as discussed in the three dyads above, Laotian dissidents 
generally left the country voluntarily. There is also no evidence of expulsion from Laos to Burma 
in a prominent history of Burma.117 
 Meddling with Overt Partiality: Unlikely, given Burma’s consistent neutralist stance (see 
the South Vietnam-Burma dyad) and the lack of evidence for Burmese meddling in Laos in 
Charney’s historical account.118 
Median Predicted Probability of Civil War Onset in Burma, 1959-1980: 1.21% per year 
(medium-low, approximately the same as the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on 
the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for civil war appear more absent than present. 
Nonstate Factor of Arms: Present; in the late 1960s, ethnically Wa warlords “built up 
their own private armies and purchased with opium money all the military equipment available 
on the black market in Thailand and Laos.”119 Likewise, “in the late 1970s, most of the [Karen 
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rebel group] KNLA’s arms were described as ‘Vietnam surplus’ (sometimes ‘Laotian’ or 
‘Thai’).”120 
Nonstate Factor of Return of Foreign Fighters from State A to State B: Possibly present. 
Ethnically Shan mercenaries from Burma fought on the side of the rightist government in Laos in 
the mid-1960s.121 Though I do not have concrete evidence, I imagine many if not most of these 
Shan returned to Burma, where their combat experience likely augmented the Shan insurgency 
(although this nonstate factor may only have operated after the Shan insurgency onset in 1959). 
Cambodia-South Vietnam 
 Evangelization: Essentially impossible, since the Khmer Rouge takeover of Cambodia on 
April 17, 1975 came only about two weeks before the state death of South Vietnam on April 30. 
 Expulsion: Possibly present. Dommen briefly refers to a 1970 incident in which 
Vietnamese nationals were expelled across the border, and to a similar incident in 1975.122 I do 
not have information on whether the individuals expelled were combatants, however. 
 Meddling with Overt Partiality: Present. In the late spring of 1970, 19,000 South 
Vietnamese troops entered Cambodia to fight the communists, which were at this point led by 
the deposed Sihanouk.123 The Cambodian government does not seem to have retaliated for this 
meddling directly; of course, by this point the Cambodian state was years into its secret support 
program for the National Liberation Front (see above), so the most logical means of Cambodian 
retaliation may already have been employed. 
Median Predicted Probability of Civil War Onset in South Vietnam, 1967-1975: 1.112% 
per year (medium-low, approximately the same as the population median of 1.05% per year). 
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Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for (another) civil war onset appear 
more absent than present. This relative lack of the structural conditions for civil war may explain 
why the presence of one or two state actions in this dyad failed to result in contagion. 
Nonstate Factor of Refugees: Present. About 300,000 Cambodian refugees fled to South 
Vietnam in the aftermath of the 1978 Vietnamese invasion, as the atrocities inflicted by the 
Khmer Rouge regime (1975-1978) became more widely known.124 
Nonstate Factor of Rebels Helping Rebels: Possibly present. In 1970, Sihanouk — who 
was a rebel leader rather than a state actor at this point — planned “coordination with the fronts 
in Vietnam and Laos.”125 However, it is not clear whether this coordination ever materialized, 
and it would be well after the civil war onset in South Vietnam in any case. 
Cambodia-Laos 
 Evangelization: Seemingly absent. Several accounts of Cambodian foreign policy during 
the Khmer Rouge regime (1975-1978) do not mention any attempts by the KR to sow further 
conflict in Laos.126 
 Expulsion: No evidence found. 
 Meddling with Overt Partiality: No evidence found. 
Median Predicted Probability of Civil War Onset in Laos, 1967-1980: 1.754% per year 
(fairly high, above the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy 
alone, structural conditions for civil war appear present, meaning they were insufficient in this 
case for contagion to occur. 
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Nonstate Factor of Refugees: Present. Brao refugees fled from Cambodia to Laos in 
1968, and refugees also fled to Laos from the ascending Khmer Rouge, beginning in 1974.127  
 Nonstate Factor of Rebels Helping Rebels: Present. Sihanouk may have supported Lao 
rebels while he was a nonstate actor (see the dyad above), and “the revival of the [Lao] southern 
resistance in 1980 was … largely a result of the support they got from the Khmer Rouges.”128 
The latter support may constitute a case of low-intensity substate conflict contagion from 
Cambodia to Laos, since the anti-Pathet Lao resistance eventually caused about 75 battle deaths 
in 1989 and 1990.129 However, the nearly nine-year delay between the Khmer Rouge support and 
the onset of low-intensity conflict in Laos suggests that the contagion case is weak (accordingly, 
it is not counted in Chapter 3), and in any event this case is outside the temporal scope of this 
chapter. 
Cambodia-Malaysia 
 Evangelization: Highly unlikely, given that the Communist Party of Malaysia was 
virtually defunct when the Khmer Rouge took over Cambodia in 1975. 
 Expulsion: No evidence found. 
 Meddling with Overt Partiality: Probably absent, given that Malaysia was a leading 
proponent of neutrality in the region, and since historical accounts of Malaysia do not mention 
any such meddling besides the involvement in South Vietnam (see the Laos-Malaysia dyad 
above for more detail). 
Median Predicted Probability of Civil War Onset in Malaysia, 1967-1980: 2.849% per 
year (high, well above the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this 
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proxy alone, structural conditions for civil war appear present, meaning they were insufficient in 
this case for contagion to occur. 
 Nonstate Factor of Refugees: Present. Like Thailand, Malaysia received refugees from 
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia that it deemed “a significant threat to their internal social and 
political stability.”130 
Cambodia-Burma 
 Evangelization: Unmentioned in two prominent histories of Burma.131 
 Expulsion: Unmentioned in two prominent histories of Burma.132 
 Meddling with Overt Partiality: Unlikely, given Burma’s strict adherence to a neutrality 
policy (see the South Vietnam-Burma dyad for evidence). 
Median Predicted Probability of Civil War Onset in Burma, 1967-1980: 1.194% per year 
(medium-low, approximately the same as the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on 
the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for (another) civil war onset appear more 
absent than present. 
Thailand-South Vietnam 
 Evangelization: Impossible, since the Communist Party of Thailand never unseated the 
sitting government in Bangkok. 
 Expulsion: No evidence found. (South Vietnam was near state death as the Thai civil war 
escalated anyway.) 
 Meddling with Overt Partiality: No evidence found. (South Vietnam was near state death 
as the Thai civil war escalated anyway.) 
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Median Probability of Civil War Onset in South Vietnam, 1974-1975: 1.106% per year 
(medium-low, approximately the same as the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on 
the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for (another) civil war onset appear more 
absent than present. 
Thailand-Laos 
 Evangelization: Impossible, since the Communist Party of Thailand never unseated the 
sitting government in Bangkok. 
 Expulsion: No evidence found. 
 Meddling with Overt Partiality: Seemingly absent. I found no evidence of Laotian 
meddling in Thailand prior to 1975, and such meddling seems unlikely given Bangkok’s military 
support for the pre-1975 right-wing regime in Vientiane. Post-1975, the Pathet Lao’s 
involvement in Thailand more closely fits “evangelization” than “meddling,” because it followed 
from a violent regime change. (See the Laos to Thailand contagion case above for more detail on 
both pre- and post-1975.) 
Median Probability of Civil War Onset in Laos, 1974-1980: 1.722% per year (fairly high, 
above the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, 
structural conditions for civil war appear present, meaning they were insufficient in this case for 
contagion to occur. 
Thailand-Cambodia 
 Evangelization: Impossible, since the Communist Party of Thailand never unseated the 
sitting government in Bangkok. 
 Expulsion: Seemingly absent. In the spring of 1980, Thailand had a policy of 
“repatriating” Cambodian rebels. “Specifically, Colonel Lim and the senior Khmer Rouge 
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leaders at Sa Kaeo were secretly trucked back to the border at night.”133 This certainly sounds 
like expulsion, but it involved the expulsion of State B combatants back to State B, rather than 
the expulsion of State A combatants that is required for this mechanism. No evidence for any 
such expulsion of Thai combatants to Cambodia was found. 
 Meddling with Overt Partiality: Seemingly absent. I found no evidence of Cambodian 
meddling in Thailand prior to 1975. Post-1975, the Khmer Rouge’s involvement in Thailand 
more closely fits “evangelization” than “meddling,” because it followed from a violent regime 
change. (See the Cambodia to Thailand contagion case above.) 
Median Probability of Civil War Onset in Cambodia, 1974-1980: 1.202% per year 
(medium-low, approximately the same as the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on 
the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for (another) civil war onset appear more 
absent than present. 
Thailand-Malaysia 
 Evangelization: Impossible, since the Communist Party of Thailand never unseated the 
sitting government in Bangkok. 
 Expulsion: No evidence found. In fact, southern Thailand was a hotbed for communist 
rebels from both sides of the border (see the Malaysia to Thailand contagion case), suggesting 
that Thailand was either unwilling or unable to move combatants across their frontier with 
Malaysia. 
 Meddling with Overt Partiality: Probably absent, given that Malaysia was a leading 
proponent of neutrality in the region, and since historical accounts of Malaysia do not mention 
any such meddling besides the involvement in South Vietnam (see the Laos-Malaysia dyad 
above for more detail). 
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Median Probability of Civil War Onset in Malaysia, 1974-1980: 2.841% per year (high, 
well above the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, 
structural conditions for civil war appear present, meaning they were insufficient in this case for 
contagion to occur. 
Thailand-Burma 
 Evangelization: Impossible, since the Communist Party of Thailand never unseated the 
sitting government in Bangkok. 
 Expulsion: Unmentioned in Charney’s history of Burma.134 
Meddling with Overt Partiality: Unlikely, given Burma’s strict adherence to a neutrality 
policy (see the South Vietnam-Burma dyad for evidence). 
Median Probability of Civil War Onset in Burma, 1974-1980: 1.21% (medium-low, 
approximately the same as the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this 
proxy alone, structural conditions for (another) civil war onset appear more absent than present. 
 Nonstate Factor of Arms: Present. As mentioned in the Laos-Burma dyad, both Wa 
warlords and Karen rebels got arms from the Thai black market.135 
 Nonstate Factor of Rebels Helping Rebels: Present, but post-onset in Burma. The 
Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) managed to assist, supply, and influence both communist 
and ethnic Karenni rebels in Burma during the 1970s. This assistance came well after the onsets 
of both the Communist Party of Burma and the Karenni substate conflicts, although the CPT may 
have encouraged a breakaway Karenni faction — the Karenni State Nationalities Liberation 
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Front (KSNLF) — to separate itself from the mainstream Karenni National Progressive Party 
(KNPP).136 
Nonstate Factor of Return of Foreign Fighters from State A to State B: Possibly present. 
Ethnic minority mercenaries from Burma fought on the side of the rightist government in 
Thailand.137 Though I do not have concrete evidence, I imagine many if not most of these 
minorities returned to Burma, where their combat experience likely augmented the insurgencies 
there (although this nonstate factor may only have operated after the onsets of these 
insurgencies, given that the Thai substate conflict did not start until 1974). 
Malaysia-South Vietnam 
 Evangelization: Impossible, since the Communist Party of Malaysia never unseated the 
sitting government in Kuala Lumpur. 
 Expulsion: No evidence of Malaysian expulsion in general in two historical accounts.138 
 Meddling with Overt Partiality: No evidence found; the Malaysian government supported 
the South Vietnamese military in its counterinsurgency (see the South Vietnam-Malaysia dyad), 
but I found no indication that this support was reciprocated by Saigon. 
 Median Probability of Civil War Onset in South Vietnam, 1959-1975: 1.157% (medium-
low, approximately the same as the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis 
of this proxy alone, structural conditions for (another) civil war onset appear more absent than 
present. 
Malaysia-Laos 
 Evangelization: Impossible, since the Communist Party of Malaysia never unseated the 
sitting government in Kuala Lumpur. 
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 Expulsion: No evidence of Malaysian expulsion in general in two historical accounts (see 
the dyad above for sources). 
 Meddling with Overt Partiality: No evidence found. 
Median Probability of Civil War Onset in Laos, 1959-1980: 1.808% (high, above the 
population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, structural 
conditions for civil war appear present, meaning they were insufficient in this case for contagion 
to occur. 
Malaysia-Cambodia 
 Evangelization: Impossible, since the Communist Party of Malaysia never unseated the 
sitting government in Kuala Lumpur. 
 Expulsion: No evidence of Malaysian expulsion in general in two historical accounts (see 
the Malaysia-South Vietnam dyad for sources). 
 Meddling with Overt Partiality: No evidence found. The Khmer Rouge (KR) is unlikely 
to have supported the Communist Party of Malaysia (CPM) after the KR’s ascent to power, 
given that the CPM was virtually defunct by then. 
 Median Probability of Civil War Onset in Cambodia, 1959-1980: 0.946% (low, below the 
population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, structural 
conditions for (another) civil war onset appear absent. 
Malaysia-Burma 
 Evangelization: Impossible, since the Communist Party of Malaysia never unseated the 
sitting government in Kuala Lumpur. 
 Expulsion: No evidence of Malaysian expulsion in general in two historical accounts (see 
the Malaysia-South Vietnam dyad for sources). 
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 Meddling with Overt Partiality: Unlikely, given Burma’s strict adherence to a neutrality 
policy (see the South Vietnam-Burma dyad for evidence). 
 Median Probability of Civil War Onset in Burma, 1959-1980: 1.21% (medium-low, 
approximately the same as the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this 
proxy alone, structural conditions for (another) civil war onset appear more absent than present. 
 Nonstate Factor of Rebels Inspiring Rebels: Present, though pre-1959. Communist Party 
of Burma (CPB) cadres met with Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) leader Chin Peng 
sometime during the late 1940s and early 1950s. I found no evidence of material CPM support 
for the CPB, but it is reasonable to assume, given these contacts, that the CPM provided some 
inspiration for the CPB’s armed struggle.139 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion, Policy Implications, and Next Steps 
 
 In this dissertation, I have built and tested an explanation for why violent civil conflicts 
spread across borders. More specifically, I have sought to understand the conditions under which 
a “substate conflict” — an armed conflict between a state and militarized rebels that has caused 
at least 25 cumulative battle-related deaths — makes a causal contribution to the onset of a 
“civil war” — an armed conflict between a state and militarized rebels that has caused at least 
1,000 cumulative battle-related deaths — in another state. My State Action Explanation is that 
contrary to current views of this mysterious and policy-relevant phenomenon, nonstate actor-
driven factors such as transnational rebel networks and structural factors for civil war such as 
poverty in the potential receiving state are insufficient to move conflict across borders on their 
own. This is because there are significant natural obstacles to “substate conflict contagion,” 
namely (1) the challenge of rebel mobilization in nascent substate conflicts, (2) the reverse 
demonstration effect, under which potential rebel elites are horrified rather than inspired by 
nearby conflicts, (3) the ability of states to fortify themselves against the spread of conflict, and 
(4) the challenge of escalation from minor conflict to full-scale civil war. In addition to 
“nonstate” and “structural” factors, the State Action Explanation argues that it generally requires 
at least one of three deliberate sovereign state actions to overcome these natural obstacles to 
substate conflict contagion and enable a contagion event. These state actions are (1) 
evangelization, the deliberate sponsorship of a nascent rebel group abroad by a state which has 
recently experienced a violent regime change; (2) expulsion, the deliberate movement of 
combatants across borders by a state in conflict; and (3) meddling with overt partiality, the 
deliberate interference in an ongoing substate conflict that results in conflict in the interfering 
state. 
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 My explanation does not argue that evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt 
partiality are sufficient to cause substate conflict contagion, only that at least one of these state 
actions is usually necessary to overcome the natural obstacles to contagion’s occurrence. The 
same can probably be said of the structural factors identified in the work of Fearon and Laitin 
and others.1 The same may also be true of the six nonstate factors identified in this dissertation 
— rebels helping rebels, rebels inspiring rebels, refugees moving across borders, arms moving 
across borders, drugs moving across borders, and expatriate fighters returning home — although 
my current empirical work cannot speak to the necessity of these factors for individual cases of 
contagion. (See the suggestions for future research below.) What sets state actions apart from 
these other usually necessary but insufficient factors for contagion is that unlike structural 
factors, state actions are proximate, not long-standing geographic, political, economic, and social 
realities; and unlike nonstate factors, state actions are taken by centralized institutions with 
“return addresses” for the developed world. Because of these characteristics, state actions are 
more preventable by great power policymakers than the nonstate and structural causes of 
contagion, and are thereby the easiest usually necessary condition for contagion to knock out. 
The policy implications of this insight will be discussed in more detail below. 
 Empirically, I have probed the plausibility of the State Action Explanation, and tested it 
in two different regions of the world. The plausibility probe came in Chapter 3, when I generated 
an original universe of 84 cases of substate conflict contagion around the world between 1946 
and 2007, and measured the presence of state actions (and structural factors) in each. My 
universe of cases was unique mainly in that instead of assuming the relatedness of substate 
conflicts that were clustered in time and space, I investigated 665 such conflict pairs in the 
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secondary source literature. I found no relationship between the two conflicts in the vast majority 
of cases, and identified the 84 cases (about 13 percent) in which conflicts were related and in 
which the second conflict in the pair escalated to a full-scale civil war. Ultimately, I found that at 
least one state action was present in about three quarters of the 84 contagion cases, and necessary 
for contagion according to one of two criteria in about two thirds. I also showed that structural 
factors on their own are insufficient to explain the variation between contagion and non-
contagion. Thus this chapter showed that the State Action Explanation has analytic value to add, 
because (1) contagion rarely occurs in the absence of evangelization, expulsion, or meddling 
with overt partiality, (2) when these state actions do occur, they tend to be pivotal to contagion 
events, and (3) these actions, when combined with structural factors, explain more variation 
between contagion and non-contagion than do structural factors alone. 
 The tests of the State Action Explanation came in Chapters 4 and 5, when I looked at two 
regional groupings of cases of contagion and non-contagion, measuring in each grouping the 
occurrence of contagion, state actions, nonstate factors, and structural factors. In Central 
America (1978-1996), I found that contagion only occurred once — from Nicaragua to El 
Salvador in 1981 — despite the frequent presence of nonstate factors, while evangelization, 
expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality were generally absent from the region. These 
empirics support the supposition that nonstate factors cannot spread conflict on their own. 
Meanwhile, in the one actual case of contagion, Nicaraguan evangelization was shown to have 
been necessary for the escalation of the Salvadoran substate conflict into a full-scale civil war. 
However, structural factors were generally absent from Central America as well. This means that 
we cannot be sure, judging from this region alone, whether the lack of contagion was due to the 
lack of state actions or the lack of structural factors. 
337 
 
 In Southeast Asia (1959-1980), I again found nonstate factors generally present and state 
actions generally absent. In this region, I also found structural factors present in about half of the 
directed dyads, making them fairly common. There were only six cases of substate conflict 
contagion in thirty-six directed dyads — therefore, these commonly present nonstate and 
structural factors cannot have been sufficient to cause the rare events of contagion on their own. 
Meanwhile, at least one state action was present in and necessary for at least four and possibly 
five of the six contagion cases. Evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality 
were also absent from most (22-24) of the 30 directed dyads in which contagion did not occur — 
although, conversely, most of the 10-13 dyads with state action present did not experience 
contagion. These empirics support the supposition that evangelization, expulsion, and meddling 
with overt partiality are usually necessary for substate conflict contagion, but also insufficient for 
its occurrence. 
 Overall, then, the State Action Explanation holds up fairly well in the early empirical 
plausibility probes and tests conducted in this dissertation. In the next section, I will consider the 
policy implications of this empirically supported explanation of substate conflict contagion. 
Then, in the third and final section, I will discuss potential directions for future research, both on 
this topic and within the civil war literature more broadly. 
Policy Implications 
 Having discussed the scholarly implications of the State Action Explanation at some 
length in Chapter 2, I will focus here on the implications for policymakers. There are three. First, 
substate conflict contagion is rare, occurring in only 0.38 percent of the 22,035 possible cases 
over the 61 years studied in this dissertation. As argued above, it is rare because it is difficult; the 
nonstate factors commonly cited as indicators of a risk of contagion are in reality insufficient to 
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spread conflict on their own. Therefore, contagion should not be viewed as an automatic 
consequence of a violent civil conflict in the developing world that is not intervened in. Quite the 
contrary, we should expect most substate conflicts, when left alone, not to spread to most 
potential receiver states. On its face, then, the fear of substate conflict contagion is not much of a 
valid justification for a great power intervention in a faraway internal conflict. 
 Second, the State Action Explanation suggests that a telltale sign of impending substate 
conflict contagion is the occurrence or imminence of evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with 
overt partiality. Not only should great power policymakers be able to observe these state actions 
in advance, thereby identifying the small number of cases in which contagion is a risk, but they 
should also be able to prevent many such state actions from occurring. The U.S. and other great 
powers have leverage over sovereign developing world governments that they do not have over 
shadowy nonstate actors, and that they certainly do not have over broad structural tendencies 
such as poverty and ethnic fractionalization in developing countries. Therefore, if the prevention 
of substate conflict contagion is a priority for great power policymakers, as it often seems to be, 
the right set of actors on which to focus is sovereign states, and the right set of actions to 
discourage is the set of evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality. 
 Third, if the prevention of evangelization, expulsion, and overt partiality — and thereby 
contagion — is to be attempted by great powers, the means of prevention are important. A 
military intervention may well stop these state actions, but it may also constitute meddling with 
overt partiality itself. The U.S. is unlikely to truly experience the security consequences from 
such meddling, since the structural conditions for civil war, however defined, do not seem to 
exist in the U.S. However, other, weaker states in the neighborhood of the original conflict that 
support or allow great power intervention may experience these consequences, and great power 
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policymakers may therefore see the very spread of conflict that they were trying to prevent in the 
first place. For example, when the U.S. involved Thailand in its meddling with overt partiality in 
Southeast Asia — which was essentially aimed at preventing both meddling and evangelization 
— the Indochinese communist regimes retaliated by substantially assisting the Communist Party 
of Thailand (see Chapter 5). 
 To give a more contemporary example, in 2011 the U.S. completed a military 
intervention in Libya, in part to prevent an anticipated flow of refugees into Egypt and Tunisia 
(see Chapter 1 for President Obama’s exact words). I argue that this was the wrong move in two 
respects. First, as a nonstate factor, refugee flows generally cannot cause substate conflict 
contagion on their own, so the security consequences of inaction in Libya were considerably less 
than Obama implied. Second, when the U.S. supported the Libyan rebels, it meddled with overt 
partiality in that conflict — and, just as in the Thai case, smaller and less stable states, in this 
instance including Qatar, joined in.2 This meddling increased, rather than decreased, the risk of 
substate conflict contagion. It invited retaliation by Qaddafi against states like Qatar, although 
ultimately this did not happen, and it empowered a new state actor — the former Libyan rebels 
— with thoroughly unclear political goals, which might end up being inimical to the internal 
security of states like Qatar. Furthermore, the meddling created the potential for popular outrage 
over the intervention in states like Qatar, which have committed scarce military resources to the 
adventure. So far conflict has not spread from Libya, and it is possible that the U.S. and its Arab 
partners got lucky this time. But the Thai case, and the numerous other cases of meddling with 
overt partiality documented in this dissertation, demonstrates that military intervention in the 
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name of preventing substate conflict contagion runs the risk of creating the very monster it was 
deployed to slay. 
 So what is the alternative? First, great powers should only intervene in developing world 
civil conflicts in order to stop substate conflict contagion when evangelization, expulsion, or 
meddling with overt partiality is ongoing or imminent. In Libya, given that these state actions 
were absent and not likely to occur — recall the difference between a refugee flow and the 
expulsion of combatants — the U.S. should not have needed to do anything to prevent contagion. 
There were other reasons to intervene, of course, namely humanitarian ones. This dissertation 
does not seek to determine when humanitarian military intervention is or is not justified on moral 
grounds. I would suggest, though, that great power policymakers balance the moral (and 
domestic political) benefits of stropping a massacre with the potential costs arising from 
dangerous meddling with overt partiality by their regional allies, the latter of which often 
accompanies great power military involvement abroad. Second, when a state action is present or 
imminent, great powers should try to fully exhaust diplomatic means of intervention, such as 
threatened or imposed economic or diplomatic sanctions, before resorting to military force that 
often requires the support of nearby weak states — states which thereby meddle with overt 
partiality. In other words, the U.S. should not do what it did in Libya: impose targeted economic 
sanctions in late February,3 but add a significant military component involving Arab allies less 
than a month later. 
 Third, these coercive diplomatic instruments should be linked narrowly to the occurrence 
or non-occurrence of these three specific state actions, not to more expansive issues such as 
internal domestic conduct or regime composition. Compared to a demand for regime change, a 
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great power demand for a developing world state to refrain from evangelization, expulsion, and 
meddling with overt partiality is not so unreasonable. If Qaddafi had been planning to expel 
rebel combatants into Egypt and Tunisia — I am aware of no evidence that he was — sustained 
U.S. and European Union economic sanctions, or the threat thereof, might have convinced him to 
step up his border security and keep the conflict contained within Libya. Qaddafi’s logistical, 
financial, and military costs for doing so might have been fairly low, compared to the costs of 
sweeping economic sanctions imposed against him. Instead, the U.S. sanctioned Libya while 
vacillating between demands of radically different domestic conduct and regime change, making 
it unsurprising that sanctions were ineffective on their own to change Tripoli’s behavior. 
 As I have said in previous chapters, I am not arguing that state-to-state coercion is easy. 
A vast literature on interstate coercion, referenced in part below, quickly invalidates any such 
claim. I am simply arguing that such coercion is easier than coercing nonstate actors or changing 
the structural conditions for civil war in a given state. So if, inevitably, great power policymakers 
are going to try to stop substate conflict contagion, they first need to be aware of the full set of 
risk factors so that they only try to stop contagion in the cases actually at risk, and they secondly 
need to employ coercive diplomatic methods against the most vulnerable actors (states), thereby 
making the regional security situation less rather than more dangerous. 
 Overall, substate conflict contagion is a more optimistic subject than great power 
policymakers often assume. As this dissertation’s title suggests, it is rare — meaning 
intervention of any kind is often unnecessary. It is also state-driven, and because it is state-
driven, it is considerably more preventable than the conventional wisdom suggests. 
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Suggestions for Future Research 
 The first suggestion for future research stems from the discussion above of coercive 
diplomacy. In order to truly advocate measures such as sanctions as potentially low-risk, high-
return means of preventing evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality, we 
need to know whether such coercive diplomacy has prevented these state actions in the past. A 
future research project could look at the historical efficacy of economic sanctions,4 diplomatic 
sanctions,5 and threats thereof,6 the goals of which were specifically to prevent states from 
taking the state actions highlighted in this dissertation. Culling the data of Gary Hufbauer, 
Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Elliott, and Barbara Oegg (HSEO), I found only four cases of 
imposed economic sanctions undertaken to prevent evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with 
overt partiality: French sanctions against Tunisia to prevent meddling in Algeria between 1957 
and 1963, American sanctions against Cuba to prevent evangelization in Latin America 
throughout the Cold War, American sanctions against Egypt to prevent meddling in Yemen and 
Congo-Kinshasa in the 1960s, and American sanctions against Nicaragua to prevent 
evangelization to El Salvador in the 1980s. HSEO code one of these four cases as a partial 
success (U.S.-Egypt), code two cases as failures (France-Tunisia and U.S.-Cuba), and do not 
evaluate the role of sanctions in stopping Nicaraguan evangelization to El Salvador specifically.7 
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Meanwhile, Robert A. Pape disagrees with the U.S.-Egypt partial success coding.8 We can 
conclude from this limited empirical record that economic sanctions have rarely been imposed to 
prevent the state actions emphasized by this dissertation specifically, and that the success rate in 
this subset of cases is up for debate. But that tells us nothing about diplomatic sanctions or the 
threat of economic or diplomatic sanctions. A full collection and investigation of the relevant 
universe of cases is needed. 
 Thinking more broadly about the next steps following from this dissertation research, the 
greatest need is to move from showing the necessity of causal mechanisms for substate conflict 
contagion to showing sufficiency. We know that at least one of evangelization, expulsion, and 
meddling with overt partiality is usually necessary for contagion, and that the presence of 
structural factors for civil war in State B is usually necessary as well. But it is not clear what 
combinations of state actions, structural factors, and nonstate factors are sufficient for contagion. 
To know this, we first need to know whether each of the six nonstate factors was present in each 
of the 84 identified cases of substate conflict contagion, so that we can see the full spectrum of 
explanatory variables across the universe of cases. (The density of transnational road networks, a 
structural variable omitted from the current analysis, should be coded in these 84 cases as well.) 
There will be a considerable coding effort involved here, but if it sheds light on the sufficiency 
question it will be well worth the time. (These data will also provide insight into whether any of 
these nonstate factors themselves are necessary for contagion, although I am personally skeptical 
that any one of the nonstate factors was necessary for a majority of contagion cases. In both 
Central America and Southeast Asia, although most of the contagion cases had at least one 
nonstate factor present, the same nonstate factors were not consistently present across these 
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cases. The one exception is the rebels helping rebels mechanism, a potential artifact of leftist 
solidarity during the Cold War which I doubt is usually present globally.) 
 Next, and somewhat relatedly, the external validity testing of the State Action 
Explanation needs to be expanded to other regions. I have closely examined the cases of 
contagion that occurred (at least to 2007), but I have only done so for two regions’ worth of 
cases of non-contagion. I would like to look next at another region that has an unusually high 
proportion of non-cases, like Central America had, so as to get at the sufficiency question 
discussed above. Former Soviet Central Asia, 1991-2007, suggests itself as a promising potential 
case study. Three of the five Former Soviet Central Asian states — Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan — have experienced violent civil conflict since independence, yet I identified no 
cases of substate conflict contagion in the region (defining the region narrowly as those three 
states plus Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan). Therefore, although I do not yet know what 
combinations of state actions, nonstate factors, and structural factors have existed in the region, I 
do know that any combinations I observe will be by definition insufficient for contagion. 
 A Former Soviet Central Asia case study has the added advantage of being post-Cold 
War. Currently my in-depth regional case studies are all from the Cold War era, when 
superpower intervention in the developing world often overshadowed intra-regional international 
politics.9 This is probably not a substantial inferential problem for my tests of the State Action 
Explanation, because superpower pressure in both Central America and Southeast Asia was 
fairly constant cross-nationally within each region. In Central America, virtually every state — 
even little Belize — was pressured by Washington to fight the perceived communist wave. In 
Southeast Asia, virtually every state was pressured by the U.S., the Soviet Union, and the 
People’s Republic of China to either help or hinder the communists in the region. States varied 
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markedly in their responses to this external pressure, of course, but the external pressure itself 
was more or less constant. Nevertheless, since we now live in a unipolar era,10 it is worth asking 
whether the phenomenon of substate conflict contagion looks different in a unipolar world. We 
know from Chapter 3 that 21 out of 26 post-Cold War contagion cases (over 80 percent) had 
state action present, which certainly supports the State Action Explanation, but that tells us 
nothing about the non-cases. Future regional case studies should seek to address this issue, and 
Central Asia looks promising in this regard. 
 Another potential follow-on project would seek to explain the spread of nonviolent 
internal political conflict across borders. This dissertation was written in the midst of the Arab 
Spring, a phenomenon similar to the “contagion” events studied here, but different in that 
dissidents generally did not mobilize for violent resistance to the state (only in Libya and Syria, 
and to a lesser extent in Yemen). Like substate conflict contagion, the spread of nonviolent 
protest is far from automatic — consider the differing outcomes in Egypt and neighboring Sudan 
(the latter of which did experience Arab Spring-related protests, but only tepidly).11 However, 
state action seems to play much less of a role on the nonviolent side of contagion — there was 
certainly nothing akin to evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality by 
sovereign governments in the Arab world in 2011. Also, geography may be less important than 
for violent contagion, which seems to be largely a regional phenomenon. Contemporary analyses 
of the roots of the Egyptian protests identify the Serbian ouster of Slobodan Milosevic and 
Boston professor Gene Sharp as significant influences.12 The small literature on the spread of 
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pro-democracy movements13 should be expanded to address the most recent set of empirics, and 
I have no doubt this will occur with or without this dissertation. That being said, my particular 
empirical approach to the issue of violent contagion — specifically, the careful collection of a 
worldwide universe of cases and the search for commonalities in causal factors across that case 
universe — might be useful for scholars and policymakers, since the next wave of nonviolent 
protest movements will probably not be in the Middle East. Similarly, my brief discussion in 
Chapter 1 of the spread of violent civil conflict within borders should make clear that a great deal 
of explanatory work remains to be done in this domain as well, and I hope my empirical 
approach serves as a useful guidepost for such future work. 
 Finally, my attempts in this dissertation to estimate the presence of the “structural 
conditions” for civil war onset have underscored our rudimentary understanding of what the 
causes of civil war in general really are. The fact that I considered a 1.5 or 2 percent annual 
predicted probability of civil war onset to be “high,” based on data from the Fearon and Laitin 
statistical model (see Chapters 3-5), attests to this limited understanding. Civil wars are rare 
events, and if the “usual suspects” of poverty, ethnic fractionalization, mountainous terrain, and 
so forth are so widely distributed across country-years, why do some “war-prone” country-years 
experience civil war while others do not? In order to answer this large and important question, 
we need to look at the dogs that did not bark, just as I tried to do in the regional case studies of 
this dissertation. Here these would be cases where consideration of the usual suspects would lead 
us to expect civil war — in other words, where the predicted probability of civil war onset was 
high — but where civil war onset did not occur. Looking only at the Fearon and Laitin dataset 
(there are certainly others worth considering), the most extreme case is Pakistan in 1947 and 
                                                 
13
 See, for example, Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik, “Transnational Networks, Diffusion Dynamics, and 
Electoral Change in the Post-Communist World,” Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political 
Science Association, Toronto, September 3-6, 2009. 
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1948, which had a 34.25% onset probability in each of those years but did not experience a 
major violent internal conflict. A closer examination of what prevented civil war in these and 
similar cases would give scholars a better sense of what causal factors are sufficient for civil war 
onset, not just necessary. 
 As with my dissertation research, then, the major next step in the civil war literature writ 
large is to go beyond understanding necessity to understanding sufficiency. This will be a 
difficult task, because eventually it will involve going beyond measuring associations between 
independent and dependent variables — which can give us a fair amount of leverage on 
necessity, even if it cannot firmly establish causality — to process-tracing cases of civil war and 
similar cases of civil peace. Its difficulty notwithstanding, this task needs good minds working 
on it. Unlike interstate war, intrastate war shows no sign of going away anytime soon,14 and it is 
increasingly top-of-mind for great power national security policymakers. Security scholars with 
policy-driven research agendas should look more closely at civil war as a phenomenon, so that 
great power security policies in the developing world can be better informed and can better 
advance national and international well-being. 
                                                 
14
 On the potential for interstate war to go away, see, among others, Carl Kaysen, “Is War Obsolete? A Review 
Essay,” International Security, Vol. 14, No. 4 (1990): 42-64. 
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Dissertation Appendix (Chapter 7): 
Identification of Actual Substate Conflict Contagion Cases 
 
Introductory note: Substate conflicts in State B are considered in turn; potential State As are 
listed in parentheses. Where actual substate conflict contagion is identified, it is noted as “State 
A  State B, Year” and then a brief discussion of the nature of the contagion follows. The 
absence of contagion between a given State A and State B is also noted, generally when 
corroborated by at least three secondary sources. Finally, wherever possible, confirmation of the 
codings of non-contagion by an area expert is noted. 
 
Example: 
State B, Year (vs. Name of Rebel Group – State A could be State 1 or State 2) 
• State 1  State B, Year. “After falling to Communist insurgency, State 1 sponsored a 
rebellion in State B.” (Source citation 1). No mention of State 2 in (Source citation 1). 
• No mention of State 2 in (Source citation 2). 
• No mention of State 2 in (Source citation 3). 
• Hence I will code no contagion from State 2 to State B, pending confirmation from 
(Source 1 author). (Source 1 author) confirms in (date) e-mail. 
 
United States, 2001 (vs. Al Qaeda – State A could be Mexico) 
• I can code this as illusionary contagion without consulting any sources; the Chiapas 
rebellion had nothing to do with 9/11. 
 
Dominican Republic, 1965 (vs. “Military Faction” – State A could be Cuba) 
• Cuba  Dominican Republic, 1965. The 1965 revolt was a “counter-coup” against a 
1963 coup that had removed Juan Bosch, a left-leaning (but seemingly not Castro-
influenced) politician (Jose Antonio Moreno, Sociological Aspects of the Dominican 
Revolution (PhD Dissertation, Cornell University, 1967), p. 19). Among the groups that 
joined up with the counter-coup initially were “Castro/Communists” (John Bartlow 
Martin, Overtaken by Events: The Dominican Crisis from the Fall of Trujillo to the Civil 
War (New York: Doubleday, 1966), pp. 672-673). These were groups influenced by and 
often trained by Castro (A.J. Thomas, Jr. and Ann van Wynen Thomas, The Dominican 
Republic Crisis 1965: Background Paper and Proceedings of the Ninth Hammarskjold 
Forum (New York: Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 1967), pp. 3-5). So 
the revolution in Cuba was a contributing, though seemingly not primary, cause of the 
1965 rebellion. 
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Trinidad and Tobago, 1990 (vs. Jamiat al-Muslimeen – State A could be Haiti) 
• UCDP conflict summary1 on Trinidad and Tobago has no mention of Haiti. 
• In a book-length interview of the coup leader, Imam Yasin Abu Bakr, there is no mention 
of Haiti as a contributor to the coup’s onset (Maximilian Christian Forte, Against the 
Trinity: An Insurgent Imam Tells His Story (Religion, Politics and Rebellion in Trinidad 
and Tobago) (Binghamton, N.Y.: Polaris-Australis Publishing Company, 1997). 
• Also no mention of Haiti in Sunday Advocate, “Special Report: The Agony of Trinidad,” 
August 5, 1990. 
• Also no mention of Haiti in Chris Searle, “The Muslimeen Insurrection in Trinidad,” 
Race Class, Vol. 33, No. 2 (1991): 29-43. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Haiti to Trinidad and Tobago. Forte confirms in 
2/5/10 e-mail. 
 
Mexico, 1994 (vs. EZLN – State A could be El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua or Panama 
• Guatemala  Mexico, 1994. Between 1970 and 1990, between 60,000 and 300,000 
Guatemalan refugees “moved across the border during the civil conflicts in that country” 
(Philip Howard and Thomas Homer-Dixon, “The Case of Chiapas, Mexico,” in Thomas 
Homer-Dixon and Jessica Blitt, Ecoviolence: Links Among Environment, Population, and 
Security (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998, pp. 22, 26-27). These refugees 
contributed to a near-tripling of the indigenous population in Chiapas over that period, 
from 288,000 to 716,000 (ibid). Population growth caused “demand-induced scarcity,” 
which contributed to “resource capture” and “ecological marginalization,” increasing 
“grievances” and contributing to the onset of the rebellion (ibid, 49-50). No mention of 
the other potential State As in this chapter. 
• UNDP entry on Mexico has no mention of any potential State As. 
• No mention of any potential State As in Andrew Reding, “Chiapas is Mexico: The 
Imperative of Political Reform,” World Policy Journal, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1994): 11-25. 
• El Salvador, Nicaragua and Panama do not appear in the index of George A. Collier with 
Elizabeth Lowery Quaratiello, Basta! Land and the Zapatista Rebellion in Chiapas, Third 
Edition (Oakland, Calif.: Food First Books, 2005). 
• Hence I will code no contagion from El Salvador, Nicaragua, or Panama to Mexico. 
Howard confirms in 2/7/10 e-mail. 
 
Guatemala, 1949 (vs. “Military faction” – State A could be Costa Rica) 
• No mention of Costa Rica in the following sources: 
o Jennifer Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project: A Violence Called 
Democracy (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), pp. 11-12. 
                                                 
1
 Uppsala Conflict Data Program synopses are frequently referenced in this appendix, and are available online: 
http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/search.php. 
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o Jim Handy, Gift of the Devil: A History of Guatemala (Toronto: Between the 
Lines, 1984), pp. 111-112. 
o Susanne Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads, and U.S. Power 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. 25. 
o Peter Calvert, Guatemala: A Nation in Turmoil (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 
pp. 35, 76-77. 
o Piero Gleijeses, “The Death of Francisco Arana: A Turning Point in the 
Guatemalan Revolution,” Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 22, No. 3 
(1990): 527-552. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Costa Rica to Guatemala, pending confirmation 
from Gleijeses. Gleijeses tells me by e-mail on 2/4/10 to read chapters in Shattered Hope: 
The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954. Pages 51-69 (some pages 
missing in Google Books) have no mention of Costa Rica. 42 Costa Rica references in 
the book, none near these pages. Search for “Guardia de Honor” Costa Rica turns up no 
results. 
 
Guatemala, 1965 (vs. FAR I – State A could be Cuba) 
• Cuba  Guatemala, 1965. “Inspired by the Cuban revolution in 1959, left-wing guerrilla 
groups started to take form in Guatemala in the 1960s as a response to a combination of 
effectively military governments and the continuation of a highly unequal form of land-
ownership.” (UCDP conflict summary on Guatemala) 
 
El Salvador, 1972 (vs. forces of Benjamin Mejia – State A could be Guatemala) 
• No discussion of inspiration or support from Guatemala in coup synopsis in James 
Dunkerley, The Long War: Dictatorship and Revolution in El Salvador (London: Verso, 
1983), p. 86. (In fact, Guatemalan government supported El Salvador government.) 
• No discussion of involvement in Guatemala in coup synopsis in Richard A. Haggarty, 
ed., El Salvador: A Country Study (Washington: Library of Congress, 1988), “The 1972 
Elections.”  
• No discussion either in Robert Armstrong and Janet Shenk, El Salvador: The Face of 
Revolution, Second Edition (Boston: South End Press, 1982), pp. 62-64. 
• No discussion either in Thomas P. Anderson, Politics in Central America: Guatemala, El 
Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1988), p. 77 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Guatemala to El Salvador. Dunkerley confirms by 
e-mail, 2/4/10, though he says, “The 1972 coup might have a number of indirect 
influences bearing in on it, including Honduras (don’t forget the war of 1969), Guatemala 
and Nicaragua.” To me that’s not really sufficient to code contagion. 
• Checked for Cuba  El Salvador contagion if Cuba is added as a State A from 1968 to 
1974. Based on Dunkerley, Armstrong/Shenk, and Anderson, there was no actual 
contagion. 
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El Salvador, 1979 (vs. ERP, FPL, FMLN – State A could be Cuba, Guatemala, or Nicaragua) 
• Nicaragua  El Salvador, 1979/1981 (1981 was the year of the civil war onset in El 
Salvador). 
o 1979: Anderson, Politics in Central America, 85: 1979 coup, which started the 
war, appears to have been supported by U.S., which did so to avoid another leftist 
victory like the one that had just taken place in Nicaragua (Armstrong and Shenk, 
110: “The administration had ‘lost another country. El Salvador would pay the 
price”; 113: “Now the State Department was abuzz with plans to avoid ‘another 
Nicaragua’ by saving El Salvador.”). Dunkerley, The Long War, 126: “In El 
Salvador the Sandinista victory had an immediate effect; slogans appeared in the 
streets of the capital declaring, ‘Somoza today – Romero tomorrow.’ However, 
the regime had been losing its grip long before July [1979].” No mention of 
Guatemala in Dunkerley. 
o 1981: As discussed at length in Chapter 4, the Nicaraguan regime was a critical 
enabler of the FMLN as it launched its “Final Offensive,” resulting in the 
Salvadoran civil war onset, in January 1981. 
• Cuba  El Salvador, 1981. As discussed in Chapter 4 (see the section on Nicaragua to El 
Salvador), Cuba was another pivotal sponsor of the FMLN in the months leading up to 
January 1981. 
• No mention of Guatemala in brief account of 1979 coup in Elizabeth Jean Wood, 
Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), p. 66. 
• Armstrong and Shenk, El Salvador, 66: Carpio, who founded the FPL, “stud[ied] the 
lessons of Latin America’s guerilla movements” before founding the party in 1972. But 
no specific mention of Guatemala, Nicaragua, or 1979. 106-113: No apparent 
involvement in these pages either. [Interestingly, Carpio explicitly rejected the Cuban 
foco model.] 
• No discussion of either Guatemala or Nicaragua in UCDP conflict summary on El 
Salvador. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Guatemala to El Salvador. Dunkerley confirms by 
e-mail, 2/4/10. 
 
Nicaragua, 1978 (vs. FSLN – State A could be Cuba or Guatemala) 
• Cuba  Nicaragua, 1978. The original founding of the FSLN in 1961 drew “inspiration 
… from the Cubans” (Eduardo Crawley, Nicaragua in Perspective, Revised Edition 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984), p. 128). The Cuban government also directly 
assisted the FSLN throughout the 1960s and 1970s, although aid did not intensify until 
late 1978, after the civil war onset in Nicaragua (John A. Booth, The End and the 
Beginning: The Nicaraguan Revolution (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), p. 133; Robert 
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Kagan, A Twilight Struggle: American Power and Nicaragua, 1977-1990 (New York: 
Free Press, 1996), pp. 78-80). 
• No mention of Guatemala in UCDP conflict summary, although “The [FSLN] coalition 
had diplomatic support from France and various Latin American regimes within the 
OAS.” 
• No mention of Guatemala in Thomas W. Walker, Nicaragua: Living in the Shadow of the 
Eagle, Fourth Edition (Boulder: Westview Press, 2003), pp. 29-42. 
• No mention of Guatemala’s involvement in 1978 onset in Crawley, pp. 148-168. 
• No mention of Guatemala’s involvement in 1978 onset in Richard R. Fagen, “Dateline 
Nicaragua: The End of the Affair,” Foreign Policy, No. 36 (1979): 178-191. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Guatemala to Nicaragua. Confirmed by Walker, 
2/5/10. 
 
Panama, 1989 (vs. forces of Moisés Giroldi– State A could be El Salvador, Guatemala, or 
Nicaragua) 
• No mention of involvement of any of these states in the onset of the Giroldi coup in 
UCDP conflict summary. (Nicaragua did support the Panamanian government militarily, 
but as far as I can tell did not get directly involved in this conflict.) 
• These states are not linked to the Giroldi coup in Robert C. Harding, The History of 
Panama (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2006), pp. 103-113. The U.S. definitely 
helped Giroldi but seems not to have directly influenced the onset of the coup. 
• No mention of these states in Peter M. Sanchez, Panama Lost? U.S. Hegemony, 
Democracy, and the Canal (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007), p. 170. Does 
note U.S. reticence about Giroldi: “U.S. troops in Panama did not seal off road access to 
the [Panama Defense Force general staff] headquarters, even though Giroldi had 
previously urged SOUTHCOM to do so. … The major was a Torrijista, and Washington 
feared that the PDF would continue its nationalist stance sans Noriega.” 
• No mention of these states in Russell Crandall, Gunboat Democracy: U.S. Interventions 
in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2006), pp. 198-199. 
• No mention of these states in Kevin Buckley, Panama: The Whole Story, Second Edition 
(New York: Touchstone, 1992), pp. 194-206 (some pages missing in Google Books, 
though). 
• Hence I will code no contagion from El Salvador, Guatemala, or Nicaragua to Panama. 
Buckley confirms in 2/9/10 e-mail. 
 
Colombia, 1964 (vs. FARC and ELN – State A could be Cuba, Argentina, Venezuela) 
• Cuba  Colombia, 1964. “The new movements were primarily children of their times. 
As elsewhere in Latin America, … the Cuban revolution made a big impact on the small 
group of left-wing students. They were impressed by the way in which, in a little over 
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two years, a tiny  band of guerillas had taken power in a small Caribbean island, and the 
belief that a revolutionary situation existed in Colombia soon took root among the urban 
radicals. … Fabio Vasquez and a small group of mostly student activists were strongly 
influenced by Cuba … when, after receiving basic military training in Havana, they set 
up the Army of National Liberation (ELN) in 1964.” (Jenny Pearce, Colombia: Inside the 
Labyrinth (London: Latin America Bureau, 1990), p. 165) No mention of Argentina or 
Venezuela’s role. 
• No mention of Argentina or Venezuela in Geoff Simons, Colombia: A Brutal History 
(London: SAQI, 2004). 
• No mention of Argentina or Venezuela’s role in Forrest Hylton, Evil Hour in Colombia 
(London: Verso, 2006). 
• No mention of Argentina or Venezuela’s role in Bert Ruiz, The Colombian Civil War 
(Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Company, 2001). 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Argentina or Venezuela to Colombia. Pearce goes 
back and forth in a 3/8/10 e-mail but seems to agree, saying she has “no direct evidence” 
of links and that the Argentine/Venezuelan conflicts were very different from the 
Colombian one.  She suggests contacting “Leon Valencia, an ex-ELN member who now 
runs the Funcacion Arco Iris in Bogota,” which I will do if I decide to start interviewing 
insurgents (I need to think about how to approach them strategically). 
 
Venezuela, 1962 (vs. Navy military faction – State A could be Cuba) 
• Cuba  Venezuela, 1962. The navy coups (there were two) were part of a broader leftist 
insurgency in early 1960s Venezuela. There were two major leftist parties in Venezuela 
at the time, PCV and MIR – both of which were linked to the navy faction in Carupano. 
MIR leftists adhered to “Castro-Communism,” at least initially, and “admitted to being 
influenced by the success of the Cuban Revolution” (H. Micheal Tarver and Julia C. 
Frederick, The History of Venezuela (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2005), pp. 107-
109; Brian F. Crisp, “Presidential Decree Authority in Venezuela,” in John M. Carey and 
Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds., Executive Decree Authority (Cambridge, U.K.: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 156; see also Richard Gott, Hugo Chavez and the 
Bolivarian Revolution (London: Verso, 2005), pp. 15-16). 
 
Venezuela, 1982 (vs. Bandera Roja – State A could be Argentina, Colombia, or Peru) 
• Colombia  Venezuela, 1982. One source of tension between the Colombian and 
Venezuelan states was “the appearance of the guerilla group ‘Bandera Roja’ (and their 
supposed link with the Colombian ELN)” (Raul F. Torres Aguilera, Venezuela and 
Colombia: Border Security Issues (MA Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1994), p. 42). 
No mention of Argentina or Peru. 
• According to the UCDP conflict summary on Venezuela, “Bandera Roja emerged around 
1970, when it split from MIR which at that time abandoned its revolutionary struggle and 
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became a regular political party. Led by Carlos Betancourt and Gabriel Puerta Aponte, 
Bandera Roja wanted to overthrow the government and establish communist rule. 
Reportedly, it had links to the Cuban government as well as to other leftist guerrilla 
groups in Latin America, such as M-19 in Colombia. During the 1970s, Bandera Roja 
clashed sporadically with security forces. It also carried out high-profile kidnappings as a 
strategy to gain attention and as a source of revenue. In 1981, it was speculated that the 
group was behind a spectacular coordinated hijacking of three domestic aircraft carried 
out on 7 December, which ended with the hostages being released and the captors being 
taken into custody on Cuba. The conflict between Bandera Roja and the government of 
Venezuela became active in 1982, as the authorities conducted a crackdown against the 
guerrilla group, causing over 25 deaths.” No mention of Argentina or Peru. 
o Could be Cuba  Venezuela, 1982 contagion, but a CIA report says of the 1981 
Bandera Roja hijacking incident, “Eleven gunmen hijacked three Venezuelan 
airliners on domestic flights, ultimately diverting them to Havana. … Their 
demands, which included a ransom of $10 million and release of seven 
Venezuelan political prisoners, were not met. They were taken into custody by 
Cuban authorities.” (Central Intelligence Agency, “Terrorist Skyjackings: A 
Statistical Overview of Terrorist Skyjackings from January 1968 through June 
1982,” July 1982, declassified, available online at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/53824134/Terrorist-Skyjackings-A-CIA-Report, p. 3). 
Sounds like Havana was no longer supporting Bandera Roja at conflict onset, and 
support in 1970 leading to onset in 1982 is too tenuous to be considered 
contagion. 
• No mention of Argentina or Peru in Richard A. Haggerty, ed., Venezuela: A Country 
Study (Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1990), p. 208. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Argentina or Peru to Venezuela in 1982, pending 
confirmation from Gott. 
 
Venezuela, 1992 (vs. Forces of Hugo Chavez – State A could be Colombia, Paraguay, Peru, or 
Suriname) 
• No mention of any potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of any potential State As in H. Micheal Tarver and Julia C. Frederick, The 
History of Venezuela (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2005), pp. 141-145. 
• No mention of any potential State As in Richard Gott, Hugo Chavez and the Bolivarian 
Revolution (London: Verso, 2005), pp. 35-80. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Colombia, Paraguay, Peru, and Suriname to 
Venezuela in 1992, pending confirmation from Gott. 
 
Suriname, 1986 (vs. SLA/Jungle Commando – State A could be Colombia, Peru, or Venezuela) 
• No mention of any potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. 
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• No mention of any potential State As in H.U.E. Thoden van Velzen, “The Maroon 
Insurgency: Anthropological Reflections on the Civil War in Suriname,” in Gary Brana-
Shute, ed., Resistance and Rebellion in Suriname: Old and New (Williamsburg, Va.: 
Studies in Third World Societies, College of William and Mary, 1990, pp. 159-188). 
• No mention of any potential State As in Scott B. Macdonald, “Insurrection and 
Redemocratization in Suriname? The Ascendancy of the ‘Third Path,’” Journal of 
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 1 (1988): 105-132. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Colombia, Peru, or Venezuela to Suriname. 
Macdonald confirms in 3/11/10 e-mail. 
 
Peru, 1965 (vs. ELN/MIR – State A could be Argentina, Colombia, Venezuela, or Cuba) 
• Cuba  Peru, 1965. UCDP conflict summary says: “The major leftist political party, 
APRA …, moved toward the right in an attempt to create coalitions that would enable it 
to gain political power. Alienated by this shift and inspired by the Cuban revolution, 
many members split from APRA and formed new, more radical groups. One of these 
people was Luis de la Puente, who formed MIR … in 1962. ELN … emerged from a 
similar split in the PCP …, also in 1962. … The two guerilla groups began their armed 
struggle in 1965.” No mention of other potential State As. 
• No mention of the other potential State As in Christine Hunefeldt, A Brief History of Peru 
(New York: Facts on File, 2004), p. 227. 
• “Presumably the Bolivian revolution made a great impact on de la Puente, who was jailed 
… in 1954 for attempting to foment a similar revolution in Peru” (Leon G. Campbell, 
“The Historiography of the Peruvian Guerilla Movement, 1960-1965,” Latin American 
Research Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1973): 45-70, p. 52. Suggests a weak Bolivia  Peru 
link (outside the scope of the dataset), but no direct mention of the role of the other 
potential State As. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Argentina, Colombia, or Venezuela to Peru in 
1965, pending confirmation from Hunefeldt. Hunefeldt goes back and forth, 3/11/10. 
 
Peru, 1982 (vs. Sendero Luminoso – State A could be Argentina, Colombia, or Venezuela) 
• No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of potential State As in Christine Hunefeldt, A Brief History of Peru (New 
York: Facts on File, 2004), pp. 236-242 
• No mention of potential State As in Orrin Starn, Carlos Ivan Degregori, and Robin Kirk, 
eds., The Peru Reader: History, Culture Politics, Second Edition (Durham, N.C.: Duke 
University Press, 2005), pp. 319-321. 
• No mention of potential State As in David Scott Palmer, “Rebellion in Rural Peru: The 
Origins and Evolution of Sendero Luminoso,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 18, No. 2 
(1986): 127-146. 
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• In David M. Burns, The Evolution of Peru’s Sendero Luminoso: A Topical Analysis 
(M.A. Thesis, Texas Technical University, 1987), there is a mention of M-19 (Colombia) 
training Sendero recruits (p. 39), but no mention of Colombia’s link to the origins of the 
conflict nor of any other State As. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Argentina, Colombia, or Venezuela to Peru in 
1982, pending confirmation from Hunefeldt. Hunefeldt goes back and forth, 3/11/10. 
 
Peru, 2007 (vs. Sendero Luminoso – State A could be Colombia) 
• Colombia  Peru, 2007. “On October 9, 2008, the group launched its most violent attack 
in a decade, killing 13 soldiers and two civilians. Further attacks have followed, resulting 
in 33 deaths and 43 injured soldiers. These attacks have led to a reevaluation by the 
military of its tactics and of Sendero’s strength. … The military also says the guerrilla 
group is better armed than previously thought. Sources for their weapons include … 
possibly … the Colombian guerrilla group  [FARC]” (Maureen Taft-Morales, “Peru: 
Current Conditions and U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service Report for 
Congress, July 21, 2009, p. 9). 
 
Bolivia, 1952 (vs. MNR – State A could be Paraguay) 
• No mention of Paraguay in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of Paraguay’s role in 1952 uprising in Herbert S. Klein, A Concise History of 
Bolivia (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
• No mention of Paraguay’s role in 1952 uprising in Waltraud Queiser Morales, Bolivia: 
Land of Struggle (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992), although some radicalization 
did occur in Paraguayan POW camps during the interstate Chaco War (p. 67). 
• No mention of Paraguay’s role in 1952 uprising in Robert J. Alexander, Bolivia: Past, 
Present, and Future of its Politics (New York: Praeger, 1982). 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Paraguay to Bolivia. Klein confirms in 3/8/10 e-
mail. 
 
Bolivia, 1967 (vs. ELN – State A could be Argentina, Colombia, Peru, or Venezuela) 
• Cuba  Bolivia, 1967. The ELN rebellion was led by Ché Guevara, who chose Bolivia 
as the place to expand his communist revolution from Cuba (UCDP conflict summary). 
No other potential State As mentioned. 
• No mention of Colombia or Peru in Herbert S. Klein, A Concise History of Bolivia 
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 225; he does mention that Ché 
came to Bolivia “apparently more interested in setting up a central guerilla headquarters 
for operations in Argentina,” but the 1963 Argentina conflict was a rightist coup, not a 
leftist insurgency. 
• No mention of other potential State As in Waltraud Queiser Morales, Bolivia: Land of 
Struggle (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992), p. 89 
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• No mention of Paraguay’s role in 1952 uprising in Robert J. Alexander, Bolivia: Past, 
Present, and Future of its Politics (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 104. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Argentina, Colombia, Peru, or Venezuela to 
Bolivia. Klein (3/11/10) says he doesn’t know enough about Ché’s decision-making to 
say for sure. 
 
Paraguay, 1947 (vs. Opposition coalition (Febreristas, Liberals and Communists) – State A could 
be Bolivia) 
• Bolivia  Paraguay, 1947. According to Philip Raine, Paraguay (New Brunswick, N.J.: 
Scarecrow Press, 1956), p. 262, the inclusion of banned parties such as the Febreristas in 
the government in 1946 was undertaken because of “a bloody revolution in Bolivia in 
which the governing military leaders were overthrown.” The rebellion appears to have 
taken place because this attempt at inclusion backfired. p. 263: “The political truce did 
not last long. The Febreristas rapidly slipped from [its leader] Franco’s control. … Early 
in January 1947, the Febreristas presented a list of demands which would effectively have 
given them and the Army full control of the Government.” Paul H. Lewis (“Leadership 
and Conflict within the Febrerista Party of Paraguay,” Journal of Inter-American Studies, 
Vol. 9, No. 2 (1967): 283-295, p. 287) writes that “a bloody civil war followed the 
expulsion of the Febreristas from the Cabinet in January, 1947.” One can surmise, then, 
that if the attempt at inclusion had not been made, there would never have been an 
opportunity for the Feberistas to mount a major rebellion. Indeed, Lewis writes, “The 
definitive structure of the Feberista movement … was to await the calling of a national 
convention by the movement’s leaders some time in the near future. This job was 
postponed, however [by the inclusion in the government]” (pp. 286-287). 
  
Paraguay, 1954 (vs. forces of General Alfredo Stroessner – State A could be Bolivia or Cuba) 
• No mention of either potential State A in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of either potential State A in Philip Raine, Paraguay (New Brunswick, N.J.: 
Scarecrow Press, 1956), pp. 267-273. 
• No mention of either potential State A in Paul C. Sondrol, “Totalitarian and Authoritarian 
Dictators: A Comparison of Fidel Castro and Alfredo Stroessner,” Journal of Latin 
American Studies, Vol. 23, No. 3 (1991): 591-620, p. 613. 
• No mention of either potential State A in Rene D. Harder Horst, The Stroessner Regime 
and Indigenous Resistance in Paraguay (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007), 
pp. 22-23. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Bolivia or Cuba to Paraguay. Nickson confirms in 
3/12/10 e-mail. 
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Paraguay, 1989 (vs. forces of General Rodriguez – State A could be Colombia, Peru, or 
Suriname) 
• No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of potential State As in Arturo Valenzuela, “Paraguay: The Coup that Didn’t 
Happen,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1997): 43-55. 
• No mention of potential State As in Diego Abente-Brun, “‘People Power’ in Paraguay,” 
Journal of Democracy, Vol. 10, No. 3 (1999): 93-100. 
• No mention of potential State As in Andrew Nickson, “The Overthrow of the Stroessner 
Regime: Re-Establishing the Status Quo,” Bulletin of Latin American Research, Vol. 8, 
No. 2 (1989): 185-209. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Colombia, Peru, or Suriname to Paraguay. Nickson 
confirms in 3/12/10 e-mail. 
 
Chile, 1973 (vs. forces of Augusto Pinochet, Toribio Merino and Leigh Guzman – State A could 
be Colombia or Uruguay) 
• No mention of either potential State A in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of either potential State A in John L. Rector, The History of Chile (Westport, 
Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2003), pp. 172-183. 
• Uruguay’s “drift to the right … under increasing military influence as the threat from the 
Tupomaros rose” may have helped lessen the revolutionary impulse among rightists in 
Chile – it reduced the fear of the left (Henry A. Landsberger and Juan J. Linz, “Chile, 
1973/Spain, 1936: Similarities and Differences in the Breakdown of Democracy,” in 
Federico G. Gil, Ricardo Lagos E., and Henry A Landsberger, eds. (John S. Gitlitz, 
trans.), Chile at the Turning Point: Lessons of the Socialist Years, 1970-1973 
(Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1979), p. 438). No mention of 
Colombia’s role in this book. 
• No mention of either potential State A’s role in Nathaniel Davis, The Last Two Years of 
Salvador Allende (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985). 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Colombia or Uruguay to Chile. Rector confirms in 
3/11/10 e-mail. 
• Since Cuba was a State A until 1974, there could be another case of contagion here – the 
success of the Cuban Revolution sowed fear of leftism that the Chilean rightists could 
exploit (Landsberger and Linz 1979, 437-438). However, Landsberger and Linz seem to 
play this link down, arguing that there were plenty of leftist failures to point to as well. I 
don’t think this is strong enough to be contagion. 
 
Argentina, 1955 (vs. forces of Eduardo A. Lonardi Doucet – State A could be Bolivia, Cuba or 
Paraguay) 
• No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. 
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• No mention of potential State As in Jonathan C. Brown, A Brief History of Argentina 
(New York: Facts on File, 2003), pp. 208-217. 
• No mention of potential State As in David Rock, Argentina, 1516-1987 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1987), pp. 308-319. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Bolivia, Cuba or Paraguay to Argentina, pending 
confirmation from Brown. (Brown’s 3/11/10 response is noncommittal.) 
 
Argentina, 1963 (vs. Colorados – State A could be Cuba or Venezuela) 
• No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. 
• Seemingly no role played by Cuba or Venezuela in 1963 coup according to Jonathan C. 
Brown, A Brief History of Argentina (New York: Facts on File, 2003), pp. 218-222 (Ché 
did visit the Argentine president in 1961, contributing to his ouster, but the 1963 conflict 
was between factions of the military). 
• No mention of role of potential State As in David Rock, Argentina, 1516-1987 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1987), pp. 342-344. 
• No mention of potential State As in Thomas M. Millington, “President Arturo Illia and 
the Argentine Military,” Journal of Inter-American Studies, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1964): 405-
424. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Cuba or Venezuela to Argentina, pending 
confirmation from Brown. (Brown’s 3/11/10 response is noncommittal.) 
 
Argentina, 1974 (vs. ERP/Monteneros – State A could be Chile, Colombia, or Uruguay) 
• Uruguay  Argentina, 1974. Leaders of what eventually became the Montoneros cut 
their teeth “contributing to the political and military development of the Tupamaros” in 
the 1960s; a 1971 Montonero assault was “modeled on the Uruguayan Tupamaros’ 
occupation of Pando in 1969”; and the EPR and Tupomaros had a joint “Revolutionary 
Coordinating Council” (Richard Gillespie, Soldiers of Peron: Argentina’s Monteneros 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 51, 96, 182). No mention of other potential 
State A’s roles. 
• Cuba  Argentina, 1974. According to Jonathan C. Brown, A Brief History of Argentina 
(New York: Facts on File, 2003), pp. 230-244, Cuba was clearly an inspiration to the 
leftist insurgents. No mention of other potential State As. 
• No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of potential State As (besides Cuba) in David Rock, Argentina, 1516-1987 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 352-366. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Chile or Colombia to Argentina, pending 
confirmation from Brown. (Brown’s 3/11/10 response is noncommittal.) 
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Uruguay, 1972 (vs. MLN/Tupamaros – State A could be Bolivia or Colombia) 
• Cuba  Uruguay, 1972. “The Tupamaros … tried to adapt the ‘foco’ theory of Guevara 
and Debray to urban conditions.” Richard Gott, “Introduction,” in Alain Labrousse 
(Dinah Livingstone, trans.), The Tupamaros: Urban Guerillas in Uruguay 
(Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin Books, 1973), p. 13. Also, the founder of the Tupamaros 
visited Cuba just before deciding, in 1960, “to organize agricultural workers in the north 
of Uruguay” (p. 32). “The movement … points to the Cuban Revolution” (p. 122). No 
mention of other potential State As playing a discernible role in this book. 
o “The connection of the Tupamaros with Castro is also more or less vague. 
Undoubtedly, Fidel is for them an inspiration, but he is only one of many. As 
already indicated, the Tupamaros have looked doctrinally to the Brazilian Carlos 
Marighella” (Robert J. Alexander, “Introduction,” in Maria Esther Gilio (Anne 
Edmondson, trans.), The Tupamaro Guerillas (New York: Saturday Review 
Press, 1972), pp. 11-12). Brazil is not coded as having an internal armed conflict 
of sufficient size at any point in this dataset. No mention of other potential State 
As. 
o No mention of other potential State As in Martin Weinstein, Uruguay: 
Democracy at the Crossroads (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988). However, 
he quotes “one ex-Tupamaro” identifying “the Cuban revolution” as a “beacon” 
of their own movement (p. 111). 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Bolivia or Colombia to Uruguay. Weinstein 
confirms in 3/12/10 e-mail. 
 
Also, I checked on potential contagion from Bolivia, Costa Rica, or Guatemala to Cuba in 1953. 
There appears to be no such contagion of conflict, based on the sources below, so I will not add 
these dyads to the dataset. 
• UCDP conflict summary on Cuba. 
• Thomas M. Leonard, Fidel Castro: A Biography (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 
2004). 
• Antonio Rafael de la Cova, The Moncada Attack: Birth of the Cuban Revolution 
(Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 2007). 
 
Spain, 1980 (vs. Basques – State A could be United Kingdom) 
• No mention of Northern Ireland in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of Northern Ireland (aside from the fact that violence evolved along a similar 
internal trajectory) in Daniele Conversi, The Basques, the Catalans and Spain: 
Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilization (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1997). 
• Only one mention of Northern Ireland in Robert P. Clark, The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 
1952-1980 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984), p. 69. ETA, already in 
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existence, “signed a joint communiqué” with the IRA and other insurgent groups (Fatah, 
KDP) in the early 1970s. 
• No mention of Northern Ireland in Christopher J. Ross, Spain, 1812-1996: Modern 
History for Modern Languages (London: Arnold Publishers, 2000). 
• Hence I will code no contagion from the U.K. to Spain, pending confirmation from 
Conversi. In 4/8/10 e-mail, he sends an article on the very subject: Daniele Conversi, 
“Domino Effect or Internal Developments? The Influences of International Events and 
Political Ideologies on Catalan and Basque Nationalism,” West European Politics, Vol. 
16, No. 3 (1993): 245-270. He basically sees external influences on process, not onset. 
Irish separatism of the early 20th century appears to have had some influence on Basque 
separatism, but not so for Northern Irish separatism of the 1970s/1980s. There was some 
Algerian (1960s) influence, but it seems too distant in time to be contagion (and 1960s 
Algeria was an extrastate conflict). 
 
Spain, 1987 (vs. Basques – State A could be United Kingdom) 
• No mention of U.K. in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of Northern Ireland (aside from the fact that violence evolved along a similar 
internal trajectory) in Daniele Conversi, The Basques, the Catalans and Spain: 
Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilization (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1997). 
• “The ETA is thought to have close links to the IRA and may occasionally follow its 
tactical lead,” in William S. Shepard, “The ETA: Spain Fights Europe’s Last Active 
Terrorist Group,” Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 1 (2002): p. 55. Doesn’t seem 
like contagion – ETA draws tactical inspiration from the IRA but it appears unconnected 
to the origins of the insurgency. 
• No mention of Northern Ireland in Christopher J. Ross, Spain, 1812-1996: Modern 
History for Modern Languages (London: Arnold Publishers, 2000). 
• Hence I will code no contagion from the U.K. to Spain, pending confirmation from 
Conversi. In 4/8/10 e-mail, he sends an article on the very subject: Daniele Conversi, 
“Domino Effect or Internal Developments? The Influences of International Events and 
Political Ideologies on Catalan and Basque Nationalism,” West European Politics, Vol. 
16, No. 3 (1993): 245-270. He basically sees external influences on process, not onset. 
Irish separatism of the early 20th century appears to have had some influence on Basque 
separatism, but not so for Northern Irish separatism of the 1970s/1980s. There was some 
Algerian (1960s) influence, but it seems too distant in time to be contagion (and 1960s 
Algeria was an extrastate conflict). 
 
Macedonia, 2001 (vs. UCK – State A could be Russia, Serbia, Croatia, or Bosnia) 
• Serbia  Macedonia, 2001. “The somewhat lesser success [compared to Bosnia] of the 
Kosovar Albanians in their war for national self-determination [was a] major spur to 
those Macedonian Albanians who eventually mounted their own insurgency.” Daniel L. 
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Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an 
Iraqi Civil War (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 191. 
• Bosnia  Macedonia, 2001. “The eventual success of the Bosnian Muslims at Dayton … 
[was a] major spur to those Macedonian Albanians who eventually mounted their own 
insurgency.” (See Serbia 1998 for more detail on this link – severity of Bosnian civil war 
 Western intervention  KLA ascendancy.) Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. 
Pollack, Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War 
(Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 191. 
• No mention of Russia in UCDP conflict summary, except as a supporter of the 
Macedonian government during the insurgency. 
• No mention of Russia’s role in onset in P.H. Liotta and Cindy R. Jebb, “Macedonia: End 
of the Beginning or Beginning of the End?” Parameters, Vol. 32, No. 1 (2002): 96-111. 
• No mention of Russia’s role in onset in Andrew Rossos, Macedonia and the 
Macedonians: A History (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 2008), pp. 261-281. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Russia to Macedonia, pending confirmation from 
Rossos. Rossos calls me on 4/12/10. He can’t say for sure but doesn’t see any direct 
influence of Chechen ideas or fighters on Macedonia. 
 
Croatia, 1992 (vs. Serbian Republic of Krajina / Serbian irregulars – State A could be Bosnia, 
Romania, Russia, Serbia) 
• Serbia  Croatia, 1992. The Yugoslav government supported the “Serbian irregulars” 
according to UCDP conflict summary on Croatia. 
• No mention of influence of Bosnia, Romania or Russia (Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh) 
on onset of Serbian intrastate conflict against Croatian state in UCDP conflict summary 
on Croatia. 
• No mention of influence of Bosnian, Romanian or Russian (Azerbaijan/Nagorno-
Karabakh) conflicts on onset of Serbian intrastate conflict against Croatian state in 
Sabrina P. Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918-2005 
(Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006), pp. 381-427. 
• No mention of influence of Bosnian, Romanian or Russian (Azerbaijan/Nagorno-
Karabakh) conflicts on onset of Serbian intrastate conflict against Croatian state in 
Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2001), pp. 221-284. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Bosnia, Romania or Russia/USSR to Croatia, 
pending confirmation from Tanner. Tanner confirms in 4/12/10 e-mail, though he 
mentions that the Croat Serbs were influenced by the Cyprus conflict. “The conflict that 
did interest and inspire the Croatian Serbs was Cyprus and in their interviews with me, 
their leaders regularly brought up this conflict. They saw Turkey’s intervention on behalf 
of the Cypriot Turks as entirely analogous to their own situation, including the idea of the 
UN patrolling a ‘frozen’ ceasefire line between the two sides. This suited the Serbs well, 
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as they had by then seized territory well beyond the limits of the territory in which Serbs 
made up a majority of the population.” Cyprus is not listed as an intrastate conflict. 
 
Serbia, 1991 (vs. Republic of Slovenia and Croatian irregulars / Republic of Croatia – State A 
could be Romania, Russia) 
• No explicit mention of Romania or Russia (Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh) in UCDP 
conflict summary on Slovenian/Croatian conflicts within Yugoslavia, though “growing 
demands for political independence and nationalistic/ethnic awareness could be noticed 
in several European countries.” 
• No mention of influence of Romanian or Russian (Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh) 
conflicts on onset of Croatian conflict against Serbian state in Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A 
Nation Forged in War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), pp. 221-284. 
• No mention of Romania, Ceausescu, Azerbaijan, or Nagorno-Karabakh in index of 
Sabrina P. Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918-2005 
(Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006). 
• No mention of Romania’s or USSR’s (Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh) role in Susan L. 
Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War (Washington: 
The Brookings Institution, 1995). 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Romania or Russia to Serbia in 1991, pending 
confirmation from Ramet. Ramet confirms in 4/10/10 e-mail. 
 
Serbia, 1998 (vs. UCK – State A could be Bosnia, Croatia, Russia) 
• Bosnia  Serbia, 1998. The severity of the Bosnian civil war leads to international 
intervention (Dayton Accords), which leads to a Kosovar Albanian rejection of the 
“peaceful path.” “The crucial event that turned the tide in favor of the KLA [away from 
the “peaceful path institutionalists”] was the signing of the Dayton Accords at the end of 
1995. … [The] strategy of passive resistance was bankrupt. The internationals had 
intervened in Yugoslavia, but Kosovo had been forgotten. The results of the Dayton 
Accords afforded the KLA instant credibility. KLA supporters consistently argued that 
the international community only responded to violence. Increasingly people began to 
listen.” Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2008), p. 32. 
• Croatia  Serbia, 1998. “The sources of KLA weapons were almost entirely outside 
Kosovo. The KLA captured few arms from the enemy. … The most important sources of 
arms were the United States, Bosnia, Croatia, Switzerland, and Germany. … Most of the 
other good small arms came from Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia.” (Perritt 2008, 117-118) 
No mention of Russia. 
•  “From the beginning, the military leadership pool was enhanced by a cadre of Albanians 
who had fought elsewhere in the Balkans, on the side of the Croats and of the Bosniaks.” 
(Perritt 2008, 45). I don’t think this is contagion in and of itself – some could have been 
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fighting against Belgrade, not the Serb components in their own countries, and this seems 
more like a tactical advantage than a cause of onset. 
• No mention of Russia in UCDP conflict summary of Serbia/Kosovo. 
• No mention of Russia (Chechnya/Parliamentary Forces) in Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and 
Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000). 
• No mention of Russia (Chechnya/Parliamentary Forces) in The Independent International 
Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons 
Learned (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Russia to Serbia in 1998, pending confirmation 
from Perritt. Perritt confirms in 4/17/10 e-mail. 
 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992 (vs. Serbian irregulars / Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
– State A could be Croatia, Romania, Russia, Serbia) 
• Serbia  Bosnia, 1992. UCDP conflict summary: “The Bosnian Serbs were assisted by 
independent militias set up by Serbs originating from Serbia or Croatia. Many of these 
irregular forces had previously been active in the conflict between the republic of Croatia 
and Croatian Serbs. At times, the Bosnian Serbs and the Serb militias carried out 
operations together, but occasional clashes between these local Serbs and non-local Serbs 
also took place. On many occasions, it was unclear what force controlled the other.” Also 
demonstration: Croatian secession  Bosnian secession (Byman and Pollack 2007)  
Bosnian Serb insurgency. 
• 1/5/12: On further review, I am invalidating the Croatia  Bosnia, 1992 contagion 
coding below. The Croatia 1992 conflict (not to be confused with the Serbia 1991 
conflict that took place in Croatia) started in May 1992, and the Bosnia 1992 conflict 
started in April 1992, according to UCDP. Therefore, the Croatia 1992 conflict cannot 
have contributed to the onset of the Bosnia conflict, which it postdated. 
o Croatia  Bosnia, 1992. UCDP conflict summary: “The Bosnian Serbs were 
assisted by independent militias set up by Serbs originating from Serbia or 
Croatia. Many of these irregular forces had previously been active in the conflict 
between the republic of Croatia and Croatian Serbs. At times, the Bosnian Serbs 
and the Serb militias carried out operations together, but occasional clashes 
between these local Serbs and non-local Serbs also took place. On many 
occasions, it was unclear what force controlled the other.” 
• No mention of Romania or Russia in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of Romania (except as a model for a coup that never materialized in 
Belgrade in 1998 – p. 326) or Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh in Tim Judah, The Serbs: 
History, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, Second Edition (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2000). 
• No mention of Romania or Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh in Laura Silber and Alan 
Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: TV Books, 1996). 
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• Hence I will code no contagion from Romania or Russia to Bosnia in 1992, pending 
confirmation from Christia. 
 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1993 (vs. Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia and Croatian irregulars 
/ Croatian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina – State A could be Croatia, Romania, Russia, 
Serbia) 
• 1/5/12: After further review, I am invalidating the CroatiaBosnia, 1993 contagion 
coding below. It appears that the expulsion event in question took place after the end of 
the Serbia 1991 substate conflict, not the Croatia 1992 conflict, which was not underway 
in “early 1992.” (Also, the JNA was not heavily involved in the Croatia 1992 conflict.) 
o Croatia  Bosnia, 1993. UCDP conflict summary: “In addition to the Bosnian 
Croats, independent Croatian militias were also active in Bosnia. These non-local 
Croats came to Bosnia from Croatia in early 1992, after having been defeated on 
the battlefield by JNA (Yugoslavian National Army) and Serbian paramilitaries. 
These more extreme Croat groups initially opposed the partition of Bosnia, as 
they had an even more far-reaching goal of taking over all Bosnian territories.” 
• Serbia  Bosnia, 1993. During the Croatian separatist war against Belgrade (Serbia 
1991), Croatia asked for Bosnian help. Instead, the Bosnian state (the interior minister 
specifically) “allow[ed] the JNA [Yugoslav National Army] to use northern and western 
Bosnia as a base from which attacks against the Croatian national guard could be 
commanded and resources.” These and other supposed actions lead to resentment by the 
Croat state against the Bosnian state, leading to Zagreb’s significant support of the anti-
Sarajevo insurgency. (Laura Silber and Alan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New 
York: TV Books, 1996), pp. 291-293). No mention of Romania or Azerbaijan/Nagorno-
Karabakh in this book. 
• UCDP conflict summary: “Early on, Serb and Croat autonomous regions within Bosnia 
were declared, and the armed violence spurred the ethnification of the Bosnian society. In 
1993, during peace talks, the Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic agreed to a plan of 
dividing Bosnia into three ethnically based territories. Fikret Abdic, a member of the 
Bosnian state presidency, disagreed with this dismemberment of Bosnia. He maintained 
that multiethnic relations were functioning well in his region, the Bihacka Krajina in 
northwestern Bosnia.” Suggests Bosnia 1992  Bosnia 1993, but that is not a case of 
contagion. Also no mention of Romania and Russia, and no direct mention of the original 
separatist conflicts in Serbia (a second-order effect). 
• “The Muslim split was arguably the result of the asymmetric losses faced among 
Muslims in eastern Bosnia and Sarajevo as opposed to their solidly entrenched ethnic kin 
in Western Bosnia.” Fotini Christia, The Closest of Enemies: Alliance Formation in the 
Afghan and Bosnian Civil Wars (PhD Dissertation, Harvard University, 2008), p. 126. No 
mention of Romania and Russia, and no apparent explicit contagion from Croatia or the 
original conflicts in Serbia. 
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• Same in Fotini Christia, “Following the Money: Muslim versus Muslim in Bosnia’s Civil 
War,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 40, No. 4 (2008): 461-480. 
• No mention of Romania (except as a model for a coup that never materialized in 
Belgrade in 1998 – p. 326) or Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh in Tim Judah, The Serbs: 
History, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, Second Edition (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2000). 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Romania or Russia to Bosnia in 1993, pending 
confirmation from Christia. 
 
Moldova, 1992 (vs. Dniestr Republic – State A could be Russia or Romania) 
• Romania  Moldova, 1992. “As long as Romania remained under Ceausescu, Moscow 
had little reason to worry about Moldavia. The Moldavian Romanians might have 
rejected the Soviet system, but they had nowhere else to go. Nevertheless, the December 
1989 Romanian Revolution changed the picture completely. … On December 30 [1989], 
several thousand Moldavians rallied again in Kishinev and for the first time some 
speakers called for reunion with Romania.” (Nicholas Dima, Moldova and the 
Transdnestr Republic (Boulder: East European Monographs, 2001), p. 145) It was fear of 
unification with Romania that drove the violent secession from independent Moldova in 
1992 (see UCDP conflict summary). However, it should be noted that the “enthusiasm 
[of the Moldavians for Romania] cooled down … when they realized that the new leader 
of Romania was Gorbachev’s protégé, and that the communists had managed to stay in 
power in Bucharest.” (Dima 2001, 145). Nevertheless, the Romanian Revolution appears 
to have spurred the initial calls for unification. 
• No mention of Romanian coup or Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts in UCDP 
conflict summary. Slavs living in the Dniestr Region feared Moldova would unite with 
Romania, but this fear seems historically grounded, not based on the 1989 coup. (Could 
be different if President Iliescu was more anti-Slavic than President Ceausescu).  
• Influence of Russian conflicts appears to be as follows: “Large amounts of money and 
great efforts were made to keep Moldova under Russian control. Among other things, 
Moscow encouraged the establishment of the Dnestr secessionist republic. In spite of this 
new trend [of secessionism from USSR], Moscow did not want to relinquish its former 
empire.” Suggests that if anything the violence in the south Caucuses should have 
discouraged Russian support of Dnestr – curiously, they just ignored it. (Dima 2001, 158) 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Russia to Moldova, pending confirmation from 
Dima. Dima confirms in 4/17/10 e-mail but mentions possible link between Bosnia 1992, 
Georgia 1992, and Moldova 1992. I ask him for more information. He replies in 4/19/10 
e-mail: “All that I remember is that they recognized each other and pledged mutual help.” 
This is not contagion (doesn’t relate to onset). 
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Soviet Union, 1946 (vs. BDPS (Lithuania) – State A could be China) 
• No mention of China in (very brief) UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of China in Roger D. Petersen, Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from 
Eastern Europe (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 80-133 and 
170-204. 
• No mention of China in Michael Kort, The Soviet Colossus: History and Aftermath, 
Fourth Edition (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), pp. 219-220. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from China to the Soviet Union, pending confirmation 
from Petersen. 
 
Russia, 1993 (vs. Parliamentary forces – State A could be Azerbaijan, Georgia) 
• No apparent foreign influences on this attempted coup at all in UCDP conflict summary. 
(Grievance was whether to dissolve the Supreme Soviet.) 
• “The influence [of the Yugoslav wars] spread … to Russia, where Russian nationalists 
gained leverage in the parliamentary struggle with President Boris Yeltsin in late 1992-
early 1993 with persistent pressure on the Serbian question. Yeltsin’s coup against the 
Russian Parliament in September-October 1993 succeeded in replacing delegates in the 
Communist regime who were most vocal on the question, only to have the new 
parliament elected in December 1993 assert this position even more strongly and 
continue to use it to mobilize opposition to Yeltsin.” Susan L. Woodward, Balkan 
Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War (Washington: The Brookings 
Institution, 1995), p. 370. Is this contagion? I don’t think so – the grievance in 
September-October 1993 appears to have been purely domestic. 
• No mention of Azerbaijan or Georgia in Philip Longworth, Russia’s Empires: Their Rise 
and Fall from Prehistory to Putin (London: John Murray, 2005), pp. 304-306. 
• No mention of Azerbaijan or Georgia in Roger Bartlett, A History of Russia (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 288-291. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Azerbaijan or Georgia to Russia, pending 
confirmation from Bartlett. Bartlett confirms in 4/19/10 e-mail. 
 
Russia, 1994 (vs. Chechen Republic of Ichkeria – State A could be Azerbaijan, Georgia) 
• Azerbaijan  Russia, 1994. “In the Transcaucuses, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict … 
was an important spur to the fighting in Georgia, and both had an impact on … the 
fighting in the Russian autonomous republic of Chechnya.” Daniel L. Byman and 
Kenneth M. Pollack, Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War 
(Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 21. 
• Georgia  Russia, 1994. As described in Chapter 3, Russian meddling in Georgia was 
pivotal to the civil war onset in Chechnya. 
o Also: “In the Transcaucuses, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict … was an important 
spur to the fighting in Georgia, and both had an impact on … the fighting in the 
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Russian autonomous republic of Chechnya.” Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. 
Pollack, Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War 
(Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 21. 
 
Russia, 1999 (vs. Wahhabi movement of the Buinaksk District (Dagestan) – State A could be 
Azerbaijan) 
• No mention of Azerbaijan in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of Azerbaijan in Christoph Zurcher, The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic 
Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus (New York: New York University Press, 
2007), pp. 186-200. 
• No mention of Azerbaijan (except as a potential training ground for an early insurgent 
leader whose influence was quite limited) in Miriam Lanskoy, “Daghestan and 
Chechnya: The Wahhabi Challenge to the State,” SAIS Review, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2002): 
167-192. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Azerbaijan to Russia in 1999, pending confirmation 
from Zurcher. Zurcher confirms in 4/29/10 e-mail. 
 
Georgia, 1991 (vs. Anti-Government Alliance – State A could be Soviet Union) 
• No mention of Azerbaijani/Nagorno-Karabakh separatism from Soviet Union in UCDP 
conflict summary. 
• The grievance of the anti-government rebels in Georgia was Gamsakhurdia himself, who 
by late 1991 was “isolated and increasingly erratic” and whose “vehement anti-Soviet 
and nationalist politics could not hide the fact that the Georgian state was falling apart 
and remained internationally isolated.” Gamsakhurdia, as well as Prime Minister Tengiz 
Sigua (one of the coup leaders), came to power in a climate of intense pro-Georgian, anti-
Abkhaz/South Ossetian nationalism. Nationalism became extreme in the wake of the 
April 9, 1989 Soviet suppression of a pro-Georgian, anti-Abkhazian demonstration. The 
demonstration, in turn, was partially in response to “Georgian fears of a repetition of the 
scenario in Karabakh, when an autonomous entity in one former Soviet republic sought to 
be integrated into another.” (Christoph Zurcher, The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic 
Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus (New York: New York University Press, 
2007), pp. 118-127). This is the closest we get to Nagorno-Karabakh  anti-
Gamsakhurdia contagion, and it seems pretty weak. 
• No mention of Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh in Irakly Areshidze, Democracy and 
Autocracy in Eurasia: Georgia in Transition (East Lansing: Michigan State University 
Press, 2007), pp. 17-32. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from the Soviet Union/Russia to Georgia in 1991, 
pending confirmation from Zurcher. Zurcher confirms in 4/29/10 e-mail. 
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Georgia, 1992 (vs. Republic of Abkhazia / South Ossetia – State A could be Azerbaijan, Russia 
(Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh)) 
• According to Byman/Pollack there was contagion from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict… 
o Russia (Soviet Union)  Georgia, 1992. “In the Transcaucuses, the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict … was an important spur to the fighting in Georgia.” Daniel L. 
Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover 
from an Iraqi Civil War (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 21. 
[According to UCDP, at the time of the “first stated incompatibility” of South 
Ossetia, 12/21/91 (or May 1991 for the non-state conflict), the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict was still situated in the Soviet Union and conducted against Moscow.] 
o Azerbaijan  Georgia, 1992. “In the Transcaucuses, the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict … was an important spur to the fighting in Georgia.” Daniel L. Byman 
and Kenneth M. Pollack, Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an 
Iraqi Civil War (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 21. 
[According to UCDP, at the time of the “first stated incompatibility” of Abkhazia, 
7/23/92, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was situated in Azerbaijan and conducted 
against Baku.] 
• However, Zurcher (in a 4/29/10 e-mail) points out the difference between inspiring 
nationalism and inspiring nationalist violence. He writes, “My reading of the history is 
that there was surprisingly little transnational effect on the eruption of violence [in 
Abkhazia/South Ossetia in 1992]. Again, it was mainly Georgian domestic politics.  I 
would find it hard to argue that NKO [Nagorno-Karabakh] inspired Ossetian and Abkhaz 
leader to switch to more violence.” 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Azerbaijan or Russia/Soviet Union to Georgia in 
1992. 
 
Georgia, 2004 (vs. Republic of South Ossetia – State A could be Russia) 
• Russia  Georgia, 2004. “Both [South Ossetians and Abkhazians] were inspired by 
Chechnya’s struggle for independence against Russia.” Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. 
Pollack, Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War 
(Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 36. 
 
Azerbaijan, 1993 (vs. Forces of Suret Husseinov – State A could be Georgia) 
• No mention of Georgia in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of Georgia in Christoph Zurcher, The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic 
Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus (New York: New York University Press, 
2007), p. 171. 
• No mention of Georgia as contributor to coup in Suzanne Goldberg, Pride of Small 
Nations: The Caucasus and Post-Soviet Disorder (London: Zed Books, 1994), pp. 119-
131. 
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• Hence I will code no contagion from Georgia to Azerbaijan in 1993, pending 
confirmation from Zurcher. Zurcher confirms in 4/29/10 e-mail. 
 
Azerbaijan, 2005 (vs. Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh – State A could be Georgia, Russia) 
• No mention of Russia (Chechnya) or Georgia in UCDP conflict summary. 
• I can find no other mention of the resurgence of this conflict in 2005. UCDP estimates 
battle-related deaths in 2005 to be 22-26, so it might not even qualify. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Georgia or Russia to Azerbaijan in 2005, on the 
basis that there was no apparent State B onset. 
 
Guinea-Bissau, 1998 (vs. Military Junta for the Consolidation of Democracy, Peace and Justice – 
State A could be Liberia, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone) 
• Senegal  Guinea-Bissau, 1998. UCDP conflict summary: “Another problem for the 
government was how to control the country’s armed forces. From the mid-1990s onward, 
there were clear indications of a growing discontent within the military. One of the main 
reasons for this was the government’s change of official policy towards the Senegalese 
separatist region Casamançe, bordering northern Guinea-Bissau. The separatist guerrilla 
in Casamançe, MFDC…has strong historic and ethnic ties to Guinea-Bissau, and the 
latter had for years provided support to the rebels. Apart from the near official support for 
the Senegalese rebels, a cross-border operation had been active for decades, with MFDC 
trading cannabis for arms. Many army officers in Guinea-Bissau were involved in this 
lucrative business, which was endangered when President Viera in 1995 promised to 
fight the rebellion in the cross-border region. This complete change in policy was a 
precondition for Guinea-Bissau to be allowed to enter the CFA franc zone. At the time, it 
appeared as if the president distanced himself completely from the cooperation with 
MFDC.” No mention of other potential State As (in terms of influence on onset). 
o Also, “Some MFDC rebel fighters reportedly crossed the border to join Mane 
[coup leader], himself an ethnic Mandingo.” Adekeye Adebajo, Building Peace in 
West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 
2002), p. 116. 
• Liberia  Guinea-Bissau, 1998. “The elections held in the aftermath of the Liberian civil 
war sent a message to West African leaders and warlords that ECOWAS and the wider 
international community would ultimately tolerate extreme violence as a political tool. … 
The resulting message undoubtedly reached Bissau.” (Jens Kovsted and Finn Tarp, 
“Guinea-Bissau: War, Reconstruction, and Reform,” United Nations University World 
Institute for Development Economics Research Working Paper No. 168 (1999): p. 12). 
No other potential State As mentioned. 
• No mention of potential State As (besides Senegal) in terms of involvement in onset in 
Adekeye Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-
Bissau (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002), pp. 111-116. 
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• Hence I will code no contagion from Mali, Niger, or Sierra Leone to Guinea-Bissau, 
pending confirmation from Tarp. 
 
Equatorial Guinea, 1979 (vs. Forces of Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo – State A could be 
Mauritania) 
• The latest UCDP summary on Equatorial Guinea says the state has never experienced a 
violent intrastate conflict rising to the 25-death threshold. So I am removing this conflict 
from the dataset as a State A and re-coding this case of potential contagion “0.” 
 
Gambia, 1981 (vs. NRC – State A could be Liberia, Mauritania) 
• Liberia  Gambia, 1981. “What took place in The Gambia was a manifestation of what I 
shall call the Rawlings/Doe syndrome. … It seems extremely likely that events in the 
Gambia were strongly influenced by the coups of Rawlings in Ghana and Doe in Liberia. 
The similarities are very marked…. In all three cases the rebels thrived on dramatic 
radical slogans. … However unappetizing these two regimes may seem there is no doubt 
that their success in seizing power has sent shockwaves throughout West Africa.” (John 
A. Wiseman, “Revolt in The Gambia: A Pointless Tragedy,” The Round Table, Vol. 71, 
No. 284 (1981): 373-380, pp. 378-379) [The Ghana  Gambia link is not coded because 
the coup in question took place in 1979 and was not sufficiently violent. The violent 
Ghana coup took place on December 31, 1981, after the July 30, 1981 Gambia coup.] 
• No mention of Mauritania in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of Mauritania in Godfrey Mwakikagile, Military Coups in West Africa since 
the Sixties (Huntington, N.Y.: Nova Science Publishers, 2001), pp. 25-28. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Mauritania to The Gambia, pending confirmation 
from Mwakikagile. 
 
Mali, 1990 (vs. MPA – State A could be Burkina Faso, Liberia, Senegal, Togo, Morocco, Chad, 
Lebanon, Israel, Afghanistan) 
• Morocco  Mali, 1990. See below. 
• Chad  Mali, 1990. See below. 
• Lebanon  Mali; Israel  Mali; Afghanistan  Mali, 1990. UCDP conflict summary 
says: “In the mid-1970s and onwards, large numbers of young Touaregs from both Mali 
and Niger emigrated to Libya and Algeria due to severe droughts. The ones who ended 
up in Libya received military training, as General Qaddafi incorporated some into his 
regular military forces and inducted others into a Libyan-sponsored ‘Islamic Legion.’ The 
latter was subsequently dispatched to Lebanon, Palestine and Afghanistan, where 
numerous Touaregs acquired considerable combat training. Along with the military 
training received, the emigrants in Libya were politically active and formed the 
Mouvement Touareg de Libération de l’Adrar et de l’Azawad, an organization dedicated 
to the liberation of the northern areas of Mali and Niger. In 1988, encouraged by Libya, 
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the Malian section of the movement split from the Nigerien one, and formed MPLA.” 
Note absence of potential State As in region. 
• “A number of these soldiers got experience from active warfare in Palestine, Lebanon 
and Chad, fighting in [Qaddafi’s] army.” Tor A. Benjaminsen, “Does Supply-Induced 
Scarcity Drive Violence Conflicts in the African Sahel? The Case of the Tuareg 
Rebellion in Northern Mali,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 45, No. 6 (2008): 819-836, 
p. 829. No mention of other potential State As. 
• “In 1986, Libya’s mercurial leader Qaddafi tried to annex neighboring Chad by an 
outright military invasion. The Chadians, with French assistance, crushed Libyan forces 
in northern Chad, resulting in another exodus of Tuaregs—this time from Qaddafi’s 
military forces. … Thus, by the end of the 1980s, Tuareg communities throughout the 
Sahel had numbers of unemployed and restless young men with considerable military 
experience. Violence and banditry in northern Mali began to increase.” (Kalifa Keita, 
“Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali,” 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College (1998), pp. 13-14) Seems like 
contagion from the interstate conflict of Libya vs. Chad. 
o “By this time [late 1980s], the conflicts in Western Sahara and Chad had flooded 
the region with small arms.” (Keita 1998, 14) 27: “The second Tuareg rebellion 
[1990] probably would not have occurred without a large number of unemployed 
young Tuareg men and a proliferation of weapons in the region.” Suggests 
Morocco  Mali and Chad  Mali. 
o No mention of other potential State As. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Burkina Faso, Liberia, Senegal or Togo to Mali in 
1990, pending confirmation from Benjaminsen. Benjaminsen confirms in 5/1/10 e-mail. 
 
Mali, 2007 (vs. ATNMC – State A could be Cote D’Ivoire, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, 
Algeria, Chad) 
• Niger  Mali, 2007. “A second Tuareg rebellion began in Niger in 2007 led by the Niger 
Movement for Justice (MNJ). The fighting spread to Mali the same year.” Stefan 
Simanowitz, “Bluemen and Yellowcake: The Struggle of the Tuareg in West Africa,” 
Media Monitors Network, March 29, 2009 
(http://usa.mediamonitors.net/content/view/full/60963). 
• No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of potential State As (in terms of contribution to onset) in Muna A. Abdalla, 
“Understanding of the Natural Resource Conflict Dynamics: The Case of Tuareg in North 
Africa and the Sahel,” Institute for Security Studies Paper No. 194 (2009), especially pp. 
1-6. Does write (p. 8): “Tuareg in Mali and Niger continued to have various military 
engagements with AQIM [Algerian insurgency] in their territories. Tuareg have no 
history of Islamic extremism and the link between this group and Tuareg fighters is still 
not very clear.” 
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• No mention of potential State As (besides Niger, in terms of contribution to onset) in Eva 
Dadrian, “Saharans on the Warpath,” Al-Ahram Weekly Online, June 5-11, 2008 
(http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2008/900/in6.htm). 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Cote D’Ivoire, Liberia, Nigeria, Algeria, Chad, or 
Senegal to Mali in 2007, pending confirmation from Abdalla. 
 
Senegal, 1990 (vs. MFDC – State A could be Burkina Faso, Liberia, Mali, Togo) 
• No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. Only substantive mention 
of influence of another conflict: “The government has also claimed that both Iraq and 
Libya have sent weapons to MFDC fighters via Mauritania.” No indication this is tied to 
onset, however. 
• No mention of potential State As in Sheldon Gellar, Senegal: An African Nation Between 
Islam and the West, Second Edition (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 115-117. 
• No mention of potential State As in Sheldon Gellar, Democracy in Senegal: 
Tocquevillian Analytics in Africa (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 160. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Burkina Faso, Liberia, Mali, or Togo to Senegal, 
pending confirmation from Gellar. Gellar confirms in 5/11/10 e-mail. 
 
Mauritania, 1975 (vs. POLISARIO – State A could be Nigeria, Morocco, Chad) 
• No mention of Nigeria or Chad in UCDP conflict summary. POLISARIO fought against 
Moroccan and Mauritanian occupiers simultaneously from 1975 (after Spanish 
withdrawal); I don’t really consider this as contagion so much as two branches of the 
same conflict. 
• No mention of Nigeria or Chad’s contribution to onset in Tony Hodges, Western Sahara: 
The Roots of a Desert War (Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill & Company, 1983). 
• No mention of Nigeria or Chad’s contribution to onset in John Damis, Conflict in 
Northwest Africa: The Western Sahara Dispute (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 
1983). 
• No mention of Nigeria or Chad’s contribution to onset in Erik Jensen, Western Sahara: 
Anatomy of a Stalemate (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005). 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Nigeria, Morocco, or Chad to Mauritania, pending 
confirmation from Hodges. 
 
Niger, 1991 (vs. FLAA – State A could be Burkina Faso, Liberia, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Togo, Morocco, Algeria, Chad) 
• No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. 
• Chad  Niger, 1991. “Some young Tuaregs and Moors who had no jobs were recruited 
as mercenaries by Colonel Mu’ammar al-Gaddafi’s Islamic League and sent to fight in 
Chad and Lebanon where they learned to handle weapons.” (Carolyin Norris, “Mali-
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Niger: Fragile Stability,” UNHCR Centre for Documentation and Research, WRITENET 
Paper No. 14/2000 (2001), p. 3.) 
• Mali  Niger, 1991. “Some of the young repatriated people [in Niger] protested against 
this misuse of aid and were arrested in Tchin-Tabaraden. Other Tuaregs attacked the 
police station of this town to release their companions and the reaction of the Nigerien 
authorities was disproportionately brutal. … Some Nigerien Tuaregs fled to neighboring 
Mali and were arrested in the town of Menaka. Malian Tuaregs launched an armed attack 
to release them in June 1990, provoking retaliation by the Malian military, which 
effectively marked the beginning of the rebellion in Mali.” (Carolyin Norris, “Mali-
Niger: Fragile Stability,” UNHCR Centre for Documentation and Research, WRITENET 
Paper No. 14/2000 (2001), p. 5.) By this account, the Niger rebellion preceded the Mali 
rebellion. Either way, it’s clear these rebellions were linked. No mention of other 
potential State As. 
o But later: “This different approach, linked to the better integration of Nigerien 
Tuaregs, also explains why the rebellion started in Mali and only later extended to 
Niger. … The determining factor, which pushed the Tuareg rebellion in both 
countries into armed conflict, was the massive disappointment in the National 
Conferences held in Niamey and Bamako in 1991. These National Conferences, 
which aimed to provide a forum where the people could challenge their leaders 
after decades of single party rule, were seen by the Tuaregs as a unique occasion 
to have their needs heard and, in the case of Niger, to secure justice for the 
violations committed by the army at Tchin-Tabaraden. But neither the demands 
for justice nor federalism were addressed, making confrontation virtually certain.” 
(Norris 2001, 7) 
• No mention of potential State As in Yvan Guichaoua, “Circumstantial Alliances and 
Loose Loyalties in Rebellion Making: The Case of Tuareg Insurgency in Northern Niger 
(2007-2009),” MICROCON (University of Sussex) Research Working Paper 20 (2009), 
pp. 8-12. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Burkina Faso, Liberia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Togo, Morocco, or Algeria to Niger in 1991, pending confirmation from Guichaoua. 
Guichaoua confirms in 5/11/10 e-mail. 
 
Niger, 1994 (vs. CRA – State A could be Liberia, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Morocco, 
Algeria, Egypt, Chad) 
• This is just a continuation of Niger 1991 – CRA (also Tuareg) split off from FLAA and 
demanded autonomy for northern Niger rather than a federal system (UCDP conflict 
summary). I am removing Niger 1994 as a potential case of contagion. 
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Niger, 1996 (vs. FDR – State A could be Liberia, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Algeria, 
Egypt, Chad) 
• Chad  Niger, 1996. UCDP conflict summary: “In the early 1990s, the situation 
deteriorated further, when several thousand Chadian Toubous took refuge in the southern 
part of the region, following the coup d’état in Chad. This reinforced tensions between 
the mainly nomadic Fulani ethnic group and settled Toubous and in 1993 and 1994 there 
were frequent clashes between these groups over grazing rights. Events in neighboring 
Chad also fuelled a vast traffic of weapons in the area. All this created a climate of 
chronic insecurity and frustration and in October 1994 the rebel group FDR … emerged.” 
No mention of other potential State As’ contribution to onset. 
• No mention of potential State As (besides Chad) in terms of contribution to onset in 
Brigitte Thébaud and Simon Batterbury, “Sahel Pastoralists: Opportunism, Struggle, 
Conflict and Negotiation: A Case Study from Eastern Niger,” Global Environmental 
Change, Vol. 11 (2001): 69-78. 
• No mention of potential State As (besides Chad) in Erika Forsberg, “Conflict Diffusion: 
Ethnic Kin as a Transmitter of Internal Conflict,” Paper presented to the International 
Studies Association Annual Convention, Honolulu, March 1-5, 2005, p. 3. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Liberia, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, 
Algeria, or Egypt to Niger in 1996, pending confirmation from Batterbury. Batterbury 
confirms in 5/11/10 e-mail. 
 
Niger, 2007 (vs. MNJ – State A could be Cote D’Ivoire, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Algeria, 
Chad) 
• Since Niger  Mali 2007, the reverse cannot be true (hence Mali is not a potential State 
A for Niger 2007). 
• Côte D’Ivoire  Niger, 2007. Yvan Guichaoua e-mail, 5/11/10: “I suspect that these 
conflicts had an indirect effect on the Niger insurgency through the weapons markets. 
AK47s typically travel a lot between the coast of the Guinea Gulf and the Sahel. The end 
of hostilities in SL or CI has made guns cheaper. Tuareg insurgents also trade arms with 
rebel groups in Chad.” 
• Liberia  Niger, 2007. Yvan Guichaoua e-mail, 5/11/10: “I suspect that these conflicts 
had an indirect effect on the Niger insurgency through the weapons markets. AK47s 
typically travel a lot between the coast of the Guinea Gulf and the Sahel. The end of 
hostilities in SL or CI has made guns cheaper. Tuareg insurgents also trade arms with 
rebel groups in Chad.” [Could code this as Sierra Leone  Niger, but the real center of 
the West African conflict he’s referring to is Liberia.] 
• Chad  Niger, 2007.  Yvan Guichaoua e-mail, 5/11/10: “I suspect that these conflicts 
had an indirect effect on the Niger insurgency through the weapons markets. AK47s 
typically travel a lot between the coast of the Guinea Gulf and the Sahel. The end of 
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hostilities in SL or CI has made guns cheaper. Tuareg insurgents also trade arms with 
rebel groups in Chad.” 
• No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of potential State As (except rejection of Algeria’s involvement in onset) in 
Stefan Simanowitz, “Bluemen and Yellowcake: The Struggle of the Tuareg in West 
Africa,” Media Monitors Network, March 29, 2009 
(http://usa.mediamonitors.net/content/view/full/60963). 
• No mention of potential State As in Human Rights Watch, “Niger: Warring Sides Must 
End Abuses of Civilians,” December 19, 2007 
(http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/12/18/niger-warring-sides-must-end-abuses-
civilians). 
• No mention of potential State As in Jeremy Keenan, “Uranium Goes Critical in Niger: 
Tuareg Rebellions Threaten Sahelian Conflagration,” Review of African Political 
Economy, No. 117 (2008): 449-466. Keenan does accuse Algeria’s intelligence services 
of playing a role in instigating the MNJ rebellion (pp. 458-459), but the Algiers interest 
in Niger does not appear to be related to its own conflict with Islamists. 
• No mention of potential State As in Yvan Guichaoua, “Circumstantial Alliances and 
Loose Loyalties in Rebellion Making: The Case of Tuareg Insurgency in Northern Niger 
(2007-2009),” MICROCON (University of Sussex) Research Working Paper 20 (2009), 
pp. 12-22. Again briefly discusses Algeria on p. 7, note 3: “Algeria has been playing a 
crucial role in the conflict, offering a sanctuary to the insurgents and providing them with 
shelter, supplies … and opening its hospitals to wounded fighters. … One can 
hypothesize several reasons behind Algeria’s tolerance toward MNJ combatants: … 
Algeria needs the support of Tuaregs from Mali and Niger to fights the Islamists – now 
rebranded Al-Qaeda Maghreb – causing political disorder in the region.” This would be 
an Algerian interest in Niger tied to its own conflict with Islamists, but Guichaoua 
doesn’t seem to see Algeria as contributing to the conflict onset. I’ll ask. (He agrees – 
Algeria did not contribute to conflict onset.) 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Nigeria, Senegal, and Algeria to Niger in 2007, 
pending confirmation from Guichaoua. Guichaoua confirms in 5/11/10 e-mail. 
 
Côte D’Ivoire, 2002 (vs. MJP, MPCI, MPIGO – State A could be Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Liberia, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone) 
• Liberia  Côte D’Ivoire, 2002. “Evidence of a direct link between the Ivorian military 
leaders of the MPCI and Taylor has yet to be established. However, a Taylor insider 
informed ICG that two top Taylor aides, Mohamed Salamé, the ambassador-at-large in 
Abidjan and Taylor’s main financier and arms broker, and General Melvin Sobandi, 
Minister of Post and Telecommunications in Monrovia, travelled to Bouaké on 17 
September 2002 to deliver money.” (International Crisis Group, “Tackling Liberia: The 
Eye of the Regional Storm,” Africa Report No. 62 (2003), p. 18) The conflict began on 
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9/19/02. No mention of other potential State As (except a marginal manpower 
contribution from Sierra Leone) in pp. 14-28, the part of the report dealing with Côte 
D’Ivoire. 
o Burkina Faso does appear to have supported the 9/19/02 coup outright, but the 
link between the 1987 Burkinabe coup in the 2002 Ivoirian conflict is tenuous. 
The original pan-Africanists initially left Côte D’Ivoire alone – it wasn’t until its 
longtime president died in 1993 that Burkina Faso got interested in overthrowing 
its government (p. 26). 
o Extending Burkina Faso’s influence to 2002 would add 3 cases of potential 
contagion: Côte D’Ivoire 2002, Niger 1996 (most certainly not one), and Guinea 
2000 (possibly one). 
• According to UCDP conflict summary, potential State As were not directly involved in 
onset. “At the outset of the conflict numerous diplomats and regional experts voiced a 
fear that the conflict would become entangled with the civil wars to the west of Ivory 
Coast, i.e. in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea. … Reflecting this concern, the conflict in 
Ivory Coast has been rife with accusations, counteraccusations and denials of foreign 
involvement in the fighting. However, these claims are all extremely difficult to verify, 
and no clear evidence has been presented by either side in the conflict.  … Stronger 
evidence of cross-border links exists when it comes to the western groups, MJP and 
MPIGO, as there were consistent reports of Liberians fighting together with the rebels. 
However, it is unclear if the Liberian soldiers were part of the Liberian army, or if they 
were mercenaries fighting for loot. There were also rumors of Sierra Leonean ex-rebel 
group RUF being involved in the fighting in western Ivory Coast.” Both MJP and 
MPIGO arose after the initial onset of the conflict in September 2002. No other states 
mentioned as potential contributors. 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in pp. Jessica Kohler, “From 
Miraculous to Disastrous: The Crisis in Côte D’Ivoire,” Centre for Applied Studies in 
International Negotiations (2003), pp. 11-35. Again, Liberian involvement is strongly 
alleged in the emergence of the western rebel groups (MJP and MPIGO), but these 
emerged after the initial onset of the conflict. 
• No mention of potential State As (besides Liberia and Burkina Faso – see above) in 
International Crisis Group, “Côte D’Ivoire: The War is Not Yet Over,” Africa Report No. 
72 (2003), pp. 1-16. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Senegal, or Sierra 
Leone to Cote D’Ivoire, pending confirmation from Kohler. Unfortunately I can’t track 
her down. 
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Guinea, 2000 (vs. RFDG – State A could be Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Niger, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone) 
• Liberia  Guinea, 2000. UCDP conflict summary: “The governmental conflict in Guinea 
was closely tied to regional instability and developments in neighboring countries. The 
rebels, RFDG …, sought to oust the perceived undemocratic regime of Guinea, and 
received strong support from Liberia’s President Charles Taylor.” 
• Sierra Leone  Guinea, 2000. UCDP conflict summary: “There were also indications 
that cooperation took place between RFDG and RUF (Revolutionary United Front) in the 
battles.” 
• Guinea-Bissau  Guinea, 2000. UCDP conflict summary: “Placed in an extremely 
volatile region, where conflicts had raged during more than a decade, Guinea was up until 
2000 a haven for roughly 500,000 refugees from war-torn Liberia, Sierra Leone and 
Guinea-Bissau.” No mention of Niger or Senegal. 
• No mention of Niger or Senegal’s contribution to Guinea onset in Prosper Addo, 
“Mercenarism in West Africa: A Threat to Ghana’s Democracy?” Kofi Annan 
International Peacekeeping Training Centre Paper No. 2 (2004). 
• Hence, in the absence of a third source, I will code no contagion from Niger or Senegal 
to Guinea, pending confirmation from Addo … who unfortunately cannot be located. 
 
Burkina Faso, 1987 (vs. Popular Front – State A could be Cameroon, Ghana, Togo, Gambia) 
• No mention of any potential State As in UCDP conflict summary, except “Vocally anti-
imperialist, Sankara had strained relations with many members of the international 
community, and cultivated ties with radical powers at the time, such as Ghana and 
Libya.” 
• No mention of any potential State As in Godfrey Mwakikagile, Military Coups in West 
Africa since the Sixties (Huntington, N.Y.: Nova Science Publishers, 2001), pp. 18-24. 
• No mention of any potential State As in Pierre Englebert, Burkina Faso: Unsteady 
Statehood in West Africa (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 52-63, 152-157. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Cameroon, Ghana, Togo, or Gambia to Burkina 
Faso, pending confirmation from Englebert. Englebert confirms in 5/11/10 e-mail. 
 
Liberia, 1980 (vs. Forces of Samuel Doe – State A could be Mauritania) 
• No mention of Mauritania in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of Mauritania in Godfrey Mwakikagile, Military Coups in West Africa since 
the Sixties (Huntington, N.Y.: Nova Science Publishers, 2001), pp. 93-98. 
• No mention of Mauritania in D. Elwood Dunn and S. Byron Tarr, Liberia: A National 
Polity in Transition (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1988), pp. 86-98. 
• No mention of either potential State A in G.E. Saigbe Boley, Liberia: The Rise and Fall 
of the First Republic (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983), pp. 80-135. 
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• Hence I will code no contagion from Mauritania to Liberia in 1980, pending 
confirmation from Mwakikagile. 
 
Liberia, 1989 (vs. NPFL – State A could be Gambia, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Togo, Ghana) 
• Gambia  Liberia, 1989. See below. 
• Ghana  Liberia, 1989. Stephen Ellis writes in 5/7/10 e-mail: “There was a group of 
Liberian politicians – generally known as the ‘progressives’- working for a revolution in 
Liberia from the late 1970s.  They were quite well networked internationally, especially 
in Ghana and Gambia.  There was a direct influence on events in Liberia from the 
Gambian revolutionaries and also the Ghanaians.” (See also Ellis 1995 below.) 
• Burkina Faso  Liberia, 1989. “Burkina Faso lent several hundred of its soldiers to 
Taylor in the early stages of Liberia’s war. Burkinabe leader Blaise Compaoré had 
obtained Taylor’s release from a Ghanaian jail a few years earlier and later introduced 
him to Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi, who sought to punish Doe for closing down the 
Libyan embassy in Liberia in 1981 and for supporting U.S. anti-Libyan policies.” 
(Adekeye Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-
Bissau (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002), p. 48. Arguably this link with Burkina Faso 
would not have existed had Compaoré not staged his coup in 1987; Compaoré had 
specific personal links to Taylor (friend of daughter of President of Cote D’Ivoire, who 
was Taylor’s main sponsor – Stephen Ellis, “Liberia 1989-1992: A Study of Ethnic and 
Spiritual Violence,” African Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 375 (1995): 165-197, p. 180). No 
mention of Cameroon or Togo as contributors to onset. 
o Paul Richards (see “Sierra Leone” below) writes in 4/30/10 e-mail: “The forces 
loaned by Taylor to establish the RUF in Sierra Leone 1991-2 included some 
francophone African fighters.  I discussed some evidence on this point in a piece 
comparing rebellions in Liberia and Sierra Leone cited in the book you have been 
reading [Richards 2002, cited in the Sierra Leone 1991 entry below].  Some 
eyewitnesses I interviewed in 1991 and 1992 claimed these francophone rebels 
were from Burkina Faso, and the 2004 conflict mapping document of No Peace 
Without Justice (which is a very detailed account of the war, chiefdom by 
chiefdom from 1991 to 2001, drawing evidence from some 400 locally based 
eyewitnesses, including some - though not many - RUF members) confirms this 
idea, though of course based on testimony from 15 years later.  Both Charles 
Taylor of the Liberian NPFL and (more especially) Foday Sankoh of the 
Sierra Leone RUF assisted in the coup that overthrew Thomas Sankara and 
installed Blaise Compaoré in Burkina Faso in 1987.” This suggests that 
without the coup in Burkina Faso, neither Taylor nor Sankoh would have had as 
significant support from Burkina Faso. 
• UCDP conflict summary: “In the initial attack on Liberia, Taylor had the assistance of the 
government of Burkina Faso.” Not clear on why. No mention of Cameroon or Togo. 
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• No mention of any potential State As in Godfrey Mwakikagile, Military Coups in West 
Africa since the Sixties (Huntington, N.Y.: Nova Science Publishers, 2001), pp. 98-103. 
• No mention of Cameroon or Togo in Stephen Ellis, “Liberia’s Warlord Insurgency,” in 
Christopher Claphman, ed., African Guerrillas (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1998), pp. 155-160. 
• No mention of Cameroon or Togo in Stephen Ellis, “Liberia 1989-1992: A Study of 
Ethnic and Spiritual Violence,” African Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 375 (1995): 165-197. 
However, several other notes: 
o “The core group of NPFL guerillas, Libyan-trained and supplemented by … 
internationalist revolutionaries from Gambia and Sierra Leone…” (p. 167) 
o “During visits to Libya probably between 1986 and 1989, Taylor had met a 
number of Gambians who had taken part in a coup attempt … in 1981 with 
Libyan backing. … They included Kukoi Samba Sanyang, known to the NPFL as 
‘Dr Manning.’ At the beginning of operations in 1989, Dr Manning was officially 
listed as Taylor’s vice-president, although he soon abandoned the NPFL after 
being edged out of the leadership by Taylor, and retired to manage a bar.” (pp. 
168-169) 
 Suggests Gambia (1981)  Liberia (1989) is a case of contagion. I will 
code it so for now, pending confirmation from Ellis. 
o “In Accra Taylor befriended the Burkinabe ambassador, … at a time when 
Captain Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso and Chairman John Rawlings of Ghana 
were close friends, and both had quite close relations with Libya. … Liberian 
exiles in Accra succeeded in contacting the new ruler of Burkina Faso, Blaise 
Compaoré, who prevailed upon the Ghanaian authorities to release Taylor into his 
own custody.” 
 Suggests that Taylor was friendly with Burkina Faso before the 1987 coup 
there, and that Burkina Faso might have sponsored Taylor’s insurgency 
even if Sankara had stayed in power. However, it appears that the specific 
links between Taylor and Compaoré were quite strong (see above), so I 
will still code this as contagion. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Cameroon or Togo to Liberia in 1989, pending 
confirmation from Ellis. Ellis confirms in 5/7/10 e-mail. 
 
Sierra Leone, 1991 (vs. RUF – State A could be Burkina Faso, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Senegal, 
Togo) 
• Liberia  Sierra Leone, 1991. UCDP conflict summary (on Liberia): “Taylor instead 
established a ‘state’ of his own in the territory he controlled, which was named ‘Greater 
Liberia.’ At one point making up around 90% of Liberia’s total territory, ‘Greater 
Liberia’ became the centre of an enormous war-economy empire, from where Taylor sold 
and smuggled timber, iron ore and diamonds. In 1991 Taylor expanded his empire into 
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Sierra Leone’s diamond-rich territory, where he assisted Foday Sankoh in launching the 
Revolutionary United Front’s (RUF) attack on the government of Sierra Leone.” 
• Burkina Faso  Sierra Leone, 1991. No mention of potential State As (besides Liberia) 
in UCDP conflict summary on Sierra Leone, except: “Burkina Faso also acted as a 
supporting party to RUF, providing the movement with valuable supplies throughout the 
conflict.” 
o Paul Richards writes in 4/30/10 e-mail: “The forces loaned by Taylor to establish 
the RUF in Sierra Leone 1991-2 included some francophone African fighters.  I 
discussed some evidence on this point in a piece comparing rebellions in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone cited in the book you have been reading [Richards 2002, cited 
below].  Some eyewitnesses I interviewed in 1991 and 1992 claimed these 
francophone rebels were from Burkina Faso, and the 2004 conflict mapping 
document of No Peace Without Justice (which is a very detailed account of the 
war, chiefdom by chiefdom from 1991 to 2001, drawing evidence from some 400 
locally based eyewitnesses, including some - though not many - RUF members) 
confirms this idea, though of course based on testimony from 15 years later.  Both 
Charles Taylor of the Liberian NPFL and (more especially) Foday Sankoh of 
the Sierra Leone RUF assisted in the coup that overthrew Thomas Sankara 
and installed Blaise Compaoré in Burkina Faso in 1987.” This suggests that 
without the coup in Burkina Faso, neither Taylor nor Sankoh would have had as 
significant support from Burkina Faso. 
• Paul Richards writes in 4/30/10 e-mail: “The Malian conflict may have been relevant in 
terms of arms supply.  According to Stephen Ellis, large numbers of guns not needed 
when that conflict was ended found their way into the Liberian conflict (and almost 
certainly, therefore, into Sierra Leone also) probably traded through regional networks of 
Fula and Mandinka merchants also operating in diamond supply from Sierra Leone.” I 
believe the Mali conflict didn’t end until 1995, although there was a peace agreement in 
1991, so this does not appear to be a case of contagion contributing to onset. 
• No mention of potential State As (besides Liberia and Burkina Faso) in Adekeye 
Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002), pp. 79-84. 
• No mention of potential State As (besides Liberia) in Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy 
M. Weinstein, “Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War,” American 
Journal of Political Science, Vol. 52, No. 2 (2008): 436-455, p. 437. 
• No mention of potential State As (besides Liberia and Burkina Faso) in Paul Richards, 
Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone (Oxford, U.K.: 
The International African Institute, 2002), pp. xiii-33. Does note, on p. 3: “[Prince] 
Johnson’s guerilla know-how formed these youthful recruits into an effective insurgent 
force. Drugged on crack cocaine, recruits deployed terroristic methods apparently 
382 
 
reflecting a knowledge of Renamo tactics in Mozambique.” However, this influence 
seems purely tactical and also post-onset. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Mali, Niger, Senegal, or Togo to Sierra Leone, 
pending confirmation from Richards. Richards (in 4/30/10 e-mail, also cited at length 
above) alleges that both the Ghana and Togo coups had Libyan sponsorship – “certainly 
there were attempts to set up RUF-type rebellions in Ghana, Gambia and Zaire [and 
Togo].” Cites no specific evidence that these coups themselves influenced the RUF, and 
calls the links “quite marginal.” Suggests I look at the Yeebo book cited in his book. 
 
Ghana, 1966 (vs. NLC – State A could be Cameroon, Gabon, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo) 
• Democratic Republic of the Congo  Ghana, 1966. “Major A.A. Afrifa, one of the main 
[coup] plotters, felt that 43 Ghanaian soldiers had lost their lives in the Congo because of 
Nkrumah’s [overthrown in the coup] disastrous policies in that conflict.” This was a key 
grievance behind the coup. Roger S. Gocking, The History of Ghana (Westport, Conn.: 
Greenwood Press, 2005), p. 148. Also mentions another international influence on the 
military’s decision to revolt: the fear of Nkrumah’s upcoming intervention in Rhodesia 
(an extrastate conflict) (p. 138). No mention of other potential State As.  
• No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of potential State As in Godfrey Mwakikagile, Military Coups in West Africa 
since the Sixties (Huntington, N.Y.: Nova Science Publishers, 2001), pp. 37-40, though 
he does note that Nkrumah “antagonized the West” with his “relentless support for 
African liberation movements” (p. 38). 
• No mention of potential State As in LaVerle Berry, ed., Ghana: A Country Study, Third 
Edition (Washington: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1995), pp. 32-37. 
Does note, as above, the military’s discontent with “Nkrumah’s aggressive involvement 
in African politics and by his belief that Ghanaian troops could be sent anywhere in 
Africa to fight so-called liberation wars” (p. 36). 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Cameroon, Gabon, or Nigeria to Ghana in 1966, 
pending confirmation from Gocking. 
 
Ghana, 1981 (vs. Forces of Jerry John Rawlings – State A could be Gambia, Liberia, Mauritania) 
• No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of potential State As in Godfrey Mwakikagile, Military Coups in West Africa 
since the Sixties (Huntington, N.Y.: Nova Science Publishers, 2001), pp. 40-45. 
• No mention of potential State As in Roger S. Gocking, The History of Ghana (Westport, 
Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2005), pp. 179-193. 
• No mention of Potential State As in LaVerle Berry, ed., Ghana: A Country Study, Third 
Edition (Washington: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1995), pp. 42-53 
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• Hence I will code no contagion from Gambia, Liberia, or Mauritania to Ghana in 1981, 
pending confirmation form Gocking. 
 
Togo, 1986 (vs. MTD – State A could be Cameroon, Gambia, Ghana) 
• Ghana  Togo, 1986. UCDP conflict summary: “It was also claimed that the rebels had 
been backed by Ghana and Burkina Faso, who allegedly had assisted in recruiting, 
arming and training the rebels. However, these allegations were rejected by the two 
neighboring states.” Ghana’s coup, which brought Rawlings to power, seemingly 
returned it to an interventionist posture internationally by aligning more with Nkrumah 
(Mwakikagile 2001, 42-43). No mention of other potential State As. 
• No mention of potential State As (besides Ghana) in Godfrey Mwakikagile, Military 
Coups in West Africa since the Sixties (Huntington, N.Y.: Nova Science Publishers, 
2001), pp. 201-203. On Ghana, notes: “Civil unrest in neighboring Ghana … during the 
early 1980s triggered by bloody military coups in those two countries sent tens of 
thousands of refugees into Togo, causing a great humanitarian crisis and social 
instability.” (p. 202) 
• No mention of potential State As (besides Ghana) in Mathurin C. Houngnikpo, 
Determinants of Democratization in Africa: A Comparative Study of Benin and Togo 
(Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 2001), pp. 75, 96-97. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Cameroon or Gambia to Togo, pending 
confirmation from Houngnikpo. 
 
Cameroon, 1984 (vs. Forces of Ibrahim Saleh – State A could be Gambia, Ghana, Liberia) 
• No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of potential State As in James Achanyi Fontem, Cameroon: Remember April 
6 (Cathca Fund, 1993), pp. 1-90. 
• No mention of potential State As in Tambi Eyongetah Mbuagbaw, Robert Brain, and 
Robin Palmer, A History of the Cameroon, Second Edition (Harlow, U.K.: Longman, 
1987), pp. 137-141. 
• No mention of potential State As in Victor Julius Ngoh, History of Cameroon Since 1800 
(Presbook, Limbe, 1996), pp. 291-296. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Gambia, Ghana, or Liberia to Cameroon, pending 
confirmation from Palmer. Palmer says in a 5/12/10 e-mail that he doesn’t know. 
 
Nigeria, 1966 (vs. Forces of Patrick Nzeogwu – State A could be Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana) 
• No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of potential State As in Charles U. Uwanaka, Nigerian Civil War: Causes, 
Events (1953-1967), Second Edition (Mafoluku, Nigeria: Pattony Publicity, 1986), pp. 5-
41. 
384 
 
• No mention of potential State As (at least not by name) in Garba Ashiwaju and Olusegun 
Areola, eds., Nigeria: The First 25 Years (Ibadan, Nigeria: Ibadan University Press, 
1995), pp. 68-69, 106-109. 
• No mention of potential State As in Richard Akinnola, History of Coup D’Etats in 
Nigeria (Lagos: Media Research and Resource Bureau, 1998), pp. 1-11. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Cameroon, Gabon, or Ghana to Nigeria in 1966, 
pending confirmation from Akinnola. Akinnola confirms in 5/12/10 Facebook message. 
 
Nigeria, 1967 (vs. Republic of Biafra – State A could be Gabon, Ghana) 
• No mention of potential State As in Armstrong Matiu Adejo, ed., The Nigerian Civil 
War: Forty Years After, What Lessons? (Makurdi, Nigeria: Aboki Publishers, 2008), pp. 
3-47, 451-472. It is noted that the experience of Katanga made accommodation of 
secession out of the question (p. 42), but I doubt accommodation would ever have been 
on the table anyway. 
• No mention of potential State As in Major General H.B. Momoh, ed., The Nigerian Civil 
War, 1967-1970: History and Reminiscences (Ibadan, Nigeria: Sam Bookman Publishers, 
2000), pp. 3-63. 
• No mention of potential State As in Herbert Ekwe-Ekwe, The Biafra War: Nigeria and 
the Aftermath (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990), except that Gabon was a 
channel for French arms to Biafra (likely post-onset, as corroborated by other sources, 
around 1968) (p. 105). 
• No mention of potential State As in Eghosa E. Osaghae, Ebere Onwudiwe, and Rotimi T. 
Suberu, eds., The Nigerian Civil War and its Aftermath (Ibadan, Nigeria: John Archers, 
2002). 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Gabon or Ghana to Nigeria in 1967, pending 
confirmation from Adejo. 
 
Nigeria, 2004 (vs. Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa and NDPVF [different territorial incompatibilities] – 
State A could be Côte D’Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Somalia, Afghanistan) 
• Guinea-Bissau  Nigeria, 2004. “Given this background, the paper explores the origin of 
the present oil violence in the Niger Delta and how it has been intensified through the use 
of weapons that are primarily smuggled from Guinea-Bissau, Gabon and Cameroon.” 
Victor Ojakorotu and Ufo Okeke-Uzodike, “Oil, Arms Proliferation and Conflict in the 
Niger Delta of Nigeria,” African Journal on Conflict Resolution (2006): 85-106, pp. 85-
86. 
• Liberia  Nigeria, 2004. “Nigerian peacekeepers have also been identified as a source of 
black market weapons. Nigerian soldiers have served in a number of peacekeeping 
missions in Africa, including Sierra Leone and Liberia, among others. This has provided 
Nigerian soldiers with access to small arms. Soldiers returning from peacekeeping 
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missions have sold small arms on the Nigerian black market, providing ‘a ready source of 
assault weapons’ for the Nigerian population.” (Jennifer M. Hazen with Jonas Horner, 
“Small Arms, Armed Violence, and Insecurity in Nigeria: The Niger Delta in 
Perspective,” Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper No. 20 (2007), p. 37) 
o “Violence in the Delta region blossomed in 2003 and 2004. In the lead-up to the 
2003 elections, violence became a tool for politicians to gain power. This 
included the provision of small arms to groups to rally support for certain 
politicians and deter the opposition from challenging these politicians.” (Hazen 
2007, 77) 
• Sierra Leone  Nigeria, 2004. “Nigerian peacekeepers have also been identified as a 
source of black market weapons. Nigerian soldiers have served in a number of 
peacekeeping missions in Africa, including Sierra Leone and Liberia, among others. This 
has provided Nigerian soldiers with access to small arms. Soldiers returning from 
peacekeeping missions have sold small arms on the Nigerian black market, providing ‘a 
ready source of assault weapons’ for the Nigerian population.” (Jennifer M. Hazen with 
Jonas Horner, “Small Arms, Armed Violence, and Insecurity in Nigeria: The Niger Delta 
in Perspective,” Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper No. 20 (2007), p. 37) 
• Democratic Republic of the Congo  Nigeria, 2004. “The weapons used by the militants 
are abundant in the country since small-arms filter into Nigeria from conflict zones like 
Liberia, Sudan, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone.” (Erich 
Marquardt, “The Niger Delta Insurgency and Its Threat to Energy Security,” Terrorism 
Monitor, Vol. 4, No. 16 (2006)) 
• Sudan  Nigeria, 2004. “The weapons used by the militants are abundant in the country 
since small-arms filter into Nigeria from conflict zones like Liberia, Sudan, Somalia, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone.” (Erich Marquardt, “The Niger Delta 
Insurgency and Its Threat to Energy Security,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 4, No. 16 (2006)) 
• Somalia  Nigeria, 2004. “The weapons used by the militants are abundant in the 
country since small-arms filter into Nigeria from conflict zones like Liberia, Sudan, 
Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone.” (Erich Marquardt, “The 
Niger Delta Insurgency and Its Threat to Energy Security,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 4, 
No. 16 (2006)) 
• Afghanistan  Nigeria, 2004. No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict 
summary, although Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa was strongly inspired by the Taliban in 
Afghanistan (the leader called himself “Mullah Omar”). 
• No mention of potential State As in Sofiri Joab-Peterside, “On the Militarization of 
Nigeria’s Niger Delta: The Genesis of Ethnic Militia in Rivers State, Nigeria,” 
Economies of Violence Working Paper No. 21 (2007). 
• No mention of potential State As in Sanusi Aliyu, Religious-Based Violence and National 
Security in Nigeria: Case Studies of Kaduna State and the Taliban Activities in Borno 
State (M.A. Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2009), pp. 78-92. 
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Does mention that some members of the Nigerian Taliban trained with AQIM (from 
Algeria), but the numbers are quite small (~25). 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Côte D’Ivoire, Guinea, or Senegal to Nigeria in 
2004, pending confirmation from Joab-Peterside. 
 
Gabon, 1964 (vs. Forces loyal to Léon M'Ba – State A could be Cameroon) 
• No mention of Cameroon in James F. Barnes, Gabon: Beyond the Colonial Legacy 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 39-47. 
• No mention of Cameroon in Brian Weinstein, Gabon: Nation-Building on the Ogooué 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966), pp. 151-152. 
• No mention of Cameroon in Charles F. Darlington and Alice B. Darlington, African 
Betrayal (New York: David McKay Company, 1968), pp. 126-141. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Cameroon to Gabon, pending confirmation from 
Barnes. This is kind of a strange intrastate conflict – the coup itself was bloodless, and it 
was only after French intervention to restore M’Ba to power (an intervention possibly 
motivated by other bloodless coups in Francophone Africa) that deaths occurred. Barnes 
mostly confirms in 5/13/10 e-mail. 
 
Central African Republic, 1996 (vs. Forces of Cyriac Souke – State A could be Burundi, Chad, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, 
Somalia, Sudan, Uganda) 
• No mention of potential State As in (very brief) UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of potential State As as they pertain to the 1996 mutiny in Allard Blom and 
Jean Yamindou, “A Brief History of Armed Conflict and its Impact on Biodiversity in the 
Central African Republic,” Biodiversity Support Program, World Wildlife Fund (2001), 
pp. 11-12. The conflict in the north is influenced by Sudan, Chad, and the DRC, but this 
appears unrelated to the mutinies (and onset after 1996). 
• No mention of potential State As in Paul Melly, “Central African Republic – Uncertain 
Prospects,” WRITENET Paper No. 14 (2002), pp. 1-8. 
• No mention of potential State As in Andreas Mehler, “The Production of Insecurity by 
African Security Forces: Insights from Liberia and the Central African Republic,” 
Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) Working Paper No. 114 (2009), pp. 9-10. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Burundi, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda to the 
Central African Republic, pending confirmation from Melly. Melly confirms in 5/14/10 
e-mail. 
 
Chad, 1966 (vs. FROLINAT – State A could be Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Ethiopia, Sudan) 
• No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. 
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• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Mario J. Azevedo, Roots of 
Violence: A History of War in Chad (Ajanta Offset, India: Gordon and Breach Publishers: 
1998), pp. 89-95. FROLINAT was formed inside Sudan, at Nyala (p. 92), but this does 
not appear to be related to the rebellion ongoing in Southern Sudan. 
• No mention of potential State As in Harold D. Nelson et al., Area Handbook for Chad 
(Washington: Foreign Area Studies, American University, 1972), pp. 119-127. Does note 
(p. 125): “The known members [leaders of FROLINAT] were exiles who operated from 
bases outside Chad; many had received guerilla and subversion training in Ghana before 
the overthrow of the government of Kwame Nkrumah in 1966 or in Algeria, Libya, Cuba, 
or North Korea. They had reentered Chad most often along the long and desolate eastern 
border with Sudan.” Again, the Sudanese connection doesn’t count because the Sudanese 
conflict at the time was in the south; as for the rest, only Cuba had an active substate 
conflict at the time of influence. 
• No mention of potential State As in Thomas Collelo, ed., Chad: A Country Study 
(Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1988), pp. 188-189. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Ethiopia, or Sudan to Chad, pending confirmation from Azevedo. Azevedo confirms in 
5/15/10 e-mail. 
 
Republic of the Congo, 1993 (vs. Cobras and Ninjas – State A could be Burundi, Chad, Djibouti, 
Ethiopia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Angola) 
• No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary; Angola and Chad 
intervened after the conflict had began (around 1997, which was by far the heaviest year 
in terms of casualties). 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Mohammed O. Maundi et al., 
Getting In: Mediators’ Entry into the Settlement of African Conflicts (Washington: 
United States Institute of Peace Press: 2006), pp. 85-91. Does note that the Cobras had 
elements from the DRC and Rwanda civil wars (p. 87), but these elements appear to 
postdate the 1993 onset by at least one year. 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Sypros Demetriou, Robert 
Muggah, and Ian Biddle, “Small Arms Availability, Trade and Impacts in the Republic of 
Congo,” Small Arms Survey Special Report (2002), pp. 4-5, 10-13. External actors are 
again mentioned in the context of the 1997 conflict only; arms purchases from abroad 
were apparently much more prevalent in the 1997 conflict than in the 1993 conflict. 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in David Eaton, “Diagnosing the 
Crisis in the Republic of the Congo,” Africa, Vol. 76, No. 1 (2006): 44-69. International 
influences are again limited to the 1997 conflict. 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to 1993 onset in Remy Bazenguissa-
Ganga, “The Spread of Political Violence in Congo-Brazzaville,” African Affairs, Vol. 98 
(1999): 37-54. 
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• Hence I will code no contagion from Burundi, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Rwanda, 
Somalia, Sudan, or Uganda to the Republic of the Congo, pending confirmation from 
Eaton. 
 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1960 (vs. State of Katanga and Independent Mining State of 
South Kasai – State A could be Ethiopia) 
• These secessionist movements began in summer 1960, and the Ethiopian coup did not 
take place until December 14, 1960 (UCDP conflict summary). Therefore Ethiopia  
D.R. Congo 1960 cannot be a case of contagion. 
 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1964 (vs. CNL – State A could be Ethiopia or Sudan) 
• China  Congo-Kinshasa, 1964. See below. 
• No mention of either potential State A in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of Ethiopia in Edgar O’Ballance, The Congo-Zaire Experience, 1960-1998 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), pp. 64-84. Does note that in late 1964 “President 
Ibrahim Abboud of Sudan flatly denied that any illicit arms for the NLC rebels had ever 
passed through his country” (p. 84). Also notes strong influence of P.R. China in terms 
of training NLC rebels (p. 69). 
• No mention of either potential State A in Jeanne M. Haskin, The Tragic State of the 
Congo: From Decolonization to Dictatorship (New York: Algora Publishing, 2005), p. 
36. 
• No mention of either potential State A in Léonce Ndikumana and Kisangani Emizet, 
“The Economics of Civil War: The Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo,” Political 
Economy Research Institute (University of Massachusetts, Amherst) Working Paper No, 
63 (2003), pp. 10-14. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Ethiopia or Sudan to D.R. Congo in 1964, pending 
confirmation from Emizet. 
 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1977 (vs. FLNC – State A could be Chad, Ethiopia, Sudan, 
Uganda, Angola) 
• Angola  Zaire, 1977. UCDP conflict summary: “In March 1977, the FLNC launched a 
military campaign from Angola with the objective of toppling the regime of President 
Mobutu. The FLNC was mainly made up of ex-Katangan gendarmes who after the Zaire 
(Katanga) civil war had helped the Angolan government fight their rebel groups.” No 
mention of other potential State As. 
• Cuba  Zaire, 1977. The Cuban government “had been supplying arms to the FLNC, as 
Mobutu favored the Chinese form of Communism over that espoused by Moscow” 
(Edgar O’Ballance, The Congo-Zaire Experience, 1960-1998 (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 2000), p. 115). 
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• No mention of potential State As (besides Angola) in Edgar O’Ballance, The Congo-
Zaire Experience, 1960-1998 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), pp. 108-122. On 
Angola, notes that “Mobutu declared that no expense would be spared in relation to the 
Angolan struggle for freedom” in 1975 (p. 109). 
• No mention of potential State As (besides Angola) in Jeanne M. Haskin, The Tragic State 
of the Congo: From Decolonization to Dictatorship (New York: Algora Publishing, 
2005), pp. 41, 59. 
• No mention of potential State As (besides Angola) in Léonce Ndikumana and Kisangani 
Emizet, “The Economics of Civil War: The Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo,” 
Political Economy Research Institute (University of Massachusetts, Amherst) Working 
Paper No, 63 (2003), pp. 15-20. On Angola: “With the victory of the MPLA in Angola, 
the Katangan gendarmes were unemployed and sought to return to the Congo and reclaim 
their region (now named Shaba) under the banner of the Front for the National Liberation 
of Congo (Front pour la Libération Nationale, FLNC).” (p. 17) 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset (besides Angola) in Thomas P. 
Odom, Shaba II: The French and Belgian Intervention in Zaire in 1978 (Leavenworth, 
Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 1993). 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset (besides Angola) in Peter 
Mangold, “Shaba I and Shaba II,” Survival, Vol. 21, No. 3 (1979): 107-115. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Chad, Ethiopia, Sudan, or Uganda to Zaire in 1977, 
pending confirmation from Emizet. 
 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1996 (vs. AFDL – State A could be Burundi, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, 
Angola) 
• Rwanda  DRC, 1996. “Spillover can … cause other civil wars in neighboring countries 
— just as the civil war in Rwanda triggered the catastrophic civil war in next-door 
Congo.” Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, Things Fall Apart: Containing the 
Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 2. 
o UCDP conflict summary: “Events in Rwanda played an important part in the early 
stage of the conflict. During the first phase, Rwandan troops assisted AFDL, 
aiming to both root out the Hutu militia operating from Zairian territory and to 
topple Mobutu, who had supported the previous regime in Rwanda, and who 
accepted the presence of the armed Hutu groups on Zairian soil. Also, Uganda 
provided much needed military training and troops to AFDL, albeit never openly 
admitting to doing so. Most analysts conclude that Uganda’s involvement was 
mainly based on security concerns, as anti-Museveni rebel groups ADF (Alliance 
of democratic Forces), WNBF (West Nile Bank Front) and LRA (Lord's 
Resistance Army) operated out of Zairian territory. The only state openly 
admitting to sending troops in aid of AFDL was Angola, who had the same 
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motivation as Rwanda and Uganda. Mobutu had for years supported Angolan 
rebel group UNITA, allowing the rebels to launch attacks from Zairian territory.” 
• Uganda  DRC, 1996. “The anti-Mobutu alliance [including Uganda] was formed 
around a single goal: ‘to cripple the insurgency movements challenging their 
governments from bases in the Congo.” Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, 
Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War (Washington: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 122. [Also Rwanda  DRC, 1998, Sudan  DRC, 
1998 and Uganda  DRC, 1998. The 1998 conflict is not listed by UCDP/PRIO; it is 
lumped in with the 1996 war.] 
• Angola  DRC, 1996. “The anti-Mobutu alliance [including Angola] was formed around 
a single goal: ‘to cripple the insurgency movements challenging their governments from 
bases in the Congo.” Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, Things Fall Apart: 
Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War (Washington: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2007), p. 122. 
• Burundi  DRC, 1996. “The Zairean government accused Burundi and Rwanda of 
provoking the conflict, and of arming and training the Banyamulenge militia. This was 
denied. … Kabila had been aided considerably by regular military elements from Rwanda 
and Burundi, especially in terms of organization, administration and supplies.” (Edgar 
O’Ballance, The Congo-Zaire Experience, 1960-1998 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
2000), pp. 164, 175. No mention of other potential State As besides Rwanda, Uganda, 
and Angola. 
• 2/5/11: Changing the coding below to non-contagion; it’s too convoluted, and you would 
have to believe that the LRA would not exist (or shelter in Zaire) without Sudanese state 
support. 
o Sudan  DRC, 1996. “Soon to join Rwanda were Uganda and Angola. … 
Uganda had also suffered assaults by rebel groups which were based inside Zaire. 
Anti-Museveni movements that were supported by Sudan were attacking from the 
region.” (Jeanne M. Haskin, The Tragic State of the Congo: From Decolonization 
to Dictatorship (New York: Algora Publishing, 2005), p. 79) So Sudan’s war  
Ugandan support for SPLA  Sudanese support for LRA  Ugandan invasion of 
Zaire to neutralize LRA. A bit of stretch, maybe. No mention of other potential 
State As (besides those noted above). 
• No mention of other potential State As (besides those already mentioned) in UCDP 
conflict summary. 
• No mention of other potential State As (besides those already mentioned) in Thomas 
Turner, The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth, and Reality (London: Zed Books, 2007). Does 
note that “Somalia syndrome” discouraged as U.S./UN intervention in Rwanda, which 
perhaps played some role in the Congo events (p. 153). 
391 
 
• Hence I will code no contagion from the Central African Republic, Chad, Djibouti, 
Ethiopia, the Republic of the Congo, or Somalia to the D.R. Congo in 1996, pending 
confirmation from Emizet. 
 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2007 (vs. BDK – State A could be Burundi, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, 
Angola) 
• No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No positive mention of potential State As in Anneke Van Woudenberg, “‘We Will Crush 
You’: The Restriction of Political Space in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” 
Human Rights Watch (2008), pp. 66-82. DRC’s Minister of the Interior claimed 
Angolan/Brazzaville support for BDK rebels, but HRW considers these claims 
unsubstantiated and so apparently does the UN (pp. 72-73). 
• No mention of potential State As in David Lewis, “Up to 12 Dead as Congo Police Fire 
on Protestors,” Reuters (June 30, 2006). 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Michael Deibert, “Congo: 
Between Hope and Despair,” World Policy Journal (Summer 2008): 63-68, p. 66. 
• No mention of potential State As in United Nations Security Council, “Twenty-Fifth 
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo,” April 2, 2008, pp. 4-5. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, or Angola to D.R. 
Congo in 2007, pending confirmation from Van Woudenberg. 
 
Uganda, 1971 (vs. Forces of Idi Amin – State A could be Chad, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Ethiopia, Sudan) 
• Sudan  Uganda, 1971. “Amin established control over the armed forces by eliminating 
rivals, promoting officers loyal to him, and recruiting mercenaries from former Anya Nya 
guerillas in southern Sudan.” Thomas P. Ofcansky, Uganda: Tarnished Pearl of Africa 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), p. 42. No mention of other potential State As. 
• Democratic Republic of the Congo  Uganda, 1971. “The next development that 
boosted the image and fortunes of the army was the Congo Rebellion of 1964-1965.” 
Enlarged the army, improved equipment, improved prestige. But a major spur for the 
coup was “the army fear that Obote was creating a rival to the army.” A.G.G. Gingyera-
Pinycwa, Apolo Milton Obote and His Times (New York: NOK Publishers, 1978), pp. 
241, 245. No mention of other potential State As. 
• No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Tony Avirgan and Martha 
Honey, War in Uganda: The Legacy of Idi Amin (Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill & 
Company, 1982), pp. 4, 9-10. 
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• No mention in Eustace G. Rutiba, Towards Peace in Uganda (Kampala: Nile Valley 
Pyramids Publishing House, 1986), pp. 11-12. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Chad or Ethiopia to Uganda, pending confirmation 
from Honey. Honey confirms in 5/17/10 e-mail. 
 
Kenya, 1982 (vs. Forces of Hezekiah Ochuka – State A could be Chad, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda) 
• No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of potential State As in Andrew Morton, Moi: The Making of an African 
Statesman (London: Michael O’Mara Books, 1998), pp. 132-139. 
• No mention of potential State As in Jennifer A. Widner, The Rise of a Party-State in 
Kenya: From ‘Harambee!’ to ‘Nyayo!’ (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 
pp. 145-150. Note, however, p. 2 for a reverse demonstration effect: “Kenyans from 
widely different parts of the country and walks of life spoke of the need to proceed 
cautiously so as not to follow the paths of their neighbors in strife-torn Uganda, Sudan, 
Ethiopia, and Somalia.” 
• No mention of potential State As in William R. Ochieng, A History of Kenya (London: 
Macmillan Kenya, 1985), pp. 154-155. 
• No mention of potential State As in Pat McGowan and Thomas H. Johnson, “African 
Military Coups d’Etat and Underdevelopment: A Quantitative Historical Analysis,” 
Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4 (1984): 633-666, p. 636. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, 
Somalia, Sudan, or Uganda to Kenya, pending confirmation from Widner. She says I’m 
probably right in a 5/18/10 e-mail but suggests I contact David W. Throup, which I did. 
Throup confirms in 5/18/10 e-mail. 
 
Burundi, 1965 (vs. Forces loyal to Gervais Nyangoma – State A could be Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, Ethiopia, Sudan) 
• Democratic Republic of the Congo  Burundi, 1965. “This spiral of ethnicization 
[preceding the 1965 coup attempt] has been accelerated by external intervention: nearby 
Congo was a focal point for the Cold War; Burundi was a base for Chinese aid to the 
Kivu-based Lumumbist rebels. … Each camp has instrumentalized the ethnicism it found 
in the two countries: the ‘nonalignment group’ [in Burundi] were mainly Tutsi 
nationalists.” (Jean-Pierre Chrétien (Scott Straus, trans.), The Great Lakes of Africa: Two 
Thousands Years of History (New York: Zone Books, 2003), p. 313.) So Congo war  
Chinese presence in Burundi  heightening of ethnic tensions. Also strong influence of 
Rwandan ethnic conflicts on Burundi; see below. No mention of Ethiopia or Sudan. 
o “During much of 1963 and 1964, Burundi politics took the form of a three-
cornered fight among the Crown, the Monrovia Group (Hutu), and the Casablanca 
Group (Tutsi). … What eventually brought this fragile balance of power to the 
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verge of collapse was the sudden intrusion of East-West rivalries into the cauldron 
of Hutu-Tutsi competition. The key to this situation was the rapid escalation of 
the ‘Congo rebellion’ (1963-64) in eastern Zaire.” Brings in Chinese, which 
escalates Tutsi refugee / Casablanca faction coordination against Hutu. (Rene 
Lemarchand, Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide (Cambridge, U.K.: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 68) No mention of Ethiopia or Sudan. 
• No mention of potential State As in (brief) UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of potential State As in Nigel Watt, Burundi: Biography of a Small African 
Country (London: Hurst & Company, 2008), pp. 29-32. 
• No mention of potential State As in Warren Weinstein and Robert Schrire, Political 
Conflict and Ethnic Strategies: A Case Study of Burundi (Syracuse: Maxwell School of 
Citizenship and Public Affairs, Foreign and Comparative Series: Eastern Africa, 1976, 
no. 23), pp. 6-17. Again the influence of the 1959 conflict in Rwanda is strongly 
emphasized. This is probably not included in my dataset because Rwanda was not a state 
at the time. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Ethiopia or Sudan to Burundi in 1965, pending 
confirmation from Lemarchand. 
 
Burundi, 1991 (vs. Palipehutu – State A could be Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Somalia, 
Sudan, Uganda) 
• Rwanda  Burundi, 1991. “The invasion of Rwanda by the Uganda-based, Tutsi-
dominated RPF on October 1, 1990, brought Hutu-Tutsi tensions in Rwanda to an 
unprecedented level of intensity. In some localities, the result was a wholesale massacre 
of hundreds of thousands of innocent Tutsi civilians. As the threat of a Tutsi takeover 
loomed increasingly large, popular sympathy for the Palipehutu correspondingly 
increased in the border areas [of Burundi]. Furthermore, as it became apparent that the 
Burundi government was doing nothing to prevent certain Rwanda refugees of Tutsi 
origins from joining the RPF and was possibly encouraging the move, the Rwanda 
authorities understandably responded in kind and gave their whole-hearted support to 
Palipehutu refugees in Rwanda. Although the evidence is lacking, it is not unreasonable 
to assume that some local civil servants in Rwanda might have been given a free hand to 
refugees to organize themselves and recruit adherents and might have looked the other 
way when they began to infiltrate back into Burundi.” Rene Lemarchand, Burundi: 
Ethnic Conflict and Genocide (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 
153-154. No mention of other potential State As’ contribution to Burundi 1991 onset. 
• No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. Rwanda refugee spillovers 
start to influence the conflict in “late 1994,” well after onset. “Initially, the conflict in 
Burundi was a purely internal affair. However, this changed drastically in the mid-1990s, 
when the country was drawn in to the conflict in neighboring Zaire/DRC.” 
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• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to 1991 onset in Jean-Pierre Chrétien 
(Scott Straus, trans.), The Great Lakes of Africa: Two Thousands Years of History (New 
York: Zone Books, 2003), pp. 314-320. Again Rwanda matters, but the 1990 FPR 
conflict is not mentioned (Palipehutu violence was already underway by then). 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, or 
Uganda to Burundi in 1991, pending confirmation from Lemarchand. Lemarchand 
confirms in 5/18/10 e-mail. 
 
Rwanda, 1990 (vs. FPR – State A could be Chad, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda) 
• Uganda  Rwanda, 1990. “In October 1990, Rwanda came under attack from the Tutsis 
in Uganda. … The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which had sprung up in Uganda, 
continued to fight with Rwanda for another three years. … The RPF was comprised 
mostly of 4,000 second-generation Rwandan refugees who had joined Uganda’s National 
Resistance Army.” (Jeanne M. Haskin, The Tragic State of the Congo: From 
Decolonization to Dictatorship (New York: Algora Publishing, 2005), p. 75) 
o “The RPF invasion force consequently comprised well-trained troops with combat 
experience who had simply deserted their NRA positions and taken their 
weapons. They were under the leadership of a charismatic military commander, 
Major-General Fred Rwigyema. He was the most famous Rwandan refugee in the 
NRA. He had risen to become deputy commander of the army and deputy 
minister of defense. But then there had been growing resentment in Uganda 
towards the Rwandans and Rwigyema had been removed from office. Later it was 
decided that non-Ugandan nationals, including Rwandan refugees, were even to 
be precluded from owning land. It was this that was said to have prompted the 
invasion and the refugees’ attempts to regain the right of citizenship in their 
country of origin.” (Linda Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan 
Genocide (London: Verso, 2004), pp. 13-14) No mention of other potential State 
As. 
• No mention of potential State As (besides Uganda) in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset (besides Uganda) in Jean-Pierre 
Chrétien (Scott Straus, trans.), The Great Lakes of Africa: Two Thousands Years of 
History (New York: Zone Books, 2003), pp. 320-329. Burundi 1993 influenced Rwanda 
1994, but neither is coded as an onset. 
• No mention of potential State As (besides Uganda) in Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda 
Crisis: History of a Genocide (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 74-99. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Chad, Ethiopia, Somalia, or Sudan to Rwanda, 
pending confirmation from Prunier. Prunier confirms in 5/20/10 e-mail. 
o Prunier to me: “Remember (perhaps hard to do for a person of your generation) 
this was in pre-globalization days: no internet, no mobile phones, the world was 
divided in little boxes. In the RPF box there was only Rwanda and Uganda, 
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nothing else, not even France or the US.” An interesting observation, especially 
given my 5/19/10 phone conversation with David Throup who said the only 
countries Kenya thought about in the early 1980s were Tanzania and Uganda (and 
to some extent Zimbabwe). Has globalization made contagion by demonstration 
easier? Maybe, maybe not — there are some random conflict linkages in the 
modern period (Afghanistan-Nigeria 2004), but also in the pre-globalization 
period (China-Peru 1960s, Cuba-everywhere 1960s, Iraq-Ethiopia 1960s). 
 
Somalia, 1978 (vs. Forces of Abdulaahi Yusuf – State A could be Chad, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda) 
• Ethiopia  Somalia, 1978. According to the UCDP summary of the Ethiopia-Somalia 
interstate conflict, Ethiopian instability (1974 overthrow of Haile Selassie, among other 
conflicts) “led the government in Mogadishu to believe that it had a good chance of 
achieving its goal of incorporating the Ethiopian Ogaden region into Somalia.” Hence the 
Somalia invasion of Ethiopia (the Ogaden War). Somalia’s defeat in the Ogaden War led 
to the 1978 coup (UCDP summary of Somalia intrastate conflict). No mention of other 
potential State As. 
o “The terrible defeat [in the Ogaden War] and the refugee influx … quickly led to 
widespread public demoralization and to an upsurge of ‘tribalism’ … as different 
groups sought scapegoats to explain the debacle. Thus, hard on the heels of the 
Somalia retreat, an unsuccessful attempted coup was mounted against the regime 
in April 1978. … After the failure of the attempted coup, those who had escaped 
arrest regrouped, forming a guerilla operation called the Somalia Salvation 
Democratic Front.” (Ioan M. Lewis, Understanding Somalia and Somaliland: 
Culture, History, Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), p. 67) 
Shows how the Ogaden defeat caused not only the coup but also the 1981 conflict 
with the SSDF. No mention of other potential State As.  
• No mention of potential State As (besides Ethiopia) in I.M. Lewis, A Modern History of 
the Somali: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa, Fourth Edition (Oxford, U.K.: James 
Currey, 2002), pp. 231-246. 
• No mention of potential State As (besides Ethiopia) in Hussein M. Adam, “Somali Civil 
Wars,” in Taisier M. Ali and Robert O. Matthews, eds., Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and 
Resolution (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999), pp. 169-179. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Sudan, or Uganda to Somalia, pending confirmation from Lewis. Lewis confirms in 
5/19/10 e-mail. 
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Djibouti, 1991 (vs. FRUD – State A could be Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, 
Uganda) 
• Ethiopia  Djibouti, 1991. “The military leaders of the FRUD undoubtedly sought to 
duplicate guerrilla victories in neighboring Somalia and Ethiopia which had led to the 
over-throw of the Siad and Mengistu regimes during the first half of 1991.” (Peter J. 
Schraeder, “Ethnic Politics in Djibouti: From ‘Eye of the Hurricane’ to ‘Boiling 
Cauldron,” African Affairs, Vol. 92, No. 367 (1993): 203-221, p. 211) No mention of 
other potential State As. 
o “Despite significant levels of elite and popular support for the FRUD within 
Djibouti, it is also clear that at least a portion (exact figures are unobtainable) of 
the roughly 3,000 guerrillas come from Afar-inhabited territories of both Ethiopia 
and the provisional government of Eritrea. This situation is at least partially due to 
the large numbers of government troops, refugees, and, most significantly, light 
arms and weaponry that streamed into Djibouti in the aftermath of Mengistu’s 
overthrow in May 1991.” (Schraeder 1993, 212) 
• Somalia  Djibouti, 1991. “The military leaders of the FRUD undoubtedly sought to 
duplicate guerrilla victories in neighboring Somalia and Ethiopia which had led to the 
over-throw of the Siad and Mengistu regimes during the first half of 1991.” (Peter J. 
Schraeder, “Ethnic Politics in Djibouti: From ‘Eye of the Hurricane’ to ‘Boiling 
Cauldron,” African Affairs, Vol. 92, No. 367 (1993): 203-221, p. 211) 
o “In short, the Djiboutian civil war appears to be a largely internal conflict in 
which an internally based leadership lacks external military patrons but, 
nonetheless, enjoys the support of an undetermined number of migratory guerrilla 
fighters and a ready supply of light weapons from black markets in both 
neighboring Somalia and Ethiopia.” (Schraeder 1993, 214) 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset of conflict in UCDP conflict 
summary, though Djibouti shares ethnic ties with both Ethiopia and Somalia. 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset (besides Ethiopia and Somalia) in 
Mohamed Kadamy, “Djibouti: Between War and Peace,” Review of African Political 
Economy, Vol. 23, No. 70 (1996): 511-521. Does note that the MPL, an early precursor 
to FRUD in the 1970s, was “much influenced by the Vietnamese struggle and the African 
liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies” (515). Seems too loose and too long 
ago to be Angola  Djibouti contagion. 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset (besides Ethiopia and Somalia) in 
Amare Tekle, “International Relations in the Horn of Africa (1991-1996), Review of 
African Political Economy, Vol. 23, No, 70 (1996): 499-509. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Burundi, Chad, Rwanda, Sudan, or Uganda to 
Djibouti, pending confirmation from Schraeder. 
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Ethiopia, 1960 (vs. Forces of Mengistu Neway – State A could be Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Iraq) 
• No mention of Congo-Kinshasa in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of Congo-Kinshasa’s contribution to coup onset in Harold G. Marcus, The 
Politics of Empire: Ethiopia, Great Britain and the United States, 1941-1974, Second 
Edition (Lawrenceville, N.J.: Red Sea Press, 1995), pp. 116-123. 
• No mention of Congo-Kinshasa in Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-
1974 (London: James Currey, 1991), pp. 209-215. In fact, “a strong theme in the coup-
makers’ pronouncements was Ethiopia’s backwardness, in contrast with the forward 
strides taken by several newly independent African states” (213), suggesting Katanga 
should have dissuaded them. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Democratic Republic of the Congo to Ethiopia in 
1960, pending confirmation from Zewde. 
• I will also assume no contagion from Iraq to Ethiopia in 1960 (since the Mengistu 
Neway coup was not pan-Arab in orientation). 
 
Ethiopia, 1964 (vs. ELF – State A could be Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Iraq, 
Cuba) 
• Cuba  Ethiopia, 1964. See below. 
• Sudan  Ethiopia, 1964. “The wider political scene has been very relevant to the growth 
of the ELF. Since Ethiopia was … one of Israel’s footholds in Africa (and allowing Israel 
to push aid through to the rebels in the Southern Sudan), it was not surprising that the 
ELF was able to call on Muslim support for an anti-American, anti-Zionist struggle. In 
1965 the quantity of arms coming through Sudan became so obvious that the Sudan 
Government announced in June that it had discovered eighteen tons of Czech arms at 
Khartoum airport intended for the ELF. Syria and Iraq also supplied funds, arms and 
training [see below].” (Patrick Gilkes, The Dying Lion: Feudalism and Modernization in 
Ethiopia (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1975), pp. 196-197) No mention of Congo-
Kinshasa. 
• Iraq  Ethiopia, 1964. “Formed in 1961 by Eritrean exiles in the Middle East, … the 
ELF cast its struggle for Eritrean independence within a pan-Arab mould. This factor 
attracted much sympathy and support for it in the Arab world. Syria and Iraq, who 
regarded Eritrea as an integral part of the Arab homeland, became the ELF’s mainstay.” 
(Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1974 (London: James Currey, 1991), 
p. 219) The Iraqi government was pan-Arab because of the 1958 coup there (and 
subsequent coups in 1959 and 1963). No mention of Congo-Kinshasa. 
• No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Gebru Tareke, The Ethiopian 
Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), pp. 
55-60. Mentions influence of FLN (Algeria), but this was not a substate conflict (it was 
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an extrastate conflict). Also mentions demonstration effect/training from Cuba (p. 59), 
suggesting Cuba  Ethiopia contagion that is out-of-region. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Democratic Republic of the Congo to Ethiopia in 
1964, pending confirmation from Zewde. 
 
Ethiopia, 1975 (vs. ALF – State A could be Chad, Sudan, Uganda, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo) 
• No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of potential State As in Peter Schwab, Ethiopia: Politics, Economics and 
Society (London: Frances Pinter, 1985), pp. 26-27, 65-66. 
• No mention of potential State As in Dawit Wolde Giorgis, Red Tears: War, Famine and 
Revolution in Ethiopia (Trenton, N.J.: Red Sea Press, 1989), p. 117. 
• No mention of potential State As in Alex De Waal, Evil Days: Thirty Years of War and 
Famine in Ethiopia (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1991), pp. 63-64. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Chad, Sudan, or Uganda to Ethiopia in 1975, 
pending confirmation from Schwab. Schwab confirms in 5/19/10 e-mail. Afterward I 
code no contagion from Zaire to Ethiopia in 1975. I could ask Schwab again, but I’m 
pretty sure the Afar revolts were internal to Ethiopia. 
 
Ethiopia, 1976 (vs. EPRP/TPLF and WSLF [different incompatibilities] – State A could be 
Chad, Sudan, Uganda) 
• Sudan  Ethiopia, 1976. “Reinvigorated by the resumption of Sudanese backing and 
support from many other Arab states, and further strengthened through an agreement 
between the rival liberation movements for tactical cooperation in the field, the rebel 
forces launched a successful drive against the smaller garrison towns at the end of 1976.” 
(John Markakis and Nega Ayele, “Class and Revolution in Ethiopia,” Review of African 
Political Economy, No. 8 (1977): 99-108, p. 106) No mention of other potential State As 
[this covers both EPRP and WSLF] 
o This could be contagion depending on why Sudan supported the EPRP/TPLF. 
Consider the following: “Sudanese support [possibly during the 1980s] was also 
part of the larger Cold War drama, which involved … Ethiopian support for the 
rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Army.” (John Prendergast and Mark Duffield, 
“Liberation Politics in Ethiopia and Eritrea,” in Taisier M. Ali and Robert O. 
Matthews, eds., Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution (Montreal: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 1999), p. 37) Considering the Sudan  Ethiopia 1964 
contagion discussed above, I think this was plausibly going on in 1976. 
 SPLA didn’t exist until early 1980s, but Ethiopian support for southern 
resistance movements (leftovers from 1963-1972 Sudanese civil war) can 
be dated to 1976 – see Sudan 1983 below. 
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• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset [WSLF is not really mentioned] 
in UCDP conflict summaries, except: 
o “During the conflict, Sudan, for its own geopolitical reasons, supported TPLF 
(Tigray People’s Liberation Force) and EDU (Ethiopian Democratic Union).” Not 
sure if these “geopolitical reasons” are related to Sudan’s civil war. 
• No mention of potential State As in Yohannis Abate, “The Legacy of Imperial Rule: 
Military Intervention and the Struggle for Leadership in Ethiopia, 1974-1978,” Middle 
Eastern Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1983): 28-42. 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in John Young, “Ethnicity and 
Power in Ethiopia,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 23, No. 70 (1996): 531-
542. 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Edmond J. Keller, “Drought, 
War, and the Politics of Famine in Ethiopia and Eritrea,” Journal of Modern African 
Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4 (1992): 609-624. [This covers both TPLF and WSLF] 
• No mention of potential State As in Adam Lockyer, “Opposing Foreign Intervention’s 
Impact on the Course of Civil Wars: The Ethiopian-Ogaden Civil War, 1976-1980,” 
Paper Presented at the Australasian Political Studies Association Conference, University 
of Newcastle, September 25-27, 2006. [This covers WSLF only] 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Gebru Tareke, The Ethiopian 
Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), pp. 
76-89, 182-190. [This covers both TPLF and WSLF] 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Chad or Uganda to Ethiopia in 1976, pending 
confirmation from Tareke. Tareke confirms in 5/24/10 e-mail. 
 
Ethiopia, 1977 (vs. OLF – State A could be Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, 
Uganda) 
• Sudan  Ethiopia, 1977. UCDP conflict summary: “Apart from the national context, 
also the regional context provided opportunities for the rebel group. Relations between 
Ethiopia and neighboring Sudan were tense during the Dergue-period and the two 
countries attempted to destabilize each other by supporting rebel groups opposing the 
neighboring state’s regime. Thus, while Ethiopia funneled Soviet weapons and Libyan 
money to Sudanese rebel group SPLM/A (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army) 
and allowed them to have bases on Ethiopian territory, the Khartoum government let 
OLF train its soldiers in southwestern Sudan.” No mention of Chad, Zaire, or Uganda. 
o SPLA didn’t exist until early 1980s, but Ethiopian support for southern resistance 
movements (leftovers from 1963-1972 Sudanese civil war) can be dated to 1976 – 
see Sudan 1983 below. 
• No mention of potential State As in Alex De Waal, Evil Days: Thirty Years of War and 
Famine in Ethiopia (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1991), pp. 65-70, 81-82. 
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• No mention of potential State As in Dawit Wolde Giorgis, Red Tears: War, Famine and 
Revolution in Ethiopia (Trenton, N.J.: Red Sea Press, 1989), p. 117. 
• No mention of potential State As in Edmond J. Keller, Revolutionary Ethiopia: From 
Empire to People’s Republic (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), pp. 158-
163. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, or 
Uganda to Ethiopia in 1977, pending confirmation from Keller. Keller confirms in 
5/20/10 e-mail. Says Sudan’s support for OLF was “minimal,” but I’ll favor the UCDP 
account. 
 
Ethiopia, 1989 (vs. ALF – State A could be Chad, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda) 
• There is no actual evidence of the conflict’s re-onset in 1989. There was a re-onset in 
1996, when the ARDUF undertook armed struggle (UCDP conflict summary). See that 
conflict below. 
 
Ethiopia, 1994 (vs. ONLF – State A could be Burundi, Chad, Djibouti, Republic of the Congo, 
Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda) 
• Somalia  Ethiopia, 1994. “Via the massive wave of returnees to the Ogaden following 
Somalia’s [1991] disintegration, the ONLF managed to establish a presence within the 
territory it sought to liberate.” Tobias Hagmann and Mohamud H. Khalif, “State and 
Politics in Ethiopia’s Somali Region Since 1991,” Bildhaan: An International Journal of 
Somali Studies, Vol. 6 (2006): 25-49, p. 40. No mention of other potential State As. 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of potential State As (besides Somalia) in John Markakis, “The Somali in 
Ethiopia,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 23, No. 70 (1996): 567-570. 
• No mention of potential State As (besides Somalia) in Theodros Dagne, “Africa and the 
War on Terrorism: The Case of Somalia,” Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 4 
(2002): 62-73, pp. 68-69. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Burundi, Chad, Djibouti, Republic of the Congo, 
Rwanda, Sudan, or Uganda to Ethiopia in 1994, pending confirmation from Hagmann. 
Hagmann confirms in 5/27/10 e-mail. 
 
Ethiopia, 1995 (vs. al-Itahad al-Islami – State A could be Burundi, Chad, Djibouti, Republic of 
the Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda) 
• Somalia  Ethiopia, 1995. “Ethiopia conducted occasional cross-border raids against 
Islamist terrorists in the country [Somalia] whom Addis Ababa blamed for several attacks 
in Ethiopia itself.” Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, Things Fall Apart: 
Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War (Washington: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2007), p. 167. 
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• Sudan  Ethiopia, 1995. “Sudan’s attitude towards terrorism in Kenya was complicated 
by the fact that its government provided support to the Islamist group Al-Ittihad al-Islami 
(Islamic Union). Al- Islami was founded around 1991, at the end of Siyyad Barre’s 
regime, with the objective of finding a minimal element of ‘national’ cohesion premised 
on Islamist ideology. Unfortunately, Al-Ittihad became an instrument of Sudanese foreign 
policy, declaring a jihad against ‘infidels’ in the region. The organization conducted 
activities in Ethiopia through the intermediary of its large resident Somali population.” 
(Eric E. Otenyo, “New Terrorism: Toward an Explanation of Cases in Kenya,” African 
Security Review, Vol. 13, No. 3 (2004): 75-84, p. 78) This is Sudan  Ethiopia 
contagion because the rise of the Islamist NIF regime in Sudan in 1989 was related to the 
conflict in Southern Sudan (see “Eritrea” below). No mention of other potential State As 
(besides Somalia). 
• No mention of potential State As (besides Somalia) in David H. Shinn, “Al Qaeda in East 
Africa and the Horn,” Journal of Conflict Studies (Summer, 2007). 
• No mention of potential State As (besides Somalia) in Tobias Hagmann and Mohamud H. 
Khalif, “State and Politics in Ethiopia’s Somali Region Since 1991,” Bildhaan, Vol. 6 
(2006): 25-49, p. 37. 
• No mention of potential State As (besides Somalia) in Ken Menkhaus, “Political Islam in 
Somalia,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2002): 109-123. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Burundi, Chad, Djibouti, Republic of the Congo, 
Rwanda, and Uganda to Ethiopia in 1995, pending confirmation from Menkhaus. 
 
Ethiopia, 1996 (vs. ARDUF – State A could be Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, 
or Uganda) 
• No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Patrick Gilkes, Ethiopia: 
Perspectives on Conflict, 1991-1999 (Swiss Peace Foundation, 1999). 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in T. Berhe and Y. Adaye, “The 
Impact of Local Conflict on Regional Stability” (no further information on reference 
available). 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Yasin Mohammed Yasin, 
“Political History of the Afar in Ethiopia and Eritrea,” Afrika Spectrum, Vol. 42, No. 1 
(2008): 39-65. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, 
Sudan, or Uganda to Ethiopia in 1996, pending confirmation from Schwab. Schwab 
confirms in 5/19/10 e-mail. 
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Eritrea, 1997 (vs. EIJM – AS – State A could be Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, 
Somalia, Sudan, Uganda) 
• Ethiopia  Eritrea, 1997. The “EJM” not only split off from the ELF in the 1970s 
(UCDP conflict summary); it was also apparently supported by the ELF in Sudan during 
the 1990s. (Ruth Iyob, “The Eritrean Experiment: A Cautious Pragmatism?” Journal of 
Modern African Studies, Vol. 35, No. 4 (1997): 647-673, pp. 665-667. (ELF was last 
active in the Ethiopian conflict in 1980, according to UCDP, but it remained active in 
Sudan thereafter.) No mention of other potential State As (besides Sudan). 
o Also a refugee spillover effect: “During the prolonged stay in Sudan, many 
refugees [from Ethiopia], the great majority of whom were Muslim, became 
increasingly integrated through residence and education into northern Sudanese 
Arabo-Islamic culture. Saudi Arabia had initially been a major supporter of 
refugee education and of a strong Islamic emphasis in the curriculum. After the 
Sudanese National Islamic Front government took power it supported Eritrean 
Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and provided sanctuary for factions of the defeated ELF. After 
independence, … EIJ … began guerilla activities in western Eritrea.” (David 
Pool, From Guerillas to Government: The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front 
(Oxford, U.K.: James Currey, 2001), p. 192) No mention of other potential State 
As. 
• Sudan  Eritrea, 1997. “The seeds of the Eritrean-Sudanese quarrel were sown in 1989, 
when the NIF reportedly sponsored the creation of the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement 
(EIJM).” (Amare Tekle, “International Relations in the Horn of Africa (1991-1996), 
Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 23, No, 70 (1996): 499-509, p. 505) This is 
contagion because the civil war in Southern Sudan was one of the causes of the rise of 
Omar al-Bashir and the NIF to power in 1989. 
o “[In early 1989] Sadiq [previous ruler] claimed his new government was 
committed to ending the southern civil war by implementing the November 1988 
DUP-SPLM agreement. He also promised to mobilize government resources to 
bring food relief to famine areas, reduce the government's international debt, and 
build a national political consensus. Sadiq’s inability to live up to these promises 
eventually caused his downfall. On June 30, 1989, Colonel (later Lieutenant 
General) Umar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir overthrew Sadiq and established the 
Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation to rule Sudan.” (Helen 
Chapin Metz, ed., Sudan: A Country Study (Washington: GPO for the Library of 
Congress, 1991), http://countrystudies.us/sudan/28.htm) 
• No mention of potential State As (besides Ethiopia and Sudan) in UCDP conflict 
summary. 
• No mention of potential State As (besides Ethiopia and Sudan) in Gaim Kibreab, Eritrea: 
A Dream Deferred (Woodbridge, U.K.: James Currey, 2009), pp. 90-98, 319-322, 380. 
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Does note that refugees from Ethiopia were among those who founded EIJM in eastern 
Sudan in the 1980s (p. 211). 
• No mention of potential State As (besides Ethiopia and Sudan) in Dan Connell, 
Rethinking Revolution: New Strategies for Democracy and Social Justice: The 
Experiences of Eritrea, South Africa, Palestine, and Nicaragua (Lawrenceville, N.J.: Red 
Sea Press, 2002), pp. 18, 123. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, 
or Uganda to Eritrea, pending confirmation from Iyob. Iyob confirms in 5/20/10 e-mail. 
 
Angola, 1975 (vs. FNLA/UNITA – State A could be Madagascar, South Africa, Zimbabwe, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, China) 
• China  Angola, 1975. See below. 
• South Africa  Angola, 1975. UCDP conflict summary: “At the outset of the civil war, 
there were substantial elements of foreign involvement, as the domestic conflict was 
drawn into both the southern African regional conflict and the global power struggle 
between the superpowers USA and the USSR. … The FNLA [and UNITA]… received 
… significant military and logistic support … from South Africa. Vehemently anti-
communist, South Africa felt threatened by MPLA’s close relationship with the Soviet 
Union, as well as by the presence of Cuban troops so close to its borders. Pretoria also 
wanted to retaliate for MPLA’s support for ANC and SWAPO.” No mention of 
Madagascar or Zimbabwe. 
• Democratic Republic of the Congo  Angola, 1975. “[Among the reasons Mobutu 
supported the FNLA militarily,] fourth, Mobutu had been angry for some time at MPLA 
for its close association with the Katanga gendarmes.” (W. Martin James III, A Political 
History of the Civil War in Angola 1974-1990 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction 
Publishers, 1992, p. 60) No mention of Madagascar. In November 1975 “Savimbi … 
circumspectly acknowledged South African, Rhodesian, and French military support.” 
(James 1992, 66) Not clear if this was related to the conflict in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe; the 
contribution seems quite marginal in any case and is barely mentioned in the rest of the 
book. The footnote (p. 84, no. 74) also mentions Biafra (Nigeria), but again in a very 
marginal sense. On p. 180, James lists 31 foreign supporters of UNITA (most 
prominently China), though actual levels of support (with the exception of China) seem 
pretty minimal. 
• No mention of Madagascar or Rhodesia/Zimbabwe (with respect to Angola) in James 
Ciment, Angola and Mozambique: Postcolonial Wars in Southern Africa (New York: 
Facts on File, Inc., 1997), pp. 44-63. 
• No mention of Madagascar or Rhodesia/Zimbabwe in Assis Malaquias, Rebels and 
Robbers: Violence in Post-Colonial Angola (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2007), 
pp. 57-80. 
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• Hence I will code no contagion from Madagascar or Rhodesia/Zimbabwe to Angola in 
1975, pending confirmation from Malaquias. 
 
Angola, 1991 (vs. FLEC-R – State A could be Comoros, Mozambique, South Africa) 
• No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. Does note: “The various 
FLEC factions initially received logistical support from Zaire, which had its eyes on 
Cabinda’s oil, but after President Neto of Angola and President Mobutu of Zaire signed 
an agreement to improve the two states’ relations, this source of support dried up. No 
new foreign help was forthcoming until in the late 1980s, when Zaire once more initiated 
contact, supplying FLEC-R with both weapons and rear bases. FLEC-FAC, for its part, 
received similar support from Congo-Brazzaville. This support remained constant until 
1997, when the regimes in both Zaire and Congo-Brazzaville were overthrown, with 
Angolan support.” Neither Congo constitutes a conflict link, since one was well before 
1991, one was after, and Congo-Kinshasa was free of conflict in the 1980s and early 
1990s. 
• No mention of potential State As (with respect to Angola) in James Ciment, Angola and 
Mozambique: Postcolonial Wars in Southern Africa (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 
1997), p. 171. 
• No mention of potential State As in Joao Gomes Porto, “Cabinda: Notes on a Soon to be 
Forgotten War,” African Security Analysis Program Occasional Paper, Institute for 
Security Studies (2003). 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Comoros, Mozambique, or South Africa to Angola 
in 1991, pending confirmation from Porto. 
 
Mozambique, 1977 (vs. RENAMO – State A could be Angola, South Africa, Zimbabwe) 
• Zimbabwe  Mozambique, 1977. UCDP conflict summary: “On the regional level, 
Mozambique’s independence threatened the white regimes in both Rhodesia and South 
Africa, since the new, Marxist, government openly supported Rhodesian rebel group 
ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) and South Africa’s ANC (African National 
Congress). Subsequently, the white regime in Rhodesia set about to assist the creation of 
a counter-revolutionary force, and was in this endeavor able to exploit the public 
disaffection with Frelimo, which was rampant through much of the Mozambican 
countryside.” Also South Africa  Mozambique if (1) South Africa helped Mozambique 
rebels too in 1977 (not sure it did) and (2) ANC conflict was active in 1977 (not sure it 
was). Surprisingly, no mention of Angola. 
o UCDP conflict summary: “Following Rhodesia’s independence in 1980 and the 
rise to power of a government friendly towards Frelimo, sponsorship of Renamo 
was taken over by South Africa. South Africa, as had been the case with 
Rhodesia, felt threatened by black left-wing rule in Mozambique and other 
southern African states, and saw Renamo as a potential vehicle for destabilization 
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of Mozambique and a tool for fighting anti-apartheid groups. Consequently, 
Renamo bases were relocated to Transvaal in northeast South Africa, and Pretoria 
took over the role of training and equipping the rebels.” Sounds like this was post-
onset only. 
• South Africa’s involvement with RENAMO seems entirely post-onset in James Ciment, 
Angola and Mozambique: Postcolonial Wars in Southern Africa (New York: Facts on 
File, Inc., 1997), pp. 110-116. No mention of Angola (with respect to Mozambique), pp. 
64-70. 
• No mention of Angola, and no mention of South Africa before 1979, in Glenda Morgan, 
“Violence in Mozambique: Towards an Understanding of Renamo,” Journal of Modern 
African Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4 (1990): 603-619. 
• No mention of Angola’s contribution to onset, and no mention of South Africa before 
1979, in Margaret Hall, “The Mozambican National Resistance Movement (Renamo): A 
Study in the Destruction of an African Country,” Africa, Vol. 60, No. 1 (1990): 39-68, 
pp. 39-40. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Angola or South Africa to Mozambique, pending 
confirmation from Ciment. E-mail bounces; Morgan and Hall can’t be located either. 
 
South Africa, 1981 (vs. ANC – State A could be Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe) 
• Zimbabwe  South Africa, 1981. “By 1980, a combination of guerilla warfare and 
negotiation had installed an African government in Zimbabwe. … The militantly anti-
colonial bent of the new rulers throughout southern Africa created a hostile environment 
for the South African government. Because the country’s buffer with independent Africa 
was gone, these ‘frontline states’ became potential launching grounds for guerilla activity 
in South Africa.” (Iris Berger, South Africa in World History (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford 
University Press (2009), p. 140) No mention of the conflicts in Angola and Mozambique, 
though notes that the ANC studied Vietnam (p. 142). 
• No mention of State As’ conflicts in terms of contribution to onset in UCDP conflict 
summary. Does note: “In the mid-1970s, the conditions for guerrilla struggle against 
South Africa improved. Political upheaval in Portugal in 1974 paved the way for the 
independence of Angola and Mozambique, under governments led by the old ANC allies 
MPLA and Frelimo, respectively. This opened up the possibility for establishing camps 
in those countries, and launching cross-border attacks from Mozambique.” But this is not 
contagion because the external supporters of ANC were friendly state governments, not 
rebel groups in Angola or Mozambique. Also notes: “Attempts were made in 1967-68 to 
create a corridor through Zimbabwe’s Matabeleland through joint operations with 
ZAPU.” This is too far from 1981 to count as contagion (the Zimbabwe conflict is not 
even coded as starting until 1972). 
• No mention of potential State A conflicts’ contribution to onset in Nigel Worden, The 
Making of Modern South Africa: Conquest, Apartheid, Democracy, Fourth Edition 
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(Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), pp. 126-148. (I believe Mozambique 
supported the ANC before South Africa supported RENAMO, meaning there was no 
contagion of the RENAMO conflict.) 
• No mention of potential State A conflicts’ contribution to onset in Leonard Thompson, A 
History of South Africa, Third Edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), pp. 
221-235. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Angola or Mozambique to South Africa, pending 
confirmation from Berger. Berger confirms in 5/24/10 e-mail. 
 
Lesotho, 1998 (vs. military faction – State A could be Angola, Comoros) 
• No mention of either potential State A in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of either potential State A in Khabele Matlosa and Neville W. Pule, “Civil-
Military Relations in Lesotho, 1966–1998: Problems and Prospects,” in Rocky Williams, 
Gavin Cawthra, and Diane Abrahams, Ourselves to Know: Civil-Military Relations and 
Defense Transformation in Southern Africa (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 
2002). 
• No mention of either potential State A in terms of contribution to onset in Fako Johnson 
Likoti, “The 1998 Military Intervention in Lesotho: SADC Peace Mission or Resource 
War?” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2007): 251-263. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Angola or Comoros to Lesotho, pending 
confirmation from Matlosa. 
 
Madagascar, 1971 (vs. Monima – State A could be South Africa) 
• No mention of South Africa in (very brief) UCDP conflict summary. It’s mentioned that 
MONIMA was Maoist. 
• No mention of South Africa in Solofo Randrianja and Stephen Ellis, Madagascar: A 
Short History (London: Hurst & Company, 2009), pp. 184-185. 
• No mention of South African (Namibian) conflict contributing to onset in Philip M. 
Allen, Madagascar: Conflicts of Authority in the Great Island (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1995), pp. 59-64. 
• Hence I will code no contagion between South Africa and Madagascar, pending 
confirmation from Allen. Allen confirms in 5/24/10 e-mail. 
 
Comoros, 1989 (vs. Presidential Guard – State A could be Angola, Mozambique, South Africa) 
• South Africa  Comoros, 1989. UCDP conflict summary: “France and South Africa - 
previous backers of Denard and the Presidential Guard, but now with new reform-minded 
governments, embarrassed by the excesses of the Guard - pressured Abdallah to dispense 
with the mercenaries. Abdallah agreed to both expel Denard and his fellow officers by 
the end of the year and to absorb the GP into the regular army. It is widely believed that it 
was Denard who, faced with deportation, shot the president to death on the night of 26-27 
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November 1989.” This is contagion if the “reform-minded government” in South Africa 
came to power as a result of ANC violence there (surely it did). No mention of Angola or 
Mozambique. 
o “The end of the Cold War, the persistent calls from Western donors for 
democratization, and the striking turn of events in South Africa following the 
release of Nelson Mandela were the harbingers for a new political era in the 
Comoros. A shift in foreign policy in France and South Africa resulted in the two 
countries combining their leverage and set the ground for ousting Denard from the 
Comoros in December 1989, against the backdrop of President Abdallah’s 
assassination.” (Ali Y. Alwahti, “Prevention of Secessionist Movements in a 
Micro-State: The International Mediation in the Comoros Islands,” Swords & 
Ploughshares, American University (date unknown), p. 2) No mention of Angola 
or of Mozambique’s contribution to onset. 
• No mention of Angola or Mozambique’s conflicts’ contributions to 1989 Comoros onset 
in Eliphas G. Mukonoweshuro, “The Politics of Squalor and Dependency: Chronic 
Political Instability and Economic Collapse in the Comoro Islands,” African Affairs, Vol. 
89, No. 357 (1990): 555-577. Does note (p. 563): “In May 1978, a group of 50 European 
mercenaries and a German Shepherd dog, led by ex-Congo mercenary Colonel Bob 
Denard, overthrew the regime.” This could suggest DRCComoros contagion, but 
Denard was a French national who had numerous mercenary experiences in his career; 
Katanga was just one of them. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Angola or Mozambique to Comoros in 1989, 
pending confirmation from Alwahti. 
 
Comoros, 1997 (vs. MPA/Republic of Anjouan – State A could be Angola, Mozambique) 
• No mention of either potential State A in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of Angola or of Mozambique’s contribution to onset in Ali Y. Alwahti, 
“Prevention of Secessionist Movements in a Micro-State: The International Mediation in 
the Comoros Islands,” Swords & Ploughshares, American University (date unknown), 
pp. 1-3. 
• No mention of Angola or of Mozambique’s contribution to onset in Richard Cornwell, 
“Anjouan: A Spat in the Indian Ocean,” African Security Review, Vol. 7, No. 3 (1998). 
• No mention of Angola or Mozambique in Gino J. Naldi, “Separatism in the Comoros: 
Some Legal Aspects,” Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 11 (1998): 247-256, pp. 
247-248. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Angola or Mozambique to Comoros in 1997, 
pending confirmation from Alwahti. 
 
Morocco 1971 (vs. forces of Mohamed Madbouh – State A could be Chad) 
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• No mention of Chad in C.R. Pennell, Morocco since 1830: A History (New York: New 
York University Press, 2000), pp. 330-332. Does note (p. 332): “The blame was laid on 
Arab nationalists, inspired by Colonel Qaddafi of Libya. In fact, most senior officers 
were Berbers, trying to protect their positions.” 
• No mention of Chad in King Hassan II (Anthony Rhodes, trans.), The Challenge 
(London: Macmillan, 1978), pp. 147-151. 
• Without a third source, I will code no contagion from Chad to Morocco in 1971, pending 
confirmation from Pennell. Pennell confirms in 5/27/10 e-mail. 
 
Morocco 1975 (vs. POLISARIO – State A could be Chad or Mauritania) 
• No mention of Chad in UCDP conflict summary. POLISARIO fought against Moroccan 
and Mauritanian occupiers simultaneously from 1975 (after Spanish withdrawal); I don’t 
really consider this as contagion so much as two branches of the same conflict. 
(Assistance from Algeria noted, but onset was pre-1991.) 
• No mention of Chad’s contribution to onset in Tony Hodges, Western Sahara: The Roots 
of a Desert War (Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill & Company, 1983). 
• No mention of Chad’s contribution to onset in John Damis, Conflict in Northwest Africa: 
The Western Sahara Dispute (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1983). 
• No mention of Chad’s contribution to onset in Erik Jensen, Western Sahara: Anatomy of 
a Stalemate (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005). 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Chad or Mauritania to Morocco in 1975, pending 
confirmation from Pennell (see just above – talks about this conflict pp. 337-342, also no 
mention of Chad). Pennell confirms in 5/27/10 e-mail. 
 
Algeria 1991 (vs. Takfir wa’l Hijra – State A could be Morocco, Mali, Niger, Chad, 
Afghanistan) 
• Afghanistan  Algeria, 1991. See below. 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in UCDP conflict summary. Does 
note: “When it comes to the various rebel groups, it is more difficult to establish both 
sender and exact recipient of the support, as much of it has been given clandestinely. 
What is certain is that a number of Islamic organizations, e.g. the Islamic Relief 
Organization, at times have made economic contributions to AIS and that Sudan supplied 
GIA with arms in the late 1990s [post-onset].” 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Luis Martinez, The Algerian 
Civil War, 1990-1998 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000). Does note (p. 63): 
“For young FIS sympathizers the violence experienced by their neighborhood in Les 
Eucalyptus was comparable with that in the city of Hama in Syria [1979], which 
symbolized the martyrdom of the Islamist Cause at the hands of an ‘impious’ state 
power.” Describes state of affairs in 1993, and seems like a bit of a stretch besides. 
409 
 
o On Takfir wa’l Hijra, “That small group included ‘Afghans’ (Algerians said to 
have fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan), and its ideological affiliation was 
of Egyptian origin.” (p. 21, note 7) Suggests Afghanistan  Algeria contagion, 
though only through a possibly marginal manpower contribution. 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in James Ciment, Algeria: The 
Fundamentalist Challenge (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1997) Does note: “Mostly 
composed of Islamic veterans of the anti-Soviet struggle in Afghanistan, these militants, 
known popularly in Algeria as ‘Afghanis,’ have formed groups like the GIA and the 
Armed Islamic Movement (MIA).” (p. 5) GIA did not emerge until later in the conflict (c. 
1993); MIA again seems pretty small. So again I’d consider these influences to be 
marginal, but I should ask. Also notes influence of “Islamist radicals inspired by their 
brethren in Egypt and elsewhere” on nascent rebellion in 1980s (p. 83). Egypt itself 
didn’t have a conflict until 1983, but suggests the Syria 1979 conflict (vs. Muslim 
Brotherhood) had some impact on Algeria 1991. (Too vague to count as contagion.) 
• No mention of potential State As in John Ruedy, Modern Algeria: The Origins and 
Development of a Nation, Second Edition (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 
pp. 247-265. However, notes that the MIA was actually a fairly sizable insurgent group 
(p. 263), suggesting Afghanistan  Algeria contagion is genuine. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Morocco, Mali, Niger, or Chad to Algeria, pending 
confirmation from Ruedy. 
 
Tunisia, 1980 (vs. Résistance Armée Tunisienne – State A could be Morocco, Chad, Mauritania) 
• No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of potential State As in Harold D. Nelson, ed., Tunisia: A Country Study, 
Third Edition (Washington: Foreign Area Studies Series, American University, 1988), 
pp. 64-68, 269, 271, 273. Libya apparently supported the uprising, but Libya has not had 
a violent substate conflict. 
• No mention of potential State As in Kenneth J. Perkins, Tunisia: Crossroads of the 
Islamic and European Worlds (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), pp. 151-153, 159. 
• No mention of potential State As in Mohamed Elhachmi Hamdi, The Politicization of 
Islam: A Case Study of Tunisia (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), pp. 36-38. Notes the 
rebels were “backed by Algerian and Libyan intelligence” (p. 38), but neither state was in 
conflict at the time. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Chad, Mauritania, or Morocco to Tunisia, pending 
confirmation from Perkins. 
 
Sudan, 1963 (vs. Anya Nya – State A could be Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia) 
• No mention of either potential State A in (brief) UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Douglas H. Johnson, The Root 
Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars (Kampala: International African Institute, 2003), pp. 21-
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35. Does note (p. 31): “By modern standards, the first years of the war were very 
modestly conducted. The guerillas were knit together very loosely and had no external 
military support, arming themselves mainly by theft from police outposts, the occasional 
ambush of army patrols, or through the defection of Southern police or soldiers. 
Ironically, the Anya Nya obtained their first substantial quantity of military hardware 
only after the 1964 overthrow of Abbud, and then only through the unwitting generosity 
of the Sudanese government. The transitional government which replaced Abbud adopted 
a more interventionist foreign policy in the region and, along with other Arab states, 
supported the Simba movement in neighboring Congo. Shipments of weapons sent 
overland through Sudan to the Simbas fell into Anya Nya hands.” 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Scopas S. Poggo, The First 
Sudanese Civil War: Africans, Arabs, and Israelis in the Southern Sudan, 1955-1972 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 145-168. Again the Simbas in Congo 
provided arms, but from 1964 on. 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Dunstan M. Wai, The African-
Arab Conflict in the Sudan (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1981), pp. 125-
141. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Democratic Republic of the Congo or Ethiopia to 
Sudan in 1963, pending confirmation from Poggo. Poggo confirms in 5/26/10 e-mail. 
 
Sudan, 1971 (vs. Sudanese Communist Party – State A could be Chad, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Ethiopia, Uganda) 
• No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of potential State As in Scopas S. Poggo, The First Sudanese Civil War: 
Africans, Arabs, and Israelis in the Southern Sudan, 1955-1972 (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009), p. 176. I suppose the Congo rebels’ support for the southern war from 
1964 on allowed the war in the south to continue, composing one of the grievances of the 
coup? Seems like a stretch. 
• No mention of potential State As in Dunstan M. Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in the 
Sudan (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1981), p. 148. 
• No mention of potential State As in Edgar O’Ballance, Sudan, Civil War and Terrorism, 
1956-99 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), pp. 60-67. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, 
or Uganda to Sudan in 1971, pending confirmation from Poggo. Poggo confirms in 
5/26/10 e-mail. 
 
Sudan, 1983 (vs. SPLM/A – State A could be Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Uganda) 
• Ethiopia  Sudan, 1983. “In 1976, … a Sudanese government delegation to Ethiopia … 
was told quite explicitly by the Ethiopian Foreign Minister that unless the Sudan ceased 
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supplying the Eritrean rebels, Ethiopia would give active support to the Anya Nya 
remnants in Ethiopia who had refused to accept the Addis Ababa agreement. Nimairi’s 
support for the Eritreans, and subsequently for anti-Derg forces, continued despite this 
warning. Ethiopia’s support for various Sudanese dissidents dates from 1976. … The 
SPLA [had an] early dependence on Mengistu’s government.” (Douglas H. Johnson, The 
Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars (Kampala: International African Institute, 2003), pp. 
59-60) No mention of other potential State As’ contribution to onset. 
• No specific mention of State As’ contribution to onset in UCDP conflict summary. 
Ethiopia’s Mengistu government aided the SPLM/A, but seemingly not as a result of any 
conflict (the 1974 coup that brought Mengistu to power was bloodless). Refugees from 
Ethiopia may have influenced the 1983 rebellion, but not enough detail is given. 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset (besides Ethiopia) in John Young, 
“Sudan: Liberation Movements, Regional Armies, Ethnic Militias, and Peace,” Review of 
African Political Economy, Vol. 30, No. 97 (2003): 423-434. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, 
Somalia, or Uganda to Sudan in 1983, pending confirmation from Johnson. Johnson 
confirms in 5/25/10 e-mail. 
 
Iran, 1966 (vs. KDPI – State A could be Iraq, Israel, Syria) 
• Iraq  Iran, 1966. “The KDPI did, nonetheless, succeed until 1966 in providing 
significant aid and manpower to Barzani’s KDP revolt in Iraq. The Shah might have even 
tolerated such assistance. … By 1966, however, he shrewdly decided to provide more aid 
to Barzani than that offered by the KDPI. By doing this, the Shah made the Iraqi Kurds 
more dependent upon him than the KDPI, after which he convinced Barzani to help him 
suppress the KDPI as the price for his support. Opportunistically, Barzani complied by 
demanding that Iranian Kurds cease opposition to the Shah. … Such a ridiculous framing 
of the issue led many to end their support of Barzani and return home to fight the Shah. 
In 1967 a dissident group within the KDPI (among those who had been forced out of 
Iraqi Kurdistan by Barzani) launched a guerilla offensive in Iran.” (David Romano, The 
Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization, and Identity (Cambridge, 
U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 231-232) No mention of Israel or Syria. 
• 1966 Kurdistan conflict is not mentioned in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of Israel or Syria in Mir Zohair Hussein and Stephen Shumock, “Kurdish 
Ethnonationalism: A Concise Overview,” in Santosh C. Saha, ed., Perspectives on 
Contemporary Ethnic Conflict: Primal Violence or the Politics of Conviction? (Oxford, 
U.K.: Lexington Books, 2006), p. 280. 
• Hence (though missing a third source) I will code no contagion from Israel or Syria to 
Iran in 1966, pending confirmation from Romano. Romano confirms in 5/25/10 e-mail. 
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Iran, 1979 (vs. MEK, KDPI and APCO [three different incompatibilities] – State A could be 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Pakistan, Syria) 
• MEK 
o Israel  Iran, 1979. UCDP conflict summary: “The group’s potential for violence 
was developed as members were sent to train in PLO camps in Lebanon and 
Jordan.” This was seemingly prior to the outbreak of the 1975 conflict in Lebanon 
(so Lebanon is not itself a sender). No mention of other potential State As. 
o No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Nicole Cafarella, 
Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK) Dossier (Center for Policing Terrorism, 2005). 
Significant support from Iraq under Saddam Hussein, but not related to any of the 
Iraqi substate conflicts. 
o No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Connor Norris, 
“Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK),” unpublished paper (available on Google Scholar), 
July 27, 2008. 
o No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Haggay Ram, 
“Crushing the Opposition: Adversaries of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Middle 
East Journal, Vol. 46, No. 3 (1992): 426-439. 
o No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset (besides Israel) in Michael 
Rubin, “Monsters of the Left: The Mujahedin al-Khalq,” Front Page Magazine, 
January 13, 2006. 
• KDPI 
o No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in UCDP conflict 
summary. 
o No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in David Romano, The 
Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization, and Identity 
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 233-238. 
o No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Edgar O’Ballance, The 
Kurdish Struggle, 1920-94 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), pp. 107-114. 
KDPI leader looked to “the recent Iraqi Kurdish insurrection” and “hoped for 
support” from the KDP, but this was after a conventional armed confrontation 
with the Iranian state went badly in August 1979 (pp. 112-113). 
• APCO 
o Iraq  Iran, 1979. “Soon after the revolution, Iran stopped effectively patrolling 
its border with Iraqi Kurdistan, permitting KDP forces to reorganize. In response, 
Iraq began supporting rebellion by Arab groups in the largely Arab-speaking and 
oil-rich Iranian province of Khuzistan.” (James DeFronzo, The Iraq War: Origins 
and Consequences (Boulder: Westview Press, 2010), p. 84) 
o No mention of other potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. 
o No additional information on this conflict available on Google Scholar. 
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• Hence I will code no contagion from Afghanistan, Lebanon, Pakistan, or Syria to Iran in 
1979, pending confirmation from Ervand Abrahamian (a historian cited by Rubin). 
Abrahamian confirms in 5/27/10 e-mail (says Amal had links to Revolutionary Guard, 
but that is not one of the conflicts here). 
 
Turkey, 1984 (vs. PKK – State A could be Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Syria) 
• Israel  Turkey, 1984. “In September 1980 Ocalan settled in Damascus and, with Syrian 
government help, established training camps in the Bekaa Valley, where Syrian and 
Palestinian officers trained his followers.” (Erik J. Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), p. 316) Again raises the question of whether “Syrian 
government help” was related to the Muslim Brotherhood conflict; I suspect not (why 
would the Syrian state want to take down a secular regime in Turkey as a result of their 
conflict with Islamists?). No mention of other potential State As. 
• Iraq  Turkey, 1984. “From 1982 onwards, the Iran-Iraq war gave Kurdish organizations 
in northern Iraq … a free hand. … Relations between the Marxist PKK and Barzani’s 
conservative [KDP] were never very cordial, but the latter nevertheless allowed Ocalan’s 
followers to operate from [KDP]-controlled areas south of the Iraqi-Turkish border.” 
(Erik J. Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), p. 316) No 
mention of other potential State As. 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in UCDP conflict summary. Iraqi 
Kurdish support in late 1980s/early 1990s, but this was seemingly post-onset. 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Sina Aksin (Dexter H. 
Mursaloglu, trans.), Turkey: From Empire to Revolutionary Republic (New York: New 
York University Press, 2007), pp. 286-287. Syrian support for PKK appears to be post-
onset and unrelated to the Muslim Brotherhood conflict. 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in David Romano, The Kurdish 
Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization, and Identity (Cambridge, U.K.: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 49-54. Notes (p. 50) “Syria was happy to provide 
the insurgents with refuge and allow them to organize on its own territory and in 
Lebanon, hoping to cultivate a political lever in its dealings with Turkey.” The “dealings” 
appear to be over water, hence totally unrelated to the Muslim Brotherhood conflict. Also 
notes (p. 50): “By 1983, the PKK also moved into Iraqi and Iranian territory, having 
reached an agreement of cooperation with Masoud Barzani’s [KDP] in northern Iraq.” 
Was the Iranian connection tied to Barzani or to the KDPI? (No; see below) 
• No mention of Iran’s, Lebanon’s or Syria’s conflicts’ contribution to onset in Michael M. 
Gunter, “Transnational Sources of Support for the Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey,” 
Conflict Quarterly (1991): 7-29. The Iranian support, limited anyway, was from the 
Iranian state and appears to have nothing to do with the KDPI. 
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• Hence I will code no contagion from Iran, Lebanon, or Syria to Turkey in 1984, pending 
confirmation from Gunter. Gunter confirms in 5/26/10 e-mail (says “Lebanon’s 
instability probably helped enable PKK training in that state,” but see argument below). 
 
Turkey, 1991 (vs. Devrimci Sol – State A could be Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon) 
• Israel  Turkey, 1991. UCDP conflict summary: “Devrimci Sol has reportedly 
cooperated with Palestinian organizations since the late 1970s and in 1991 militants 
trained in Lebanon’s Syrian-held Bekaa Valley.” No Syrian conflict is remotely 
proximate; Syria does appear to have occupied the Bekaa Valley during the Lebanon 
War, but presumably it could have found somewhere else to train Devrimci Sol militants. 
Also, “This struggle was intensified in the beginning of the 1990s during the Gulf War 
when Devrimci Sol started a violent campaign against government and security 
representatives, as well as American ‘imperialists’ on Turkish soil.” This is contagion of 
an interstate war (U.S.-Iraq 1991), but is not related to any substate conflicts in Iraq. No 
mention of other potential State As. 
• No mention of potential State As in Noriyuki Katagiri, “In the Spotlight: Revolutionary 
People’s Liberation Party/Front,” Center for Defense Information, November 4, 2002. 
• No mention of potential State As (external support “unknown”) in U.S. State Department, 
Patterns of Global Terrorism (Washington: U.S. State Department, 2001), pp. 108-109. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Iran, Iraq, or Lebanon to Turkey in 1991, pending 
confirmation from Sözen (see below). Sözen confirms in 5/27/10 e-mail. 
 
Turkey, 2005 (vs. MKP – State A could be Iran, Iraq, Israel) 
• No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary (it is Maoist, though). 
• No mention of potential State As in START summary on TKP/ML-TIKKO 
(http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=116). 
• No mention of potential State As in Ahmet Sözen [Eastern Mediterranean University, 
North Cyprus], “Terrorism and the Politics of Anti-Terrorism in Turkey,” in Robert W. 
Orttung and Andrey Makarychev, eds., National Counter-Terrorism Strategies: Legal, 
Institutional, and Public Policy Dimensions in the US, UK, France, Turkey and Russia 
(Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2006), p. 138. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Iran, Iraq, or Israel to Turkey in 2005, pending 
confirmation from Sözen. Sözen confirms in 5/27/10 e-mail. 
 
Iraq, 1958 (vs. Free Officers Movement – State A could be Israel, Lebanon) 
• Israel  Iraq, 1958. “One of the major impacts of the defeat in Palestine was the belief 
among many Iraqi officers and soldiers that they had lost the war because they had been 
betrayed by their own government. … The Iraqi army’s experience in Palestine, along 
with the pro-Western Baghdad Pact in 1955 and the Suez crisis and war of 1956, 
eventually combined to provoke the armed forces to do what the opposition political 
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parties could not: destroy the monarchy and free Iraq from British domination.” (James 
DeFronzo [University of Connecticut], The Iraq War: Origins and Consequences 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 2010), p. 35) 
o The Egyptian Revolution, which inspired the Iraqi revolt, was also a product of 
the Palestinian conflict (“Similar to younger officers in the Iraqi military, 
Egyptian officers whose army had also been defeated in the 1948 war with Israel 
believed that the Egyptian government had betrayed its fighting forces, … leading 
to the shame of defeat” – p. 37). 
• Lebanon  Iraq, 1958. “The West … may have encouraged [Prime Minister] Nuri al-
Said of Iraq to support [Lebanese President] Chamoun’s [rigged elections]. If so, then the 
West helped to tip Nuri’s already corrupt regime over the edge and to extinguish the pro-
Western Iraqi monarchy. In Iraq … Kassem had formed an equivalent of Egypt’s ‘Free 
Officers’ organization, and when Nuri made clear his intention to help Chamoun the 
Kassem faction staged a successful rebellion to depose Nuri and King Feisal II. … In the 
summer of 1958 Nuri had perceived that if the Lebanese civil war resulted in a victory for 
the pro-Nasser Arabs then Iraq would be isolated. He had already given Chamoun moral 
and monetary support in May and June, and resolved in July to deploy an army division 
to Jordan for possible use against Syria. … On the morning of 14 July army contingents 
headed by Kassem, … ignoring instructions to bypass Baghdad on their way to Jordan, 
entered the Iraqi capital.” (Geoff Simons, Iraq: From Sumer to Saddam, Second Edition 
(London: Macmillan, 1996), pp. 251-252) 
 
Iraq, 1961 (vs. KDP – State A could be Israel, Lebanon) 
• No mention of Israel or Lebanon in Edgar O’Ballance, The Kurdish Struggle, 1920-94 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), pp. 47-50. The revolt was actually started on 
September 11, 1961 by a Kurd named Sheikh Abbas Mohammed; Barzani, who had 
become a hero in the Iran 1946 conflict, was not initially involved (pp. 47-48), and 
neither apparently was the KDP itself (p. 49). Thus Iran 1946  Iraq 1961 contagion is 
invalid. 
• No mention of Lebanon in UCDP conflict summary. Israel supported the KDP, but 
apparently only from 1970 on (David Romano, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: 
Opportunity, Mobilization, and Identity (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), p. 193). Does note that KDP split from KDPI (Iran) in 1946, but apparently KDP 
was not involved in the initial onset of the Kurdish conflict in 1961 (see above). 
• No mention of Lebanon’s or Israel’s contribution to onset in David Romano, The Kurdish 
Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization, and Identity (Cambridge, U.K.: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 188-193. 
• No mention of Israel or Lebanon in James DeFronzo, The Iraq War: Origins and 
Consequences (Boulder: Westview Press, 2010), pp. 55-56. On the Iranian/KDPI 
connection, notes Barzani “began to prepare for armed conflict” in January 1961, but 
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O’Ballance disagrees, writing “he had had no intention of rising in arms against the 
central government: he was drawn into revolt by circumstances” (1996, p. 47). I favor the 
O’Ballance account because it seems more detailed. 
• No mention of Israel or Lebanon in Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq Since 
1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship (London: I.B. Tauris, 1990), pp. 79-82. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Israel or Lebanon to Iraq in 1961, pending 
confirmation from DeFronzo. DeFronzo confirms in 5/29/10 e-mail. 
 
Iraq, 1982 (vs. SCIRI – State A could be Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Afghanistan) 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in UCDP conflict summary. The 
Iranian government has supported SCIRI from the start, but the anti-Shah coup in 1979 
was not in itself a substate conflict (though it did kick off three separate substate 
conflicts, seemingly not related to Iraq 1982). 
• No mention of potential State A conflicts’ contribution to onset in James DeFronzo, The 
Iraq War: Origins and Consequences (Boulder: Westview Press, 2010), p. 90. 
• No mention of potential State A conflicts’ contribution to onset in Robert G. Rabil, “The 
Iraqi Opposition’s Evolution: From Conflict to Unity?” Middle East Review of 
International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 4 (2002). 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Afghanistan, Iran, Israel, Lebanon, or Syria to Iraq 
in 1982, pending confirmation from DeFronzo [I forgot to ask about Afghanistan]. 
DeFronzo mostly confirms in 5/29/10 e-mail (has some nuance about the Iran 
connection). 
 
Iraq, 2004 (vs. Al-Mahdi Army, Ansar al-Islam, ISI – State A could be Iran, Israel, Turkey, 
Afghanistan) 
• Afghanistan  Iraq, 2004. “Ansar-controlled territories … were a stronghold where 
Kurdish Islamism converged with the ‘Arab Afghans.’ These Arab Afghans were Arab 
mujahideen who had traveled to join the Afghani jihad against the Soviets and then 
stayed on in training camps in the mountains of Afghanistan once the war was over. 
Many fled to Kurdistan after the U.S. assault on their mountain abodes in 2001 and 2002 
and turned to training local Islamists. … One of these Arab Afghans is thought to have 
been Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.” (Peter J. Munson, Iraq in Transition: The Legacy of 
Dictatorship and the Prospects for Democracy (Washington: Potomac Books, 2009), pp. 
144-145) No mention of Iran’s or Turkey’s conflicts. 
• Israel  Iraq, 2004. “Over the next year [2001-2002], al-Zarqawi bounced between Iran 
and Kurdistan, where he was protected by Ansar al-Islam, and built up his army and a 
network of contacts. He frequented Syria and the Ain al-Halwa Palestinian refugee camp 
in southern Lebanon, his prime recruiting ground.” (Peter J. Munson, Iraq in Transition: 
The Legacy of Dictatorship and the Prospects for Democracy (Washington: Potomac 
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Books, 2009), p. 146) [Southern Lebanon is a disputed territory in the Israel 1990 
substate conflict] 
• No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of Turkey’s or Iran’s conflicts’ contribution to onset in James DeFronzo, The 
Iraq War: Origins and Consequences (Boulder: Westview Press, 2010), pp. 195-218. 
Does note (p. 212): “The key reason for the rise of the resistance insurgency was the 
perception that the United States and its partners had launched an unprovoked and 
unjustified invasion of Iraq for the purpose of seizing control of its energy resources and 
removing an opponent of U.S. and Israeli policies.” I don’t think this is a direct enough 
link to be Israel  Iraq contagion – the key impetus for the rise of the insurgency was the 
U.S. invasion, and the Palestinian story appears to be pure rhetoric (some other grievance 
against the U.S. would have been found, or the mercantilist story would have stood on its 
own). 
• No mention of MEK in Kenneth Katzman, “Iran’s Activities and Influence in Iraq,” 
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (June 4, 2009). 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Iran or Turkey to Iraq in 2004, pending 
confirmation from DeFronzo. DeFronzo confirms in 5/29/10 e-mail. 
 
Egypt, 1993 (vs. al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya – State A could be Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Turkey, Mali, Niger, Chad, Afghanistan) 
• Afghanistan  Egypt, 1993. UCDP conflict summary: “Many Islamist activists instead 
became involved in jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and did not return to 
Egypt until the beginning of the 1990s. With this influx of battle-hardened veterans the 
situation in Egypt radically changed.” No mention of other potential State A conflicts’ 
contribution to onset (Iran and Sudan supported, but seems unrelated to their conflicts; 
October War of 1973 laid the foundation for recruitment, but this was a long-ago 
interstate conflict). 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset (besides Afghanistan) in Hisham 
Mubarak, Souhail Shadoud, and Steve Tamari, “What  Does the Gama'a Islamiyya 
Want?: An Interview with Tal’at Fu’ad Qasim,” Middle East Report, No. 198 (1996): 40-
46. 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset (besides Afghanistan) in Anneli 
Botha, “Politics and Terrorism: An Assessment of the Origin and Threat of Terrorism in 
Egypt,” Institute for Security Studies Paper No. 131 (2006), pp. 1-7. 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset (besides Afghanistan) in Arthur 
Goldschmidt, Jr., A Brief History of Egypt (New York: Facts on File, 2008), p. 223. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Turkey, Mali, Niger, or Chad to Egypt, pending confirmation from Botha. Botha more or 
less confirms in 5/31/10 e-mail. 
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Syria, 1966 (vs. Forces loyal to Nureddin Atassi and Youssef Zeayen – State A could be Iran, 
Iraq, Israel) 
• No mention of Iran or Iraq in UCDP conflict summary. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is 
mentioned in the sense that the Syrian defeat promoted a general destabilization of Syria 
post-1948, but this seems too distant and weak to be contagion. 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Patrick Seale, Asad of Syria: 
The Struggle for the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988), pp. 97-103. 
• No mention of potential State As in Nikolaos Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 1996), pp. 34-47. 
• No mention of Iran in Martin Seymour, “The Dynamics of Power in Syria since the 
Break with Egypt,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1970): 35-47. Mentions the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict but concludes its contribution to the 1966 coup was marginal 
and likely rhetorical (p. 43). The contribution of the Iraqi conflict seems rather complex, 
but overall this feels more like an internecine power struggle than a conflict somehow 
influenced by the events in Iraq (I should ask Van Dam). 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Iran, Iraq, or Israel to Syria in 1966, pending 
confirmation from Van Dam. Unfortunately he cannot be contacted. 
 
Syria, 1979 (vs. Muslim Brotherhood – State A could be Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon) 
• Lebanon  Syria, 1979. “In turn, the Lebanese civil war galvanized internal unrest in 
Syria, which only ended its own civil war in 1982.” Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. 
Pollack, Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War 
(Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 21. 
o UCDP conflict summary: “Tensions further increased within the country when 
Syria intervened on the Christian ‘rightist’ side in Lebanon's civil war in 1976; a 
move that seriously compromised the leadership’s legitimacy as an Arab and 
Muslim proponent.” No mention of other potential State As. 
o Also refugee spillovers from Lebanon – Patrick Seale, Asad of Syria: The 
Struggle for the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988), p. 320. No mention of 
other potential State As’ contribution to onset. Does note that Arafat had an “early 
allegiance” to the Muslim Brotherhood, pre-1966, but this seems too distant and 
weak to be contagion. Also notes Iraqi government support for Muslim 
Brotherhood (p. 321), but this appears to be unrelated to the Kurdish conflict in 
Iraq. 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset (besides Lebanon) in Nikolaos 
Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996), pp. 89-96. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Iran, Iraq, or Israel to Syria in 1979, pending 
confirmation from Van Dam. Unfortunately he cannot be contacted. 
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Lebanon, 1958 (vs. Independent Nasserite Movement /Mourabitoun Militia – State A could be 
Israel) 
• The Lebanon conflict preceded the Iraq conflict in 1958, so Iraq cannot be a State A. 
• Israel  Lebanon, 1958. “Immediately after independence, Lebanon’s internal political 
balance was further strained by the influx of 120,000 refugees from Palestine following 
the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948.” (Tom Russell, “A Lebanon Primer,” 
MERIP Reports, No. 133 (1985): 17-19, p. 17) 
o “[Early 1950s]: “The balance between religious communities, provided for in the 
[1943] National Pact, was precariously maintained, and undercurrents of hostility 
were discernible. The Muslim community criticized the regime in which 
Christians, alleging their numerical superiority, occupied the highest offices in the 
state and filled a disproportionate number of civil service positions. Accordingly, 
the Muslims asked for a census, which they were confident would prove their 
numerical superiority. The Christians refused.” (Thomas Collelo, ed., Lebanon: A 
Country Study (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1987) 
o UCDP conflict summary: “Changing demographics (in favor of the Sunnis and 
Shiites) and differing views on what political alignments the state should pursue 
however soon created deep rifts in society.” 
 
Lebanon, 1975 (vs. LNM/LAA – State A could be Iraq, Israel) 
• Israel  Lebanon, 1975. “Many Lebanese Muslims staunchly supported the Palestinians 
against Israel. … After both the 1956 and 1967 Arab-Israeli wars, they were appalled that 
the Maronite-dominated government did nothing to help the Arab cause against Israel. 
This was part of the powder keg of animosity between Muslims and Christian Lebanese 
that the PLO detonated.” Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, Things Fall Apart: 
Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War (Washington: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2007), p. 33. [Also Jordan 1970-1971  Lebanon 1975 according to 
Byman/Pollack, 21, but Jordan’s conflict is not included in the UCDP/PRIO list.] 
o UCDP conflict summary: “Also, the massive influx of Palestinian refugees into 
Lebanon following the 1948 and 1967 Israeli-Arab wars had by the 1970s reached 
more than 300 000, this also tilting power in favor of the Sunnis since most 
Palestinians were of this religious persuasion. Amongst the Palestinian refugee 
population could also be found the forces of the PLO and other guerrilla groups 
who made up a formidable fighting force of over 15 000 men who were keen not 
to lose their last foothold on the Israeli border. The fact that the Palestinian groups 
in Lebanon also at times acted as a ‘state-within-the-state,’ building roadblocks 
and clashing with Christian militias and security forces, did little to assuage the 
fears of the Maronite elite. The Palestinian presence in Lebanon - and also the 
devastation it wrought on the country in the form of Israeli attacks, which 
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especially embittered the southern Shias - thus became yet another contributing 
factor to the outbreak of the civil war.” No mention of Iraq or Kurds. 
• No mention of Kurds in Edgar O’Ballance, The Civil War in Lebanon, 1975-1992 (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998). 
• Only sporadic mentions of Kurds in Farid el Khazen, The Breakdown of the State in 
Lebanon, 1967-1976 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000). They did 
emigrate from Iraq to Lebanon, but “in smaller numbers” (p. 131). 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Iraq to Lebanon in 1975, pending confirmation 
from el Khazen. Khazen confirms in 6/1/10 e-mail. 
 
Lebanon, 1982 (vs. LNM/Amal – State A could be Iran, Iraq, Israel, Syria) 
• Israel  Lebanon, 1982. According to UCDP conflict summary, the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon in 1982 – motivated by the PLO insurgency – and its installment of Bashir 
Gemayel as President of Lebanon caused the LNM assassination of Gemayel, which 
started the intrastate war. No mention of Iran or Iraq in terms of onset. Syria’s support for 
the LNM is prominently mentioned, but it’s not clear that this is related to the Muslim 
Brotherhood conflict. 
• No mention of Iran, Iraq, or Syrian conflict with Muslim Brotherhood in Edgar 
O’Ballance, The Civil War in Lebanon, 1975-1992 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 
pp. 112-122. The Muslim Brotherhood is only briefly mentioned on p. 104, as the target 
of a Syrian bombing campaign inside Lebanon in February 1980. 
• No mention of conflicts in Iran, Iraq, or Syria in Tom Russell, “A Lebanon Primer,” 
MERIP Reports, No. 133 (1985): 17-19. 
• No mention of Syrian Muslim Brotherhood in Etienne Sakr, “The Politics and Liberation 
or Lebanon,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 4 (2005): 86-105. 
Iranian support for rebel groups from the “early 1980s” is noted, but this appears to be on 
the part of the Iranian government and unrelated to the MEK/KDPI/APCO conflicts of 
1979. No mention of Iraq’s contribution to onset. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Iran, Iraq, or Syria to Lebanon in 1982, pending 
confirmation from el Khazen. Khazen confirms in 6/3/10 e-mail. 
 
Israel, 1949 (vs. Palestinian insurgents – State A could be Iran) 
• No mention of Kurds/Iran in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of Kurds in Benny Morris, 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008). 
• No mention of Kurds/Iran in Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 
Second Edition (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), pp. 257-349. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Iran to Israel in 1948/1949, pending confirmation 
from Tessler. Tessler confirms in 5/28/10 e-mail. 
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Israel, 1990 (vs. Hezbollah – State A could be Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Turkey) 
• Lebanon  Israel, 1990. UCDP conflict summary: “Harakat Amal initially held a 
relatively neutral stance towards the Israeli presence [in southern Lebanon], since it 
supported their actions against Palestinian militants. However, as Israel attempted to 
solidify its grip on the ‘security zone’ through the creation of an occupation-type 
administration, anti-Israeli sentiments began to grow amongst pro-freedom Shiite 
activists, most notably among Amal and Lebanese National Resistance fighters. Amal 
leader Nabih Berri began to oppose the Israeli occupation, and Hezbollah began to take 
form from the Lebanese National Resistance and dissident members of Amal around 
1982.” No mention of other potential State As’ contribution to onset (Iran supports 
Hezbollah, but this is not related to the MEK/KDPI conflicts in Iran). 
• No mention of potential State A conflicts’ contribution to onset (besides Lebanon) in 
Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East from the 1948 
War of Independence to the Present, Revised Edition (London: Greenhill Books, 2004), 
pp. 377-385. Syrian/Iranian support noted, but none related to a substate conflict in those 
countries. 
• No mention of potential State A conflicts’ contribution to onset (besides Lebanon) in 
Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism (London: I.B. Tauris, 
2005), pp. 29-42 (some pages missing). 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Iran, Iraq, or Turkey to Israel in 1990, pending 
confirmation from Harik. 
 
Israel, 2006 (vs. Hezbollah – State A could be Iran, Iraq, Turkey) 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of State A conflicts’ contribution to onset in Amos Harel and Avi 
Issacharoff, 34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008). 
• No mention of State A conflicts’ contribution to onset in Hany T. Nakhleh, The 2006 
Israeli War on Lebanon: Analysis and Strategic Implications (Master of Strategic Studies 
Thesis, U.S. Army War College, 2007). 
• No mention of State A conflicts’ contribution to onset in Matt M. Matthews, We Were 
Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War (Leavenworth: The Long War 
Series, Occasional Paper 26, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Combat Studies 
Institute Press, 2008). 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Iran, Iraq, or Turkey to Israel in 2006, pending 
confirmation from Harel. Harel confirms in 6/4/10 phone call. 
 
Saudi Arabia, 1979 (vs. JSM – State A could be Oman) 
• No mention of Oman in (brief) UCDP conflict summary. 
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• No mention of Oman in Thomas Hegghammer and Stéphane Lacroix, “Rejectionist 
Islamism in Saudi Arabia: The Story of Juhayman al-‘Utaybi Revisited,” International 
Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 39, No. 1 (2007): 103-122. 
• No mention of Oman in Alexei Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia (London: Saqi 
Books, 1998), pp. 395-396. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Oman to Saudi Arabia, pending confirmation from 
Hegghammer. Hegghammer confirms in 6/1/10 e-mail. 
 
North Yemen, 1962 (vs. Royalists – State A could be Oman) 
• No mention of Oman in (brief) UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of Oman in Jonathan Walker, Aden Insurgency: The Savage War in South 
Arabia, 1962-1967 (Staplehurst, U.K.: Spellmount, 2005), pp. 41-53. 
• No mention of Oman in Robin Bidwell, The Two Yemens (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1983), pp. 195-208. This was a proxy war between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, but neither 
had yet had a substate conflict. 
• No mention of Oman in Robert D. Burrowes, “Prelude to Unification: The Yemen Arab 
Republic, 1962-1990,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 23, No. 4 
(1991): 483-506. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Oman to North Yemen in 1962, pending 
confirmation from Burrowes. Burrowes confirms in 6/1/10 e-mail. 
 
North Yemen, 1980 (vs. National Democratic Front – State A could be Oman or Saudi Arabia) 
• No mention of Oman or Saudi Arabia in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of Oman’s or Saudi Arabia’s conflicts’ contribution to onset in Robin 
Bidwell, The Two Yemens (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983). pp. 321-324. 
• No mention of Oman’s or Saudi Arabia’s conflicts’ contribution to onset in F. Gregory 
Gause III, “Yemeni Unity: Past and Future,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 42, No. 1 (1988): 
33-47. 
• No mention of Oman’s or Saudi Arabia’s conflicts’ contribution to onset in Robert D. 
Burrowes, “The Yemen Arab Republic and the Ali Abdallah Salih Regime: 1978-1984,” 
Middle East Journal, Vol. 39, No. 3 (1985): 287-316. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Oman or Saudi Arabia to North Yemen in 1980, 
pending confirmation from Burrowes. Burrowes confirms in 6/1/10 e-mail. 
 
South Yemen, 1986 (vs. Yemenite Socialist Party - Abdul Fattah Ismail faction – State A could 
be North Yemen) 
• North Yemen  South Yemen, 1986. “Units of the National Democratic Front, which in 
1982 were forced to retreat from the North into the South, reportedly joined in the 
fighting against [PDRY President] Ali Nasir.” F. Gregory Gause III, “Yemeni Unity: Past 
and Future,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 42, No. 1 (1988): 33-47, p. 45. 
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Oman, 1972 (vs. PFLO – State A could be North Yemen, China) 
• China  Oman, 1972. See below. 
• No mention of North Yemen in UCDP conflict summary (South Yemen supported the 
rebels, but this appears unrelated to the Royalist conflict in North Yemen). 
• No mention of North Yemen’s contribution to Oman conflict in Fred Halliday, “The 
Arabian Peninsula Opposition Movements,” MERIP Reports, No. 130 (1985): 13-15. 
PFLO grew out of the Arab Nationalist Movement cadres in Oman, but this does not 
seem directly related to any particular substate conflict in the region (maybe Israel 1949, 
but this is a stretch). 
• No mention of North Yemen in Fred Halliday, review of John W. Garver, China and 
Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World, in Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 44, No. 
1 (2008): 151-153. Does note (p. 151): “One place where Chinese support did make a 
significant impact for a few years was in the guerrilla war in Dhofar, southern Oman, 
when, from 1968 to 1973, China was the main military supplier, and ideological 
inspiration, for the guerrillas of the People’s Front for the Liberation of Oman and the 
Arab Gulf.” Suggests China  Oman contagion. 
• No mention of North Yemen’s conflict in John Townsend, Oman: The Making of a 
Modern State (Taylor & Francis, 1977), pp. 112-121. 
• No mention of North Yemen’s conflict in Stephen A. Cheney, The Insurgency in Oman, 
1962-1976 (Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1984). Does note: 
“Communist leanings trended to stronger ties with the new revolutionary regime in South 
Yemen, and garnered support from the People’s Republic of China, Iraq, and radical 
Palestinian organizations.” This was in 1967, five years before the conflict reached 
sufficient intensity for inclusion, and based on the sources above the support from the 
PRC seems the only one that is not marginal. (By 1975 Iraq had flipped to join the side of 
the Omani government; the Palestinian groups are small ones, like PFLP.) 
• Hence I will code no contagion from North Yemen to Oman, pending confirmation from 
Halliday … who unfortunately died in 2010. 
 
Tajikistan, 1992 (vs. UTO – State A could be Afghanistan, Pakistan, Russia) 
• Afghanistan  Tajikistan, 1992. “Groups in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan [saw] 
Afghanistan as a model for their own struggles.” Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. 
Pollack, Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War 
(Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 113. 
o “The flow of arms from Afghanistan showed the dangers of Islamic 
fundamentalist expansion into the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS).” (Barnett R. Rubin, “The Fragmentation of Tajikistan,” Survival, 
Vol. 35, No. 4 (1993): 71-91, p. 71) Also notes that the fall of Najibullah in 
Afghanistan in 1992 cut off a major source of external support for the Tajik 
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government, heightening social strain (p. 73). Also, “the drug trade already 
thriving in much of Afghanistan expanded both within that country and amongst 
its neighbors, providing an independent economic base for warlords after the 
cessation of foreign aid to the Afghan combatants and their regional supporters” 
(p. 73). No mention of conflicts in USSR/Russia (Azerbaijan / Nagorno-
Karabakh); mentions of Pakistani jihadist support for IRP do not appear to be 
related to the MQM conflict in Pakistan. 
• No mention of Pakistan or the conflicts in USSR/Russia (Azerbaijan / Nagorno-
Karabakh) in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of conflicts in Pakistan or USSR/Russia contributing to Tajikistan onset in 
U.S. Institute of Peace, The War in Tajikistan Three Years On (Special Report 15, 
November 1995). 
• No mention of conflicts in Pakistan or USSR/Russia contributing to Tajikistan onset in 
Dov Lynch, “The Tajik Civil War and Peace Process,” Civil Wars, Vol. 4, No. 4 (2001): 
49-72. 
• Hence I will code no contagion between Pakistan or Russia and Tajikistan, pending 
confirmation from Rubin. Rubin confirms in 5/31/10 e-mail. 
 
Afghanistan, 1978 (vs. Hizb-i Demokratik-i Khalq-i Afghanistan – State A could be Pakistan) 
• Pakistan  Afghanistan, 1978. Daoud’s support for the Baluchi insurgency in Pakistan 
led to a chastisement from the Soviet Union. In response, Daoud “veered away from the 
Soviet Union” and purged his government of communists. These events “forced the two 
bitterly opposed factions of the PDPA to unite” in 1977, most likely contributing to the 
successful overthrow of Daoud in 1978. (Angelo Rasanayagam, Afghanistan: A Modern 
History (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003), pp. 62-65) 
o “One of Daud’s last acts was a diplomatic deal with Islamabad in March, 
concluded under prodding from the shah, that would have ruled out the continued 
use of Afghan territory by Baluch guerrillas and Pashtun dissidents opposed to the 
Pakistani government. The March agreement was bitterly attacked by tribal 
militants, because it would have forced all of those now in Afghanistan to leave 
and would have barred their future access to the country in the event of renewed 
trouble in Pakistan. Taraki used this issue to arouse mass support against Daud in 
the critical interlude between the assassination of Khalq trade unionist Amir 
Khaiber on April 17 and the coup 10 days later.” (Selig S. Harrison, “Nightmare 
in Baluchistan,” Foreign Policy, No. 32 (1978): 136-160, p. 147) 
 
Uzbekistan, 1999 (vs. IMU – State A could be Afghanistan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan) 
• Afghanistan  Uzbekistan, 1999. “Groups in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan [saw] 
Afghanistan as a model for their own struggles.” Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. 
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Pollack, Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War 
(Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 113. 
o See also just below. 
o Drug contagion from Afghanistan is also noted by Cornell among others. 
• Tajikistan  Uzbekistan, 1999. UCDP conflict summary: “In 1992 Adolat [predecessor 
to IMU] was declared illegal and the leaders fled to the neighboring country of Tajikistan 
to join the opposition in the Tajik armed conflict. … When the armed conflict in 
Tajikistan ended in 1997, Islamic leaders Yuldashev and Namangani moved on to 
Afghanistan and joined the Taliban movement there. In 1998 they formed IMU and in 
February 1999 they initiated the Uzbek conflict.” No mention of MQM conflict in 
Pakistan or Chechnya conflict in Russia. 
• No mention of Pakistan’s MQM conflict in Svante E. Cornell, “Narcotics, Radicalism, 
and Armed Conflict in Central Asia: The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan,” Terrorism 
and Political Violence, Vol. 17 (2005): 577-597. Chechnya is mentioned as one of the 
places that IMU’s “ideologue,” Tohir Yoldash, visited in the mid to late 1990s while he 
“toured the Islamic world” (p. 584). This seems pretty weak, though, as his partner, Juma 
Namangani, seems more involved in the violence. 
• No mention of Chechnya or MQM in Alisher Ilkhamov, “Uzbek Islamism: Imported 
Ideology or Grassroots Movement?” Middle East Report, No. 221 (2001): 40-46. 
• No mention of Chechnya or MQM in Reuel R. Hanks, “Dynamics of Islam, Identity, and 
Institutional Rule in Uzbekistan: Constructing a Paradigm for Conflict Resolution,” 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 40 (2007): 209-221. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Pakistan or Russia to Uzbekistan, pending 
confirmation from Cornell. Cornell confirms in 6/4/10 e-mail. 
 
China, 1947 (vs. Taiwanese insurgents – State A could be Soviet Union) 
• No mention of Soviet Union in Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo’s Son: Chiang Ching-Kuo 
and the Revolutions in China and Taiwan (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
2000), pp. 148-149. 
• No mention of Eastern European Soviet conflicts in Tse-Han Lai et al., A Tragic 
Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947 (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1991). 
• No mention of Eastern European Soviet conflicts in Steven Phillips, “Between 
Assimilation and Independence: Taiwanese Political Aspirations Under Nationalist 
Chinese Rule, 1945-1948,” in Murray A. Rubinstein, ed., Taiwan: A New History, 
Expanded Edition (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2007). 
• Hence I will code no contagion from the Soviet Union to China in 1947. I can’t think of 
any way to ask somebody about this link without looking really silly (it seems obvious), 
so I won’t. 
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China, 1950 (vs. Tibet – State A could be Soviet Union) 
• No mention of Soviet Union in Philip J. Barton, Tibet and China: History, Insurgency, 
and Beyond (MS Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2003), pp. 24-42. 
• No mention of Eastern European Soviet conflicts in John Kenneth Knaus, “Official 
Policies and Covert Programs: The U.S. State Department, the CIA, and the Tibetan 
Resistance,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (2003): 54-79. 
• No mention of Eastern European Soviet conflicts in Michael M. Sheng, “Mao, Tibet, and 
the Korean War,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3 (2006): 15-33. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from the Soviet Union to China in 1950. I can’t think of 
any way to ask somebody about this link without looking really silly (it seems obvious), 
so I won’t. 
 
India, 1948 (vs. CPI – State A could be Myanmar, China) 
• China  India, 1948. “The ‘liberation’ activities of the Party during this period found 
their most extreme expression in the predominantly rural and remote Telengana region of 
Hyderabad State. Owing to the disturbed conditions which preceded the integration of the 
State in the Indian Union, the Communists found it an ideal centre in which to build their 
‘Yenan.’” (M.R. Masani, “The Communist Party in India,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 1 
(1951): 18-38, p. 27) Does note, however, that China’s civil war tactics were called into 
question by CPI leadership during the late 1940s, although China played a more 
unquestioned role from 1950 onward. Claims the Burma uprising was spurred by the 
same Comintern meeting in Calcutta, February 1948, as the Indian uprising – both at the 
direction of Moscow (p. 26). Hence no contagion from Myanmar to India. 
• No mention of Burma/Myanmar in Joseph Tharamangalam, “The Communist Movement 
and the Theory and Practice of Peasant Mobilization in South India,” Journal of 
Contemporary Asia, Vol. 11, No. 4 (1981): 487-498, pp. 491-492. 
• No mention of Burma/Myanmar in Vivek Chadha, Low Intensity Conflicts in India: An 
Analysis (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), pp. 390-394. 
• No mention of Burma/Myanmar in Maya Chadda, Ethnicity, Security, and Separatism in 
India (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 44-45. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Myanmar to India in 1948, pending confirmation 
from Chadda. Chadda confirms in 6/7/10 e-mail. 
 
India, 1956 (vs. NNC – State A could be Myanmar, China) 
• China  India, 1956. “There was [a] professed sympathy of the Chinese for the Naga 
cause. This resulted in a number of militant groups being trained in China. It also led to 
the arming of Naga militants with sophisticated weapons of Chinese origin. … It was the 
Chinese policy of lebensraum which dictated its annexation of Aksai Chin in a unilateral 
action [1950]; this, when resisted by India coupled with India’s sympathetic handling of 
Tibetan insurgency, is what probably led China to repay India in the same coin.” Vivek 
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Chadha, Low Intensity Conflicts in India: An Analysis (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 
2005), pp. 290-291. 
• Myanmar  India, 1956. “The various militant groups, starting with the Naga National 
Council (NNC) of Nagaland, had traditionally forged and maintained ties with similar 
movements in Myanmar, primarily with the Kachins who were instrumental in providing 
them sanctuary, training, weapons and access to the clandestine arms market of south-
east Asia.” (Anindita Dasgupta, “Small Arms Proliferation in India’s Northeast: A Case 
Study of Assam,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2001): 59-65, p. 59) 
o This might be tenuous because the Kachin rebellion didn’t really start until 1961; 
the 1949-1950 rebellion in Kachin was a quick blip on the radar and largely 
unrelated to the KIO insurgency. Still, it’s only “primarily” the Kachins in this 
article, so probably other Burmese insurgent groups (of which there were many 
by 1956) supported the NNC. 
 
India, 1966 (vs. MNF – State A could be Nepal, Myanmar, China) 
• China  India, 1966. Chinese offered support for the MNF starting in 1964, with East 
Pakistan as an intermediary. (Vivek Chadha, Low Intensity Conflicts in India: An 
Analysis (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), p. 336) No mention of Nepal. Notes that 
“A number of Mizo soldiers from the Burmese army … joined the MNF” (p. 337), but 
this does not appear to be related to substate conflicts inside Myanmar. 
• No mention of Nepal or Burma/Myanmar in Bipan Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee, and 
Aditya Mukherjee, India Since Independence, Thirteenth Edition (New Delhi: Penguin 
Books, 2008), pp. 146-147. 
• No mention of Nepal in Arthur J. Dommen, “Separatist Tendencies in Eastern India,” 
Asian Survey, Vol. 7, No. 10 (1967): 726-739. Notes that MNF cadres have sought 
“sanctuary” in Burma (p. 738), but this does not appear to be related to any Burmese 
substate conflicts. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Nepal or Myanmar to India in 1966, pending 
confirmation from Mridula Mukherjee. 
 
India, 1969 (vs. CPI-ML – State A could be Myanmar, China) 
• China  India, 1969. The leader of CPI(ML) “planned a … militant struggle on the lines 
of Mao’s teachings” and was openly supported by the Chinese government. (Vivek 
Chadha, Low Intensity Conflicts in India: An Analysis (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 
2005), pp. 397-398). No mention of Myanmar. 
• No mention of Myanmar in (very brief) UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of Myanmar in Bipan Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee, and Aditya Mukherjee, 
India Since Independence, Thirteenth Edition (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2008), pp. 
292-293. 
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• Hence I will code no contagion from Myanmar to India in 1969, pending confirmation 
from Mridula Mukherjee. 
 
India, 1978 (vs. TNV – State A could be Bangladesh, Pakistan, Myanmar, China) 
• Pakistan  India, 1978. UCDP conflict summary: “The genesis of the territorial 
insurgency in Tripura lies to a large extent in the same demographic changes that 
occurred following India’s independence in 1947. An influx of Bengali settlers from East 
Pakistan immediately following partition in 1947, as well as following Bangladeshi 
independence in 1971, resulted in a transformation of Tripura’s demographics from a 
predominantly tribal to a non-tribal province in the period from 1950 to the 1990s. A 
perceived economic and political marginalization among the tribal people was attributed 
to the state-sponsored influx of Bengali settlers and their annexation of land, which left 
the tribal people a demographic and economic minority in the area. … All the major rebel 
outfits since the onset of the first organized insurgency in Tripura in 1978 have shared a 
strong resentment against Bengali settlers and have made use of anti-colonial rhetoric 
specifically targeting India as a colonizer of Tripuran lands.” No mention of 
Burma/Myanmar. Notes that “The TNV set up its first bases of operation in the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts in neighboring Bangladesh, where they also received training from 
the MNF (Mizo National Front).” But this doesn’t appear to have anything to do with the 
JSS/SB conflict in Bangladesh over that territory. 
• No mention of Burma/Myanmar in Vivek Chadha, Low Intensity Conflicts in India: An 
Analysis (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), pp. 365-376. Also notes the basing in 
Bangladesh but also doesn’t connect this to the JSS/SB conflict. 
• No mention of Burma/Myanmar in Subir Bhaumik, “Ethnicity, Ideology, and Religion: 
Separatist Movements in India’s Northeast,” in Satu P. Limaya, Robert G. Wirsing, and 
Mohan Malik, eds. Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia (Honolulu: Asia-
Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004). Notes Bangladesh state support for TNV, but 
this appears unrelated to the JSS/SB conflict, which started prior to the August 1975 coup 
that resumed Bangladesh’s state support (it may, though, help spur Indian support for the 
JSS/SB – will need to look into this further). 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Bangladesh or Myanmar to India in 1978, pending 
confirmation from Bhaumik. 
 
India, 1982 (vs. PLA – State A could be Bangladesh, Pakistan, Myanmar, China) 
• China  India, 1982. “A member of the UNLF, Bisheshwar Singh, who was dissatisfied 
with its [peaceful] methods, began to assert himself. He decided to form an independent 
organization with help from the Chinese and proceeded to China for training in 1975. On 
his return, he formed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in 1978.” (Vivek Chadha, Low 
Intensity Conflicts in India: An Analysis (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), p. 315) 
No mention of Pakistan. Immigration from Bangladesh and Myanmar is noted as one 
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cause of the conflict, but it’s not clear this immigration is related to the conflict in 
Bangladesh. 
• Myanmar  India, 1982. “Manipur has not been exempt from the common bane of the 
Northeast—illegal immigration. Illegal immigrants have poured in from Bangladesh, 
Nepal, and Myanmar.” Identified as “Reason for Discontent.” (Vivek Chadha, Low 
Intensity Conflicts in India: An Analysis (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), p. 314) 
The Burmese immigration is almost certainly related to the conflict there: 
http://www.refugeesinternational.org/sites/default/files/120909_india_closegap.pdf. 
• Pakistan  India, 1982. “Manipur has not been exempt from the common bane of the 
Northeast—illegal immigration. Illegal immigrants have poured in from Bangladesh, 
Nepal, and Myanmar.” Identified as “Reason for Discontent.” (Vivek Chadha, Low 
Intensity Conflicts in India: An Analysis (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), p. 314) 
The immigration from present-day Bangladesh is probably related to the substate conflict 
in Pakistan (over Bangladeshi independence), as above. 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to PLA onset (besides China and 
Myanmar) in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to PLA onset (besides China and 
Myanmar) in Subir Bhaumik, “Ethnicity, Ideology, and Religion: Separatist Movements 
in India’s Northeast,” in Satu P. Limaya, Robert G. Wirsing, and Mohan Malik, eds. 
Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for 
Security Studies, 2004), pp. 232-233. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Bangladesh to India in 1982, pending confirmation 
from Bhaumik. 
 
India, 1983 (vs. Sikh insurgents – State A could be Bangladesh, Myanmar, Pakistan) 
• Pakistan  India, 1983. “The Khalistan movement of the 1980s in part was inspired by 
the independence of Bangladesh in 1971.” (Mehtab Ali Shah, “The Emergence of the 
Muhajir Quami Movement (MQM) in Pakistan and its Implications for Regional 
Security,” The Round Table, Vol. 348, No. 1 (1998)) 
• No mention of Bangladesh or Myanmar in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of Bangladesh or Myanmar in Vivek Chadha, Low Intensity Conflicts in 
India: An Analysis (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), pp. 188-200. 
• No mention of Bangladesh or Myanmar in Simrat Dhillon, “The Sikh Diaspora and the 
Quest for Khalistan: A Search for Statehood or Self-Preservation?” Institute of Peace and 
Conflict Studies Research Paper (2007). 
• No mention of Bangladesh or Myanmar in Bipan Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee, and 
Aditya Mukherjee, India Since Independence, Thirteenth Edition (New Delhi: Penguin 
Books, 2008), pp. 423-434. Does note that Pakistan supported the terrorists, but this is 
related to the India-Pakistan interstate conflict. 
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• Hence I will code no contagion from Bangladesh or Myanmar to India in 1983, pending 
confirmation from Mridula Mukherjee. 
 
India, 1989 (vs. Kashmir Insurgents and ABSU [different territorial incompatibilities] – State A 
could be Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Pakistan) 
• Kashmir: 
o No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. Arab support 
spilling over from Afghan conflict is noted, but post-onset (“beginning of the 
1990s”). 
o No mention of potential State As in Vivek Chadha, Low Intensity Conflicts in 
India: An Analysis (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), pp. 109-123. Pakistani 
support for Kashmiri insurgents, present since the beginning, appears unrelated to 
Bangladesh conflict of 1971 (quite the contrary, the 1971 war quashed 
secessionism in Kashmir – pp. 93-94), and MQM insurgency of 1990 hadn’t 
started yet. 
o No mention of potential State As (besides Pakistan) in Bipan Chandra, Mridula 
Mukherjee, and Aditya Mukherjee, India Since Independence, Thirteenth Edition 
(New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2008), pp. 415-422. 
• Bodoland: 
o Pakistan  India, 1989. Migrants from present-day Bangladesh in the aftermath 
of the 1971 East Pakistan war contributed to land scarcities and tensions in 
Bodoland. (Vivek Chadha, Low Intensity Conflicts in India: An Analysis (New 
Delhi: Sage Publications (2005), pp. 261-262). No mention of other potential 
State As. 
o No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. Immigration is 
noted as a cause of the conflict, but no indication this immigration is linked to one 
of the conflicts in the three State As. 
o No mention of State As’ contribution to the ABSU onset in Anindita Dasgupta, 
“Small Arms Proliferation in India’s Northeast: A Case Study of Assam,” 
Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2001): 59-65, pp. 60-61. 
Probably weapons from Myanmar passed to ABSU via ULFA (see below), but 
this is not direct contagion from Myanmar to India. 
o No mention of potential State As (besides Pakistan) in Pralip Kumar Narzary, 
“Hidden Truth of Ethnic Clash Between Boro Tribe and Santhals in Assam, 
India,” Stud. Tribes Tribals, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2006): 57-62. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, or Myanmar to India in 
1989, pending confirmation from Dasgupta. Dasgupta confirms in 6/23/10 e-mail. 
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India, 1990 (vs. PWG and ULFA [different incompatibilities] – State A could be Bangladesh, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar) 
• PWG: 
o Sri Lanka  India, 1990. “The Tamil Tigers are particularly active in providing 
training in explosives warfare, which is their forte. There is some evidence that 
the group has assisted the Naxalite PWG in explosives training.” (Sandy Gordon, 
“Resources and Instability in South Asia,” Survival, Vol. 35, No. 2 (1993): 66-87, 
p. 82) No mention of Bangladesh, Pakistan, or Myanmar. Notes “less strong 
evidence” of Tamil involvement with ULFA and the Sikh insurgents – I won’t 
count the latter as contagion because the Sikh onset in 1983 preceded the Tamil 
onset in 1984. 
o No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. 
o No mention of JSS/SB conflict in Bangladesh in Rajat Kujur, “Naxal Movements 
in India: A Profile,” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Research Paper 
(2008). 
• Assam: 
o Pakistan  India, 1990. UCDP conflict summary: “The insurgency in Assam 
primarily emerged out of one single issue: the influx of illegal immigrants from 
Bangladesh/East Pakistan. An anti-foreigner movement emerged in the late 
1970s, mobilizing support based on the sense of relative deprivation among the 
tribal people vis-à-vis the Bengali settlers. This movement demanded the settlers’ 
expulsion from Assam. ULFA, established on 7 April 1979, was a part of this 
movement.” Bangladeshi JSS/SB conflict appears unrelated. 
o Myanmar  India, 1990. “Help from the NSCN and the [Burmese] KIA played a 
vital role in transforming ULFA into a formidable guerilla outfit armed with 
sophisticated weapons.” (Anindita Dasgupta, “Small Arms Proliferation in India’s 
Northeast: A Case Study of Assam,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 36, No. 
1 (2001): 59-65, p. 60) Support from LTTE appears to be post-onset; Bangladesh 
sanctuaries appear unrelated to JSS/SB. 
o No mention of potential State As in Sandy Gordon, “Resources and Instability in 
South Asia,” Survival, Vol. 35, No. 2 (1993): 66-87, pp. 72-73. 
o No mention of JSS/SB conflict in Bangladesh in Sanjib Baruah, “The State and 
Separatist Militancy in Assam: Winning a Battle and Losing the War?” Asian 
Survey, Vol. 34, No. 10 (1994): 863-877. 
o No mention of JSS/SB conflict in Bangladesh in Arijit Mazumdar, “Bhutan’s 
Military Action Against Indian Insurgents,” Asian Survey, Vol. 45, No. 4 (2005): 
566-580. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Bangladesh to India in 1990, pending confirmation 
from Gordon. Gordon confirms in 6/23/10 e-mail. 
 
432 
 
India, 1992 (vs. NSCN – IM – State A could be Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar) 
• Upon further review I do not view this as a valid re-onset of the Nagaland conflict. There 
were only 5 years of non-conflict involving the incompatibility (1975-1980), according to 
Vivek Chadha, Low Intensity Conflicts in India: An Analysis (New Delhi: Sage 
Publications (2005), p. 298. 
 
Pakistan, 1971 (vs. Mukti Bahini – State A could be India, Sri Lanka, Iran) 
• No mention of Sri Lanka or Iran in Iftikhar H. Malik, The History of Pakistan (Westport, 
Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2008), pp. 153-156. Indian support for Mukti Bahini 
insurgency is noted (p. 155), but seemingly this was unrelated to the Northeast India 
conflicts. 
• No mention of Sri Lanka or Iran in Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan: The Continuing Search 
for Nationhood, Second Edition (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 56-61. Indian 
support again noted, but again not tied to Indian conflicts. 
• No mention of Sri Lanka or Iran in Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971-
1977, Second Edition (Houndmills, U.K.: Macmillan Press, 1988), pp. 58-61. Same story 
with India. 
• No mention of Northeast Indian conflicts in Vijay Sen Budhraj, “Moscow and the Birth 
of Bangladesh,” Asian Survey, Vol. 13, No. 5 (1973): 482-495. 
• No mention of Northeast Indian conflicts in Zaglul Haider, “A Revisit to the Indian Role 
in the Bangladesh Liberation War,” Journal of Asian and African Studies, Vol. 44, No. 5 
(2009): 537-551. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from India, Sri Lanka, or Iran to Pakistan in 1971, 
pending confirmation from Haider. 
 
Pakistan, 1974 (vs. Baluchi insurgents – State A could be India, Sri Lanka) 
• No mention of India or Sri Lanka in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of India’s or Sri Lanka’s contribution to Baluchistan onset in Herbert 
Feldman, “Pakistan in 1974,” Asian Survey, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1975): 110-116. 
• No mention of Indian conflicts’ or Sri Lanka’s contribution to Baluchistan onset in Selig 
S. Harrison, “Nightmare in Baluchistan,” Foreign Policy, No. 32 (1978): 136-160. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from India or Sri Lanka to Pakistan in 1974. Experts 
could not be reached. 
 
Pakistan, 1990 (vs. MQM – State A could be Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Iran) 
o Afghanistan  Pakistan, 1990. “The security environment in Pakistan … has also been 
indirectly affected as a result of the use of Pakistan as a conduit for the supply of 
weapons for the Afghan War. According to one estimate, there are now one million 
unlicensed Kalashnikov rifles in the country. Such weapons are used extensively in the 
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ethnic wars fought out in the cities of Sindh.” (Sandy Gordon, “Resources and Instability 
in South Asia,” Survival, Vol. 35, No. 2 (1993): 66-87, p. 76) 
o “The arrival of Afghan refugees in the 1980s added to the volatile demographic 
situation in Karachi. … MQM targeted the Afghans as the main cause of 
instability in Karachi. MQM demanded easier access to arms licenses for 
Muhajirs to counter the armed Pathans [Afghan refugees].” (Farhat Haq, “Rise of 
the MQM in Pakistan: Politics of Ethnic Mobilization,” Asian Survey, Vol. 35, 
No. 11 (1995): 990-1004, p. 994) No specific mention of other relevant conflicts 
(Indian support is vaguely alluded to, but no explicit tie made to Indian conflicts). 
• India  Pakistan, 1990. “The MQM’s mounting militancy in Pakistan has coincided with 
increased insurgency in the Indian administered part of Kashmir, which started in 1989 
and gained momentum in the early 1990s. In attempts to make Pakistan pliant to its 
pressures, from the late 1980s onwards, India was conceivably looking to provide covert 
support for some dissident groups within Pakistan. The Indian objective of supporting 
terrorists in Pakistan, among other considerations, is aimed at preventing the latter from 
interfering in the internal affairs of India. … Creating a linkage between Kashmir and 
Karachi, India seemingly conveys the message to Pakistan that its own stability in 
Karachi is also at stake and it should refrain from supporting the Kashmiri militants.” 
(Mehtab Ali Shah, “The Emergence of the Muhajir Quami Movement (MQM) in 
Pakistan and its Implications for Regional Security,” The Round Table, Vol. 348, No. 1 
(1998)). No mention of other potential State As’ conflicts’ contributions (besides 
Afghanistan). 
• No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of conflicts in Bangladesh, India, or Iran in Mohammad Waseem, “Ethnic 
Conflict in Pakistan: The Case of MQM,” Pakistan Development Review, Vol. 35, No. 4 
(1996): 617-629. “Political refugees” from Iraq, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka are noted, but 
their numbers appear small – only 1,700 Iraqi refugees in Pakistan in 1990 according to 
UNHCR. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, or Iran to Pakistan in 1990, 
pending confirmation from Haq. Haq confirms in 6/7/10 e-mail. 
 
Pakistan, 2004 (vs. BLA/Baluch Ittehad – State A could be Afghanistan, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, 
Iran, Uzbekistan) 
• Afghanistan  Pakistan, 2004. U.S. involvement in Afghanistan drives Taliban into 
Baluchistan, where Pakistan must step up its troop presence. This was one of the 
grievances leading to the revolt. (Justin S. Dunne, Crisis in Baluchistan: A Historical 
Analysis of the Baluch Nationalist Movement in Pakistan (MA Thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2006), p. 55) No mention of other potential State As’ conflicts. 
o Also: “The Baluch nationalists have no dearth of conflict-specific capital. The 
initial influx of weaponry came during the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
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when the Soviets attempted to destabilize Pakistan by igniting a subnational 
movement in Baluchistan.” (Shanna Dietz Surendra, “Explaining Social 
Mobilization in Pakistan: A Comparative Case Study of Baluchistan and Azad 
Kashmir,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, Vol. 
29, No. 2 (2009): 246-258, p. 255) No legitimate mention of other State A 
conflicts. 
• UCDP conflict summary notes accusations of support for Baluch insurgents from Indian 
government and “Afghan warlords,” but says neither has been substantiated. The Baluch 
insurgency is ethnically tied to the Jondollah insurgency in Iran, but according to UCDP, 
“neither the BLA nor the Baluch Ittehad seemed to have had any cross-border 
connections or cooperation with these militants.” No mention of other potential State As. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Iran, or Uzbekistan to 
Pakistan in 2004, pending confirmation from Surendra. Surendra confirms in 6/16/10 e-
mail. 
 
Pakistan, 2007 (vs. TNSM/TTP – State A could be Afghanistan, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Iran, 
Uzbekistan) 
• Afghanistan  Pakistan, 2007. “Pakistan is one of the few countries to have succeeded in 
using a proxy force, the Taliban, to secure its interests in a civil war. However, this 
‘victory’ came at a horrendous price. Pakistan’s support of these radical Islamists 
affected its own social balance, encouraging the explosion of Islamic fundamentalism 
inside Pakistan, increasing the number of armed groups operating from Pakistan, creating 
networks for drugs and weapons to fuel the conflict, and threatening the cohesion of the 
state.” Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, Things Fall Apart: Containing the 
Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 39. 
• Uzbekistan  Pakistan, 2007. IMU cadres have sheltered in Pakistan, contributing to the 
unrest there and also creating disputes between Taliban leaders over what to do with them 
(Mona Kanwal Sheikh, “Disaggregating the Pakistani Taliban,” Danish Institute for 
International Studies Brief (2009), p. 4). No mention of other potential sending conflicts. 
• No mention of potential State As (besides Afghanistan) in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of potential State As (besides Afghanistan and Uzbekistan) in K. Alan 
Kronstadt and Kenneth Katzman, “Islamist Militancy in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border 
Region and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (2008). 
• Hence I will code no contagion from India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, or Iran to Pakistan in 2007, 
pending confirmation from Sheikh. 
 
Bangladesh, 1975 (vs. JSS/SB – State A could be India or Sri Lanka [or Pakistan, but this is the 
same country in 1971]) 
• India  Bangladesh, 1975. Indian support for the JSS/SB is noted extensively below – 
the question is why. Consider: “Even as they withdrew from the plains of Bangladesh, the 
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Indians hung on longer in the strategic Chittagong Hill Tracts. … In the past, Pakistan 
had used this area as a base from which to assist tribal groups in India, such as the Mizos, 
who were opposed to the central government. India wanted to forestall any such use of 
the Hill Tracts by the Bangladeshis. … In March 1972 the Indians completed their 
withdrawal.” (Craig Baxter, Bangladesh: From a Nation to a State (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1997), p. 147) Seems plausible that India supported the JSS/SB for the same 
reason – to keep Dhaka from using the area as a base for anti-India insurgents. No 
mention of Sri Lanka. 
• No mention of Sri Lanka in UCDP conflict summary. India has been accused of aiding 
the JSS/SB, but not clear if this is connected to any of the Indian conflicts. 
• No mention of Sri Lanka in Syed Aziz-al Ahsan and Bhumita Chakma, “Problems of 
National Integration in Bangladesh: The Chittagong Hill Tracts,” Asian Survey, Vol. 29, 
No. 10 (1989): 959-970. Does note support from India, but again this seems unrelated to 
Indian conflicts. 
• No mention of Sri Lanka in G.H. Peiris, “Political Conflict in Bangladesh,” Ethnic 
Studies Report, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1998): 1-75, pp. 29-42. Again Indian support is noted, 
and again it seems to have no direct tie to the Northeast Indian conflicts. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Sri Lanka to Bangladesh, pending confirmation 
from Baxter. 
 
Myanmar, 1948 (vs. CPB, CPB–RF, PVO – “White Band” faction and Arakan insurgents [two 
different incompatibilities] – State A could be Philippines, India, China) 
• Communists: 
o China  Myanmar, 1948. “The first shots were fired on April 2 [1948]; … 
Burma’s civil war … had begun. The decision to take up arms was confirmed by 
the party leadership at a Central Committee meeting … in May. The entire 
Central Committee, with the sole exception of Goshal, supported the Maoist 
strategy of guerilla warfare as opposed to general strikes.” (Bertil Linter, The Rise 
and Fall of the Communist Party of Burma (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, 
Cornell University, 1990), p. 14) Interestingly there does not appear to have been 
actual Chinese support at this stage, only inspiration both tactical and otherwise. 
Only mention of Philippines is that the conflict was allegedly not related (p. 12). 
o India  Myanmar, 1948. CPI’s role in the CPB uprising is in dispute, but it 
seems clear that the movements were in contact with one another and that Indian 
developments influenced Burmese ones. For example, “At a CC meeting at the 
end of December [1946, after the Hyderabad rebellion began], the CPB 
acknowledged criticism from the Indian Communist Party for its Browderist 
[peaceful] line and the following month first discussed its future slogan, ‘the final 
seizure of power.’” (Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of 
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Ethnicity, Second Edition (London: Zed Books, 1999), pp. 69-70) No mention of 
Philippines. 
o No mention of Philippines in UCDP conflict summary. 
o No mention of Philippines in Michael W. Charney, A History of Modern Burma 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 72-73. 
• Arakan: 
o No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. 
o No mention of potential State As’ conflicts in Aye Chan, “The Development of a 
Muslim Enclave in Arakan (Rahkine) State of Burma (Myanmar),” SOAS Bulletin 
of Burma Research, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2005): 396-420. 
o No mention of Philippines in Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics 
of Ethnicity, Second Edition (London: Zed Books, 1999). 
• Hence I will code no contagion from the Philippines to Myanmar in 1948, pending 
confirmation from Charney. Charney confirms in 6/13/10 e-mail. 
 
Myanmar, 1949 (vs. KNU, PNDF and MFL-MUF [different territorial incompatibilities] – State 
A could be Philippines, India, China) 
• Karen 
o China  Myanmar, 1949. “Mao’s influence was not, however, confined to the 
communist movement. The KNU had copies of his writings as early as 1949 and, 
through the 1950s, this led to the Karen nationalist movement’s ideological drift 
to the political left.” (Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of 
Ethnicity, Second Edition (London: Zed Books, 1999), p. 93) No mention of other 
potential State As. 
o No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. Support from China 
began in the mid-1950s with the CPB alliance, but not in 1949. 
o No mention of potential State As in Edward M. Law Yone and David G. 
Mandelbaum, “Pacification in Burma,” Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 19, No. 17 
(1950): 182-187. 
o No mention of potential State As in Michael W. Charney, A History of Modern 
Burma (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 66-67, 74-75. 
• Kachin 
o No mention of potential State As in (brief) UCDP conflict summary. 
o No mention of potential State As in Edward M. Law Yone and David G. 
Mandelbaum, “Pacification in Burma,” Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 19, No. 17 
(1950): 182-187. 
o No mention of potential State As’ contribution in Martin Smith, Burma: 
Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, Second Edition (London: Zed Books, 
1999). 
• Mon 
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o No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. 
o No mention of potential State As in Michael W. Charney, A History of Modern 
Burma (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 66-67, 74-75. 
o No mention of potential State As’ contribution in Martin Smith, Burma: 
Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, Second Edition (London: Zed Books, 
1999). 
• Hence I will code no contagion from India or the Philippines to Myanmar in 1949, 
pending confirmation from Charney. Charney confirms in 6/13/10 e-mail. 
 
Myanmar, 1957 (vs. KNPP – State A could be Indonesia, Philippines, South Vietnam, India, 
China) 
• No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of potential State As in Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of 
Ethnicity, Second Edition (London: Zed Books, 1999). 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Lawrence E. Cline, 
“Insurgency in Amber: Ethnic Opposition Groups in Myanmar,” Small Wars & 
Insurgencies, Vol. 20, No. 3 (2009): 574-591. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Indonesia, Philippines, South Vietnam, India, or 
China to Myanmar in 1957, pending confirmation from Cline. Cline confirms in 6/16/10 
e-mail. 
 
Myanmar, 1959 (vs. NSH/SSIA – State A could be Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, 
South Vietnam, India, China) 
• China  Myanmar, 1959. “Just as the growth of the modern ‘Burmese’ nationalist 
movement can be dated back to the reaction against British colonialism and the formation 
of the Young Men’s Buddhist Association at the turn of the century, so the Shan 
movement can be linked to the KMT invasion and the influx of ethnic Burman troops and 
officials into the state.” (Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, 
Second Edition (London: Zed Books, 1999), p. 190) Basically KMT invasion  
Burmese troop presence  grievance among local Shan. No mention of other potential 
State As. 
• No mention of potential State As besides China in UCDP conflict summary. KMT was 
active in Shan in the late 1950s, and left. “The Shan insurgent movement grew slowly, 
but took over most of the drug business after the KMT left in 1961.” 
• No mention of other potential State As in Martin Smith, “Burma (Myanmar): The Time 
for Change,” Minority Rights Group International Report (2002), p. 19. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, South 
Vietnam, or India to Myanmar in 1959, pending confirmation from Charney. Charney 
confirms in 6/13/10 e-mail. 
 
438 
 
Myanmar, 1961 (vs. KIO – State A could be Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, South Vietnam, India, 
China) 
• China  Myanmar, 1961. Chinese war with KMT spills over into Kachin State, leads the 
CCP to have territorial designs on parts of Burma. In 1960 a Burma-China treaty signs 
three Kachin villages over to China. “This historic treaty, made over the heads of local 
villagers, was a major factor behind the sudden outbreak of the Kachin uprising, begun 
by the … KIO in February 1961.” (Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of 
Ethnicity, Second Edition (London: Zed Books, 1999), pp. 157-158) No mention of other 
potential State As. 
• No mention of potential State As besides China in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of potential State As (besides China) in Karin Dean, “Spaces and 
Territorialities on the Sino-Burmese Boundary: China, Burma and the Kachin,” Political 
Geography, Vol. 24, No. 7 (2005): 808-830. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, South Vietnam, and 
India to Myanmar in 1961, pending confirmation from Dean. 
 
Myanmar, 1990 (vs. NMSP – State A could be Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Papua New Guinea, 
Philippines, India) 
• Based on the UCDP conflict summary, I believe this is not a legitimate re-onset. NMSP, 
an offshoot of MFL-MUF (covered in Myanmar 1949), was founded in 1958/1959 and 
has been active since then. 
 
Myanmar, 1992 (vs. KNPP – State A could be Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Papua New Guinea, 
Philippines, India) 
• Based on Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, Second Edition 
(London: Zed Books, 1999), I do not think this is a legitimate re-onset. KNPP was active 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, acting in concert with larger rebel groups. 
 
Myanmar, 1996 (vs. BMA – State A could be Cambodia, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, 
Philippines, India) 
• Based on the UCDP conflict summary, I believe this is not a legitimate re-onset. BMA 
broke off from NMSP after the latter signed a peace agreement with the government in 
1995, meaning there was really only a one-year lag between the two Mon conflicts. 
 
Myanmar, 1997 (vs. UWSA – State A could be Cambodia, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, 
Philippines, India) 
• No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of potential State As in Lawrence E. Cline, “Insurgency in Amber: Ethnic 
Opposition Groups in Myanmar,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 20, No. 3 (2009): 
574-591. Does note alleged Chinese support for UWSA (p. 586), but this seems to be 
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dated to the late 2000s. (Besides, I’m not sure China would really count as a State A in 
1997.) 
• No mention of potential State As in Carl Grundy-Warr and Elaine Wong, “Geopolitics of 
Drugs and Cross-Border Relations: Burma-Thailand,” IBRU Boundary and Security 
Bulletin (Spring 2001): 108-121. 
• No mention of potential State As in Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of 
Ethnicity, Second Edition (London: Zed Books, 1999). 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Cambodia, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, 
Philippines, and India to Myanmar in 1997, pending confirmation from Cline. Cline 
confirms in 6/16/10 e-mail. 
 
Myanmar, 2005 (vs. KNPP – State A could be Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, India) 
• Based on the UCDP conflict summary, I do not think this is a legitimate re-onset. KNPP 
continued to fight the government throughout the 1990s, especially after 1996 when it 
rejected a 1995 ceasefire. The pickup in violence in the mid-2000s appears in large part 
to be due to a government campaign against the KNPP (itself driven by peace with KNU 
and the relocation of the national capital). 
 
Sri Lanka, 1971 (vs. JVP – State A could be India, China, Pakistan) 
• China  Sri Lanka, 1971. “Rohana Wijeweera was a professional revolutionary who 
appears to have spent most of his adult life searching out and testing alternative 
instruments for the revolutionary overthrow of state power. His early political activity 
was in the ‘old left,’ but experience in studying in Moscow led him into the ‘China wing’ 
of the Marxists.” (Mick Moore, “Thoroughly Modern Revolutionaries: The JVP in Sri 
Lanka,” Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3 (1993): 593-642, p. 618) No mention of 
Naxalite conflict in India (or other Indian substate conflicts), or Pakistan. 
• I am invalidating this link – could be either the extrastate conflict with France (seems 
most likely) or the interstate conflict with North Vietnam (seems second-most likely) 
rather than the intrastate conflict within South Vietnam (seems least likely). 
o South Vietnam  Sri Lanka, 1971. “The JVP of 1971 provided an early example 
of this process of localization of the dynamics of revolution within the periphery. 
The JVP was hostile to the Soviet Union at the ideological level, obtained some 
material support from North Korea, and took the Maoist and Vietnamese models 
of ‘peasant revolution’ as its ideological reference points.” (Mick Moore, 
“Thoroughly Modern Revolutionaries: The JVP in Sri Lanka,” Modern Asian 
Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3 (1993): 593-642, p. 599) 
• No mention of potential State As (besides China) in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of potential State As (Pakistan not screened for) in Gananath Obeyesekere, 
“Some Comments on the Social Backgrounds of the April 1971 Insurgency in Sri Lanka 
(Ceylon),” Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 33, No. 3 (1974): 367-384. 
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• Hence I will code no contagion from India or Pakistan to Sri Lanka in 1971, pending 
confirmation from Moore. Moore confirms in 6/16/10 e-mail. 
  
Sri Lanka, 1984 (vs. LTTE/TELO/EPRLF – State A could be Bangladesh, India, China, 
Pakistan) 
• China  Sri Lanka, 1984. “LTTE strategy is based on a three-stage struggle, influenced 
by both Mao Zedong and Che Guevara.” (Alan J. Bullion, India, Sri Lanka and the Tamil 
Crisis, 1976-1994 (London: Pinter, 1995), p. 92) Also notes that PLOTE had ties with 
PLO, but this was a minor Tamil insurgent group. No mention of Bangladesh or of Indian 
conflicts playing a role in India’s decision to support the Tamil insurgents. 
• Pakistan  Sri Lanka, 1984. “In 1976, encouraged by the separation of East Pakistan 
from West Pakistan and the creation of the state of Bangladesh, the FP transformed itself 
into the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) and began to push for a separate Tamil or 
Eelam state.” (Gamini Samaranayake, “Political Terrorism of the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka,” South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, Vol. 30, 
No. 1 (2007): 171-183, p. 173) No mention of Chittagong Hill Tracts conflict or Indian 
substate conflicts. 
o “The example of Bangladesh, while also showing what could be achieved by 
armed struggle indicated, too, the possibility that the Indian government might be 
persuaded to take up the Tamil cause as it had that of the people of East Bengal.” 
(ibid, p. 174) 
• No mention of Bangladesh in UCDP conflict summary. Indian support does not appear to 
be related to any Indian substate conflicts. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Bangladesh or India to Sri Lanka in 1984, pending 
confirmation from Samaranayake. 
 
Sri Lanka, 1989 (vs. JVP – State A could be Bangladesh, India) 
• This link has been invalidated, since it appears more connected to the Vietnam interstate 
conflict. 
o South Vietnam  Sri Lanka, 1989. “'It is clear that the JVP in the post-accord 
period modeled its tactics on the Vietnamese experience. They identified an 
external aggressor (India), saw the UNP government as a puppet regime of that 
power (like the Diem regime in South Vietnam), claimed that cliques … were at 
work within these regimes, brought in women, students and monks as a ‘frontline’ 
in street battles, emphasized the ‘patriotic’ nature of the opposition, wooed 
‘patriotic intellectuals’ …” (S. Leelananda, “JVP Learning from Vietnam?” 
Lanka Guardian, Vol. 13, No. 19 (19??), p. 18). Cited in Mick Moore, 
“Thoroughly Modern Revolutionaries: The JVP in Sri Lanka,” Modern Asian 
Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3 (1993): 593-642, p. 614, note 55. No mention of Indian or 
Bangladeshi conflicts contributing to onset. 
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• No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of potential State As in Stanley Jeyaraja Tambiah, Buddhism Betrayed? 
Religion, Politics, and Violence in Sri Lanka (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1992), pp. 95-100. 
• No mention of Bangladesh or South Vietnam in Shelton U. Kodikara, “The Continuing 
Crisis in Sri Lanka: The JVP, the Indian Troops, and Tamil Politics,” Asian Survey, Vol. 
29, No. 7 (1989): 716-724. Does note JVP sees India as expansionist in part because of 
its actions in East Pakistan and Sikkim (p. 717), but these links seem largely rhetorical in 
nature (and would likely be replaced by other anti-India rhetoric in their absence). 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Bangladesh or India to Sri Lanka in 1989, pending 
confirmation from Moore. Moore confirms in 6/16/10 e-mail. 
 
Nepal, 1960 (vs. Nepali Congress – State A could be India, China) 
• No mention of substate conflicts in India or China in UCDP conflict summary. 
• Chinese and Indian substate conflicts appear not to be involved based on Tribhuvan Nath, 
The Nepalese Dilemma, 1960-1974 (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1975), pp. 196-208. 
Basically a conflict between the King and parliamentarians, though Marxists (including 
Maoists) were on the periphery. 
• Chinese and Indian substate conflicts appear not to be involved based on Frederick H. 
Gaige, “Nepal: Compromise and Liberalization,” Asian Survey, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1969: 94-
98. In fact, CCP was opposed to the Nepali Congress. 
• Chinese and Indian substate conflicts appear not to be involved based on Ali Riaz and 
Subho Basu, Paradise Lost? State Failure in Nepal (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 
2007), p. 46. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from India or China to Nepal in 1960, pending 
confirmation from Riaz. Riaz confirms in 6/29/10 e-mail. 
 
Nepal, 1996 (vs. CPN–M – State A could be Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Peru) 
• Peru  Nepal, 1996. See below. 
• India  Nepal, 1996. UCDP conflict summary: “CPN-M … received secondary support 
in the form of training and military hardware from a number of Indian Maoist insurgency 
movements, amongst them the Maoist Communist Centre and the People's War Group.” 
This makes it look more like contagion from India than from China. No mention of other 
potential State As. 
• No mention of potential State As (besides India) in Ali Riaz and Subho Basu, Paradise 
Lost? State Failure in Nepal (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2007), pp. 119-134. 
Ideological inspiration from India is noted, though very early in the Maoist movement’s 
life (late 1940s). Also significant inspiration from Peru (p. 126) – the “Maoist” 
appellation seems to stem from Indian and Peruvian inspiration, not Chinese. 
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• No mention of potential State As in Deepak Thapa with Bandita Sijapati, A Kingdom 
Under Siege: Nepal’s Maoist Insurgency, 1996 to 2004, Updated Edition (London: Zed 
Books, 2004), pp. 53-109. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, or Pakistan to Nepal in 
1996, pending confirmation from Riaz. Riaz confirms in 6/29/10 e-mail. 
o Update, 1/12/11: In Askok K. Mehta and Mahendra Lawoti, “Military 
Dimensions of the ‘People’s War’: Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Nepal,” 
in Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari, eds., The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: 
Revolution in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 179, it is 
alleged that while the CPN-M received no more than 15% of its arms from 
outside the country, these arms “could have been acquired from” both the Indian 
Maoists and the Sri Lankan LTTE. I will not code Sri Lanka  Nepal contagion 
because this link seems far too marginal (and since Riaz confirmed it did not 
exist). 
 
Thailand, 1951 (vs. Navy military faction – State A could be Indonesia, Myanmar, Philippines, 
China) 
• No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of potential State As in Thak Chaloemtiarana, Thailand: The Politics of 
Despotic Paternalism (Bangkok: Social Science Association of Thailand, 1979), pp. 49-
55. 
• No mention of potential State As in Chris Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit, A History of 
Thailand (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 140-144. 
Communist suspicions and intrigue abound in intra-regime struggle, but no mentions of 
specific countries (besides U.S.). 
• Hence I will code no contagion from China, Indonesia, Myanmar, or the Philippines to 
Thailand in 1951, pending confirmation from Phongpaichit. 
 
Thailand, 1974 (vs. CPT – State A could be South Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, China) – substate conflict onset occurred in 1974 and civil war 
onset occurred in 1976 
• China  Thailand, 1974. UCDP conflict summary: “CPT (Communist Party of 
Thailand) was formed on 1 December 1942 as the Thai section of the Chinese 
Communist party. The group continued to be heavily influenced by China and also 
received various support from China. … In 1962, a small, pro-CPT, radio station, VOPT 
(Voice of the People of Thailand), began broadcasting from the Chinese province of 
Yunnan. … Radio Hanoi and Radio Beijing also broadcasted similar messages.” 
(Seemingly not related to South Vietnam substate conflict, though.) 
o Also: “Some early party members who had gone to China to fight in the 
revolution returned to Thailand, including Udom Srisuwan, a Christian-educated 
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Chinese-Chan who became … the party’s main theoretician.” (Chris Baker and 
Pasuk Phongpaichit, A History of Thailand (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), p. 181) No mention of other potential State As (besides 
Laos and Malaysia). 
• Laos  Thailand, 1974/1976. UCDP conflict summary: “Since the 1960s, there had been 
recurring reports about CPT (Communist Party of Thailand) receiving vast support from 
mainly China but also from North Vietnam and Laos. In the mid-1970s, following the 
Khmer Rouge’s victory in Cambodia in 1975, support was reported also from Cambodia. 
The support reportedly consisted of mainly weapons, funds, training and the granting of 
temporary sanctuaries for CPT rebels.” Some Thai meddling in Laos as well (see Chapter 
5). See above on North Vietnam. No mention of other potential State As. 
• Cambodia  Thailand, 1974/1976. Evangelization present, as discussed in Chapter 5. 
• South Vietnam  Thailand, 1974/1976. Meddling with overt partiality present, as 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
• Malaysia  Thailand, 1974. “In the Far South, it still seems difficult to find one’s way 
between the guerillas of the Malayan CP … and the CPT; they most certainly cooperate 
ideologically as well as out of necessity, and have probably carved their own zones.” 
(Patrice de Beer, “History and Policy of the Communist Party of Thailand,” in Andrew 
Turton, Jonathan Fast, and Malcolm Caldwell, eds., Thailand: Roots of Conflict 
(Nottingham, U.K.: Spokesman, 1978), p. 147) No mention of other potential State As 
(besides China). 
• No mention of State As’ contribution to 1974 onset (besides those noted above) in 
Stephen I. Alpern, “Insurgency in Northeast Thailand: A New Cause for Alarm,” Asian 
Survey, Vol. 15, No. 8 (1975): 684-692. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Indonesia, Myanmar, or the Philippines to Thailand 
in 1974, pending confirmation from Phongpaichit. 
 
Thailand, 2003 (vs. Patani insurgents – State A could be Cambodia, Indonesia, Myanmar, 
Philippines, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka) 
• Cambodia  Thailand, 2003. Aurel Croissant e-mail, 6/15/10: “I cannot see any 
influence of the … conflict in Cambodia on Pat(t)ani – except perhaps the fact, that the 
Cambodia-Conflict played a role for the small arms trade on the Malay peninsula 
including Southern Thailand.” 
• Indonesia  Thailand, 2003. UCDP conflict summary: “More substantial claims have 
been made that some Thai insurgents have received training in Indonesia, especially in 
the region of Aceh, but it has not been clarified to what extent this has taken place as part 
of a planned support of the Thai insurgency.” Malaysian state support is also alleged, but 
no recent substate conflicts in Malaysia (CPM was last active in 1981, and this is not the 
Malaysian state). No mention of Cambodia, Myanmar, or the Philippines. 
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• Afghanistan  Thailand, 2003. The group GMIP is comprised of “Patani natives 
returned from fighting with the mujahideen in Afghanistan” (UCDP conflict summary) 
and this group comprised a significant component of Patani insurgent leadership in 2004 
(Kanid Utitsarn, “Insurgency in 3 Provinces in Southern Part of Thailand,” U.S. Army 
War College Strategy Research Project (2007), p. 2). No mention of other potential State 
As’ conflicts (besides Indonesia) in Utitsarn 2007. 
• Philippines  Thailand, 2003. “Some groups are involved in arms-trade to Aceh, 
Mindanao, and Sri Lanka.” (Aurel Croissant, “Muslim Insurgency, Political Violence, 
and Democracy in Thailand,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 19 (2007): 1-18, p. 
6) 
• Sri Lanka  Thailand, 2003. “Some groups are involved in arms-trade to Aceh, 
Mindanao, and Sri Lanka.” (Aurel Croissant, “Muslim Insurgency, Political Violence, 
and Democracy in Thailand,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 19 (2007): 1-18, p. 
6) No mention of Cambodia or Myanmar/Burma. 
• No mention of additional State As (besides those noted above) in Patcharawat 
Thnaprarnsing, “Solving the Conflict in Southern Thailand,” U.S. Army War College 
Strategy Research Project (2009). 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Myanmar to Thailand in 2003, pending 
confirmation from Croissant. Croissant confirms in 6/15/10 e-mail. 
 
Cambodia, 1967 (vs. KR – State A could be Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, South 
Vietnam, China) 
• China  Cambodia, 1967. “[Pol Pot] had his own concept of a revived Angkorean glory. 
His, inspired by the brutal China of Mao Zedong, called for a new atheistic civilization 
built atop a totally destroyed past.” (Wilfred P. Deac, Road to the Killing Fields: The 
Cambodian War of 1970-1975 (College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M University Press, 
1997), p. 42) No mention of Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, or Burma/Myanmar. 
• South Vietnam  Cambodia, 1967. “Despite his sympathy for the communists abroad, 
Sihanouk was wary of leftists in Cambodia. In 1963, with the war exploding in 
neighboring Vietnam [at this point an intrastate conflict in South Vietnam], he moved 
openly and dramatically against the left, … [forcing] the leading leftists to flee Phnom 
Penh. Among them were the top central committee members of the Khmer Rouge. … 
Most of these Khmer Rouge fled to a Vietnamese communist base along the border, … 
hoping to lead their own insurgency against Sihanouk one day.” (Elizabeth Becker, When 
the War was Over: Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge Revolution, Second Edition (New 
York: PublicAffairs, 1998), pp. 10-11) No mention of Indonesia, Malaysia, or 
Burma/Myanmar; role of Laos seems quite limited (but I should ask – Becker says “Laos 
was a very junior partner”). 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in UCDP conflict summary. 
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• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to 1967 onset (besides China) in Edward 
Kissi, Revolution and Genocide in Ethiopia and Cambodia (Lanham, Md.: Lexington 
Books, 2006), pp. 19-44.  
• Hence I will code no contagion from Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, or Myanmar to 
Cambodia, pending confirmation from Becker. Becker confirms in 6/15/10 e-mail. 
 
Laos, 1959 (vs. Pathet Lao/Neutralists – State A could be Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
Philippines, South Vietnam, China) 
• South Vietnam  Laos, 1959. Laos granted an embassy to South Vietnam but not North 
Vietnam, which led to increased North Vietnamese support to the Pathet Lao, 
contributing heavily to the civil war onset there in 1959. See Chapter 5 for more detail 
and sourcing. 
o “On 15 December 1958, a Lao patrol was fired upon in a disputed area close to 
the demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam. This remote mountain 
valley was of considerable strategic importance for the DRV, since it provided an 
infiltration route around the western end of the demilitarized zone for communist 
cadres moving south. The DRV immediately … dispatched ‘a battalion-sized 
force’ into the disputed area. In response to this incident, … Phuy Xananikon 
demanded and received emergency powers to govern for a period of one year 
without recourse to the Assembly – a move which effectively eliminated any 
parliamentary forum for the [communist] LPF.” This sets in motion a wave of 
anti-communist repression that ultimately leads to the civil war. The international 
incident would not occurred without the intrastate conflict in South Vietnam – the 
reason the area was important to the DRV. (Martin Stuart-Fox, A History of Laos 
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 105-108) No mention 
of other potential State As. 
• China  Laos, 1959. “Concurrent with [Phuy Xananikon’s] anti-communist activities in 
1959, China set up a center for training Pathet Lao cadres in Yunnan and sent into Laos 
cadres of the Ho Tribe.” Does note that China’s influence on Lao communists was 
overshadowed by DRV until later in the war. (Don Fletcher and Geoff Gunn, Revolution 
in Laos: The “Fourth Generation” of People’s War? (Townsville, Australia: Southeast 
Asian Monograph Series No. 8, James Cook University of North Queensland, 1981), p. 
36) No mention of other potential State As (besides Vietnam). 
o Also: “The ideological orientation of the Pathet Lao movement was influenced 
from the outset by the Maoist model.” (p. 39) 
• No mention of potential State As (besides Vietnam) in (brief) UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset (besides Vietnam and China) in 
C.J. Christie, “Marxism and the History of the Nationalist Movements in Laos,” Journal 
of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1979): 146-158. 
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• Hence I will code no contagion from Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, or the Philippines 
to Laos in 1959, pending confirmation from Stuart-Fox. Stuart-Fox confirms in 6/16/10 e-
mail – also claims that the “Chinese influence we now know was minimal,” although I 
still think what I found above is sufficient to code contagion. 
 
Laos, 1989 (vs. LRM – State A could be Cambodia, Indonesia, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, 
Philippines) 
• No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. The rebels congregated in 
refugee camps in Thailand, but Thailand had no proximate conflict (the CPT certainly 
wouldn’t have supported them). 
• No mention of potential State As in Martin Stuart-Fox, A History of Laos (Cambridge, 
U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 201. 
• No mention of potential State As in Jane Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic Mountains: The 
Hmong, the Americans, and the Secret Wars for Laos, 1942-1992 (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1993), pp. 498-502. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Cambodia, Indonesia, Myanmar, Papua New 
Guinea, or the Philippines to Laos, pending confirmation from Stuart-Fox. Stuart-Fox 
confirms in 6/16/10 e-mail. 
 
South Vietnam, 1955 (vs. FNL – State A could be Indonesia, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand, 
China) 
• China  South Vietnam, 1955. Edward Miller e-mail, 6/18/10: “All senior VWP leaders 
and strategists were very familiar with Mao’s ideas and repeatedly described themselves 
as practitioners of ‘people’s war.’”  
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Philip E. Catton, Diem’s Final 
Failure: Prelude to America’s War in Vietnam (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 
2002). 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Seth Jacobs, Cold War 
Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America’s War in Vietnam, 1950-1963 
(Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), especially pp. 89-90. 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Truong Nhu Tang with David 
Chanoff and Doan Van Toai, A Vietcong Memoir (San Diego: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1985), pp. 1-80. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Indonesia, Myanmar, Philippines, or Thailand to 
South Vietnam, pending confirmation from David Hunt (recommended by Edward 
Miller, who was recommended by Jacobs). Hunt more or less confirms in 6/24/10 e-mail. 
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Malaysia, 1958 (vs. CPM – State A could be Indonesia, Myanmar, Philippines, South Vietnam, 
China) 
• This appears not to be a legitimate onset, based on Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard 
Y. Andaya, A History of Malaysia (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982), pp. 257-264. 
The CPM originally started fighting the British in an extra-state conflict in 1948 (not 
included in the scope of this project). In 1957 the British handed over the Malay state to 
an anti-communist government that continued the fight against the now mainly defunct 
communists. So there doesn’t appear to have been a real onset in 1958 – this conflict is 
best viewed as one continuous, low-grade conflict starting in 1948 and ending in 1989, 
and out of the scope of this project because it started as extrastate. 
 
Malaysia, 1963 (vs. CCO – State A could be Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, South Vietnam, China) 
• China  Malaysia, 1963. “Both Wen and Bong [SCO/CCO leaders] had opted to 
renounce their citizenship and left for China … on 27 June 1962. … The group was 
escorted to Beijing … as overseas Chinese guests of the State Department and the 
Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau. Wen and Bong spent the next seven or eight months in 
China, … meeting Chinese officials associated with foreign affairs.” (Vernon L. Porritt, 
The Rise and Fall of Communism in Sarawak, 1940-1990 (Victoria, Australia: Monash 
University Press, 2004), p. 83) No mention of other potential State As’ conflicts. 
o Also: “Many young Chinese are proud of the achievements of Communist China 
and feel what is good in China should be copied here.” (Quoted in Justus M. van 
der Kroef, “Communism in Sarawak Today,” Asian Survey, Vol. 6, No. 10 
(1966): 568-579, p. 575) The CCO allegedly had “a Vietcong-style training 
camp” (ibid), but not sure this really qualifies as South Vietnam  Malaysia 
contagion. No mention of other potential State A conflicts. 
o Also: “It is perhaps partly because of these Maoist ideological influences 
particularly in the practice of modern insurgency, that the heterogeneous rebel 
elements have been able to establish any pattern of coordinated action at all.” 
(Justus M. van der Kroef, “The Sarawak-Indonesian Border Insurgency,” Modern 
Asian Studies, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1968): 245-265, p. 258) No mention of other 
potential State A conflicts. 
• No mention of potential State A conflicts in UCDP conflict summary. Indonesia 
supported the CCO, but this appears unrelated to any Indonesian conflicts. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, or South Vietnam to 
Malaysia, pending confirmation from Porritt. Porritt confirms in 8/5/10 e-mail. 
 
Malaysia, 1974 (vs. CPM – State A could be Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, Philippines, 
Thailand, China) 
• Based on UCDP summary, this appears not to be a legitimate re-onset. CPM was active 
through the 1960s and early 1970s. 
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Malaysia, 1981 (vs. CPM – State A could be Cambodia, Indonesia, Myanmar, Philippines, 
Thailand) 
• Based on UCDP summary, this appears not to be a legitimate re-onset. CPM was active 
throughout the late 1970s. 
 
Philippines, 1946 (vs. HUK – State A could be China) 
• Based on Alfredo B. Saulo, Communism in the Philippines: An Introduction (Manila: 
Ateneo Publications, 1969), pp. 1-49, this onset appears to be pre-1946. The Huk militia 
originated in 1942 and fought the Japanese-run government of the Philippines. There was 
only a 2-3-year lull in the fighting after Allied liberation of the Philippines before Huk 
was reactivated and starting fighting the new Filipino government. (In any case, Chinese 
communism appears to have had only a very limited influence on Filipino communism at 
this stage.) 
 
Philippines, 1969 (vs. CPP – State A could be Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
South Vietnam, China) 
• Based on UCDP conflict summary, this does not appear to be a legitimate re-onset. CPP 
split off from HUK in 1968, after being expelled by the HUK leadership of the Filipino 
communists. HUK was still active in the 1960s, suggesting the CPP conflict is just a 
continuation of the HUK conflict from the 1940s. See also Thomas A. Marks, Maoist 
Insurgency Since Vietnam (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. 97-98: “Even after the Huk 
Rebellion collapsed, low-level violence had continued as some Huk commanders and 
their protégés refused to surrender. The young Maoists of the CPP forged tenuous links 
with these Huk remnants, all of which were active in banditry at the time in the central 
Luzon area north of Manila, sparking another round in the conflict.” 
 
Philippines, 1970 (vs. MIM/MNLF – State A could be Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, China, South Vietnam) 
• No mention of potential State A conflicts in UCDP conflict summary. Malaysian support 
for rebels is noted, but this seems unrelated to the dual communist insurgencies in 
Malaysia. 
• No mention of potential State A conflicts in W.K. Che Man, Muslim Separatism: The 
Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand (Singapore: Oxford 
University Press, 1990), pp. 74-84, 138-148. Nur Misauri was a Marxist (p. 77), but this 
doesn’t seem to have anything to do with China. MNLF training in PLO camps is also 
mentioned, but this was probably post-onset (Arab World support for the MNLF began 
around 1971 and escalated slowly from there; civil war onset was in 1972 according to 
UCDP/PRIO). 
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• No mention of potential State A conflicts in Soliman M. Santos, Jr., “Evolution of the 
Armed Conflict on the Moro Front,” Background Paper to Philippine Human 
Development Report (2005). 
• No mention of potential State A conflicts (besides China) in Dennis Shoesmith, “Islam 
and Revolution in the Southern Philippines,” Dyason House Papers, Vol. 9, No. 4 
(1983): 2-12. MNLF did use Maoist tactics and ideology to some extent, but seemingly 
post-onset (party documents cited are from the early 1980s, and a change in tactics to 
Maoist methods is noted, suggesting in the earlier period Maoism was not involved). 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
China, or South Vietnam to the Philippines, pending confirmation from Kathleen Nadeau 
(writer of a general history on the Philippines). Nadeau confirms in 6/18/10 e-mail (but 
not for South Vietnam, which I didn’t consider to be a State A at the time – South 
Vietnam is absent from the secondary sources, however). 
 
Indonesia, 1950 (vs. Republic of South Moluccas – State A could be Myanmar, Philippines, 
China) 
• No mention of potential State As in Adrian Vickers, A History of Modern Indonesia 
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 139. 
• No mention of potential State As’ conflicts in Dieter Bartels, “Can the Train Ever Be 
Stopped Again? Developments in the Moluccan Community in the Netherlands Before 
and After the Hijackings,” Indonesia, Vol. 41 (1986): 23-45. 
• No mention of potential State As’ conflicts in Guy J. Pauker, “Government Responses to 
Armed Insurgency in Southeast Asia: A Comparative Examination of Failures and 
Successes and their Likely Implications for the Future,” Rand Paper Series (1985), p. 17. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from China, Myanmar, or the Philippines to Indonesia in 
1950, pending confirmation from Vickers. Vickers confirms in 6/19/10 e-mail. 
 
Indonesia, 1953 (vs. Darul Islam – State A could be Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand, China) 
• No mention of potential State As in Adrian Vickers, A History of Modern Indonesia 
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 119-120. (Leader was a 
Marxist, but no mention of China.) 
• No mention of potential State As’ contribution to Darul Islam conflict in Bilveer Singh, 
“The Challenge of Militant Islam and Terrorism in Indonesia,” Australian Journal of 
International Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 1 (2004): 47-68. 
• No mention of potential State A conflicts in Liem Soei Liong, “Indonesian Muslims and 
the State: Accommodation or Revolt?” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1988): 
869-896. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from China, Myanmar, Philippines, or Thailand to 
Indonesia in 1953, pending confirmation from Singh. 
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Indonesia, 1965 (vs. OPM – State A could be Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, South Vietnam, China) 
• No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of potential State As in Peter King, West Papua and Indonesia since Suharto 
(Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2004), pp. 20-22. 
• No mention of potential State As in Peter Savage and Rose Martin, “The OPM in West 
Papua New Guinea: The Continuing Struggle Against Indonesian Colonialism,” Journal 
of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 7, No. 3 (1977): 338-346. Inspiration from Cuba is noted (pp. 
342-343), but in the late 1970s, so no clear link to 1965 onset. 
• No mention of potential State As in Carmel Budiardjo, “West Papua: Under the 
Indonesian Jackboot,” Human Rights Defender, No. 6 (1996). 
• Hence I will code no contagion from China, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, or South 
Vietnam to Indonesia in 1965, pending confirmation from King. King confirms in 
6/19/10 e-mail. 
 
Indonesia, 1975 (vs. FRETILIN – State A could be Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
Philippines, Thailand) 
• No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary, although FRETILIN was 
allegedly communist. 
• No mention of potential State As in Adrian Vickers, A History of Modern Indonesia 
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 167. The accusations of 
FRETILIN communism seems to be an Indonesian façade to justify invasion to the U.S. 
• No mention of potential State As in Helen M. Hill, Stirrings of Nationalism in East Timor 
(Sydney: Otford Press, 2002), pp. 59-174. Does note: “The U.S. defeat in Indochina was 
quoted as evidence that independence can be won even against apparently invincible 
forces” (p. 129), but this refers to the interstate conflict in Vietnam, not the intrastate one. 
Indonesian suspicions of FRETILIN communism actually seem pretty unwarranted, and 
in any case the fear is probably more related to Indonesia’s own troubles with 
communism than to communism abroad. Quite a bit of inspiration from extrastate 
conflicts in Portuguese Africa. 
• No mention of potential State As’ conflicts in James Dunn, East Timor: A Rough 
Passage to Independence, Third Edition (Double Bay, Australia: Longueville Books, 
2003). 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, 
or Thailand to Indonesia in 1975, pending confirmation from Hill. 
 
Indonesia, 1976 (vs. OPM – State A could be Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, 
Thailand) 
• Based on UCDP conflict summary, this appears not to be a legitimate re-onset. 
Seemingly OPM was active in the early 1970s. 
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Indonesia, 1990 (vs. GAM – State A could be Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, 
Philippines) 
• Cambodia  Indonesia, 1990. “Marijuana is sold to obtain weapons not only from 
Cambodia and Thailand but also from individuals in the Indonesian security forces.” 
(Kirsten E. Schulze, The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist 
Organization (Washington: East-West Center, 2004), p. 28) No mention of other 
potential State As. Arms came from Thailand too, but the CPT conflict ended in 1982, 
and Schulze in his e-mail (cited below) says the Thai arms were “new” and “from the 
Thai military,” seemingly unrelated to the CPT conflict. 
• No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of potential State As in Tim Kell, The Roots of Acehnese Rebellion, 1989-
1992 (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1995), pp. 52-82. Bases in Malaysia are 
noted (p. 73), but these appear unrelated to communist insurgencies in Malaysia. 
• No mention of potential State As in Geoffrey Robinson, “Rawan Is as Rawan Does: The 
Origins of Disorder in New Order Aceh,” Indonesia, Vol. 66 (1998): 127-157. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Laos, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, and the 
Philippines to Indonesia in 1990, pending confirmation from Schulze. Schulze more or 
less confirms in 6/20/10 e-mail, noting only the possibility of “some” weapons coming 
from the southern Philippines via Thailand. 
 
Indonesia, 1999 (vs. GAM – State A could be Cambodia, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, 
Philippines) 
• Based on the following quote, I do not believe this is a legitimate re-onset: “By 1991, 
GAM had been virtually wiped out in Aceh. Three factors, however, ensured the 
organization’s survival. First, its leadership was safe in exile where it continued to make 
its case for independence. Second, a significant number of GAM members including 
military commanders found safe haven in neighboring Malaysia where GAM continued 
to exist as an insurgent movement among the refugees and supported by the Acehnese 
diaspora. And third, the DOM experience [Indonesian repression up to 1998] gave rise to 
a whole new generation of GAM. Almost every Acehnese family in Pidie, North Aceh, 
and East Aceh was represented among the victims, and when after the fall of Suharto 
nothing was done to address Acehnese demands for justice, this ensured that GAM not 
only reemerged but was transformed into a genuinely popular movement in the third and 
current phase from 1998 onward.” (Kirsten E. Schulze, The Free Aceh Movement 
(GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization (Washington: East-West Center, 2004), p. 
5) 
o Also: “By late 1991 it appeared that government troops had largely succeeded in 
crushing the rebellion, and in killing most of its top leaders, but Aceh Merdeka 
supporters continued to menace Indonesian forces thereafter.” (Geoffrey 
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Robinson, “Rawan Is as Rawan Does: The Origins of Disorder in New Order 
Aceh,” Indonesia, Vol. 66 (1998): 127-157, p. 131) 
 
Papua New Guinea, 1989 (vs. BRA – State A could be Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, 
Philippines) 
• No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. 
• No mention of potential State As in Anthony J. Regan, “Current Developments in the 
Pacific: Causes and Course of the Bougainville Conflict,” Journal of Pacific History, 
Vol. 33, No. 3 (1998): 269-285. 
• No mention of potential State As in David Hegarty, “Peace Interventions in the South 
Pacific: Lessons from Bougainville and Solomon Islands,” State, Society and Governance 
in Melanesia Working Paper No. 3 (2003), p. 4. 
• No mention of potential State A conflicts in Herb Thompson, “The Economic Causes and 
Consequences of the Bougainville Crisis,” Resources Policy, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1991): 69-
85. 
• Hence I will code no contagion from Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, or the 
Philippines to Papua New Guinea, pending confirmation from Regan. 
